A Russian-US “New Détente” Would Revolutionize International Relations

A Russian-US “New Détente” Would Revolutionize International Relations

By Andrew Korybko

Here’s the full interview that I gave to Newsweek’s Tom O’Connor, excerpts of which were included in his article about “What A Trump-Putin Détente Means for Russia and Iran’s Partnership”.

1. Russia and Iran have pursued closer ties in recent years while they have also faced conflict with parties supported by the United States. Now there is hope that a peaceful settlement may be reached for the Ukraine issue, while the situation remains tense in the Middle East. Do you feel that Russia could prove helpful in supporting diplomacy as it relates to the Iranian nuclear issue given President Putin’s good standing with the leadership of Iran, the U.S. and the Arab nations in the region?

I agree on both counts that a peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian issue appears likely and that Russia can then encourage Iran to reach its own such settlement with the US over the nuclear issue. The ongoing Russian-US talks can be interpreted as driven by the mutual desire for a “New Détente” brought about by their exhaustion after three years of fighting an intense proxy war. It’s therefore natural that resolving one issue can have a domino effect by seeing Russia and the US cooperate on other issues.

The Iranian nuclear one is important for both of them but in different ways: Russia is concerned about what the US and Israel might do if Iran doesn’t agree to a new nuclear deal, which could destabilize Russia’s southern periphery, while the US is concerned about Iran allegedly developing nukes. If they reach a peaceful settlement in Ukraine, especially one that leads to strategic cooperation on resources like Arctic gas and rare earth minerals, then each would have an interest in helping the other on this.

To that end, Russia could share with Iran what it’s learned from engaging with Trump 2.0, namely his administration’s very different worldview when compared to his predecessor’s. Given the trust between Russia and Iran at the national and leadership levels, coupled with what could by then the peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian issue that leads to a “New Détente” between Russia and the US, Iran might very well be receptive to this. It also helps that President Pezeshkian is considered to be a “reformist”.

In American political parlance, this means that he’s a “moderate” and is thus already predisposed in principle to talking with the US in pursuit of pragmatic deals, which could first take the form of phased sanctions relief. In particular, the US could begin by waiving sanctions for Russian and Indian companies that cooperate with Iran via the North-South Transport Corridor as a trust-building measure, which could then expand to the level of rescinding direct sanctions on a step-by-step basis if a deal is reached.

2. How has the fall of the former Syrian government of President Assad affected the relationship between Russia and Iran, given their shared experience in the Syrian Arab Republic?

Russia and Iran cooperated on fighting terrorism in Syria but also arguably competed with one another there as well over which of them would be the Assad Government’s top partner. Russia air support was pivotal in defeating ISIS, but then Moscow tabled a draft constitution in January 2017 during the first Astana Summit that Damascus essentially discarded and made no progress on. That led to Iran courting Syria, which expanded its role in the “Resistance Axis” as a counterweight to potential Russian pressure.

The reasons behind the Assad Government’s downfall are complex and still being debated among experts, but few would argue that his refusal to make pragmatic concessions to the opposition under Russian mediation and his armed forces’ inability to adapt to the times were fatal in combination. The years of peace that followed the last ceasefire were essentially wasted. Part of this, however, might have to do with Syria clumsily “balancing” between its competing Russian and Iranian patrons.

Had it picked one and stuck with them, then that senior partner could have taken full responsibility for the diplomatic processes required for reaching a lasting peace as well as the military reforms required for defending against the rebels if they violated the ceasefire, yet that never happened. Assad didn’t want to dump Russia since it provided international legitimacy and development assistance while dumping Iran was never considered due to the importance of the IRGC and Hezbollah’s ground presence.

If Assad chose Iran over Russia, then Israel might have preemptively “demilitarized” Syria like it ultimately did in mid-December shortly after his fall out of fear that it would turn into a “terrorist state”, while choosing Russia over Iran could have forced him into a peace deal that he didn’t want to make. He wanted to have his cake and eat it too, but in the end, neither of his patrons was able to save him since each concluded on their own that the opportunities that he lost made his government unsalvageable.

Assad’s fall might therefore have taught Russia and Iran the importance of more candid discussions with one another about sensitive issues such as their relations with third countries. Instead of ignoring their competition in Syria and discouraging their media and foreign supporters from discussing it, they could have all addressed it head-on with the intent of more effectively managing it for the greater good. This lesson might come in handy amidst Trump’s stated goal of reaching another deal with Iran.

Russia could share with Iran what it’s learned from engaging with Trump 2.0, and their candid exchange of views could better inform Iran of the US’ new worldview, how it envisages accomplishing this, and the way in which it negotiates so that any potential talks between them can be as fruitful as possible. Their updated Russian-Iranian Strategic Partnership pact from mid-January shows that there’s no bad blood between them over Syria, whether Assad’s fall or their competition there, and that each trusts the other.

It’s therefore entirely feasible that their privileged relations with one another can see Russia help the US reach a deal with Iran in the event that Russia and the US first agree on a peaceful settlement to the Ukrainian issue per their mutual desire for a “New Détente” that could revolutionize the world order. If successful, then the next in line for the US to make a deal with could be China, which Russia could also help it with as well in pursuit of their increasingly shared vision for the future of International Relations.

3. Israel has continued to promote bellicose rhetoric toward Iran, with some officials openly calling on President Trump to pursue strikes against the nation’s nuclear program or even carry out a strategy toward regime change, similar to “colour revolutions” seen elsewhere in the world. Do you feel Russia may be willing to expand its security relationship with Iran to include improving defence cooperation, selling more advanced weaponry such as aircraft and air defence equipment and/or reaching mutual defence guarantees as established with the DPRK?

Russia is likely exploring the expansion of its military-technical ties with Iran after they updated their strategic partnership last month, but this would be predicated from Russia’s perspective on maintaining the regional balance of power with the aim of deterring an Israeli and/or US attack. For his part, Trump doesn’t seem interested in embroiling the US in another war, whether a conventional or proxy one. His goal is to wrap everything up in Eastern Europe and then West Asia in order to “Pivot (back) to Asia”.

What’s meant by this is that he wants to restore the US’ military-diplomatic focus on Asia that followed the withdrawal from Iraq, which can lead to muscularly containing China and thus raise the odds that it’ll agree to an economic-centric comprehensive deal that would be more in the US’ favour. Reaching agreements with China’s Russian and then Iranian strategic partners first, both of whom have enormous resource reserves, is meant to bolster the chances that Beijing will follow suit instead of holding out.

That’s because there’s the possibility that these deals could result in limiting those countries’ resource exports to China, not formally of course, but in the event that the US and its partners (including the Indo-Pacific Rim countries of India, South Korea, and Japan) offer better prices and partnership terms. It’s here where the US’ sanctions can be creatively leveraged by granting waivers to American and friendly countries’ companies to help bring about the desired change in those countries’ resource export trends.

The Chinese economy is still very much dependent on exports despite its current dual-circulation strategy as well as on resource imports, which makes it extremely vulnerable to its largest importers’ and suppliers’ trends. Trump 2.0 therefore appears to be trying to macro-economically engineer these selfsame trends that would be required for weakening the Chinese economy to the point where Beijing considers cutting an economic-centric deal with Washington on more of the latter’s terms than before.

Russia seems to understand what the US wants to do and how it plans to bring this about, whether due to its own analysis of Trump 2.0 or because its representatives explicitly conveyed this to them, which explains Putin’s seemingly abrupt interest in cutting a deal and even partnering with the US. If both are successful, then the US’ threat perception of Russia will disappear while its overall focus then turns towards Iran and China, thus relieving some of the past three years’ worth of intense pressure on Russia.

Once again standing in the US’ way by offering mutual defence guarantees to Iran, which were noticeably missing from their newly updated strategic partnership pact last month, would therefore defeat the whole purpose of cutting a deal with the US and even economically partnering with it afterwards. In fact, the preceding rationale very strongly suggests that Russia would try to take the diplomatic lead in encouraging Iran to cut its own such deal with the US in order to take the pressure off of both of them.

The more protracted that Sino-US talks are, which could even even descend into a global rivalry along the lines of the Soviet-US one after World War II, the better it would be for Russia and Iran if they already reached their own deals with the US since they could then balance between both camps. The same goes for India, which still counts China as its top trade partner in spite of their border dispute but is overall much closer with the US, and these three could cooperate to maximize their collective influence.

A new Non-Alignment Movement, which could tentatively be coined the Neo-NAM, might then arise to help maintain the global balance of power and economic influence between those two superpowers. All the while, Russia, Iran, and India, as Chinese partners who by then would have also cut their own deals with the US (India’s being focused on trade unlike the other two’s mostly geopolitical and resource deals), would be in a prime global position. This could in turn herald the Golden Age that Trump wants.

Excerpts from this interview were included in Tom O’Connor’s article for Newsweek about “What A Trump-Putin Détente Means for Russia and Iran’s Partnership”.

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Why Might Russia Repair Its Ties With The West And How Could This Reshape Its Foreign Policy?

Why Might Russia Repair Its Ties With The West And How Could This Reshape Its Foreign Policy?

By Andrew Korybko

To be clear, the explanations and forecasts shared in this analysis concern the scenario of a Russian rapprochement with the West upon the successful conclusion of peace talks with the US, they’re not in any way a declaration of what will absolutely come to pass.

Trump’s proposal to return Russia to the G7 and Orban’s prediction about it being “reintegrated into…the European security system and even the European economic and energy system” after the Ukrainian Conflict ends hint at a Russian rapprochement with the West. Russian-US peace talks are underway, and if they succeed in bringing about any of the aforesaid outcomes, then this would have to be cogently accounted for as would the future of Russian foreign policy. Here are some explanations and forecasts:

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* Russia Neutralized Ukrainian-Emanating Threats From NATO

The nearly three-year-long special operation saw Russia destroy all of NATO’s stockpiles that it sent to Ukraine, which could have otherwise been used to help launch a conventional proxy invasion of Russia one day had Russia not decisively stopped the bloc’s clandestine expansion into Ukraine. Although the risk of World War III spiked at times during the interim due to some very dangerous US-backed Ukrainian provocations, that risk has now largely decreased due to Russia’s victory over NATO’s Ukrainian proxy.

* Trump’s Return Revolutionized Russian-US Relations

The “Department Of Government Efficiency’s” purge of warmongering liberal-globalists, who hitherto controlled the US’ permanent military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies (“deep state”), immediately after Trump’s inauguration is responsible for the commencement of Russian-US talks. These fast-moving processes revolutionized Russian-US relations and consequently contributed to Russia recalibrating its threat assessment of the US, which in turn reopened previously closed opportunities.

* Pragmatic Mutual Compromises Are Finally Possible

While it remains to be seen exactly what form they’d take, whatever agreement might emerge from the ongoing Russian-US talks will almost certainly entail pragmatic mutual compromises, which would have become possible due to the aforesaid factors. Neither Putin nor Trump are maximalists, and both have proven their pragmatism in the past, so it’s reasonable to expect them to meet each other in the middle. The example that they set could then become the norm for resolving other states’ disputes and conflicts.

* Russia Never Rejected Cooperation With Any Country

It was the US-led West that rejected cooperation with Russia, not the inverse, since Russia always maintained that it’ll cooperate with any friendly country. For that reason, today’s enemies could become tomorrow’s partners if they reverse their unfriendly policies. After all, former enemies like Turkiye, Iran, and China are now some of Russia’s closest partners, and ties with Germany were excellent prior to 2022 despite the Nazis’ genocide of the Soviets, so the precedent exists for a rapprochement with the West.

* Its Multipolar Moves Were Always Gradual & Responsible

Apart from the special operation, which was a last-ditch attempt to safeguard Russia’s national security after NATO’s clandestine expansion into Ukraine, all of Russia’s multipolar moves were always gradual and responsible. Creating a BRICS currency for example, which Russia confirmed that it isn’t doing, could throw the fragile and interconnected order into chaos to everyone’s detriment. Any perceived slowdown of multipolar moves on its part after a rapprochement with the West would therefore be an illusion.

* Russia & Trump’s America Both Prefer Populist-Nationalists

For the first time since the end of the Old Cold War, America under Trump’s second administration now openly prefers populist-nationalist leaders and movements over liberal-globalists, which aligns with Russia’s preference from over the past decade. This convergence of interests might even see them working together in third countries as part of a new modus vivendi to liberate them from the yoke of the liberal-globalist holdovers that the US is now actively purging from its “deep state”.

* Both Are Also Favourable Towards The Rise Of Civilization-States

Professor Alexander Dugin’s prediction about the rise of civilization-states came true after Russia’s Eurasian Union took on such contours in the name of the Russian World while Trump 2.0 made claims to Canada and Greenland as part of a complementary “Fortress America” policy. They might therefore jointly support populist-nationalist movements in civilizational anchor states who endeavour to build their own similar regional spheres of influence in the emerging multipolar-civilizational world order.

* Russia Is Neutral Amidst The Sino-US Dimension Of The New Cold War

Just like China is neutral amidst the Russo-US dimension of the New Cold War, so too is Russia neutral towards the Sino-US one, despite each being one another’s top strategic partner. They’re importantly not allies though and that’s why neither is obligated to support the other against the US, thus explaining why China doesn’t arm Russia or recognize its control over the New Regions, which further justifies Russian neutrality if the Sino-US rivalry foreseeably intensifies after the Ukrainian Conflict ends.

* Multi-Alignment Is The Mainstay Of Russian Foreign Policy

Russia has always sought to balance between its diverse foreign partners, but its grand strategic goal of serving as a bridge between China and the EU that adds value to trade in each direction was offset by the special operation that it was compelled to wage. A meaningful rapprochement with the West could lead to the resumption of this policy, albeit in new conditions after what just happened and the impending intensification of the Sino-US rivalry, which would restore its briefly abandoned balancing act.

* Russia Will Always Promote Multipolarity Across The World

There’s no realistic chance that Russia will ever stop promoting multipolarity since its enduring national security interests depend on the successful completion of these processes across the world. Even if ties improve with the West, Russia will still promote regionalization in the Global South to accelerate the rise of civilization-states and their associated spheres of influence, which can hasten the creation of a “new world order” that’s more predictable for larger players at least. This is arguably Russia’s endgame.

———-

To be clear, the explanations and forecasts shared above concern the scenario of a Russian rapprochement with the West upon the successful conclusion of peace talks with the US, they’re not in any way a declaration of what will absolutely come to pass. That scenario remains credible, though its likelihood can’t be confidently assessed, due to recent events. The purpose of this exercise is therefore solely to predict Russia’s motives if this happens and the possible consequence for its foreign policy.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Three Arguments Tearing Apart Robert Kagan’s Claims About Trump, Ukraine, And Putin

Three Arguments Tearing Apart Robert Kagan’s Claims About Trump, Ukraine, And Putin

By Andrew Korybko

The exact opposite of what Kagan posited is true: Russia can’t militarily control Ukraine indefinitely; a Russian-American brinksmanship scenario is terrifyingly realistic; and Putin is indeed interested in compromising but only under certain conditions.

Hugely influential neoconservative thinker Robert Kagan recently published a lengthy diatribe at The Atlantic fearmongering about Russia’s total and indefinite control of Ukraine, which he takes for granted if Trump doesn’t redouble aid to Ukraine. It’s premised on the presumptions that Russia can military control all of Ukraine indefinitely, there’s no realistic Russian-American brinksmanship scenario over that country, and Putin is unwilling to compromise. The following three arguments tear apart his claims:

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1. Russia Lacks The Means To Militarily Control Ukraine Indefinitely

Ukraine is a geographically enormous country that would require tremendous military resources for anyone to control indefinitely. On top of that, a large segment of its population now has military experience or at least basic arms training, weapons are now proliferating throughout its society with wild abandon, and the entire western part is known to be ultra-nationalist to the point of fascist. It would accordingly require much greater means than Russia has to militarily control Ukraine indefinitely.

Any attempt to do so, however, could expose Russia to an Afghan- and Iraqi-like insurgency that it’s ill-prepared to contain. Its forces would stand out in the ultra-nationalist western part of the country and therefore make easy targets for unconventional warfare (terrorism). These networks are deeply rooted and have existed for decades, lying dormant during most of the Soviet era but still never having been completely dismantled. Their fighters can also be easily supplied by neighboring NATO nations.

Ukraine could therefore turn into “Russia’s Vietnam” in much costlier ways than 1980s Afghanistan did both in terms of troops and treasure. Putin knows this and that’s why spring 2022’s draft peace treaty essentially sought to delegate Ukraine’s demilitarization and denazification to a castrated government. Russia can’t carry out these tasks on its own unilaterally without exposing itself to the aforesaid risks. It requires a compliant Ukrainian government without which neither is likely to ever be achieved in full.

2. Brinksmanship Is Possible If NATO Conventionally Intervenes After A Russian Breakthrough

Unlike what Kagan implied throughout his article, a Russian-American brinksmanship scenario is terrifyingly realistic given the possibility that NATO could conventionally intervene in Ukraine at least up till the Dnieper after a Russian breakthrough. For as averse as Trump is to risking World War III over Ukraine, he also doesn’t want to go down in history as a loser (at least for however long it takes for Ukraine to potentially bleed Russia enough till it withdraws per the above) who “gave Ukraine to Putin”.

This concern is made all the more poignant by how regularly he condemned Biden over the years for his administration’s debacle in Afghanistan, which would look a lot less bad in comparison to Trump letting Putin “take all of Ukraine” like Kagan fearmongers is in the cards if he doesn’t redouble aid to it. If Russian boots were planted on Poland’s south-eastern border, then the US also would struggle to disengage from Europe like Trump reportedly wants as part of his planned “Pivot (back) to Asia”.

It therefore can’t be ruled out that he’d threaten and possibly even authorize a conventional NATO intervention in Ukraine at least up till the Dnieper to “strategically salvage” some of the country if Russia achieves a military breakthrough instead of “surrendering” Ukraine in its entirety. In that case, Putin would be the one thrown into the dilemma of risking World War III over that ultra-nationalist western half of Ukraine, which he might decline doing and instead agree to a grand deal for ending the conflict.

3. Putin Is Indeed Interested In Compromising So Long As It’s A Practical Means To An End

Contrary to the Western elite’s perceptions, Putin is indeed interested in compromising, but this has to entail the fulfilment of at least most Russian goals in Ukraine. The top ones concern the restoration of its constitutionally neutral status, demilitarization, denazification, and recognition (even informal) of the new ground realities (i.e. four more former Ukrainian regions joining Russia). There are other objectives of importance to Russia too but these are the primary ones that Putin must absolutely achieve.

He’s staked his reputation on at least their superficial fulfilment, which gives him some flexibility over the details that might ultimately be agreed to, especially with regard to denazification. Moreover, the new ground realities also cut both ways in the sense of Ukraine having integrated more closely than ever into NATO since the special operation began, not to mention Finland and Sweden joining NATO. He might therefore have to ultimately accept a less-than-ideal endgame in Ukraine and Europe more broadly.

Although Putin recently began to climb the escalation ladder, this wasn’t meant to signal that he plans to continue the conflict till Russian boots are planted on Poland’s south-eastern border, but to “escalate to de-escalate” so as to get the US to concede to some of his main goals. He also knows that Trump doesn’t want to risk World War III over the historically Russian-controlled eastern half of Ukraine so the two dozen compromises suggested at the end of this analysis here might be more feasible than many think.

———-

As can be seen, the exact opposite of what Kagan posited is true: Russia can’t militarily control Ukraine indefinitely; a Russian-American brinksmanship scenario is terrifyingly realistic; and Putin is indeed interested in compromising but only under certain conditions. His falsehoods had to be fact-checked since he’s an influential figure whose words shape American elite discourse. His intended audience should therefore know that they’re being misled into supporting more aid to Ukraine on false premises.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Creative Energy Diplomacy Can Lay The Basis For A Grand Russian-American Deal

Creative Energy Diplomacy Can Lay The Basis For A Grand Russian-American Deal

By Andrew Korybko

The key to this is the US offering Russia a decent deal in Ukraine with lucrative sanctions-waived energy and tech opportunities that would incentivize Russia into informally agreeing to deprive China of decades-long access to ultra-cheap resources for fuelling its superpower rise at the US’ expense.

Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak shared an update on the proposed Russian gas pipeline to China through Kazakhstan, which was analysed here in November, shortly before the start of the year. He confirmed that “This process, so to speak, is underway. Estimates, the feasibility study and negotiations are now underway.” This statement shouldn’t be misinterpreted as assuming that the project is a done deal like RT implied in its report, however, since it’s more of a message to the US at this point.

The previously mentioned analysis cited last summer’s about the continued Sino-Russo pricing dispute over the Power of Siberia II (POS2) pipeline, which boils down to China demanding bargain-basement prices (reportedly equivalent to Russia’s domestic ones) while Russia obviously wants something better. This impasse hasn’t yet been resolved, and while some like Asia Times’ Yong Jian consider the trans-Kazakh proposal to be an agreed-upon rerouting of POS2, that’s arguably a premature conclusion.

Pricing disputes still exist and the “process” that Novak described has only begun. It’s far from finalized and might still take a while to be completed, if ever, as suggested by the POS2 and Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline precedents. The first, which was earlier known as the “Altai Pipeline” before the decision to reroute it via Mongolia, has been discussed for a full decade already with no deal in sight. The same goes for the second, which was first agreed upon in 2015, but no progress has been made since then either.

Amidst the latest talk of the Russia-Kazakhstan-China (“RuKazChi”) gas pipeline, Russia’s last direct gas pipeline to Europe was just shut down after Ukraine’s decision to let their five-year transit agreement lapse. Russia can still indirectly export gas to Europe via TurkStream, and Europe can always compensate for this long-foreseen loss of 5% of its gas import total via more Russian LNG, but the writing is on the wall that the EU will continue diversifying from Russia under American pressure.

In that event, Russia’s lost budgetary revenue from energy exports to Europe can only realistically be replaced by China, but Russia is still reluctant to agree to the bargain-basement prices that China is reportedly demanding. Its decisionmakers’ thought processes can only be speculated upon given the opacity and sensitivity of these talks, but this might reasonably be due to the expectation that the US’ more muscular containment of China could coerce Beijing into agreeing to better prices with time.

Another possibility, which isn’t mutually exclusive at this point at least, is that they might also be holding out hope that some of their European exports could one day be resumed seeing as how the infrastructure still exists but their partners made a US-pressured political decision to cut off imports. The best-case scenario from their perspective would therefore be that China agrees to prices closer to the market rate while the EU resumes some of their Russian gas imports after the special operation ends.

The reality though is that Russia is unlikely to have its cake and eat it too, and there’s no guarantee that either of its two main gas partners – the EU and China – will behave as expected even at a later date. The EU won’t resume any pipeline imports unless it receives approval from the US while China is known to operate on a much longer timeframe than most so it might hold off on clinching a deal indefinitely until Russia finally accepts its bargain-basement price demands. This places Russia in a very bad position.

Unless something changes, Russia might very well be coerced by the unfortunate circumstances in which it finds itself into agreeing to China’s reported proposal to sell it gas at domestic prices, which could turbocharge China’s superpower rise while placing Russia in a greater position of dependence. That might be preferred by Russian decisionmakers over sitting on these reserves indefinitely without receiving any financial benefit from them as sanctions start to create fiscal and monetary challenges.

From the US’ perspective, it’s worse for Russia to turbocharge China’s superpower rise and enter into a relationship of greater dependence with it that could be exploited by China to procure other resources at equally cheap rates than to allow the partial resumption of Russian exports to Europe. At the same time, such resumptions couldn’t be approved until after the Ukrainian Conflict ends, and this would be politically impossible in any case unless the US could spin the outcome as a victory of sorts over Russia.

Likewise, Russia couldn’t agree to this arrangement unless it too was able to spin the outcome as a victory, especially if the informal terms include a commitment not to build any new pipelines to China in exchange for the abovementioned proposed resumption overcompensating for that lost revenue. Therein lies the need for creative diplomacy of the kind suggested here last month and here the other day, the insight of which will now be blended, summarized, and built upon for the reader’s convenience.

The gist is that the US and Russia could agree to a series of mutual compromises culminating in the partial restoration of an energy bridge between Russia and the West for the purpose of depriving China of its envisaged decades-long access to ultra-cheap Russian resources for fuelling its superpower rise. No one should assume that everything proposed below will enter into force, but these suggestions could help move their talks along. From the US’ side, its possible compromises could take the form of:

* Ukraine finally holding elections as part of a US-backed “phased leadership transition” against Zelensky, who’s the top obstacle to a lasting peace, and then legitimizing the following two agreements;

* Ukraine restoring its constitutional neutrality in order to exclude itself from ever joining NATO and thus resolving the core security concern that provoked Russia’s special operation;

* Ukraine demilitarizing and denazifying everything east of the Dnieper in what had for centuries been Russia’s traditional “sphere of influence” (everything west had traditionally been under Polish influence);

* The US terminating its bilateral security agreement with Ukraine in order to assure Russia that any cessation of hostilities wouldn’t be a ruse for rearming Ukraine and reigniting the conflict at a later date;

* The US agreeing that no Western peacekeepers will deploy along the DMZ between Russia and Ukraine east of the Dnieper (all parties might agree to an entirely non-Western peacekeeping mission though);

* The US also agreeing that Article 5 won’t apply to any Western country whose uniformed troops in Ukraine, which would be unilaterally deployed there in this scenario, come under attack by Russia;

* The US approving the EU’s partial resumption of Russian gas pipeline imports in order to buoy the bloc’s struggling economy via an influx of low-cost fuel (but higher-priced than what China demands);

* The US and EU returning some of Russia’s seized assets as “compensation” for the West retaining control over the European portion of its pipelines;

* The US lifting its sanctions on the Russian-EU energy trade, including Russia’s use of SWIFT, and expanding this to include more countries and spheres as a reward for keeping the peace with Ukraine;

* The US waiving sanctions on Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project for itself, the EU, India, and Japan so that they can replace lost Chinese investment and ensure that they receive this gas instead of China;

* The US replicating the preceding policy on a case-by-case basis to squeeze out and ultimately replace all Chinese investment in Russian energy projects to preclude the possibility of more future exports to it;

* and the US building upon the trust that it hopes to regain with Russia through these compromises to resume frozen strategic arms control talks on a priority basis before the expiry of the New START in 2026.

From Russia’s side, its own compromises could take the form of:

* Agreeing to only the partial demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine west of the Dnieper (ideally with the first influenced by the Istanbul Agreement while the second might remain superficial);

* Limiting its control of Ukrainian-claimed lands to only Crimea and those four regions that voted to join Russia in September 2022’s referenda;

* Tacitly accepting that it won’t be able to assert control over the parts of Kherson and Zaporozhye Regions west of the Dnieper but nevertheless continuing to officially maintain such claims;

* Agreeing to limited military restrictions on its side of the DMZ as a trust-building measure for furthering the rest of the complicated negotiation process and then complying with these terms;

* Informally agreeing to prioritize the development of its Arctic and Pacific fleets over its Baltic and Black Sea ones in a tacit cession of influence to NATO that soberly reflects the current military realities;

* Formally acknowledging the loss of control over the EU and Ukrainian portions of its pipeline infrastructure (ideally in exchange for “compensation”, including the return of some of its seized assets);

* Tacitly accepting that the rest of its seized assets are lost, but possibly agreeing that they can be invested in rebuilding Ukraine and/or Syria or donated to the UN, perhaps to fund a new African project;

* Informally agreeing not to build new pipelines to China or expand energy exports to it so long as sanctions-waived energy investments from and exports to others overcompensate for that lost revenue;

* Unofficially preferring sanctions-waived investment from others (America, Europe, India, Japan, South Korea) in its resource-rich Arctic and Far East regions as opposed to that from China;

* Doing the same with regard to preferring tech imports from them (and Taiwan too, which was Russia’s main source of high-precision machine tools a year ago);

* Tacitly accepting that these sanctions waivers can be rescinded in an instant if Russia reneges on the Ukrainian or Chinese terms of this proposed grand deal;

* and negotiating with the US in good faith on strategic arms control, which could ultimately include restoring limits on intermediate-range missiles in Europe that lead to warehousing the mighty Oreshniks.

For as politically difficult as these compromises might be for each side, the US could spin them as having stopped Russia from controlling all of Ukraine and thus preventing it from planting its boots on the Polish border, while Russia could spin them as having stopped Ukraine from joining NATO and thus preventing that bloc from planting their boots on its exposed western border. Moreover, Russia would relieve pressure upon it in Europe, while the US Navy would control the bulk of China’s energy imports.

The key to this is the US offering Russia a decent deal in Ukraine with lucrative sanctions-waived energy and tech opportunities that would incentivize Russia into informally agreeing to deprive China of decades-long access to ultra-cheap resources for fuelling its superpower rise at the US’ expense. This grand deal is Trump’s to lose, and the world will know that he fumbled it if Russia makes progress on new pipelines to China, which could accompany or be followed by him “escalating to de-escalate”.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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2024-11-09 17:00:41

The Clock Is Ticking For Russia To Achieve Its Maximum Goals In The Ukrainian Conflict

The Clock Is Ticking For Russia To Achieve Its Maximum Goals In The Ukrainian Conflict

By Andrew Korybko

Trump’s reported plan for a Western/NATO peacekeeping mission in Ukraine places Russia in the dilemma of either pre-empting this with another large-scale nationwide offensive, targeting those forces after they enter at the risk of sparking World War III, or tacitly accepting this endgame.

The Wall Street Journal’s report that Trump’s peace plan for Ukraine envisages the creation of an 800-mile demilitarized zone that would be patrolled by Europeans adds a lot of urgency to Russia’s nearly 1000-day-long struggle to achieve its maximum goals in this conflict. The potential entrance of conventional Western/NATO forces into Ukraine as peacekeepers places Russia in the dilemma of accepting yet another “red line” being crossed or risking World War III by targeting them.

To refresh everyone’s memory since it’s been so long since the special operation started, Russia officially aims to: 1) demilitarize Ukraine; 2) denazify it; and 3) restore its constitutional neutrality, among other supplementary and informal goals. September 2022’s referenda then added the official goal of removing Ukrainian forces from the entirety of the four regions that Russia now claims as its own, including the areas of Kherson and Zaporozhye on the other side of the Dnieper, which will be challenge.

At the same time, Putin has repeatedly refused to reciprocally escalate in response to egregious Ukrainian provocations like its bombing of the Kremlin, early warning systems, strategic airfields, oil refineries, and residential buildings, et al, all due to him not wanting the conflict to spiral out of control. For as responsible of an approach as this is, the drawback is that it created the perception that he might accept the crossing of even more “red lines”, including conventional Western/NATO forces in Ukraine.

Putin’s aversion to escalation might therefore be exploited by Trump, who was reportedly handed a plan in June advising him to give Ukraine whatever it wants if Russia refuses whatever peace deal he proposes, ergo the high likelihood of a conventional Western/NATO intervention to decisively freeze the conflict. Trump’s track record of “escalating to de-escalate” with North Korea and Iran suggests that he’d also go through with this plan against Russia, hence why it should take this scenario seriously.

Provided that Putin lacks the political will to risk an unprecedented escalation by targeting those conventional Western/NATO forces, and his behaviour thus far in response to other provocations suggests that this is indeed the case, then he’ll have to race against the clock to achieve his maximum goals. It’ll still take some time for the US to get key stakeholders like Poland on board, where 69% of the public is against dispatching troops to Ukraine in any capacity, so this likely won’t happen by mid-January.

In any case, Russia no longer has a hypothetically indefinite amount of time like before to: 1) demilitarize Ukraine; 2) denazify it; 3) restore its constitutional neutrality; and 4) remove Ukrainian forces from the entirety of the four regions that Russia now claims as its own, including those areas across the Dnieper. Even though the military-strategic dynamics of the conflict favour it, and capturing Pokrovsk could lead to huge gains in Donetsk, it’ll be very difficult to achieve all these goals by the time an intervention occurs.

To explain in the order that they were mentioned, Ukraine was initially supposed to be demilitarized upon the swift success of the special operation in its early phase, but the UK and Poland (whose role most observers aren’t aware of) convinced Zelensky to rubbish spring 2022’s draft peace treaty. That document would have greatly slashed its military capabilities, but it’s no longer realistic to imagine that he’d agree to this, especially after being given tens of billions of dollars’ worth of NATO arms.

NATO is also unlikely to agree to ask for them back due to the perception (regardless of its veracity) that Ukraine must be able to “deter” Russia from supposedly recommencing the conflict after it finally ends. The Taliban’s swift capture of Afghanistan after Biden’s bungled withdrawal from there was viciously lambasted by Trump, who’d go down in history as an even bigger loser if he agreed to “demilitarize” Ukraine and was then played for a fool by Putin if Russia steamrolls through it sometime later.

The only viable way in which Russia could implement Ukraine’s demilitarization in today’s context is to control as much of its territory as possible in order to ensure that no threatening weapons are deployed there. The problem though is that Russia is unlikely to obtain military control over all of Ukraine, or even just significant parts of its territory east of the Dnieper in proximity to the internationally recognized border across which Kiev’s shells still regularly fly, by the time of a Western/NATO intervention.

One of the reasons why the special operation’s opening phase didn’t result in ending the conflict on Russia’s terms is because the West informed Zelensky about how overextended its military logistics had become and thus encouraged him to exploit that to push it back like he ultimately did. Given how cautious of a leader Putin is, he’s unlikely to act out of character once more by ordering a repeat of this same risky strategy even if the frontlines collapse and Russia is able to roll into other regions.

Another unforeseen challenge that Russia experienced during the special operation’s opening phase was actually holding the broad swaths territory that it nominally controlled. Ukraine’s hidden Javelin and Stinger stockpiles inflicted enough losses behind Russia’s lines to engender the large-scale pullback that coincided with the failure of spring 2022’s peace talks. There’s also the obvious difficulty of swiftly capturing large cities like Kharkov, Sumy, and Zaporozhye, which hasn’t yet happened.

Moving along to Russia’s second maximum goal of denazifying Ukraine after explaining how tough it’ll be to achieve the first one of militarizing it, this too can’t succeed without a political agreement that’s no longer realistic in today’s context after such a chance slipped away in spring 2022. What Russia has in mind is Ukraine promulgating legislation that aligns with these goals, such as banning the glorification of World War II-era fascists and rescinding restrictions on ethnic Russians’ rights.

Zelensky has no reason to go along with this anymore like he flirted with doing in early 2022 and Trump’s team doesn’t seem to care all that much about this issue anyhow. It’s therefore unclear how Russia can achieve this before a Western/NATO intervention except in the unlikely scenario of a Russian-friendly Colour Revolution and/or military coup, neither of which the US would accept, and both of which would probably thus prompt the aforesaid intervention out of desperation to salvage “Project Ukraine”.

The third maximum goal of restoring Ukraine’s constitutional neutrality is comparatively more likely but nevertheless moot at this point given that the raft of security guarantees that it already clinched with NATO states since the start of this year de facto amount to continued Article 5 support. Contrary to popular perceptions, this clause doesn’t obligate the dispatch of troops, but only for each country to do whatever it deems fit to help allies under attack. Their existing military aid to Ukraine aligns with this.

Coercing Ukraine to rescind 2019’s constitutional amendment making NATO membership a strategic objective would therefore be a superficial concession to Russia on the US’ part to make Trump’s peace plan a little less bitter for Putin to swallow. As with the previous two maximum goals, Zelensky has no reason to comply with Putin’s demands in this regard since the latter’s forces aren’t in a position to impose this upon him, thus meaning that it can only realistically be done if Trump orders him to.

As the reader probably already picked up on, the common theme is that Russia’s inability to militarily coerce Zelensky into complying with its maximum goals greatly reduces the possibility that they’ll be achieved, which also holds true for the final one of obtaining control over all its new regions’ land. It’s unimaginable that Zelensky will voluntarily cede Zaporozhye with its over 700,000 population, for example, or that Trump will accept the Western opprobrium that would follow coercing him to do so.

The same goes for letting Russia cross the Dnieper to obtain control over that region’s and Kherson’s areas on the other side, thus creating the opportunity for it to build up its forces there in the future for a lightning strike across Ukraine’s western plains in the event that the conflict ever rekindles after it ends. There’s no way that Trump would ever give Putin such an invaluable military-strategic gift so Russia’s supporters shouldn’t deceive themselves by getting their hopes up thinking that this will happen.

The only way in which Russia can achieve its maximum goals before the entrance of Western/NATO troops into Ukraine as peacekeepers is through military means, which would require another large-scale multi-pronged offensive of the sort that characterized the special operation’s early days. Even then, however, the high risk of once again overextending its military logistics, being ambushed by Stingers/Javelins, and thus risking reputational costs and even on-the-ground losses, will remain.

As such, there are really only three options left for Russia: 1) escalate now before Western/NATO troops enter Ukraine and either coerce Zelensky into agreeing to these demands or capture and hold enough land in order to demilitarize as much of the country as possible; 2) escalate after they enter at the risk of sparking a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis that could spiral into World War III; or 3) accept the fait accompli of freezing the conflict along the Line of Contact and begin preparing the public accordingly.

It’s unclear which option Putin will choose since he hasn’t yet signalled a preference for any of them. Nevertheless, it’s timely to quote 19^th-century Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov, who famously said that “Russia is not sulking; she is composing herself.” Russia knows that the clock is ticking for achieving its maximum goals before Trump likely orders Western/NATO peacekeepers to enter Ukraine. The Kremlin is quiet for now precisely because policymakers have yet to decide what to do.

———-

Readers might be interested in reviewing the following analyses for more insight into Russia’s dilemma:

* 14 July 2022: “Korybko To Azerbaijani Media: All Sides Of The Ukrainian Conflict Underestimated Each Other”

* 12 November 2022: “20 Constructive Critiques Of Russia’s Special Operation”

* 1 November 2024: “Trump 2.0 would be no easy ride for Vladimir Putin”

* 7 November 2024: “Here’s What Trump’s Peace Plan Might Look Like & Why Russia Might Agree To It”

* 8 November 2024: “View from Moscow: Russia tepidly welcomes Trump’s return”

They illustrate the challenges inherent in Russia achieving its maximum goals anytime soon.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Korybko To Azerbaijani Media: All Sides Of The Ukrainian Conflict Underestimated Each Other

OneWorld is publishing the full-length English version of the interview that Andrew Korybko gave to Oxu.

^{Andrew Korybko (Andrew Korybko's Newsletter)}

Here’s What Comes Next After Putin And Trump Just Agreed To Start Peace Talks

Here’s What Comes Next After Putin And Trump Just Agreed To Start Peace Talks

By Andrew Korybko

The path ahead will be very difficult due to the sensitive issues that Russia and the US must resolve.

12 February 2025 will go down in history as the day when the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine officially began to end. Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth started everything off by declaring that: Ukraine won’t join NATO; the US doesn’t believe that Ukraine can restore its pre-2014 borders; the US won’t deploy troops to the conflict zone; the US wants the Europeans to assume some peacekeeping responsibilities there instead; but the US won’t extend Article 5 guarantees to EU forces there.

This was followed by Trump and Putin talking for the first time since the former returned to office. They agreed to begin peace talks without delay, which was followed by Trump calling Zelensky to brief him about this and likely coerce the concessions from him that he presumably promised Putin. Trump also suggested that he’ll soon meet Putin in Saudi Arabia and that each of them might then visit each other’s countries as part of the peace process. Here are some background briefings about the larger context:

* 3 January: “Creative Energy Diplomacy Can Lay The Basis For A Grand Russian-American Deal”

* 17 January: “The Merits Of A Demilitarized ‘Trans-Dnieper’ Region Controlled By Non-Western Peacekeepers”

* 3 February: “Territorial Concessions Might Precede A Ceasefire That Leads To New Ukrainian Elections”

* 4 February: “Trump’s Interest In Ukraine’s Rare Earth Minerals Might Backfire On Zelensky”

* 7 February: “Trump’s Special Envoy Shed More Light On His Boss’ Ukrainian Peace Plan”

The first analysis about creative energy diplomacy contains a dozen proposed compromises for each side that could help move their talks along. In fact, the one about the US not extending Article 5 guarantees to EU forces in Ukraine is now policy per Hegseth, so it’s possible that some others might follow. Additionally, Trump just remarked about how unpopular Zelensky has become, which suggests that he’s planning the “phased leadership transition” via new elections that was also proposed in that piece.

It remains to be seen which of these other proposals might soon become US policy, with the same being said for the ones that Russia might implement, such as agreeing to limited military restrictions on its side of the DMZ that’ll likely be created by the end of this process for example. What follows are the five main issues that’ll shape the Russian-US peace talks on Ukraine between their leaders, diplomats, and whichever of their experts might be invited to participate in this via complementary Track II talks:

———-

* Territorial Parameters

The most immediate issue that must be resolved is where the new Russian-Ukrainian border will fall. Hegseth’s claim about Ukraine’s inability to restore its pre-2014 border hints that Trump could coerce Zelensky into withdrawing from at least all of Donbass, which is at the centre of the territorial dimension of their conflict, though it’s possible that his forces might fall back as far as Zaporozhye city. Letting Russia control that city and the parts of its new regions west of the Dnieper is unlikely at this time.

That’s because Trump might not want to take the flak that would follow giving Russia a city of over 700,000 whose residents didn’t vote in September 2022’s referendum. The same goes for the parts of Russia’s new regions west of the river. Instead, he might propose a UN-supervised referendum sometime after the fighting freezes to resolve this aspect of their territorial dispute, all while allowing Russia to continue to officially lay claim to those areas. That might be pragmatic enough for Putin to agree.

* DMZ Terms & Peacekeeper Roles

The next issue to address after the above are the terms of the DMZ along their interim border and the role of the peacekeepers who’d then likely deploy there to monitor it. Hegseth’s declaration that the US will not extend Article 5 guarantees to EU forces there could deter them from playing a major role, which Russia would have to authorize via a UNSC Resolution in any case per Permanent Representative Vasily Nebenzia otherwise they’ll be legitimate targets. Non-Western ones are thus much more agreeable.

As it turns out, the vast majority of UN peacekeepers are from non-Western countries, so they could prospectively deploy there under a UNSC mandate per Nebenzia’s suggestion and possibly even result in the total exclusion of any Western peacekeepers if it’s agreed that none will contribute to this mission. Their terms would have to be acceptable to both Russia and the US in order for this resolution to pass, so it’s unclear exactly what they’ll be able to do or not do, but that directly segues into the next issue.

* Demilitarization & Denazification

Two of Russia’s main goals in the special operation are to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, which it initially sought to do by militarily coercing Ukraine into this per the terms established in spring 2022’s draft peace treaty, though that didn’t succeed due to the UK and Poland. It’s unrealistic to imagine that Trump will agree to let Russia deploy its armed forces throughout the entirety of Ukraine to implement this so it can only be accomplished through similar diplomatic means involving Kiev’s acquiescence.

Therein lies the possible role that UN peacekeepers can play in monitoring and enforcing whatever is ultimately agreed upon for demilitarizing and denazifying Ukraine. This could take the form of inspecting suspected illegal arms sites and all of Ukraine’s cross-border traffic (including at its ports) while having the right to mandate changes to its media reporting and school curricula as need be. This is the only way to ensure that Ukraine remains demilitarized and denazified after the conflict ends.

* Sanctions Relief

Russia has repeatedly demanded the lifting of all Western sanctions, but the argument can be made that “deal-master” Trump wouldn’t ever agree to do this all at once, instead preferring to draft a plan for phased sanctions relief as a reward for Russia’s compliance with a ceasefire, armistice, or peace treaty. This could take the form of what was proposed in the creative energy diplomacy analysis whereby some Russian exports to the EU could resume during the first phase as a trust-building measure.

While Russia would prefer that they all be immediately lifted, its policymakers might conclude that it’s better to accept a phased plan if that’s all that Trump is comfortable offering instead of nothing at all. He’d do well though to engage in the goodwill gesture of lifting sanctions on Russia’s oil exports by sea too since that could convince those policymakers that he’s serious about relieving pressure on Russia. This would in turn make it easier for Putin to sell the compromise of phased sanctions relief at home.

* New Security Architecture

Russia envisaged creating a new European security architecture through mutual agreements with the US and NATO in December 2021 per the security guarantee requests that it shared with them at the time. These were in hindsight meant to diplomatically resolve their security dilemma, whose roots are in NATO’s continued eastward expansion after the Old Cold War and especially its clandestine expansion into Ukraine, in lieu of the special operation that Putin was secretly planning at the time if that failed.

So much has changed since then that separate comprehensive talks on this must start right after whatever agreement they reach on Ukraine. The new issues include NATO’s eastern military buildup, Finland and Sweden’s new memberships, Russia’s hypersonic Oreshniks, their deployment to Belarus, Russia’s deployment of nukes there too, the future of the New START that expires next year, and the new space arms race, et al. Agreeing on a new security architecture will therefore stabilize the world.

———-

As can be seen, the path ahead will be very difficult due to the sensitive issues that Russia and the US must resolve, but their leaders have shown that they have the will to negotiate in good faith. Neither side is likely to achieve their maximum objectives, but diplomacy is the art of the possible, so each will do their utmost to achieve as much as they can in this regard given the circumstances. The best-case scenario is a fair and lasting peace that truly resolves the root causes at the core of this conflict.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Voice of East

2025-01-17 07:59:00

The Merits Of A Demilitarized “Trans-Dnieper” Region Controlled By Non-Western Peacekeepers

The Merits Of A Demilitarized “Trans-Dnieper” Region Controlled By Non-Western Peacekeepers

By Andrew Korybko

This proposal is the most realistic means for keeping the peace after an armistice.

Bloomberg cited unnamed “people with knowledge of Kremlin thinking” to report that Russia will only demand that Ukraine restore its constitutional neutrality, “drastically cut back military ties with the NATO alliance”, limit its army, and freeze the front lines, albeit with some territorial swaps. Also, “The Kremlin’s position is that while individual NATO members may continue to send arms to Ukraine under bilateral security agreements, any such weapons should not be used against Russia or to recapture territory.”

To be sure, Bloomberg might have either invented their sources or they’re uninformed of what the Kremlin thinks, but there’s also the possibility that they’re accurately reflecting what it plans to ask for during peace talks. Hopefully Russia’s demands of Ukraine are more than what Bloomberg just reported, however, because the aforesaid requests would be settling for much less than it might otherwise be able to achieve as suggested by some of the proposals made at the end of this analysis here.

For instance, any agreement to limit the Ukrainian Armed Forces is meaningless without a monitoring mission paired with credible enforcement mechanisms to enforce compliance. After all, even written guarantees that individual NATO members won’t arm Ukraine for the purpose of using these weapons against Russia or to recapture territory – not to mention purely verbal ones – could be broken. There’s also the question of how Russia would respond to future drone and missile strikes from Ukraine.

The most realistic way to address these concerns is through the participation of only non-Western countries in monitoring and peacekeeping roles, the latter of which could concern deployment along the entire Russian-Ukrainian border, including the Line of Contact (LOC). About the second-mentioned, the reported territorial swaps could see Russia give back its part of Kharkov Oblast in exchange for Ukraine giving back its part of Kursk Oblast, which each would formally retain their territorial claims to the other.

This would restore the status quo ante bellum along that part of their universally recognized frontier while serving as a legal workaround against their respective constitutional prohibitions on ceding territory, which in Russia’s case is absolute while Ukraine’s requires a national referendum. Accordingly, freezing the LOC through an armistice a la the Korean precedent wouldn’t violate either of their laws, thus retaining Ukraine’s claims to the entirety of its pre-2014 borders and Russia’s to its post-2022 ones.

As for effectively keeping the peace, Russia could be more confidently assured that Ukraine won’t unilaterally violate the armistice with Western encouragement if the proposed non-Western monitoring and peacekeeping contingent is allowed to inspect all trains and cars that cross the Dnieper eastward. Ukraine might undertake a long-term clandestine campaign to rebuild its heavy weaponry presence in proximity to the DMZ ahead of a possible sneak attack so this would be imperative for impeding that.

Likewise, since such equipment could also be smuggled across the river, these forces should also be given the means for patrolling it as well as the right to detain people, seize their contraband, and use lethal force if they come under attack. Kiev should have a special regime since it’s difficult to enforce such checks given the capital’s location on both sides of the river, but one possibility is fencing off its north-eastern, eastern, and south-eastern reaches beyond the city’s limits and conducting checks there.

The ideal scenario should be to demilitarize everything east of the Dnieper and north of the LOC that remains under Kiev’s formal control, the so-called “Trans-Dnieper” region for lack of a better description, while having its DMZ manned by Russia’s closest non-Western partners. The first part of this suggestion would prevent Ukraine from unilaterally violating the armistice while the second would do the same with regards to Russia since it would be loath to attack Indian and other such friendly peacekeepers.

This proposal takes for granted that NATO will continue expanding its influence in Western Ukraine along that side of the Dnieper, but the river will serve as a major obstacle to on-the-ground offensive action by either party, all while they presumably concentrate air defence systems up and down its banks. It’s unrealistic to expect Russia to plant boots its boots on the NATO-Ukrainian border, monitor everything that crosses, and then hold these positions indefinitely as explained here so this is the next best solution.

In the event that Russia or Ukraine detects illegal military activity by the other in the Trans-Dnieper region such as prohibited arms and special forces, then they should already have a protocol agreed upon as part of their armistice for peacefully addressing this prior to resorting to kinetic action if that fails. This could include a formal complaint with evidence, tasking the non-Western monitoring and peacekeeping mission with investigating, and in the worst-case scenario, drone or missile strikes against those targets.

On-the-ground military activity by either party would be strictly prohibited since that would violate the terms of the armistice and instantly risk another conflict, ergo the purpose of the non-Western monitoring and peacekeeping mission along the DMZ, the Dnieper, and around Eastern Kiev for deterring this. There could also be previously agreed and very severe economic, financial, and other consequences from Western and non-Western countries that would immediately enter into effect if that happens.

Basically, the Trans-Dnieper region would function as a no-man’s land or buffer zone, and the locals who feel uncomfortable living there could either relocate elsewhere in Ukraine such as west of the Dnieper or take advantage of Russia’s simplified procedure from summer 2022 for moving eastward instead. As can be seen, the proposal for a demilitarized Trans-Dnieper region that would be monitored and maintained by non-Western peacekeepers would greatly keep the pace, hence why Russia must demand it.

Any armistice or peace treaty that doesn’t include this outcome risks being unilaterally violated by Ukraine with Western encouragement after some time. Its terms, especially those involving severe multidimensional consequences against whichever party sends ground forces into this zone (though importantly not for carrying out surgical strikes), should also reassure the West that Russia won’t violate this deal either. That’s why the US would do well to seriously consider this proposal if Russia brings it up.

Should Russia settle for less by only demanding what Bloomberg reported, then it would be tacitly requesting nothing more than a temporary lull in hostilities to prepare for the next inevitable phase of the conflict. Officially speaking, Russia remains determined to reach a lasting peace that preferably meets as many of its maximum goals as is realistically possible given the new circumstances in which it now finds itself after over 1,000 days of conflict, so it should be receptive to the Trans-Dnieper proposal.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#Dnieper #Geopolitics #NATO #Russia #TheWest #Ukraine

Russia offers fast-track citizenship to all Ukrainians

President Vladimir Putin has signed a decree offering an easier path to Russian citizenship for all Ukrainians

^RT

Putin’s Praise Of Trump’s Approach To Peace Talks Sends A Message To All Of Russia’s Supporters

Putin’s Praise Of Trump’s Approach To Peace Talks Sends A Message To All Of Russia’s Supporters

By Andrew Korybko

The mission that Putin just tasked the FSB with deserves more attention due to what it signifies.

Some of Russia’s supporters at home and abroad have been sceptical of Trump’s commitment to peace talks with Putin, but the latter just praised his counterpart’s approach and thus sent a message to them. He was speaking at a meeting of the board of the Federal Security Service (FSB) when said that his first contacts with Trump and his team “inspire certain hopes”. He elaborated that the US now shares Russia’s desire to repair their relations and work on addressing larger strategic problems in the world.

Putin continued by saying that “our partners demonstrate pragmatism and a realistic vision of things, and have abandoned numerous stereotypes, the so-called rules, and messianic, ideological clichés of their predecessors.” He then warned the FSB about how “A portion of Western elites are still committed to maintaining instability in the world, and these forces will try to disrupt or to compromise the newly resumed dialogue.”

This was followed by him tasking them with “leveraging every possibility offered by diplomacy and special services to thwart such attempts.” Their latest mission deserves more attention due to what it signifies. For starters, it suggests that Putin and Trump are truly approaching a game-changing deal that can be described as a “New Détente” between their countries, the potential details of which were shared in the following five analyses:

* 3 January: “Creative Energy Diplomacy Can Lay The Basis For A Grand Russian-American Deal”

* 13 February: “Here’s What Comes Next After Putin & Trump Just Agreed To Start Peace Talks”

* 14 February: “Why Might Russia Repair Its Ties With The West & How Could This Reshape Its Foreign Policy?”

* 15 February: “Vance’s Munich Speech Vindicated Putin’s Summer 2022 Prediction About Political Change In Europe”

* 25 February: “Russia & The US’ Diplomatic Choreography At The UN Shows Their Commitment To A ‘New Détente’”

Moving along, the next point is that some Western elite might try to stop this “New Détente” since it goes against their interests. Nobody knows which forms this might take, but Putin’s warning about how they could try to disrupt this process hints at provocations against Russia and/or Belarus, while his words about compromising their dialogue could refer to leaks or lies. The FSB must in any case either preemptively avert these scenarios or have plans in place for what Russia should do if they materialize.

Third, the preceding two points imply Putin’s preference for his supporters to publicly back what he’s trying to achieve in the face of resistance from some Western elite or at least not discredit him by questioning his or Trump’s intentions. In other words, the “politically correct” interpretation of recent events is that Russia and the US are sincerely working to comprehensively patch up their problems for the world’s benefit, and anything that challenges this view will be frowned upon by the Kremlin.

The fourth point builds upon the last one by raising the possibility that those supporters who defy the new “politically correct” interpretation of recent events might even be suspected of operating under the influence of the dissident Western elite. This could lead to foreign ones being “cancelled” and domestic ones investigated depending upon the way in which their own dissident views are expressed. And finally, the last point is that Putin wants everyone to trust him as he tries to clinch the real “deal of the century”.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#DonaldTrump #Geopolitics #Russia #USA #VladimirPutin

Russia’s Veto Of The UNSC Resolution On Sudan Saved It From A Neocolonialist Plot

Russia’s Veto Of The UNSC Resolution On Sudan Saved It From A Neocolonialist Plot

By Andrew Korybko

The text was ambiguous about the authorities’ legitimacy even though they represent their country at the UN, didn’t call for the RSF to cease its attacks against the SAF, could have led to more arms smuggling to the group under the cover of aid, eroded Sudan’s sovereignty via the ICC, and could have led to a disastrous military intervention.

British Foreign Secretary David Lammy railed against Russia at the UNSC on Monday following the latter’s veto of a draft ceasefire resolution in Sudan, which Russian First Deputy Permanent Representative Dmitry Polyanskiy responded to right afterwards. His words can be read in full here and will be summarized in the present piece, but before doing so, here are five background briefings for readers to review if they forgot about the origins of this conflict or weren’t aware of them to begin with:

* 16 April 2023: “Sudan’s ‘Deep State’ War Could Have Far-Reaching Geostrategic Consequences If It Continues”

* 21 April 2023: “Here’s Why The US Is Trying To Pin The Blame For Sudan’s ‘Deep State’ War On Russia”

* 27 April 2023: “Russia Is Right: ‘Political Engineering’ From Abroad Is Responsible For The Sudanese Crisis”

* 4 May 2023: “The Mainstream Media’s Admissions That American Meddling Ruined Sudan Are Misleading”

* 15 July 2023: “Sudan’s Neighbours Signalled That They’re Disinterested In Fighting A Divide-And-Rule Proxy War”

To oversimplify, the rivalry between Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”) exploded in spring 2023, exacerbated as it was by foreign pressure to complete the political transition. Burhan didn’t believe the rumours that the RSF was backed by Wagner, which were spread to pressure him into scrapping Sudan’s plans to host a Russian naval facility in exchange for Western support.

The military dimension of the conflict has since stalemated even though the humanitarian consequences continue to worsen. An estimated 24.8 million people out of the country’s nearly 50 million total population are now in need of humanitarian assistance, there are over 8 million internally displaced people, and 3 million fled abroad as refugees. These startling facts are the reason why the UNSC tabled the latest draft resolution for a ceasefire, but as could have been expected, the West sought to exploit it.

Polyanskiy began his response to Lammy by condemning the UK’s attempt to impose a ceasefire on Sudan as a way to “score points” with its British-based diaspora after London co-authored the document. He then explained that Russia’s primary objection is that the draft resolution doesn’t confirm that it’s the Sudanese authorities led by Burhan, who’s Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC), that have the sole responsibility for protecting civilians, defending the borders, and inviting foreign forces.

He then delivered his knockout punch: “We have to qualify such a position of our colleagues as nothing but an attempt to give themselves an opportunity to meddle in the affairs of Sudan and facilitate their further engagement in political and social engineering in the country. Precisely that was the case in the spring of 2023, when the attempts to impose decisions that did not enjoy the support of the country’s population laid the groundwork for the tragedy that unfolded in Sudan.”

Polyanskiy followed up by implying that the UK tacitly supports the RSF after the draft text was changed to remove earlier calls for that group to end its siege of Al-Fasher and other towns. The “new distorted language” that replaced the original essentially encourages the RSF to continue hostilities so long as civilians are no longer targeted. The external mechanisms that were proposed to ensure accountability, namely the “International Criminal Court” (ICC), are “totally inept” and erode Sudan’s sovereignty too.

Moving along, he then mentioned how premature it is to consider a possible peacekeeping force when Sudan hasn’t yet suggested such and the UN Secretary General’s own report to the UNSC that was shared upon their request “clearly states that conditions are still unripe” for this. Moreover, the conflict is still in its active phase and spread across a large area, so deploying peacekeepers in those circumstances “could spell total disaster”.

Polyanskiy’s other point of criticism was that the draft ceasefire resolution inappropriately demands that “Sudan open all its borders to humanitarian access while not using the numerous border crossings provided by state authorities to deliver aid. It is not without reason that Port Sudan is imposing restrictions; thus, it has been flagging the threat of arms being sent across the border to feed the rebels.” He then ended by calling for an end to double standards towards Sudan and Israel.

“Certain countries are vociferously crying for a ceasefire” in Sudan “while in the case of Gaza those very countries give ‘carte blanche’ to Israel so that it continues the escalation, overlooking the blatant violations of IHL by the Israeli army. Likewise, they prioritize Israel’s right to self-defence and protection of its citizens, but when it comes to Sudan, they somehow deny the same right to its government and accuse the Sudanese army of all ills.” This was a powerful way to end his response to Lammy.

The reason why Russia vetoed the resolution was because it wanted to save Sudan from a neocolonialist plot to exploit its people’s suffering in order to turn it into a vassal state. The text was ambiguous about the authorities’ legitimacy even though they represent their country at the UN, didn’t call for the RSF to cease its attacks against the SAF, could have led to more arms smuggling to the group under the cover of aid, eroded Sudan’s sovereignty via the ICC, and could have led to a disastrous military intervention.

What’s most interesting about all of this is that Russia’s close Chinese partner voted in support of the resolution for the reasons that its Permanent Representative explained here. They lent some legitimacy to Russia’s concerns but insisted that the draft would have led to a ceasefire which would have in turn protected civilians. As can be seen, Russia and China sometimes have polar opposite views on sensitive issues, which readers can learn more about here, but they responsibly manage these differences.

It’s absurd to imagine that China is part of the UK’s neocolonialist plot to subjugate Sudan as a Western vassal state by exploiting its people’s suffering to that end, however, so observers should simply accept that it and Russia sometimes don’t always see eye on everything. This objective fact debunks the claim that pushed by the Mainstream Media and the Alt-Media Community alike that they’re “allies”, each in pursuit of their own ideological-narrative agenda, and clarifies the real state of relations between them.

Russia and China have excellent relations as proven by them jointly accelerating multipolar processes, but their national interests sometimes diverge on sensitive issues like Sudan, Kashmir, and the Ukrainian Conflict, et al. That’s normal and taking the other side doesn’t mean that they’re doing so to spite their partner or as part of a secret alliance with the West. In this case, all that it shows is that China is either more trusting of or naïve about the West than Russia is, which is an interesting observation to reflect on.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Zelensky’s Political Future Is Shaky Amidst His Vicious Rift With Trump

Zelensky’s Political Future Is Shaky Amidst His Vicious Rift With Trump

By Andrew Korybko

Trump has been on the warpath since the inauguration and is politically neutralizing all of his enemies at home so Zelensky should have known better than to become Trump’s newest enemy abroad and risk his wrath.

Trump came out swinging against Zelensky in a social media post on Wednesday where he accused him of being an unpopular dictator who doesn’t want elections, manipulating America “into a war that couldn’t be won”, and possibly having stolen tens of billions of dollars’ worth of aid from it since 2022. This follows Zelensky accusing him of spewing “Russian disinformation” after Trump earlier claimed that the Ukrainian leader’s approval rating was just 4% when explaining why he won’t hold elections.

Tensions between these two have been brewing for quite a while already and can be traced back to how the Democrats exploited one of their phone calls from Trump’s first term as the pretext for impeaching him. Trump had called Zelensky to inquire about evidence that his government might have been in possession of proving the Biden family’s alleged corruption in Ukraine. That experience left Trump with a very poor but lasting impression of Ukraine in general and Zelensky in particular.

It was gradually reinforced as the Biden Administration openly allied with Zelensky’s throughout the course of the Ukrainian Conflict and even more rumours abounded about other corrupt deals. Credible speculation of misappropriated and even missing funds began to rile Trump as did the obviousness of those their mutual unwillingness to at least freeze hostilities with Russia. Everything became personal once Zelensky let himself be used as a campaign prop by the Democrats in Pennsylvania last September.

His response to Trump’s historic election approximately six weeks later was to try appealing to his ego with insincere praise and even buying him off by offering a vague deal over Ukraine’s rare earth minerals, which Kiev convinced Lindsey Graham over the summer are worth a whopping $10-12 trillion. Zelensky later rebuffed a draft deal from Trump that reports claimed “would amount to a higher share of Ukrainian GDP than reparations imposed on Germany at the Versailles Treaty” if accepted.

Bloomberg then reported earlier this week that Ukraine barely has any rare earth minerals to begin with, thus suggesting that Zelensky was trying to manipulate Trump into providing Ukraine more aid on the false pretext that the US could reap a huge return on its investment via these non-existent resources. To make matters even worse, this came shortly after Zelensky fearmongered on Monday that Ukraine can turn into Afghanistan 2.0 if Trump hastily ends this conflict too, which was meant to get under his skin.

That wasn’t all either since Zelensky had also authorized his forces to bomb partially US-owned oil infrastructure in Russia earlier that day, which came right before the first round of Russian–US talks on Ukraine that he then complained about being excluded from. Those remarks prompted Trump to declare how “disappointed” he was with Zelensky. Instead of shutting his mouth and frenziedly working behind the scenes to repair his troubled ties with Trump, Zelensky accused him of being in cahoots with Russia.

Vice President Vance swiftly warned Zelensky that “badmouthing” Trump will backfire while National Security Advisor Waltz lamented that those two leaders’ ties were “clearly going in the wrong direction.” As can be seen, their vicious rift is entirely due to Zelensky’s unbridled arrogance in thinking that he could manipulate deal-master Trump with false promises of rare earth riches and then inexplicably expecting that public insults will successfully bully him, which are both enormous errors of judgement.

Had Zelensky bit his tongue even after his Afghanistan quip on Monday, then he could have at least tried to claim ignorance of his military bombing partially US-owned oil infrastructure in Russia and blamed his advisors for misinforming him about Ukraine’s rare earth riches, but he dug himself a hole instead. Complaining about being excluded from the Russian-US talks, badmouthing Trump and implying abandonment by the US, and then accusing Trump of spewing “Russian disinformation” were mistakes.

Zelensky is ultimately his own man and must take responsibility for his actions. It’s unimportant who might have speculatively misadvised him since he still went along with what they could have suggested despite Trump’s reputation for never capitulating to those who pressure and especially insult him. Trump has been on the warpath since the inauguration and is politically neutralizing all of his enemies at home so Zelensky should have known better than to become Trump’s newest enemy abroad and risk his wrath.

It’s difficult to imagine any restoration of cordial working relations between Zelensky and Trump after what just happened. In fact, Trump might not even want to talk to Zelensky ever again anymore, but he might still have to as part of the peace process. The only way to avoid the awkwardness that this would entail would be if Zelensky either stepped down, was replaced upon finally holding the elections that he scandalously postponed last year, or was deposed through some other means.

In the interim, Trump might rely on his subordinates like Special Envoy Keith Kellogg to pass along messages between them from here on out unless in the unlikely scenario that Zelensky humiliates himself with a sincere apology and then agrees to do whatever Trump demands of him. Since that’s not foreseeable given his unbridled arrogance, which is arguably connected to the “god complex” that the Democrats and their European allies cultivated in him since early 2022, mediators will have to suffice.

Zelensky might not have much time left to decide what to do, however, since he’s already skating on thin ice given his objective unpopularity (which might not be as bad as Trump claimed but accounts for why he’s against holding elections) and his growing number of rivals at home. As the situation along the front worsens and ties with the US continue deteriorating, both at the personal and national levels, an inflection point might soon be reached whereby a regime change process of some sort is initiated.

Whether this takes the form of him resigning, finally holding elections (in which he might even agree not to run), being pressured to do either of the aforesaid by large-scale protests (which might take on contours of a US-backed Colour Revolution), or is deposed through a coup is anyone’s guess. There’s also the possibility that nothing dramatic will happen but that seems improbable given the viciousness of his rift with Trump and the American leader’s vengeful disposition after all that he’s been put through.

For that reason, observers shouldn’t take Zelensky’s rule over Ukraine for granted since something might suddenly happen, whether it’s naturally occurring, the result of Trump ordering his intelligence services to “take care of” Zelensky, or a blend thereof in the case of US-backed protests or coup attempts. Vance will thus likely be vindicated in warning that Zelensky’s “badmouthing” of Trump will backfire. but it remains to be seen what form that’ll take and whether it’ll succeed in moving along the peace process.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Trump’s Interest In Ukraine’s Rare Earth Minerals Might Backfire On Zelensky

Trump’s Interest In Ukraine’s Rare Earth Minerals Might Backfire On Zelensky

By Andrew Korybko

Instead of abandoning his efforts to freeze the Ukrainian Conflict by doubling down on military aid in the hopes that Zelensky’s forces will then recapture these deposits from Russia, Trump might instead try to cut a deal with Putin for Russia to sell some of these extracted resources to the US.

Trump’s confirmed interest in Ukraine’s rare earth minerals is being interpreted by some as beneficial for Zelensky amidst uncertainty about his commitment to Ukraine. One of the points from Zelensky’s so-called “Victory Plan” calls for letting his country’s allies extract its critical minerals. New Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently warned about the strategic advantage that China derives from its control over the rare earth mineral supply chain so he might have influenced Trump’s views on this issue.

US Senator Lindsey Graham raised awareness of Ukraine’s critical mineral riches during his trip there last June after he claimed that they’re sitting on $10-12 trillion worth of such wealth. Trump 2.0’s foreign policy focus on more muscularly containing China in all ways predictably predisposed him to appreciate the abovementioned point from Zelensky’s “Victory Plan”. The problem though is that the bulk of Ukraine’s critical mineral wealth is under Russian control and Ukrainian forces continue retreating.

At the same time, Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg’s words about how Ukraine needs to hold its long-delayed elections were seen as Trump’s interest in brokering a ceasefire, after which martial law can be lifted, the elections can be held, and the new government can then begin peace talks. This expectation contrasts with what Trump said a few days later about his interest in Ukraine’s (largely Russian-controlled) rare earth mineral deposits and the attendant possibility for proxy escalation.

Instead of abandoning his efforts to freeze the Ukrainian Conflict by doubling down on military aid in the hopes that Zelensky’s forces will then recapture these deposits from Russia, which could perpetuate the proxy war and thus derail his foreign policy agenda, Trump might instead try to cut a deal with Putin. One of the conditions that Trump could make for coercing Ukraine into withdrawing from at least some of the territory that Russia claims as its own might be for Putin to sell the US some of these minerals.

Putin might agree to this depending on how far Trump is able to coerce Ukraine into withdrawing, plus there’s a pragmatic argument in favour of this arrangement in that it could form a trust-building measure for the US one day allowing the EU to partially resume some Russia gas pipeline imports. The purpose would be to restore a degree of Russia and the EU’s pre-conflict complex economic interdependence, albeit this time under US supervision, as a reward for Russia complying with a ceasefire.

Russia requires capital and technology to fully exploit the rare earth deposits that are now under its control, both of which could be provided by the US, with the first possibly involving the return of some seized Russian assets so long as they’re invested into this endeavour. If successfully implemented, then this proposal could lead to more creative diplomacy of the sort suggested at the end of this analysis here for depriving China of Russia’s enormous resource wealth, which aligns with Trump’s foreign policy goals.

Ukraine wouldn’t be left completely in the lurch, however, since other smaller rare earth mineral deposits still remain under its control. These could be given to the US in exchange for continued military aid, even if the latter is curtailed when compared to its height under the Biden Administration in the run-up to summer 2023’s ultimately doomed counteroffensive. If Trump already reaches an agreement with Putin on the Russian-controlled deposits, then Zelensky would have little choice but to agree to this deal.

Far from the full military support that he expected to receive in pursuit of recapturing those lost deposits, he’d only end up with whatever the cost-conscious Trump Administration determines is the absolute minimum that the US considers that Ukraine requires for keeping the peace. This is the best outcome for those on all sides who truly want peace, but it requires substantial will on both the US and Russia’s parts along with the US coercing Ukraine into agreeing, none of which can be guaranteed.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Trump’s Latest Sanctions Threat Against Russia Suggests That He’s Getting Impatient For A Deal

Trump’s Latest Sanctions Threat Against Russia Suggests That He’s Getting Impatient For A Deal

By Andrew Korybko

This moment of truth could even arrive earlier than expected and thus force Putin to compromise or escalate before he’s fully made up his mind either way.

Trump said in an interview with NBC News that “If Russia and I are unable to make a deal on stopping the bloodshed in Ukraine, and if I think it was Russia’s fault — which it might not be — but if I think it was Russia’s fault, I am going to put secondary tariffs on oil, on all oil coming out of Russia. That would be that if you buy oil from Russia, you can’t do business in the United States. There will be a 25% tariff on all oil, a 25- to 50-point tariff on all oil.”

NBC News interpreted this as alluding to what he earlier threatened on social media regarding the imposition of secondary sanctions on those that purchase oil from Venezuela. He wrote that “any Country that purchases Oil and/or Gas from Venezuela will be forced to pay a Tariff of 25% to the United States on any Trade they do with our Country.” As it relates to Russia, this would spike tariffs on China and India, the first of which is already in a trade war with the US while the second wants to avoid one.

This is precisely the former US Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg insinuated in an interview with the New York Post in early February that was analysed here at the time. The takeaway was that such threats might suffice for getting them to nudge Russia into a deal over Ukraine despite whatever apprehensions Putin might have. The consequences of not doing so could be their compliance with the US’ secondary sanctions and all that could entail for the Russian economy if it’s deprived of this revenue.

India is more susceptible to this form of American pressure while China might resist for the reasons explained here, in which case Russia could become disproportionately dependent on China, thus leading to the fait accompli of de facto junior partnership status that Putin has tried his utmost to avoid. Accordingly, it might only be India that tries nudging Russia into a deal over Ukraine while China might not do what Trump expects, instead openly defying his secondary sanctions if they’re then imposed.

This analysis here briefly touches upon the five reasons why Russia might accept or reject a ceasefire in Ukraine, with it becoming increasingly likely that Trump might soon ramp up the pressure on Putin to decide, especially after he also just said that there’s a “psychological deadline” for this. In his words, which followed right after his interview with NBC News, “It’s a psychological deadline. If I think they’re tapping us along, I will not be happy about it.”

The day before, Trump spent a sizeable amount of the day golfing with Finnish President Alexander Stubb, who shared his impression of his counterpart’s approach to Russia with the media. As he phrased it, “When you spend seven hours with someone, you at least get an intuition of the direction in which we’re going…The half-ceasefire has been broken by Russia, and I think America, and my sense is also the President of the United States, is running out of patience with Russia.”

This assessment aligns with what Trump told NBC News the next day and his later quip about a “psychological deadline” for concluding talks with Putin. The American leader’s preference for wielding sanctions as a foreign policy tool might therefore come into play against Russia exactly as was foreseen in early February after Kellogg’s cited interview. This moment of truth could even arrive earlier than expected and thus force Putin to compromise or escalate before he’s fully made up his mind either way.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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De-Dollarization Was Always More Of A Political Slogan Than A Pecuniary Fact

De-Dollarization Was Always More Of A Political Slogan Than A Pecuniary Fact

By Andrew Korybko

Any breakthrough in Russian-US relations would inevitably disappoint those multipolar enthusiasts who bought into the most ideologically dogmatic narratives of the New Cold War and consequently believed that Russia would forever eschew the dollar out of principle.

The three-year-long NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine contributed to the belief that the international community had bifurcated into the West and the World Majority respectively, with the outcome of the aforesaid conflict determining which camp will most powerfully shape the global systemic transition. This paradigm predisposed observers to imagine that BRICS, which represents the World Majority, is actively coordinating de-dollarization policies in order to decouple themselves from the West’s financial clutches.

That perception persists to this day despite last October’s BRICS Summit achieving nothing of tangible significance at all, including on the de-dollarization front, and leading members like India and Russia subsequently confirming in response to Trump’s tariff threats that they’re not creating a new currency. As it turns out, even before Trump initiated the nascent Russian–US “New Détente”, the international community wasn’t as divided over the past three years as many multipolar enthusiasts thought.

Complex interdependencies kept most of the main players together, including Russia and the West after Russia continued selling oil, gas, and critical minerals like uranium to the West in spite of their proxy war. Similar interdependencies account for why Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar declared in mid-November that “India has never been for de-dollarization” and then reaffirmed this position last week when he said that “we have absolutely no interest in undermining the dollar at all.”

He also said that “I don’t think there is a unified BRICS position on [de-dollarization]. I think BRICS members, and now that we have more members, have very diverse positions on this matter. So, the suggestion or the assumption that somewhere there is a united BRICS position against the dollar, I think, is not borne out by facts.” The reason why it’s important to draw attention to his latest words is because of the global context within which they were shared as regards the nascent Russian-US “New Détente”.

Putin’s recent invitation to American companies to cooperate with Russia on strategic resources, including energy in the Arctic and even rare earth minerals in Donbass, will lead to Russia using more dollars in international trade if anything comes of this. That would in turn discredit the perception shared earlier in this analysis of Russia actively de-dollarizing, which Putin himself always said that it was forced by sanctions into doing and thus wouldn’t have ordinarily happened on its own.

A thaw in their tensions brought about by the US brokering an end to their proxy war in a way that meets most of Russia’s interests would therefore naturally see Russia using the dollar yet again. To be sure, it’ll still support the creation of platforms like BRICS Bridge, BRICS Clear, and BRICS Pay, but these would be aimed at preventing dependence on the dollar more so than advancing de-dollarization per se. The rouble will also continue to be used as Russia’s preferred currency in conducting international trade.

Nevertheless, any breakthrough in Russian-US relations would inevitably disappoint those multipolar enthusiasts who bought into the most ideologically dogmatic narratives of the New Cold War and consequently believed that Russia would forever eschew the dollar out of principle. Those who previously criticized India’s pragmatic approach towards this currency, particularly Jaishankar’s comments from mid-November, would then eat crow if Russia ultimately ends up following its lead.

Even if Russia is just partially returned to the dollar’s global ecosystem through the lifting of US sanctions on that currency’s use for facilitating the strategic resource deals that Putin just proposed, then it would likely result in the rest of BRICS moderating their de-dollarization policies as well, if they even had them. China alone might continue making the most progress in this regard, but even it too has been hesitant to go all-out, also due to its complex interdependencies with the West (including its US Treasury holdings).

These observations about Russia, India, and China’s diverse views towards the dollar show that de-dollarization was always more of a political slogan than a pecuniary fact, one that only Russia made tangible progress on but only because it was forced to, though it might soon rebalance as explained. They collectively form RIC, the core of BRICS, so whatever they say or do will influence comparatively smaller countries. There’s nothing wrong with that though, neither in general nor in this context.

Comparatively smaller countries can’t make major impacts on the global economic or financial systems on their own, and in this particular context, almost all of them with few exceptions still have close trading ties with the US that necessitate them remaining within the dollar’s global ecosystem. They couldn’t realistically de-dollarize in the way that the most dogmatic ideologues imagined without immense cost to themselves or replacing their dependence on the US/dollar with China/the yuan.

The most pragmatic approach has always been the one pioneered by India whereby countries strive to use their national currencies more in trade while diversifying their foreign currency baskets in order to avert dependence on any single one. This enables them to strengthen their sovereignty in a meaningful and realistic way without risking the ire of major players by actively dropping their currency and/or actively adopting their rival’s. It’s this balance that will come to define financial multipolarity processes.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Five Takeaways From Trump’s Fateful Decision To Freeze All Military Aid To Ukraine

Five Takeaways From Trump’s Fateful Decision To Freeze All Military Aid To Ukraine

By Andrew Korybko

Transatlantic ties, Russian-US relations, and the nature of American hegemony are all transforming before everyone’s eyes as Trump makes bold moves to force Zelensky to the peace table with Putin.

An unnamed senior Defence Department told the media on Monday evening that Trump decided to freeze all military aid to Ukraine until its leaders demonstrate a good-faith commitment to peace. This comes just several days after Zelensky picked his fight with Trump and Vance at the White House. The Wall Street Journal earlier predicted that Ukraine could only continue fighting at its current level till this summer in such a scenario. Here are five takeaways from this monumental development:

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1. Trump Is Serious About Brokering Peace

Zelensky made it clear during his disastrous visit to the White House last Friday that he’s dead-set on fighting till the last Ukrainian unless his country either gets NATO membership or Western troops. Neither of those demands is acceptable to Trump since they’d risk World War III, but so too could that risk continue rising if the conflict doesn’t soon end. Trump therefore realized that the only way to force Zelensky to the peace table with Putin is to freeze all military aid until he moderates his extreme stance.

2. He & Putin Likely Have A Secret Agreement

Trump said last week that “A ceasefire could take place immediately”, which was arguably an inadvertent admission of a secret agreement with Putin. No lasting peace can be reached until after the next Ukrainian presidential elections, but they can’t be held during martial law, ergo the need for a ceasefire. Although Putin earlier conditioned this on Ukraine withdrawing from the disputed regions, he might support a ceasefire to justify the US’ curtailed aid to Ukraine and legitimize Russian-US economic deals.

3. But It’s Not Yet A Comprehensive One

If the aforesaid speculation is accurate, then it doesn’t mean that those two have a comprehensive agreement. Serious issues such as the final Russian-Ukrainian border and the question of peacekeepers have yet to be agreed to and might not be resolved till after the next Ukrainian presidential and parliamentary elections. It’s therefore premature to predict that the Line of Contact will become the final border and that Western peacekeepers will be deployed there, especially since Russia opposes both.

4. Poland Might Have A Pivotal Role To Play

About 90% of Western military aid to Ukraine transits through Poland so Trump might ask it to stop the Europeans from using its territory to arm Ukraine during a ceasefire in exchange for post-conflict perks. He doesn’t want the Brits, French, or Germans emboldening Ukraine to violate the ceasefire or provoke Russia into doing so and can incentivize Poland to prevent this by promising to keep American troops there, possibly redeploy some from Germany to Poland, and turn Poland into its top partner in Europe.

5. The “New Détente” Is Trump’s Top Priority

Every major move that’s taken place since Trump’s call with Putin in mid-February has been predicated on advancing his grand strategic goal of a Russian–US “New Détente”, the gist of which is to revolutionize International Relations through a game-changing comprehensive partnership between them. Readers can learn more about its details from the three preceding hyperlinked analyses, but it’s the pursuit of this goal that ultimately drove Trump to make the fateful decision to freeze all military aid to Ukraine.

———-

Transatlantic ties, Russian-US relations, and the nature of American hegemony are all transforming before everyone’s eyes as Trump makes bold moves to force Zelensky to the peace table with Putin. His latest one was literally one of the worst-case scenarios from Ukraine’s and Europe’s perspective but there’s little that they can do in response other than capitulate to his demands. The US holds all the cards like Trump reminded Zelensky last Friday and those who think otherwise risk paying the price.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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2025-03-01 17:00:11

Zelensky Picked His Fight With Trump And Vance After Getting Cold Feet About Making Peace

Zelensky Picked His Fight With Trump And Vance After Getting Cold Feet About Making Peace

By Andrew Korybko

Zelensky was triggered after realizing that the Trump Administration wants to coerce him into peace with Putin and won’t be manipulated into prolonging, let alone escalating, the conflict after signing their rare earth minerals deal like he somehow expected that they would.

Friday’s spectacle in the Oval Office will forever be remembered as one of the most epic failures that any foreign leaders has made after Zelensky delusionally thought that that he could disrespect Vice President Vance on live TV in front of Trump without any consequences while being a guest in their country. Readers can watch the full recording here, which shows Zelensky aggressively reacting to Vance’s benign comment about prioritizing diplomacy with Putin over the prior administration’s failed tough talk.

Everything then spiralled out of control after Zelensky accused Vance of speaking loudly to him, which prompted Trump to contradict Zelensky and tell him to keep quiet since he’s already talked too much, all while brutally berating him in a scene that had never been witnessed before in America’s highest office. Trump and Vance also accused Zelensky of being ungrateful for American aid after he lied about Ukraine being left alone since the start of the conflict and reminded him of how disrespectfully he was behaving.

Trump wrapped everything up by warning that the US might completely end its support for Ukraine if Zelensky doesn’t agree to make peace with Putin before unprecedentedly kicking Zelensky out of the White House. To add insult to injury, White House staffers then ate the lunch that was already prepared for Zelensky and his team with the expectation that they’d sign the rare earth minerals deal that was the reason behind his visit. Trump also posted on social media about how Zelensky disrespected the US.

For as clear-cut as the sequence of events was for any objective observer who watched the roughly 10-minute footage that was hyperlinked to in the introductory paragraph, namely that Zelensky provoked his two hosts by disrespecting Vance, the Financial Times’ Ben Hall had a totally different view. According to him, “it is not hard to imagine that Vance and Trump were spoiling for a fight with the Ukrainian leader…Arguably, the stage was set for an ambush” when Zelensky arrived in the Oval Office.

While it’s true that Zelensky and Trump were just embroiled in a vicious spat prior to the Ukrainian leader’s arrival to the US, his American counterpart invited him to visit because he wanted to patch up their problems by signing the rare earth minerals deal and then discuss a path to peace with Putin. Trump treated Zelensky benevolently prior to Zelensky trying to disrespect Vance, as did Vance, who didn’t say anything personal or insulting before Zelensky suddenly decided to harangue him.

It seems like Zelensky was triggered after realizing that the Trump Administration wants to coerce him into peace with Putin and won’t be manipulated into prolonging, let alone escalating, the conflict after signing their rare earth minerals deal like he somehow expected that they would. For that reason, he then decided to sabotage the talks by creating a spectacle, possibly hoping that it would justify abruptly refusing to sign the aforesaid deal if they were going to use it right afterwards to pressure him to peace.

Zelensky isn’t being advised by anyone with even basic insight into how Trump operates otherwise he’d have known that public pressure on his counterpart always backfires. Zelensky would also never have thought that the US needs Ukraine for anything more than Ukraine needs the US. Trump is already considering a more important rare earth minerals deal with Putin so he doesn’t even need Ukraine’s resources whereas Ukraine has no alternative to American arms and is thus fully dependent on it.

This observation brings the analysis to the penultimate point about how Trump ominously left unanswered a question about whether he’ll suspend military aid to Ukraine like he threatened at the end of his and Vance’s heated exchange with Zelensky. If that’s what he ends up doing, and it’s too early to say for sure, then it would represent the worst-case scenario for the Europeans since Russia could then carry on as far westward as it wants if the front lines collapse without fear of the US intervening.

Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth already confirmed a few weeks ago that the US won’t extend Article 5 guarantees to any NATO country’s troops in Ukraine so the UK, France, and whoever else might have considered dispatching them there in that event will now be forced to think twice about it. In other words, Russia could hypothetically carry on as far as Ukraine’s border with NATO if it wants to, though Putin might stop far short of that if a breakthrough coerces Kiev into complying with his demands.

The final point to make is that what happened in Oval Office on Friday was truly a black swan in the sense that nobody could have expected that Zelensky would ruin his relations with Trump right at the moment when they were supposed to sign their rare earth minerals deal that would then pave the way to peace. Trump even exclaimed during the height of their drama how the US was giving Ukraine cards to play for helping it end the conflict on much better terms than if he didn’t diplomatically involve himself in it.

He was therefore very serious about brokering peace between Zelensky and Putin, hence why he was so exasperated at Zelensky’s blatant disrespect once everything started snowballing after Zelensky began to disrespect Vance, which explains why he unprecedentedly kicked him out of the White House. The “New Détente” that Trump wants to broker with Putin, which readers can learn more about from the five analyses hyperlinked in the middle of this one here, is largely predicated on forcing Zelensky into peace.

Zelensky’s last-minute decision to sabotage the peace process by creating a global spectacle caught Trump off guard, but he wasn’t going to let Zelensky disrespect Vance with impunity, let alone after Zelensky’s disrespect transformed into disrespect for the US. That’s not to say that the “New Détente” is now derailed since Trump and Putin still have the will to enter into a series of mutual compromises aimed at establishing strategic ties, but just that it might now proceed independently of Ukraine.

Accordingly, it was actually Zelensky who ruined everything, not Trump and Vance. They could never have expected that he’d burn Ukraine’s bridges with the US knowing that it’s impossible for Ukraine to replace US military aid. Those two thought that he came to DC to sign the rare earth minerals deal that would then place them all on the path to peace with Putin. Perhaps Zelensky didn’t realize what he was getting into until it was too late, by which time he let his emotions get the best of him, but who knows.

In any case, it’s very difficult to imagine there being any rapprochement between Zelensky and Trump or Ukraine and the US in general without Zelensky leaving office or fully capitulating to Trump’s demands. If he defiantly perpetuates the conflict and the US cuts him off, then Russia will pretty much be given free rein by Washington to do whatever it wants with Ukraine, though it’s unknown how the EU would react. Everything will become clearer by next week though once it’s known exactly what Zelensky plans to do.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#DonaldTrump #Geopolitics #Russia #Ukraine #USA

Trump leaves question on possible suspension of military aid to Ukraine unanswered

"It doesn't matter what I'm considering," he told reporters

^TASS

Why Did Trump Just Repost His Threat To Impose 100% Tariffs On BRICS Countries?

Why Did Trump Just Repost His Threat To Impose 100% Tariffs On BRICS Countries?

By Andrew Korybko

A full-fledged economic pressure campaign by the US against the BRICS countries might be imminent.

Trump reposted late November’s threat to impose 100% tariffs on BRICS countries if they go through with their alleged plans to create a new currency or support an existing one to replace the dollar, which was analysed here at the time. It was assessed that his threat was based upon false premises since such plans were only floated around by the group and never seriously advanced. Even Putin downplayed them as was proven in the aforesaid analysis citing speeches from the official Kremlin website.

The idea that the BRICS Countries are trying to move away from the Dollar, while we stand by and watch, is OVER. We are going to require a commitment from these seemingly hostile Countries that they will neither create a new BRICS Currency, nor back any other Currency to replace…

— Donald J. Trump Posts From His Truth Social (@TrumpDailyPosts) January 31, 2025

The reality is that BRICS hasn’t achieved anything tangible in the decade since it agreed to create the New Development Bank in 2014, with even last October’s Kazan Summit falling flat despite the unprecedented hype that preceded it as explained in detail here back then. Shortly after Trump’s initial threat, Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar clarified that his country has no de-dollarization plans, which was reaffirmed after his latest threat and also echoed by Russia too.

In any case, it’s worthwhile wondering why Trump would repost the exact same threat two months later, which can be answered by remembering that this immediately preceded his imposition of 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico and 10% on China on the pretext that they won’t help him stop the fentanyl scourge. It might therefore very well be that he’s planning to expand the anti-Chinese dimension of these tariffs on the pretext that Beijing is trying to internationalize the yuan via BRICS as a competitor to the dollar.

As for the group’s other countries, they could be sanctioned on a case-by-case basis on the pretext that they’re either working with China to this end or on the related one that they’re trying to create a new currency within BRICS, with such threats giving him powerful negotiating leverage over them. Seeing as how the BRICS claim is provably false as was earlier shown, the first scenario about implementing tariffs on the pretext of helping China internationalize the yuan is more likely, thus excluding India at least.

To be sure, he might still impose other forms of pressure upon it when negotiating trade-related issues, but there’s no credible basis for alleging that India is conspiring with its Chinese rival to internationalize the yuan amidst their unresolved border dispute that’s only recently thawed. The other countries don’t have any such tensions with China and concomitant obstacles to internationalizing its currency at the dollar’s expense so it’s possible that they might soon be threatened with tariffs on this pretext.

In that case, some of the less economically strong and politically sovereign countries might capitulate to whatever the US demands of them, which could take the form of gradually rebalancing their trade and investment away from China and back towards the US. In practice, this could lead to renegotiated trade and investment deals alongside other means of bringing this about, including underhanded ones that could see these BRICS countries informally creating an unfriendly environment for Chinese businesses.

Nobody should expect that this might happen right away or lead to a rupture in their relations with China, let alone them withdrawing from BRICS, but just that it’s the most logical goal that Trump would be aiming for if he threatens to tariff them on the de-dollarization pretext that he just reposted about. In other words, a full-fledged economic pressure campaign by the US against the BRICS countries might be imminent, one which many of them might prefer to submit to than risk crippling tariffs.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#BRICS #China #DonaldTrump #Geopolitics #India #Russia #USA

Saudi Arabia Has Good Reason To Dillydally On Formally Joining BRICS

Saudi Arabia Has Good Reason To Dillydally On Formally Joining BRICS

By Andrew Korybko

Making an official decision either way could disrupt the Kingdom’s careful multi-alignment between the West and the World Majority.

Saudi Minister of Economy and Planning Faisal Al-Ibrahim told the World Economic Forum during last month’s Davos Summit that “We’ve been invited to the BRICS, similar to how we’ve been invited to many other multilateral platforms in the past historically. We assess many different aspects of it before a decision is made and right now, we are in the middle of that.” Saudi Arabia has good reason to dillydally on formally joining BRICS too for the reasons that’ll now be explained.

It was posited here in January 2024 when the country first revealed that it hadn’t yet accepted the group’s official membership invitation that this “is due to Western perceptions about this association, Iran’s involvement in the Red Sea Crisis, and Israeli-US pressure”, which still holds true. Regarding the first, Saudi Arabia would arguably feel uncomfortable with its name and national brand being included in the plethora of agenda-driven promotional materials misportraying BRICS as an anti-Western alliance.

The Kingdom used to be solidly in the Western camp but has taken a page from India’s book in recent years by multi-aligning between them and what Russia now calls the World Majority. This grand strategic recalibration is due to Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS), whose character and vision were praised by Putin in late 2022, which was analysed here at the time. MBS understandably doesn’t want to fuel the false perception that he’s pivoting away from the West.

The second reason about Iran’s involvement in the Red Sea Crisis is also still relevant since Saudi Arabia doesn’t want to formally join an organization in which its historic rival is also a member amidst the latest support that the latter has given to the Kingdom’s Houthi enemies. Moreover, Iran also supports Hamas, whose sneak attack on 7 October abruptly delayed work on the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which was supposed to make Saudi Arabia a key node in Euro-Asian trade.

The final reason builds upon the aforementioned and includes joint pressure from its fellow Israeli-American IMEC investors who didn’t want Saudi Arabia joining a group within which Iran is also now a member as the West Asian Wars between Israel and the Iranian-led Resistance Axis were raging. Even though the two main ones in Gaza and Lebanon have since officially ended, neither would look approvingly upon Saudi Arabia formally joining BRICS, which could endanger its ties with both.

MBS wants to revive IMEC as soon as possible since it’s expected to function as an integral part of his “Vision 2030” grand strategic plan (the end date of which will likely be pushed back due to all that’s happened since its announcement in 2016) to revolutionize his country’s socio-economic systems. That’s not possible without a large degree of US involvement and Israel’s cooperation, the latter of which requires formal Saudi recognition of the Jewish State, possibly explaining Bibi’s concessions on Gaza.

Openly defying them by formally joining the same group within which their shared Iranian nemesis is already a member, and doing so right after Trump returns to power amidst reports that he’ll reimpose his “maximum pressure” policy against the Islamic Republic, could lead to both abandoning IMEC. The US and Israel offer Saudi Arabia tangible economic and financial benefits whereas BRICS has yet to provide its members with any whatsoever at all as explained here after the latest Kazan Summit.

Additionally, Trump is under the false impression (subsequently debunked by Indian Minister of External Affairs Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar) that BRICS is focused on de-dollarizing and wants to create a new currency to rival the dollar, so he’d predictably overreact if Saudi Arabia decides to formally join now. That could scuttle MBS’ ambitious IMEC plans that are one of the center-pieces of his “Vision 2030” grand strategic plan so he’s loath to risk such consequences in exchange for literally nothing at all from BRICS.

It therefore makes perfect sense why Saudi Arabia is dillydallying on formally joining BRICS since it presently enjoys all the knowledge-sharing and elite-networking benefits brought about through its partial participation without any of the political or economic risks inherent in being a full member. MBS can therefore maintain his Kingdom’s careful multi-alignment between the West (which includes Israel in this formulation) and the World Majority by indefinitely delaying a decision on this either way.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#BRICS #Geopolitics #IMEC #SaudiArabia #TheWest #USA #WorldEconomicForum

Voice of East

2025-02-02 11:07:31

Why Did Trump Just Repost His Threat To Impose 100% Tariffs On BRICS Countries?

Why Did Trump Just Repost His Threat To Impose 100% Tariffs On BRICS Countries?

By Andrew Korybko

A full-fledged economic pressure campaign by the US against the BRICS countries might be imminent.

Trump reposted late November’s threat to impose 100% tariffs on BRICS countries if they go through with their alleged plans to create a new currency or support an existing one to replace the dollar, which was analysed here at the time. It was assessed that his threat was based upon false premises since such plans were only floated around by the group and never seriously advanced. Even Putin downplayed them as was proven in the aforesaid analysis citing speeches from the official Kremlin website.

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The idea that the BRICS Countries are trying to move away from the Dollar, while we stand by and watch, is OVER. We are going to require a commitment from these seemingly hostile Countries that they will neither create a new BRICS Currency, nor back any other Currency to replace…

— Donald J. Trump Posts From His Truth Social (@TrumpDailyPosts) January 31, 2025

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The reality is that BRICS hasn’t achieved anything tangible in the decade since it agreed to create the New Development Bank in 2014, with even last October’s Kazan Summit falling flat despite the unprecedented hype that preceded it as explained in detail here back then. Shortly after Trump’s initial threat, Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar clarified that his country has no de-dollarization plans, which was reaffirmed after his latest threat and also echoed by Russia too.

In any case, it’s worthwhile wondering why Trump would repost the exact same threat two months later, which can be answered by remembering that this immediately preceded his imposition of 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico and 10% on China on the pretext that they won’t help him stop the fentanyl scourge. It might therefore very well be that he’s planning to expand the anti-Chinese dimension of these tariffs on the pretext that Beijing is trying to internationalize the yuan via BRICS as a competitor to the dollar.

As for the group’s other countries, they could be sanctioned on a case-by-case basis on the pretext that they’re either working with China to this end or on the related one that they’re trying to create a new currency within BRICS, with such threats giving him powerful negotiating leverage over them. Seeing as how the BRICS claim is provably false as was earlier shown, the first scenario about implementing tariffs on the pretext of helping China internationalize the yuan is more likely, thus excluding India at least.

To be sure, he might still impose other forms of pressure upon it when negotiating trade-related issues, but there’s no credible basis for alleging that India is conspiring with its Chinese rival to internationalize the yuan amidst their unresolved border dispute that’s only recently thawed. The other countries don’t have any such tensions with China and concomitant obstacles to internationalizing its currency at the dollar’s expense so it’s possible that they might soon be threatened with tariffs on this pretext.

In that case, some of the less economically strong and politically sovereign countries might capitulate to whatever the US demands of them, which could take the form of gradually rebalancing their trade and investment away from China and back towards the US. In practice, this could lead to renegotiated trade and investment deals alongside other means of bringing this about, including underhanded ones that could see these BRICS countries informally creating an unfriendly environment for Chinese businesses.

Nobody should expect that this might happen right away or lead to a rupture in their relations with China, let alone them withdrawing from BRICS, but just that it’s the most logical goal that Trump would be aiming for if he threatens to tariff them on the de-dollarization pretext that he just reposted about. In other words, a full-fledged economic pressure campaign by the US against the BRICS countries might be imminent, one which many of them might prefer to submit to than risk crippling tariffs.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#BRICS #China #DonaldTrump #Geopolitics #India #Russia #USA

Trump to enact tariffs on Mexico, Canada and China starting Feb. 1, White House says

President Trump will enact 25% tariffs on Mexico and Canada starting Saturday, as well as a 10% tariff on China.

^{Aimee Picchi (CBS News)}

Russia And Pakistan Will Comprehensively Expand Cooperation In The Resource Sector

Russia And Pakistan Will Comprehensively Expand Cooperation In The Resource Sector

By Andrew Korybko

Pakistan wants to reduce its disproportionate dependence on China, hence why it prefers for Russia to modernize its resource infrastructure instead of China, which aligns with US strategic goals.

Express Tribune reported on the outcome of the ninth Pakistan-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation. The protocol that they inked comprehensively expands cooperation in the resource sector. This includes energy and mineral exploration, oilfield services, a gas pipeline, industrial communication, shared standards, equipment, LNG, coal and chemical cooperation, and hydroelectric power and water management. Here are some background briefings:

* 31 July: “Assessing The Prospects Of Pakistan’s Reported Strategic Roadmap For Trade With Russia”

* 19 September: “Russian-Pakistani Relations Are Surprisingly Taking On Strategic Dimensions”

* 9 October: “It’ll Take Time To Reap The Fruits Of The First-Ever Russian-Pakistani Trade & Investment Forum”

The primary obstacles to their cooperation up until this point were financial and political, the first with regard to Pakistan’s infamous lack of funds and the second due to the US’ influence over its government. It remains unclear how they were surmounted, but it could be that Pakistan will offer Russia preferential stakes in these projects in lieu of cash while the US might have allowed this to happen in order for its historical ally’s decrepit resource infrastructure to finally modernize.

Elaborating more on the last point, private American companies might not be willing to bear the tremendous costs that this could entail due to how long it’ll take to receive a return on their investments, but state Russian companies might not have the same concerns. Moreover, from the US’ strategic perspective, if its own private companies can’t take on these projects due to the unfavourable terms, then it’s better for Russian ones to do so than Chinese ones if Washington is forced to choose.

That’s because the US is competing with China for influence over Pakistan, not with Russia, which will never approach anywhere near those two’s level of influence there. While it might appear to observers that Russia’s strategic resource inroads in Pakistan could erode American influence, they actually serve as a counterweight to China’s by denying the People’s Republic more influence in this sector. The US’ premier influence over Pakistan’s military, political system, and elites remains unaffected by this.

Viewed from an admittedly controversial zero-sum perspective, the gradual growth of Russian influence in parts of the Pakistani economy therefore erodes China’s influence over the country, which in turn strengthens America’s overall strategic position. Sanctioned Russia urgently requires new markets, and it’s willing to pay higher costs for access to them so long as it’s promised high rates of return in the long term through preferential stakes in these projects, thus explaining its national interest in this context.

Readers should also be aware that this is part of Russia’s “Pivot to (South) Asia” that was described in detail here late last month and aims to preemptively avert disproportionate dependence on China. Pakistan also wants to reduce its own already existing such dependence on China, hence why it prefers for Russia to modernize its resource infrastructure, which aligns with US strategic goals. If this trend continues, then it’ll one day be possible to speak about the Russian-US-Chinese interplay in Pakistan.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#China #Economy #Pakistan #Russia #Trade #USA

Three Takeaways From The Impending Launch Of The First Russian-Pakistani Freight Train Service

Three Takeaways From The Impending Launch Of The First Russian-Pakistani Freight Train Service

By Andrew Korybko

The best-case scenario would be for Pakistan to defy the US’ secondary sanctions threats against all those that do business with Iran, patch up its problems with the Taliban, and thus rely on two trade routes to Russia instead of just one, but that might be asking too much of its de facto military junta.

Pakistan Railways Freight CEO Sufiyan Sarfaraz Dogar announced last week that the first Russian-Pakistani freight train service will launch on 15 March and transit across Iran, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. It’ll facilitate the export of Russian energy and industrial products to Pakistan and Pakistan’s export of agricultural ones and textiles to Russia according to reports. This has been a long time in the making and represents the latest milestone in their relations. Here are the top three takeaways:

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* Iran’s Irreplaceable Role In Their Expanded Trade Is A Double-Edged Sword

Next month’s plans show that Russia and Pakistan are prioritizing Iran over Afghanistan as the irreplaceable transit state for expanding their bilateral trade, which is sensible considering the continued Pakistani-Taliban tensions that’ll be touched upon next, but it also carries with it some risks. Trump already revived his first administration’s “maximum pressure” policy against Iran and is therefore expected to impose secondary sanctions against all companies that still trade with it without a waiver.

He’s so serious about this that he threatened to modify or rescind the waiver that his first administration extended to India so he’ll predictably come down harshly against Pakistan too. Therein lies the problem since Pakistan has proven in the past that it’ll comply with American sanctions against Iran, most infamously the one that’s obstructing their over-decade-long pipeline plans, so it might very well do the same during the US’ latest sanctions crackdown and therefore abandon this route for trade with Russia.

* Continued Pakistani-Taliban Tensions Impede The Most Direct Trade Route

Russian-Pakistani trade could be more effectively conducted in terms of cost and time by relying on Afghanistan as their irreplaceable transit state, but that’s not possible so long as Pakistani-Taliban tensions persist. In a nutshell, they boil down to the Taliban suspecting that Pakistan’s de facto military junta is secretly allied with the US against them, while Pakistan accuses them of backing Pashtun and Baloch terrorist groups (perhaps as an asymmetrical means of restoring the lopsided balance of power).

Although Russia is better positioned than anyone else to mediate between them, it hasn’t yet formally attempted this, nor might it ultimately succeed in resolving the security dilemma at the core of their disputes. That’s regrettable since remaining reliant on Iran carries with it the abovementioned risk that Pakistan capitulates to the US’ secondary sanctions pressure. The self-evident solution is to patch up their problems for the greater good of Eurasian connectivity but that’s a lot easier said than done.

* At Least The Will Exists On Both Sides To Expand Bilateral Trade Though

Ending everything on a positive note, it’s laudable that the will exists on both sides to expand bilateral trade in spite of the obstacles that were just described. Quite clearly, a faction/school of the Pakistani Establishment still veritably exists which is serious about diversifying from their country’s economic dependence on China and testing the limits of its traditional political dependence on the US, each by means of Russia. This suggests that the higher-ups are hedging their bets a bit on both.

From the Russian side, there’s a consensus on the need to comprehensively develop relations with non-traditional partners like Pakistan at this historic phase of the global systemic transition to multipolarity, though nobody should be under any illusions about this ever being done at India’s expense. The combined effect of the aforesaid imperatives is that the parties are sincerely attempting to make good on their economic agreements from last year in pursuit of their complementary interests as explained.

———-

The impending launch of the first Russian-Pakistani freight train service across Iran, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan is a big deal, but the obstacles posed by Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy against Iran and continued Pakistani-Taliban tensions might limit bilateral trade. The best-case scenario would therefore be for Pakistan to defy the US on Iran, patch up its problems with the Taliban, and thus rely on two trade routes to Russia instead of just one, but that might be asking too much of its de facto military junta.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#Iran #Pakistan #PakistanArmy #Russia #Taliban

The Merits Of A Demilitarized “Trans-Dnieper” Region Controlled By Non-Western Peacekeepers

The Merits Of A Demilitarized “Trans-Dnieper” Region Controlled By Non-Western Peacekeepers

By Andrew Korybko

This proposal is the most realistic means for keeping the peace after an armistice.

Bloomberg cited unnamed “people with knowledge of Kremlin thinking” to report that Russia will only demand that Ukraine restore its constitutional neutrality, “drastically cut back military ties with the NATO alliance”, limit its army, and freeze the front lines, albeit with some territorial swaps. Also, “The Kremlin’s position is that while individual NATO members may continue to send arms to Ukraine under bilateral security agreements, any such weapons should not be used against Russia or to recapture territory.”

To be sure, Bloomberg might have either invented their sources or they’re uninformed of what the Kremlin thinks, but there’s also the possibility that they’re accurately reflecting what it plans to ask for during peace talks. Hopefully Russia’s demands of Ukraine are more than what Bloomberg just reported, however, because the aforesaid requests would be settling for much less than it might otherwise be able to achieve as suggested by some of the proposals made at the end of this analysis here.

For instance, any agreement to limit the Ukrainian Armed Forces is meaningless without a monitoring mission paired with credible enforcement mechanisms to enforce compliance. After all, even written guarantees that individual NATO members won’t arm Ukraine for the purpose of using these weapons against Russia or to recapture territory – not to mention purely verbal ones – could be broken. There’s also the question of how Russia would respond to future drone and missile strikes from Ukraine.

The most realistic way to address these concerns is through the participation of only non-Western countries in monitoring and peacekeeping roles, the latter of which could concern deployment along the entire Russian-Ukrainian border, including the Line of Contact (LOC). About the second-mentioned, the reported territorial swaps could see Russia give back its part of Kharkov Oblast in exchange for Ukraine giving back its part of Kursk Oblast, which each would formally retain their territorial claims to the other.

This would restore the status quo ante bellum along that part of their universally recognized frontier while serving as a legal workaround against their respective constitutional prohibitions on ceding territory, which in Russia’s case is absolute while Ukraine’s requires a national referendum. Accordingly, freezing the LOC through an armistice a la the Korean precedent wouldn’t violate either of their laws, thus retaining Ukraine’s claims to the entirety of its pre-2014 borders and Russia’s to its post-2022 ones.

As for effectively keeping the peace, Russia could be more confidently assured that Ukraine won’t unilaterally violate the armistice with Western encouragement if the proposed non-Western monitoring and peacekeeping contingent is allowed to inspect all trains and cars that cross the Dnieper eastward. Ukraine might undertake a long-term clandestine campaign to rebuild its heavy weaponry presence in proximity to the DMZ ahead of a possible sneak attack so this would be imperative for impeding that.

Likewise, since such equipment could also be smuggled across the river, these forces should also be given the means for patrolling it as well as the right to detain people, seize their contraband, and use lethal force if they come under attack. Kiev should have a special regime since it’s difficult to enforce such checks given the capital’s location on both sides of the river, but one possibility is fencing off its north-eastern, eastern, and south-eastern reaches beyond the city’s limits and conducting checks there.

The ideal scenario should be to demilitarize everything east of the Dnieper and north of the LOC that remains under Kiev’s formal control, the so-called “Trans-Dnieper” region for lack of a better description, while having its DMZ manned by Russia’s closest non-Western partners. The first part of this suggestion would prevent Ukraine from unilaterally violating the armistice while the second would do the same with regards to Russia since it would be loath to attack Indian and other such friendly peacekeepers.

This proposal takes for granted that NATO will continue expanding its influence in Western Ukraine along that side of the Dnieper, but the river will serve as a major obstacle to on-the-ground offensive action by either party, all while they presumably concentrate air defence systems up and down its banks. It’s unrealistic to expect Russia to plant boots its boots on the NATO-Ukrainian border, monitor everything that crosses, and then hold these positions indefinitely as explained here so this is the next best solution.

In the event that Russia or Ukraine detects illegal military activity by the other in the Trans-Dnieper region such as prohibited arms and special forces, then they should already have a protocol agreed upon as part of their armistice for peacefully addressing this prior to resorting to kinetic action if that fails. This could include a formal complaint with evidence, tasking the non-Western monitoring and peacekeeping mission with investigating, and in the worst-case scenario, drone or missile strikes against those targets.

On-the-ground military activity by either party would be strictly prohibited since that would violate the terms of the armistice and instantly risk another conflict, ergo the purpose of the non-Western monitoring and peacekeeping mission along the DMZ, the Dnieper, and around Eastern Kiev for deterring this. There could also be previously agreed and very severe economic, financial, and other consequences from Western and non-Western countries that would immediately enter into effect if that happens.

Basically, the Trans-Dnieper region would function as a no-man’s land or buffer zone, and the locals who feel uncomfortable living there could either relocate elsewhere in Ukraine such as west of the Dnieper or take advantage of Russia’s simplified procedure from summer 2022 for moving eastward instead. As can be seen, the proposal for a demilitarized Trans-Dnieper region that would be monitored and maintained by non-Western peacekeepers would greatly keep the pace, hence why Russia must demand it.

Any armistice or peace treaty that doesn’t include this outcome risks being unilaterally violated by Ukraine with Western encouragement after some time. Its terms, especially those involving severe multidimensional consequences against whichever party sends ground forces into this zone (though importantly not for carrying out surgical strikes), should also reassure the West that Russia won’t violate this deal either. That’s why the US would do well to seriously consider this proposal if Russia brings it up.

Should Russia settle for less by only demanding what Bloomberg reported, then it would be tacitly requesting nothing more than a temporary lull in hostilities to prepare for the next inevitable phase of the conflict. Officially speaking, Russia remains determined to reach a lasting peace that preferably meets as many of its maximum goals as is realistically possible given the new circumstances in which it now finds itself after over 1,000 days of conflict, so it should be receptive to the Trans-Dnieper proposal.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#Dnieper #Geopolitics #NATO #Russia #TheWest #Ukraine

The US’ Coercion Of Panama Over The Canal Presages Impending Military Tensions With China

The US’ Coercion Of Panama Over The Canal Presages Impending Military Tensions With China

By Andrew Korybko

The US wants to preemptively neutralize as many of the means as possible through which China could asymmetrically respond to this scenario in plausibly deniable ways such as by having its company that controls port facilities on both sides of the canal shut down transit in the event of a crisis.

Panamanian President Jose Raul Mulino declared after meeting with Secretary of State Marco Rubio that his country’s 2017 memorandum of understanding with China on the Belt & Road Initiative won’t be renewed and that it might even terminate the deal earlier. His policy shift was preceded by Trump threatening that “something very powerful is going to happen” if Panama doesn’t neutralize China’s influence over the canal and follows Rubio elaborating on the US’ perceived threat assessment.

He told Megyn Kelly last week that the Hong Kong-based company which built port facilities on both sides of the canal is under the Chinese government’s control and could thus shut down transit through that waterway as part of Beijing’s contingency planning in the event of a crisis with Washington. It’s unimportant whether others share this assessment since all that matters is that this is how Trump 2.0 sees everything and is the reason why it’s coercing Panama over the canal.

That observation presages impending Sino-US military tensions since the US wouldn’t preemptively make these moves without expecting a possible worsening of relations with China. Trump already escalated his famous trade war with China over the weekend by imposing additional 10% tariffs on it but that on its own likely won’t lead to a full-fledged crisis between them. Rather, it’s the US’ opposition to China’s regional territorial claims over Taiwan and the East and South China Seas that could result in this.

Accordingly, there are reasons to expect that the US will more forcefully push back against those aforesaid claims in the coming future, ergo the need to secure the Panama Canal just in case tensions spiral out of control and Beijing orders its company there to shut down transit as a plausibly deniable asymmetrical response. That could greatly harm the US economy together with greatly impeding the US Navy’s ability to rapidly build up its capabilities in the Indo-Pacific in response to a regional crisis there.

Trump 1.0’s National Security Strategy in 2017 already declared China to be the US’ strategic competitor so it follows that his second administration would build upon that by more muscularly containing China. Prior to that, it’s imperative that the US preemptively neutralizes as many of the means as possible through which China could asymmetrically respond to that in plausibly deniable ways, with the Panama Canal scenario being among Trump 2.0’s priorities due to its importance in American grand strategy.

Likewise, remaining bogged down in Eastern Europe fighting a hopeless proxy war with Russia that Rubio admitted that Ukraine can’t win and is actually leading to its destruction has kept tens of thousands of US troops on the other side of Eurasia, hence the need to end the conflict sooner than later so they can subsequently redeploy to the Indo-Pacific for containing China instead. This explains the urgency with which Trump 2.0 wants to at least freeze that conflict and might thus make some concessions to Russia.

Readers can learn more about how that might look here, which is beyond the scope of this analysis, but the point is that everything that Trump is now doing on the world stage is connected in one way or another to his administration’s preparations for impending military tensions with China. Some plans like neutralizing China’s influence over the Panama Canal are more clear-cut while others like his threats to tariff the EU aren’t as easily understandable in this context but they’re all perceived by him in this way.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#China #Geopolitics #PanamaCanal #USA

The US Will Struggle To Get Europe To Abide By Putin’s Demand To Stop Arming Ukraine

The US Will Struggle To Get Europe To Abide By Putin’s Demand To Stop Arming Ukraine

By Andrew Korybko

A compromise is possible whereby the Europeans are pressured by the US into stockpiling their Ukrainian-destined arms in Poland and Romania for swift shipment across the border if hostilities re-erupt sometime after a ceasefire, armistice, or peace treaty is agreed to.

The official Kremlin readout from Putin’s most recent phone call with Trump shared Putin’s demand that “a complete cessation of providing Kiev with foreign military aid and intelligence must become the key condition for preventing an escalation of the conflict and making progress towards its resolution.” Trump’s temporary suspension of such assistance proves that he has the political will to shut it off for good if he gets what he wants from negotiations with Putin, but the Europeans are a different story.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Trump during a Cabinet meeting on Monday before the end of the 12-hour-long Russian-US talks in Riyadh that day that “You’ve [promoted despite] despite impediments from other countries”, which was arguably an allusion to the Europeans’ warmongering. Although deliberately vague, he might very well have been referring to the EU’s and UK’s plans to continue arming Ukraine in spite of Putin’s demand that this cease as one of his most important conditions for peace.

Poland, Romania, and the Black Sea in descending order serve as the entry points for foreign weapons into Ukraine, none of which the US has full control over. It jointly operates the Rzeszow logistics hub in south-eastern Poland through which an estimated 90-95% of all weapons to Ukraine pass but this facility can continue functioning even if the US pulls out. The situation is similar with Romania’s newly built “Moldova Highway” for facilitating the shipment of arms from Greek ports to Ukraine.

The US military only jointly operates local port facilities in Alexandroupolis while having no direct influence over the “Moldova Highway”, both of which can also continue functioning without it. As for the Black Sea, the new grain deal that the US is negotiating with Russia could either lead to international checks on cargo for detecting arms trafficking or create a plausible cover for this trade. In any case, just like the preceding two, the point is that others besides the US can rely on this route too.

Trump is unlikely to threaten economic sanctions against nominal NATO allies whose countries continue to arm Ukraine even if his own decides to cut it off for good as part of the series of pragmatic compromises that it’s negotiating with Russia for sustainably ending the conflict. The only scenario in which he might rally Congress to pass another arms package is if Russia significantly expands its ground campaign beyond the regions that it claims as its own as was discussed here.

As long as that doesn’t happen, then the US’ Biden-era aid will soon run out and Ukraine will then be entirely dependent on European aid, but it’s unclear whether that drastic curtailment in aid (also keeping in mind their already greatly depleted stockpiles) would suffice for Russia to cease hostilities. Putin might agree to it as part of the series of pragmatic compromises that he’s negotiating with Trump, or he could still lean on his counterpart to exert more pressure on the Europeans to follow in his footsteps.

Trump’s hands would be tied in the second scenario as was just explained, but he could also lead from the front by suggesting that the Europeans instead stockpile the equipment that they want to send to Ukraine in Poland and Romania per their “security guarantee” commitments to Kiev. These refer to the bilateral pacts clinched last year whereby major countries like the UK, France, Poland, Italy, and the US itself basically agreed to resume their existing level of support for Ukraine if hostilities re-erupt.

Whatever weapons the Europeans might still send to Ukraine wouldn’t compensate for the cut-off of US aid so they’d be transferring their equipment to be destroyed for no purpose other than delaying the inevitable political resolution of the conflict, by which time Russia could even gain more ground. Putin might of course prefer for NATO not to stockpile anything in proximity to Ukraine’s borders for swift shipment across if there’s a continuation war, but Russia can’t control what they do on their territory.

Trump and his team would therefore do well to convey these points to the Europeans in order to facilitate the Ukrainian peace process. Putin might not agree to a ceasefire or armistice so long as the Europeans continue arming Ukraine, which would be futile on their part in any case, while they’d just be wasting their weapons that could otherwise be put to better use if hostilities re-erupt and the US thus restores its prior level of support for Ukraine. This proposed compromise might lead to a breakthrough.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Voice of East

2025-03-12 17:57:50

Will Putin Agree To A Ceasefire?

Will Putin Agree To A Ceasefire?

By Andrew Korybko

There are five compelling arguments for either scenario.

Ukraine just agreed to a month-long ceasefire after talks with the US in Jeddah, but it’s conditional on Russia agreeing to the same, which remains uncertain. Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff is expected to pay his second trip to Moscow in just as many months later this week, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz plans to speak to Russian officials soon, while Trump said that he hopes to talk to Putin by Friday. All three will try to convince Putin to silence the guns. Here’s why he might not agree to do that:

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1. Russia Wants To Liberate All The Occupied Territories

Putin declared last June that he’d only agree to a ceasefire if Ukraine withdrew from the entirety of the four regions that voted to join Russia in September 2022 and publicly abandoned its plans to join NATO. That was shortly before Ukraine invaded Russia’s universally recognized Kursk Region. Agreeing to a ceasefire now with no guarantee that it’ll lead to the liberation of those five regions could result in the indefinite occupation of at least some of them if the front lines harden into a Korean-DMZ.

2. The Front Lines Might Soon Collapse To Russia’s Benefit

It’s obvious that one of the primary reasons why Ukraine agreed to a month-long ceasefire conditional on Russia agreeing to the same, apart from resuming the US’ previously cut military and intelligence aid, is to prevent the front lines from soon collapsing to Russia’s benefit. Aware of this, Russia might decide to carry on – perhaps advancing while negotiating additional terms to the proposed ceasefire – in order to take full advantage of this, thus raising the chances of speedily liberating all the occupied territories.

3. Russia Wants To Scare Away Western Peacekeepers

European peacekeepers might enter Ukraine during the month-long ceasefire, or some of their “mercenaries” who are already there might simply switch uniforms to then take on this role instead, which Russia already said would be absolutely unacceptable and make them legitimate targets. Keeping the conflict going might therefore scare them away from this and thus ensure that de facto NATO forces are kept as far away from Russia’s western border as possible.

4. Some Of The Russian Public Don’t Want A Ceasefire

A significant share of the Russian public, including veterans of the special operation, are thought to be against any ceasefire since they’d consider it to be stopping halfway instead of finishing the job after all the sacrifices that were paid to get this far. The authorities are sensitive to public opinion on the conflict, especially from veterans, so their opposition to this might be taken into consideration more than outside observers expect and could thus push Putin a lot closer to rejecting a ceasefire than most other factors.

5. Putin Might Really Believe That Trump Is Bluffing

And finally, the most decisive factor might be that Putin truly believes that Trump is bluffing about “escalating to de-escalate”, whether economically-financially through the strict enforcement of secondary sanctions against India, China, etc., and/or militarily by going all-in backing Ukraine. If that’s the case, then it follows that Putin only entertained negotiations to see whether he could achieve his maximum goals through diplomatic means, absent which he’d continue pursuing them militarily.

—–

There’s also the chance that Putin agrees to a ceasefire, which could be explained in the following ways:

1. Russia Wants To Avert Disproportionate Dependence On China

Trump’s tweet last Friday suggested that he plans strict secondary sanctions enforcement against India and China if Putin rejects a ceasefire, which could lead to the first complying and thus placing Russia in the position where it would become much more dependent on the second. Russia has thus far relied on India as its friendly counterbalance vis-a-vis China, but if Putin is informed that this might no longer be the case if Russia keeps fighting, then he might opt for peace to avoid becoming China’s junior partner.

2. It Also Wants To Beat China To The Chase With The “New Détente”

Putin wouldn’t just be rejecting a ceasefire, but also a “New Détente” with the US, which could lead to China replacing Russia in this arrangement if Trump travels to China next month like the latest reports claim and then negotiates a deal for ending their trade war. The recalibrated triangulation that might follow wouldn’t be in Russia’s interests, especially if the US gets China to comply with sanctions in order to coerce Russia into peace, so Putin might agree to a ceasefire in order to avert this scenario as well.

3. The “New Détente” Could Geopolitically Revolutionize The World

Putin might calculate that beating China to the chase with the “New Détente” and becoming more of a strategic partner to the US than the EU are worth pragmatic compromises on Ukraine since these two outcomes could geopolitically revolutionize the world to Russia’s grand strategic advantage. If that’s what he’s thinking, then he might defy popular expectations to boldly agree to a ceasefire, after which publicly financed media would explain the rationale to Russia’s supporters at home and abroad.

4. Additional (& Even Secret) Terms Might Be Attached To The Ceasefire

Building upon the above, additional (and even secret) terms might be attached to the ceasefire for guaranteeing that Western peacekeepers won’t enter Ukraine and that the US won’t maximally rearm it during that period, which Russia could get the US to agree to via creative resource diplomacy. Giving the US privileged access to Russian energy and minerals, especially the rare earth ones that it needs for competing with China, might be all that it takes for Trump to put the kibosh on those two aforesaid fears.

5. Putin Might Really Believe That Trump Is Serious

And finally, the most decisive factor might be that Putin truly believes that Trump is serious about “escalating to de-escalate”, in which case he might prefer not to risk a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis that could hypothetically end with Russia compromising on much more than if it agreed to a ceasefire. Putin is a pragmatist who prefers managing tensions instead of exacerbating them, with the only recent exception being the decision to use the Oreshniks as explained here, so he might take Trump up on this.

———-

Everyone will soon find out whether or not Putin agrees to a ceasefire, but whichever decision he makes, the five reasons that were shared for each scenario would compellingly explain his choice. It’s anyone’s guess what he’ll do since each scenario’s arguments are persuasive and he knows that this is his most fateful decision since the special operation. Putin might therefore ask their respective Kremlin proponents to debate amongst themselves in front of him one last time before making up his mind.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Trump may meet Xi in China as soon as April despite escalating trade war, insiders say

US President Donald Trump could visit China as early as next month, according to multiple diplomatic sources, as the American leader has appeared focused on ...

^{South China Morning Post (Yahoo News)}

Putin’s Victory Day Truce Is Meant To Reassure Trump Of His Peaceful Intentions

Putin’s Victory Day Truce Is Meant To Reassure Trump Of His Peaceful Intentions

By Andrew Korybko

Putin might be concerned that Zelensky manipulated Trump against him after their latest meeting given Trump’s subsequent angry post about Putin.

The Kremlin announced on Monday that Russia will temporarily suspend military action against Ukraine from midnight on May 7-8 to midnight on May 10-11 for humanitarian reasons in honour of Victory Day. Just like with the recent Easter truce, however, Russia also warned that there’ll be an “adequate and effective response” if Ukraine violates it. The larger context in which this second Russian-initiated truce in recent weeks is taking place concerns Trump’s increasing irritation with Putin.

It was earlier explained how “Five Significant Disagreements Account For Trump’s Newfound Anger With Putin” that manifested itself over the weekend by Trump speculating in a post that “maybe [Putin] doesn’t want to stop the war, he’s just tapping me along”. Trump also threatened banking and secondary sanctions. At the same time, however, Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that new sanctions would prolong the conflict by promptly ending the peace process so Trump might just be bluffing for now.

Be that as it may, Putin might have interpreted Trump’s post as proof of him having been negatively influenced by Zelensky following their latest meeting at the Vatican the day prior during Pope Francis’ funeral, which could explain why he decided upon a Victory Day truce and then announced it so early. Regardless of whatever observers might think about Russia’s terms for ending the conflict, not to mention their feasibility, Putin’s move is arguably meant to reassure Trump of his peaceful intentions.

Putin isn’t “tapping Trump along”, he’s just reluctant to agree to what Reuters reported to be the terms of the US’ finalized peace plan, which entail major concessions that would basically freeze the conflict in exchange for sanctions relief without addressing some of Russia’s core demands. These include Ukraine’s demilitarization and restoring its minorities’ socio-religious rights, especially those of ethnic Russians and Russian Orthodox Christians, though Ukraine’s path to NATO would be blocked if this deal is reached.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov recently confirmed that Russia isn’t seeking Zelensky’s removal and is ready to resume bilateral negotiations without any preconditions, but neither should be interpreted as capitulation, just as attempts to get Ukraine to comply with more of Russia’s demands. Lavrov repeated these selfsame demands in his latest interview with Brazil’s O Globo newspaper, though at the same time, he also just told CBS’ Margaret Brennan that Russia is seeking a “balance of interests”.

This should be interpreted as a sincere willingness to compromise in some creative way that meets more of Russia’s demands, but the Kremlin claimed on Monday that Ukraine has shown no interest in this. Even so, while Russia hopes that the newly announced Victory Day truce might get Ukraine to reconsider, Putin’s primary objective right now is to convince Trump that he’s serious about peace. To that end, once again temporarily ceasing hostilities can help, though it can only do so much.

If tangible progress towards peace isn’t soon achieved, then the US might abandon its mediation efforts, the consequences of which were analysed here. In that scenario, it can’t be ruled out that the US might double down on its armed aid to Ukraine in parallel with imposing secondary sanctions against Russia, which Putin doesn’t want to risk. That’s why he just announced another truce, and so early at that, in order to show Trump that he still wants to attain more of his goals through diplomacy instead of force.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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The UK’s 100-Year Partnership Pact With Ukraine Is Just A Public Relations Stunt

The UK’s 100-Year Partnership Pact With Ukraine Is Just A Public Relations Stunt

By Andrew Korybko

In terms of the bigger picture, the UK definitely wants to play a long-term and highly strategic role in Ukraine, but the extent to which it can execute its lofty plans as contained in last January’s “security guarantee” pact and their latest rehash last week largely depends on the US.

The UK and Ukraine clinched a 100-year partnership pact on Thursday in a development that’s supposed to highlight their enduring commitment to one another, but it’s really just a public relations stunt since the document only rehashes what was previously agreed upon a year ago. The UK extended so-called “security guarantees” to Ukraine on 12 January 2024, which covered everything contained in their latest pact, with the notable exception being that the latter talks about “exploring options” for “military bases”.

While RT importantly drew attention to this, the UK never made a secret about its plans to move in that direction, but the century-long timeframe means that it might not happen in anyone’s lifetime, if at all. This declaration of intent was seemingly timed to coincide with Trump’s return to office since it correspondingly serves morale-boosting purposes among Western and Ukrainian anti-Russian hawks amidst his team’s signals that the US will at least partially disengage from that country moving forward.

Trump’s nominee for Secretary of State Marco Rubio declared during his Senate confirmation hearing the day prior on Wednesday that “This war must end. Everyone should be realistic: Russia, Ukraine, and the US will have to make concessions.” The writing was already on the wall long before that, however, so no one should be surprised. This reinforces the claim that the UK’s 100-year partnership pact with Ukraine, the intent of which was hitherto unknown till this week, is just a superficial response to Trump.

To be sure, some part of their “security guarantees” will probably enter into force, such as more joint arms production. The establishment of a British base in Ukraine is unlikely anytime soon though since it’s unthinkable that Trump would agree to have the US defend the UK per Article 5 if its troops there come under attack by Russia. After all, he wants to partially disengage from Ukraine so as to “Pivot (back) to Asia”, but the aforesaid scenario is a Damocles’ sword preventing that from ever occurring in full.

The British aren’t expected to build such a base without American reassurance that it’ll have their back in that event, but even if they did, it’s almost certain that the US would coerce the UK to back down should London decide to provoke a Cuban-like nuclear brinksmanship scenario if its forces are attacked. That associated clause in their 100-year partnership pact about “exploring” this “option” is therefore the embodiment of this public relations spectacle that might even be forgotten by as early as next week.

In terms of the bigger picture, the UK definitely wants to play a long-term and highly strategic role in Ukraine, but the extent to which it can execute its lofty plans as contained in last January’s “security guarantee” pact and their latest rehash last week largely depends on the US as explained. So long as it successfully disengages from Ukraine at least in part and doesn’t allow for Article 5 to be activated for foreign troops in Ukraine who come under attack from Russia, then these ambitions will be contained.

This observation goes to show just how much the US determines the military-strategic dynamics in post-conflict Ukraine. By behaving responsibly in compromising with Russia, especially if some of the dozen ideas that were proposed at the end of this article here are implemented or at least this proposal here for a demilitarized Trans-Dnieper region, the US can greatly reduce the risk of another war breaking out. The UK wants to further divide-and-rule Europe, but it’ll struggle to succeed if the US isn’t on board.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Five Significant Disagreements Account For Trump’s Newfound Anger With Putin

Five Significant Disagreements Account For Trump’s Newfound Anger With Putin

By Andrew Korybko

The peace process might go kaput if they can’t resolve these issues.

Trump speculated that Russia’s bombing of civilian areas might signal that “maybe [Putin] doesn’t want to stop the war, he’s just tapping me along”, and then reiterated his earlier threat to impose “secondary sanctions” against those who violate the US’ primary ones, which was analysed here. This followed Trump’s latest meeting with Zelensky, who might have negatively influenced over his hitherto largely positive perceptions of Putin, and comes after reports that the US has finalized its peace plan.

Five significant disagreements that have emerged throughout the course of negotiations account for Trump’s volte-face toward Putin.

1. The first was referenced by Trump in his post where he condemned Russia’s bombing of civilian areas. Putin argued earlier in April that Russia is targeting Ukrainian troops there, but the optics of continued Russian strikes against civilian areas amidst peace talks with the US evidently left a very negative impression on Trump, who now doubts Putin’s commitment to peace.
2. The second concerns European peacekeepers in Ukraine, which the US’ reportedly finalized peace plan suggests despite Russia opposing it. Although Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth already declared that the US won’t extend Article 5 mutual defence guarantees to NATO countries’ troops in Ukraine, Russia fears that the US could be manipulated by the Europeans into mission creep if the latter deploy there. Putin therefore prefers for there to be no ambiguity about this and for Trump to scrub it from his plan.
3. Third, it’s unclear whether Ukraine will be obligated to at least partially demilitarize like Kiev provisionally agreed to do during spring 2022’s ultimately failed peace talks, which is one of Russia’s explicitly declared goals in the conflict. Trump is reluctant to support this since he seems to believe that it could embolden Putin to recommence hostilities in the future, especially in the absence of European peacekeepers, but this demand isn’t something that Putin could easily walk away from.
4. The fourth disagreement is over the US’ refusal to accede to Russia’s demand for coercing Ukraine into withdrawing from the disputed territories that are still under Kiev’s control. The New York Times cited a source who described this as “unreasonable and unachievable”, but it’s imperative for Russia after the Kremlin recognized the entirety of these regions as Russian following September 2022’s referenda. Just like with demilitarization, Putin also can’t easily walk away from this either, hence the disagreement.
5. And finally, the US’ reportedly finalized peace plan also requests that Russia hand over the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant and Kakhovka Dam to the US, which is as unacceptable for Putin as the preceding points of accepting European peacekeepers, dropping demilitarization, and curbing his territorial claims.

All five disagreements, including the first-mentioned one about Russia’s continued strikes against military targets in civilian areas, collectively contributed to this impasse right before the diplomatic finish line.

If Putin and Trump can’t resolve these issues, after which Trump would then also have to get Zelensky to agree to their new deal, then the peace process will probably go kaput. Putin and Trump are incentivized to resolve their disputes due to how mutually beneficial the nascent Russian–US “New Détente” is while Zelensky would struggle to continue fighting if the US once again cuts off military aid as punishment for rejecting whatever those two agree to. Be that as it may, it’ll still be very difficult to break this deadlock.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Zelensky Might Have An Ace Up His Sleeve If He Decides To Run Again

Zelensky Might Have An Ace Up His Sleeve If He Decides To Run Again

By Andrew Korybko

The staggering scale of Ukraine’s military losses likely isn’t reflected in its voter lists, which Zelensky might thus exploit to fraudulently help him win re-election through an avalanche of fake votes.

The Economist cited unnamed Ukrainian sources over the weekend to report that Zelensky might be planning to run for re-election during a deliberately short campaign season that could conclude by mid-summer and thus place his rivals at a major disadvantage by giving them less time to make their case. He’s considering this as a means of preventing Trump and Putin, who he believes are conspiring against him whether on their own or together, from pushing him out of power through upcoming elections.

Zelensky might have an ace up his sleeve if he goes through with this plan, however, since it’s likely that many of the soldiers who were killed might not have been taken off of the Central Election Commission’s voter lists. This could then be exploited to fraudulently help him win re-election through an avalanche of fake votes. After all, Zelensky claimed earlier this year that Ukraine only lost around 46,000 troops, while Russian sources usually allege that over ten times that amount have been killed so far.

For what it’s worth, the latest exchange of fallen soldiers saw Ukraine receive 909 bodies and Russia 43, which is a 21:1 ratio. It’s therefore likely that Russian estimates of Ukrainian losses are closer to reality than Zelensky’s are. That probably being the case, it can consequently be intuited that the yawning discrepancy between Kiev’s official figures and reality isn’t officially reflected in the voter lists. If the latter were updated, then Zelensky wouldn’t be able to keep up the charade of only 46,000 losses.

His government can’t admit that many times more soldiers were killed otherwise morale would plummet, all their prior lies would be exposed, and he’d be further discredited. Accordingly, there’s little chance that he’d allow the voter lists to be updated to reflect the staggering scale of his side’s losses, especially since keeping them hidden could facilitate electoral fraud. There’s no reason why he’d deprive himself of this after already illegitimately remaining in power since the expiry of his term last May.

To the contrary, he has every reason to ensure that Ukraine’s losses aren’t reflected in the voter lists, which he could accomplish by leveraging his influence over corrupt institutions. Anyone who leaks the truth about this, whether with respect to Ukraine’s real losses or his potential attempt to defraud the next elections through these means, could be arrested by the SBU on “national security” pretexts. Ukraine is already a police state in which this agency wields full control so it’s not a far-fetched scenario.

It’s here where the US could make a difference by publicly releasing its official estimates of Ukraine’s losses and demanding that the voter lists are updated to reflect them as the precondition for recognizing the outcome of the next elections. Zelensky would thus be forced into the dilemma of either openly defying the US and correspondingly discrediting the electoral process in the world’s eyes or complying and correspondingly discrediting himself at home by exposing his own prior lies about Ukraine’s losses.

It’ll also take time to properly update the voter lists, and the US might even demand that it supervises this process to reduce the likelihood of fraud, which could extend the amount of time that it takes and therefore result in a longer campaign season than he might be planning. That would assuredly help his rivals, who the US might then back to help push Zelensky out through these means as Trump’s revenge for their fight in the White House in late February. It’ll be interesting to see what comes next.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Voice of East

2025-03-01 17:00:11

Zelensky Picked His Fight With Trump And Vance After Getting Cold Feet About Making Peace

Zelensky Picked His Fight With Trump And Vance After Getting Cold Feet About Making Peace

By Andrew Korybko

Zelensky was triggered after realizing that the Trump Administration wants to coerce him into peace with Putin and won’t be manipulated into prolonging, let alone escalating, the conflict after signing their rare earth minerals deal like he somehow expected that they would.

Friday’s spectacle in the Oval Office will forever be remembered as one of the most epic failures that any foreign leaders has made after Zelensky delusionally thought that that he could disrespect Vice President Vance on live TV in front of Trump without any consequences while being a guest in their country. Readers can watch the full recording here, which shows Zelensky aggressively reacting to Vance’s benign comment about prioritizing diplomacy with Putin over the prior administration’s failed tough talk.

Everything then spiralled out of control after Zelensky accused Vance of speaking loudly to him, which prompted Trump to contradict Zelensky and tell him to keep quiet since he’s already talked too much, all while brutally berating him in a scene that had never been witnessed before in America’s highest office. Trump and Vance also accused Zelensky of being ungrateful for American aid after he lied about Ukraine being left alone since the start of the conflict and reminded him of how disrespectfully he was behaving.

Trump wrapped everything up by warning that the US might completely end its support for Ukraine if Zelensky doesn’t agree to make peace with Putin before unprecedentedly kicking Zelensky out of the White House. To add insult to injury, White House staffers then ate the lunch that was already prepared for Zelensky and his team with the expectation that they’d sign the rare earth minerals deal that was the reason behind his visit. Trump also posted on social media about how Zelensky disrespected the US.

For as clear-cut as the sequence of events was for any objective observer who watched the roughly 10-minute footage that was hyperlinked to in the introductory paragraph, namely that Zelensky provoked his two hosts by disrespecting Vance, the Financial Times’ Ben Hall had a totally different view. According to him, “it is not hard to imagine that Vance and Trump were spoiling for a fight with the Ukrainian leader…Arguably, the stage was set for an ambush” when Zelensky arrived in the Oval Office.

While it’s true that Zelensky and Trump were just embroiled in a vicious spat prior to the Ukrainian leader’s arrival to the US, his American counterpart invited him to visit because he wanted to patch up their problems by signing the rare earth minerals deal and then discuss a path to peace with Putin. Trump treated Zelensky benevolently prior to Zelensky trying to disrespect Vance, as did Vance, who didn’t say anything personal or insulting before Zelensky suddenly decided to harangue him.

It seems like Zelensky was triggered after realizing that the Trump Administration wants to coerce him into peace with Putin and won’t be manipulated into prolonging, let alone escalating, the conflict after signing their rare earth minerals deal like he somehow expected that they would. For that reason, he then decided to sabotage the talks by creating a spectacle, possibly hoping that it would justify abruptly refusing to sign the aforesaid deal if they were going to use it right afterwards to pressure him to peace.

Zelensky isn’t being advised by anyone with even basic insight into how Trump operates otherwise he’d have known that public pressure on his counterpart always backfires. Zelensky would also never have thought that the US needs Ukraine for anything more than Ukraine needs the US. Trump is already considering a more important rare earth minerals deal with Putin so he doesn’t even need Ukraine’s resources whereas Ukraine has no alternative to American arms and is thus fully dependent on it.

This observation brings the analysis to the penultimate point about how Trump ominously left unanswered a question about whether he’ll suspend military aid to Ukraine like he threatened at the end of his and Vance’s heated exchange with Zelensky. If that’s what he ends up doing, and it’s too early to say for sure, then it would represent the worst-case scenario for the Europeans since Russia could then carry on as far westward as it wants if the front lines collapse without fear of the US intervening.

Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth already confirmed a few weeks ago that the US won’t extend Article 5 guarantees to any NATO country’s troops in Ukraine so the UK, France, and whoever else might have considered dispatching them there in that event will now be forced to think twice about it. In other words, Russia could hypothetically carry on as far as Ukraine’s border with NATO if it wants to, though Putin might stop far short of that if a breakthrough coerces Kiev into complying with his demands.

The final point to make is that what happened in Oval Office on Friday was truly a black swan in the sense that nobody could have expected that Zelensky would ruin his relations with Trump right at the moment when they were supposed to sign their rare earth minerals deal that would then pave the way to peace. Trump even exclaimed during the height of their drama how the US was giving Ukraine cards to play for helping it end the conflict on much better terms than if he didn’t diplomatically involve himself in it.

He was therefore very serious about brokering peace between Zelensky and Putin, hence why he was so exasperated at Zelensky’s blatant disrespect once everything started snowballing after Zelensky began to disrespect Vance, which explains why he unprecedentedly kicked him out of the White House. The “New Détente” that Trump wants to broker with Putin, which readers can learn more about from the five analyses hyperlinked in the middle of this one here, is largely predicated on forcing Zelensky into peace.

Zelensky’s last-minute decision to sabotage the peace process by creating a global spectacle caught Trump off guard, but he wasn’t going to let Zelensky disrespect Vance with impunity, let alone after Zelensky’s disrespect transformed into disrespect for the US. That’s not to say that the “New Détente” is now derailed since Trump and Putin still have the will to enter into a series of mutual compromises aimed at establishing strategic ties, but just that it might now proceed independently of Ukraine.

Accordingly, it was actually Zelensky who ruined everything, not Trump and Vance. They could never have expected that he’d burn Ukraine’s bridges with the US knowing that it’s impossible for Ukraine to replace US military aid. Those two thought that he came to DC to sign the rare earth minerals deal that would then place them all on the path to peace with Putin. Perhaps Zelensky didn’t realize what he was getting into until it was too late, by which time he let his emotions get the best of him, but who knows.

In any case, it’s very difficult to imagine there being any rapprochement between Zelensky and Trump or Ukraine and the US in general without Zelensky leaving office or fully capitulating to Trump’s demands. If he defiantly perpetuates the conflict and the US cuts him off, then Russia will pretty much be given free rein by Washington to do whatever it wants with Ukraine, though it’s unknown how the EU would react. Everything will become clearer by next week though once it’s known exactly what Zelensky plans to do.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Trump leaves question on possible suspension of military aid to Ukraine unanswered

"It doesn't matter what I'm considering," he told reporters

^TASS

Will Putin Agree To A Ceasefire?

Will Putin Agree To A Ceasefire?

By Andrew Korybko

There are five compelling arguments for either scenario.

Ukraine just agreed to a month-long ceasefire after talks with the US in Jeddah, but it’s conditional on Russia agreeing to the same, which remains uncertain. Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff is expected to pay his second trip to Moscow in just as many months later this week, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz plans to speak to Russian officials soon, while Trump said that he hopes to talk to Putin by Friday. All three will try to convince Putin to silence the guns. Here’s why he might not agree to do that:

———-

1. Russia Wants To Liberate All The Occupied Territories

Putin declared last June that he’d only agree to a ceasefire if Ukraine withdrew from the entirety of the four regions that voted to join Russia in September 2022 and publicly abandoned its plans to join NATO. That was shortly before Ukraine invaded Russia’s universally recognized Kursk Region. Agreeing to a ceasefire now with no guarantee that it’ll lead to the liberation of those five regions could result in the indefinite occupation of at least some of them if the front lines harden into a Korean-DMZ.

2. The Front Lines Might Soon Collapse To Russia’s Benefit

It’s obvious that one of the primary reasons why Ukraine agreed to a month-long ceasefire conditional on Russia agreeing to the same, apart from resuming the US’ previously cut military and intelligence aid, is to prevent the front lines from soon collapsing to Russia’s benefit. Aware of this, Russia might decide to carry on – perhaps advancing while negotiating additional terms to the proposed ceasefire – in order to take full advantage of this, thus raising the chances of speedily liberating all the occupied territories.

3. Russia Wants To Scare Away Western Peacekeepers

European peacekeepers might enter Ukraine during the month-long ceasefire, or some of their “mercenaries” who are already there might simply switch uniforms to then take on this role instead, which Russia already said would be absolutely unacceptable and make them legitimate targets. Keeping the conflict going might therefore scare them away from this and thus ensure that de facto NATO forces are kept as far away from Russia’s western border as possible.

4. Some Of The Russian Public Don’t Want A Ceasefire

A significant share of the Russian public, including veterans of the special operation, are thought to be against any ceasefire since they’d consider it to be stopping halfway instead of finishing the job after all the sacrifices that were paid to get this far. The authorities are sensitive to public opinion on the conflict, especially from veterans, so their opposition to this might be taken into consideration more than outside observers expect and could thus push Putin a lot closer to rejecting a ceasefire than most other factors.

5. Putin Might Really Believe That Trump Is Bluffing

And finally, the most decisive factor might be that Putin truly believes that Trump is bluffing about “escalating to de-escalate”, whether economically-financially through the strict enforcement of secondary sanctions against India, China, etc., and/or militarily by going all-in backing Ukraine. If that’s the case, then it follows that Putin only entertained negotiations to see whether he could achieve his maximum goals through diplomatic means, absent which he’d continue pursuing them militarily.

—–

There’s also the chance that Putin agrees to a ceasefire, which could be explained in the following ways:

1. Russia Wants To Avert Disproportionate Dependence On China

Trump’s tweet last Friday suggested that he plans strict secondary sanctions enforcement against India and China if Putin rejects a ceasefire, which could lead to the first complying and thus placing Russia in the position where it would become much more dependent on the second. Russia has thus far relied on India as its friendly counterbalance vis-a-vis China, but if Putin is informed that this might no longer be the case if Russia keeps fighting, then he might opt for peace to avoid becoming China’s junior partner.

2. It Also Wants To Beat China To The Chase With The “New Détente”

Putin wouldn’t just be rejecting a ceasefire, but also a “New Détente” with the US, which could lead to China replacing Russia in this arrangement if Trump travels to China next month like the latest reports claim and then negotiates a deal for ending their trade war. The recalibrated triangulation that might follow wouldn’t be in Russia’s interests, especially if the US gets China to comply with sanctions in order to coerce Russia into peace, so Putin might agree to a ceasefire in order to avert this scenario as well.

3. The “New Détente” Could Geopolitically Revolutionize The World

Putin might calculate that beating China to the chase with the “New Détente” and becoming more of a strategic partner to the US than the EU are worth pragmatic compromises on Ukraine since these two outcomes could geopolitically revolutionize the world to Russia’s grand strategic advantage. If that’s what he’s thinking, then he might defy popular expectations to boldly agree to a ceasefire, after which publicly financed media would explain the rationale to Russia’s supporters at home and abroad.

4. Additional (& Even Secret) Terms Might Be Attached To The Ceasefire

Building upon the above, additional (and even secret) terms might be attached to the ceasefire for guaranteeing that Western peacekeepers won’t enter Ukraine and that the US won’t maximally rearm it during that period, which Russia could get the US to agree to via creative resource diplomacy. Giving the US privileged access to Russian energy and minerals, especially the rare earth ones that it needs for competing with China, might be all that it takes for Trump to put the kibosh on those two aforesaid fears.

5. Putin Might Really Believe That Trump Is Serious

And finally, the most decisive factor might be that Putin truly believes that Trump is serious about “escalating to de-escalate”, in which case he might prefer not to risk a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis that could hypothetically end with Russia compromising on much more than if it agreed to a ceasefire. Putin is a pragmatist who prefers managing tensions instead of exacerbating them, with the only recent exception being the decision to use the Oreshniks as explained here, so he might take Trump up on this.

———-

Everyone will soon find out whether or not Putin agrees to a ceasefire, but whichever decision he makes, the five reasons that were shared for each scenario would compellingly explain his choice. It’s anyone’s guess what he’ll do since each scenario’s arguments are persuasive and he knows that this is his most fateful decision since the special operation. Putin might therefore ask their respective Kremlin proponents to debate amongst themselves in front of him one last time before making up his mind.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Ukraine Already Kinda Has Article 5 Guarantees From Some NATO Countries

Ukraine Already Kinda Has Article 5 Guarantees From Some NATO Countries

By Andrew Korybko

Considering that Article 5 always left the option of armed force up to each individual member, which remains the case with each of the bilateral “security guarantees” that Ukraine reached with some of them over the past year, Meloni’s dramatic proposal doesn’t actually amount to anything new.

Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni made headlines after suggesting that NATO’s Article 5 should be extended to Ukraine even if it doesn’t formally join the bloc. In her words, “Extending the same coverage that NATO countries have to Ukraine would certainly be much more effective (than dispatching peacekeepers), while being something different from NATO’s membership.” What she didn’t mention is that Ukraine already kinda has these guarantees from some NATO countries, including Italy.

They were agreed to with Italy, the US, UK, France, Germany, Poland, and others throughout the course of the past year, which readers can confirm through each of the preceding hyperlinks that redirect to the full text of their respective pacts from official government sources. The common thread between them is that they all promise to resume their existing level of military-technical cooperation with Ukraine (ex: intelligence, arms, logistics, etc.) if another conflict breaks out after this one inevitably ends.

This is essentially the same as NATO’s Article 5, which obligates members to assist those of their allies that come under attack, albeit as each of them “deems necessary”. Although the use of armed force is mentioned, it’s ultimately left to individual members to decide whether to employ this option. Ukraine has arguably enjoyed the benefits of this principle for the past three years despite not being a NATO member since it’s received everything other than troops from the alliance as explained above.

Considering that Article 5 always left the option of armed force up to each individual member, which remains the case with each of the bilateral “security guarantees” that Ukraine reached with some of them over the past year, Meloni’s dramatic proposal doesn’t actually amount to anything new. It’s only newsworthy since Article 5 is commonly associated in the public imagination with employing armed force upon the request of those allies that come under attack, but this has always been a misperception.

The reason why Russia has consistently opposed Ukraine’s formal membership into NATO is because policymakers believe that this could increase the pressure upon the bloc to directly intervene in its support if Ukraine were to provoke Russia into cross-border kinetic action after joining. That could in turn immediately prompt a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis or even World War III, the latter of which might break out by miscalculation, both of which Russia obviously prefers to avoid.

Ukraine’s hypothetical NATO membership is assessed by Russia to be incomparably more dangerous than the Baltic States’ due to the former’s post-independence and Western-encouraged anti-Russian identity. The presence of such ethno-national radicals at the pinnacle of power in Kiev greatly raises the chances of them unilaterally provoking Russia into cross-border kinetic action in order to manipulate NATO, first and foremost its American leader, into either coercing Russia into concessions or waging war against it.

Nevertheless, it would still ultimately remain every member’s sovereign prerogative whether or not to support Ukraine with armed force, but public opinion in some of the European members might push their leaders to react in such a way that then escalates the crisis to the point of involving the US. For example, if the UK resorted to armed force in support of Ukraine per the way in which its leadership applies Article 5 in that scenario, then the US might feel compelled to protect it from Russian retaliation.

While the same dynamics would be present even in the case of countries reacting in the aforesaid way per their leaderships’ application of the “security guarantees” that they agreed to give Ukraine last year, there’d be much less pressure on them since it wouldn’t be through NATO. That applies even more to the US’ response to any allies unilaterally entering into a hot war with Russia outside of NATO’s ambit since it could argue that this wasn’t agreed upon so it’ll hang them out to dry to avoid World War III.

Returning to Meloni’s proposal, the most that she’ll likely manage to achieve is to assemble a “coalition of the willing” that would explicitly extend Article 5 guarantees to Ukraine with the knowledge of how this would be interpreted by the public, as in likely employing armed force in its support if requested. Poland already ruled out dispatching troops to Ukraine under any circumstances, though that could change after May’s presidential election, while Hungary and Slovakia are already dead-set against this.

Moreover, Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth declared in early February that the US won’t extend Article 5’s mutual defence guarantees to any NATO country’s troops in Ukraine, which will likely deter many of them from considering Meloni’s proposal since they now know that America wouldn’t have their backs. Trump 2.0 has proven itself impervious to domestic and international pressure, the latter of which includes what it’s experiencing nowadays from its NATO allies, to risk war with Russia over Ukraine.

No realistic scenario therefore exists for expecting the US to intervene in anyone else’s support if they end up embroiled in a hot war with Russia, at least so long as Trump remains in office and provided that he’s succeeded by Vance or another like-minded member of his party. Even if the opposition returns to power, Trump plans to already lock in strategic resource deals with Russia before then in order to deter them from risking war with Russia over Ukraine due to how mutually detrimental that would be.

His planned “Pivot (back) to Asia” could also reshape global geopolitics by then too, thus leading to more pressure upon future administrations to responsibly manage relations with Russia no matter what so as ensure continued access to its strategic resources that the US needs for competing with China. Restoring and expanding the US’ complex interdependencies with Russia, which still exist in part to this day as proven by Russian uranium exports to the US, is Trump’s envisaged means towards the end of peace.

Reflecting on all the insight shared in this analysis, it can consequently be concluded that Meloni’s proposal isn’t anything new nor is it a game-changer, and it was likely shared to show that Italy shouldn’t be ignored amidst France, Germany, and Poland’s competition for leadership of post-conflict Europe. Ukraine already kinda has Article 5 guarantees from some NATO countries, but these won’t foreseeably manifest themselves through armed force so nothing serious is expected to come from this anyhow.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Voice of East

2025-02-24 11:53:07

Here’s What I Learned From Analysing The New Cold War Every Day For Three Years Straight

Here’s What I Learned From Analysing The New Cold War Every Day For Three Years Straight

By Andrew Korybko

What ties these five trends together is Trump’s historic return to the presidency, his successful purge of the “deep state” that enabled him to pursue his long-sought “New Détente” with Russia, and Putin’s receptiveness to his American counterpart’s grand strategic plan of a comprehensive partnership.

I’m a Moscow-based American political analyst with a PhD. in Political Science from MGIMO, and this is my third yearly review of the New Cold War after I published by first and second on each anniversary of the special operation here and here. I’ve been analysing this subject every day since 24 February 2022, beginning at now-defunct OneWorld till mid-2022 and continuing at my Substack to the present. Here’s what I learned from doing this daily for my third year straight:

———-

* Trump’s Election Changed The Course Of History

Trump’s historic election victory was a game-changer in the New Cold War since everything would have been altogether different had Kamala won instead. Unlike her and Biden, he envisages responsibly managing the US’ geopolitical rivalry with Russia by brokering peace in Ukraine as the first step, after which he plans to initiate similarly motivated talks with Iran and China to that same end. Diplomacy and deal-making now take precedence over risking World War III through reckless provocations.

* The Consequences Of Ceding Sovereignty

The EU and Ukraine are learning the consequences of ceding their sovereignty to the US after Trump began treating them as the vassals that they are. The first now fears that America will abandon it as part of Trump’s “Pivot (back) to Asia” for more muscularly containing China while the second has no say in the nascent Russian-US talks over its ongoing conflict. Each ceded their sovereignty to the US with the false expectation that their allied liberal-globalists in the “deep state” would stop Trump’s return.

* Strategic Patience vs. Strategic Escalation

World War III might have already broken out long ago had Putin not exercised strategic patience by declining time and again to meaningfully respond to Ukraine’s many US-backed provocations. He only began to practice a policy of strategic escalation in late November last year to deter the outgoing Biden Administration from provoking the aforesaid after it dangerously allowed Ukraine to use the US’ long-range missiles against targets in Russia’s pre-2014 borders. This pragmatic approach deserves credit.

* Diplomacy: The Art Of The Possible

Trump’s DOGE-driven purge of the “deep state” enabled him to advance his first term’s plans for a “New Détente” with Russia via the initiation of talks with it over Ukraine, which aims to ensure its neutrality in the Sino-US dimension of the New Cold War in exchange for a geopolitical and economic partnership. Russia’s proposal during their talks for joint energy projects in the Arctic could be a first step towards this end, but mutual compromises of the sort detailed here are required for solidifying their “New Détente”.

* From Populist-Nationalism To Civilization-States

Russia and Trump’s America both regard the emergence of civilization-states as the next phase of the global systemic transition. The first’s Eurasian Union and the second’s “Fortress America” policy, which consists of incorporating Canada and Greenland, fulfil this role. They also support populist-nationalist movements across the world that share their civilization-state vision of the future and might accordingly join forces in helping them come to power in order to accelerate this process as explained here and here.

———-

What ties these five trends together is Trump’s historic return to the presidency, his successful purge of the “deep state” that enabled him to pursue his long-sought “New Détente” with Russia, and Putin’s receptiveness to his American counterpart’s grand strategic plan of a comprehensive partnership. The successful conclusion of their nascent talks and the clinching of the aforementioned partnership will revolutionize International Relations while their failure could abruptly revive the risk of World War III.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Trump claims his victory prevented WW3

US President Donald Trump has said his electoral victory in November prevented World War III

^RT

Zelensky Picked His Fight With Trump And Vance After Getting Cold Feet About Making Peace

Zelensky Picked His Fight With Trump And Vance After Getting Cold Feet About Making Peace

By Andrew Korybko

Zelensky was triggered after realizing that the Trump Administration wants to coerce him into peace with Putin and won’t be manipulated into prolonging, let alone escalating, the conflict after signing their rare earth minerals deal like he somehow expected that they would.

Friday’s spectacle in the Oval Office will forever be remembered as one of the most epic failures that any foreign leaders has made after Zelensky delusionally thought that that he could disrespect Vice President Vance on live TV in front of Trump without any consequences while being a guest in their country. Readers can watch the full recording here, which shows Zelensky aggressively reacting to Vance’s benign comment about prioritizing diplomacy with Putin over the prior administration’s failed tough talk.

Everything then spiralled out of control after Zelensky accused Vance of speaking loudly to him, which prompted Trump to contradict Zelensky and tell him to keep quiet since he’s already talked too much, all while brutally berating him in a scene that had never been witnessed before in America’s highest office. Trump and Vance also accused Zelensky of being ungrateful for American aid after he lied about Ukraine being left alone since the start of the conflict and reminded him of how disrespectfully he was behaving.

Trump wrapped everything up by warning that the US might completely end its support for Ukraine if Zelensky doesn’t agree to make peace with Putin before unprecedentedly kicking Zelensky out of the White House. To add insult to injury, White House staffers then ate the lunch that was already prepared for Zelensky and his team with the expectation that they’d sign the rare earth minerals deal that was the reason behind his visit. Trump also posted on social media about how Zelensky disrespected the US.

For as clear-cut as the sequence of events was for any objective observer who watched the roughly 10-minute footage that was hyperlinked to in the introductory paragraph, namely that Zelensky provoked his two hosts by disrespecting Vance, the Financial Times’ Ben Hall had a totally different view. According to him, “it is not hard to imagine that Vance and Trump were spoiling for a fight with the Ukrainian leader…Arguably, the stage was set for an ambush” when Zelensky arrived in the Oval Office.

While it’s true that Zelensky and Trump were just embroiled in a vicious spat prior to the Ukrainian leader’s arrival to the US, his American counterpart invited him to visit because he wanted to patch up their problems by signing the rare earth minerals deal and then discuss a path to peace with Putin. Trump treated Zelensky benevolently prior to Zelensky trying to disrespect Vance, as did Vance, who didn’t say anything personal or insulting before Zelensky suddenly decided to harangue him.

It seems like Zelensky was triggered after realizing that the Trump Administration wants to coerce him into peace with Putin and won’t be manipulated into prolonging, let alone escalating, the conflict after signing their rare earth minerals deal like he somehow expected that they would. For that reason, he then decided to sabotage the talks by creating a spectacle, possibly hoping that it would justify abruptly refusing to sign the aforesaid deal if they were going to use it right afterwards to pressure him to peace.

Zelensky isn’t being advised by anyone with even basic insight into how Trump operates otherwise he’d have known that public pressure on his counterpart always backfires. Zelensky would also never have thought that the US needs Ukraine for anything more than Ukraine needs the US. Trump is already considering a more important rare earth minerals deal with Putin so he doesn’t even need Ukraine’s resources whereas Ukraine has no alternative to American arms and is thus fully dependent on it.

This observation brings the analysis to the penultimate point about how Trump ominously left unanswered a question about whether he’ll suspend military aid to Ukraine like he threatened at the end of his and Vance’s heated exchange with Zelensky. If that’s what he ends up doing, and it’s too early to say for sure, then it would represent the worst-case scenario for the Europeans since Russia could then carry on as far westward as it wants if the front lines collapse without fear of the US intervening.

Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth already confirmed a few weeks ago that the US won’t extend Article 5 guarantees to any NATO country’s troops in Ukraine so the UK, France, and whoever else might have considered dispatching them there in that event will now be forced to think twice about it. In other words, Russia could hypothetically carry on as far as Ukraine’s border with NATO if it wants to, though Putin might stop far short of that if a breakthrough coerces Kiev into complying with his demands.

The final point to make is that what happened in Oval Office on Friday was truly a black swan in the sense that nobody could have expected that Zelensky would ruin his relations with Trump right at the moment when they were supposed to sign their rare earth minerals deal that would then pave the way to peace. Trump even exclaimed during the height of their drama how the US was giving Ukraine cards to play for helping it end the conflict on much better terms than if he didn’t diplomatically involve himself in it.

He was therefore very serious about brokering peace between Zelensky and Putin, hence why he was so exasperated at Zelensky’s blatant disrespect once everything started snowballing after Zelensky began to disrespect Vance, which explains why he unprecedentedly kicked him out of the White House. The “New Détente” that Trump wants to broker with Putin, which readers can learn more about from the five analyses hyperlinked in the middle of this one here, is largely predicated on forcing Zelensky into peace.

Zelensky’s last-minute decision to sabotage the peace process by creating a global spectacle caught Trump off guard, but he wasn’t going to let Zelensky disrespect Vance with impunity, let alone after Zelensky’s disrespect transformed into disrespect for the US. That’s not to say that the “New Détente” is now derailed since Trump and Putin still have the will to enter into a series of mutual compromises aimed at establishing strategic ties, but just that it might now proceed independently of Ukraine.

Accordingly, it was actually Zelensky who ruined everything, not Trump and Vance. They could never have expected that he’d burn Ukraine’s bridges with the US knowing that it’s impossible for Ukraine to replace US military aid. Those two thought that he came to DC to sign the rare earth minerals deal that would then place them all on the path to peace with Putin. Perhaps Zelensky didn’t realize what he was getting into until it was too late, by which time he let his emotions get the best of him, but who knows.

In any case, it’s very difficult to imagine there being any rapprochement between Zelensky and Trump or Ukraine and the US in general without Zelensky leaving office or fully capitulating to Trump’s demands. If he defiantly perpetuates the conflict and the US cuts him off, then Russia will pretty much be given free rein by Washington to do whatever it wants with Ukraine, though it’s unknown how the EU would react. Everything will become clearer by next week though once it’s known exactly what Zelensky plans to do.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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There Might Be A Military Dimension To Russia’s Newfound Interest In Djibouti And Somaliland

There Might Be A Military Dimension To Russia’s Newfound Interest In Djibouti And Somaliland

By Andrew Korybko

All in all, Russia’s Gulf of Aden-Red Sea naval base plans depend first and foremost on whether Sudan implements their long-delayed agreement, absent which the next variable is whether the US keeps its base in Djibouti or transfers its forces from there to Somaliland upon recognizing the latter.

The Horn of Africa figured prominently on Russia’s diplomatic agenda last week after two high-profile engagements with Djibouti and Somaliland. The first concerned the National Assembly Speaker’s visit to Moscow to meet with his Russian counterpart while the second hosted a delegation led by the Chairman of the Russian Trade Association in Africa who agreed to expand agricultural, logistical, and industrial cooperation. Both developments might have a military dimension to them.

Russia has long sought to revive its Soviet-era naval presence in the Gulf of Aden-Red Sea (GARS) region, ultimately settling on building a base in Sudan, but the implementation of these plans has repeatedly been delayed due to that country’s civil war and Western pressure. That’s why Russia might be looking for alternatives in Djibouti or Somaliland in case Sudan’s latest signal of intent once again amounts to nothing. Even if things work out, however, then one of them could still host complementary facilities.

It was explained here in November 2023 “How Russia Could Mediate A Series Of Deals Between Djibouti, Ethiopia, & South Sudan”, which might result in obtaining a naval base in Djibouti in exchange for stakes in joint South Sudanese mining companies, discounted agricultural exports, and a regional oil pipeline. Djibouti might finally be interested in this if Trump implements “Project 2025’s” proposal (page 186) to recognize Somaliland “as a hedge against the US’ deteriorating position in Djibouti” vis-a-vis China.

Djibouti could prospectively replace or even likely overcompensate for its lost revenue from renting the US a naval base there if the US transfers its forces to Somaliland by taking Russia (and by extent Ethiopia and South Sudan) up on this plan. Russia could even hypothetically assume control of the US’ (by then former) Djiboutian naval base just like it assumed control of the US’ former airbase in Niger last May. A seamless transition would be in Djibouti’s immediate financial interests and lay the basis for other deals.

On the other hand, the US might stay put in Djibouti, in which case Russia would naturally prioritize Somaliland as a possible alternative to Sudan instead. Although it has cordial relations with Somalia, which lays claim to Somaliland, the Somalian President slammed Russia twice in late January 2024 while speaking at a major international conference in Italy. This context might partially explain why Russia has no qualms about offending Somalia by dispatching its trade and investment delegation to Somaliland.

Russia might be looking to lay the basis for a deal whereby formal recognition could be extended to Somaliland together with scaling their recently agreed investments in exchange for a naval base. To be clear, the aforesaid scenario is educated conjecture since no credible reports have been published at the time of writing to suggest that their representatives actually discussed this during the delegation’s visit, but it can’t be ruled out given the strategic context in which their trip took place.

All in all, Russia’s GARS naval base plans depend first and foremost on whether Sudan implements their long-delayed agreement, absent which the next variable is whether the US keeps its base in Djibouti or transfers its forces from there to Somaliland upon recognizing the latter. As can be seen, Russia is reacting to regional developments instead of trying to shape them, which its policymakers assessed to be the most pragmatic approach towards this dynamism given the limits of their country’s influence.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Five Takeaways From The Newly Signed Russian-Ethiopian Naval Cooperation Agreement

Five Takeaways From The Newly Signed Russian-Ethiopian Naval Cooperation Agreement

By Andrew Korybko

This development is much more newsworthy than casual observers might have thought.

Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy Admiral Vladimir Vorobyev signed a naval cooperation agreement with landlocked Ethiopia last week while visiting its Maritime Training Institute. Readers can learn more about Ethiopia’s policy of peacefully regaining free and full access to the sea here and here. Ethiopia is one of Russia’s oldest partners anywhere in the world so it’s natural that they’d cooperate in this strategic sphere. Here are five takeaways from this development that make it newsworthy:

———-

1. Russia Reaffirmed Its Belief In Ethiopia’s Peaceful Intentions

Ethiopia’s abovementioned policy was maliciously twisted by neighbouring Eritrea and Somalia to fearmonger about its aggressive regional intentions, yet while ties with Somalia recently improved, they’ve also recently deteriorated with Eritrea partially over this issue. By signing their naval cooperation agreement, Russia is reaffirming its belief in Ethiopia’s peaceful intentions, which Eritrea should interpret as a signal that Russia doesn’t approve of its thinly veiled opposition to Ethiopia’s policy. .

2. The First Phase Will Likely Be Experience-Sharing & Training

Ethiopia hasn’t had a navy for over three decades so it must have understandably lost some of its experience in operating one, which is why Russia is expected to share its own experiences with Ethiopia as the first likely phase of their naval cooperation and possibly train its sailors on Russian vessels too. The time and resources that’ll be invested into these education programs also prove that Russia believes that Ethiopia will indeed succeed in its policy of peacefully regaining free and full access to the sea.

3. The Next One Could Then See Naval Sales And/Or Transfers

Russia’s naval modernization plans might result in some of its existing vessels being rendered redundant, yet these same vessels could still meet the needs of the Ethiopian Navy, hence why it’s expected that they’d be sold and/or transferred for free as the next phase of their naval cooperation at a later date. It’s premature to predict the details other than to assess that it would make the most sense for Ethiopia to rely on Russia for this instead of any other partner in light of their recently signed agreement.

4. The Quid Pro Quo Might Be Joint Use Of Future Ethiopian Ports

Ethiopia is cash-strapped and might not want to barter natural resources for naval cooperation with Russia so it’s possible that their quid pro quo could be that Ethiopia ensures that whatever port agreements it clinches in the region also allow for Russia’s joint use of these facilities. The right to friendly port calls, logistics support, and the opportunity for trilateral drills between Russia, Ethiopia, and the host state would advance Moscow’s security interests in the strategic Gulf of Aden-Red Sea region.

5. Others Could Be Drawn To Russia By Ethiopia’s Successful Example

And lastly, other countries could be drawn to Russia after seeing for themselves how it would have by then successfully trained and equipped the revived Ethiopian Navy, which might expand the Kremlin’s influence among landlocked and coastal countries alike. Closer military cooperation between them regardless of which armed service it focuses on would help diversify their respective partnerships, thus making them less dependent on traditional Western ones, and also bring tangible benefits.

———-

The newly signed Russian-Ethiopian naval cooperation agreement is therefore much more newsworthy than casual observers might have thought if they earlier came across this headline while most others probably haven’t even heard about this until now. In any case, both parties stand to gain from this arrangement, with Ethiopia obtaining training and likely equipment too with time while Russia bolsters its reputation as a reliable military partner and might even obtain access to a future naval base or two.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#Africa #Ethiopia #Geopolitics #Russia #Somalia #Somaliland

Voice of East

2025-02-28 11:36:36

The Ethio-Somali Rapprochement Is A Pleasant Surprise

The Ethio-Somali Rapprochement Is A Pleasant Surprise

By Andrew Korybko

It had hitherto appeared almost inevitable that a proxy war would soon be waged in Somalia between Ethiopia and Egypt due to all sides’ (those three’s, Eritrea’s, and Somaliland’s) seemingly unshakable positions.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed just visited Mogadishu in a reciprocal trip after Somali Prime Minister Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) travelled to Addis in early January and mid-February. This follows their second Turkish-mediated talks from mid-December and comes right after their top military representatives agreed to develop a “Status Of Forces Agreement” (SOFA) per their leaders’ will. That breakthrough paved the way for Abiy to visit Mogadishu as the latest phase of their rapprochement.

The larger context enables observers to better appreciate what’s happening. Somalia was manipulated by nearby Egypt and Eritrea into denying landlocked Ethiopia the sea access that it requires to preemptively avert socio-economic and therefore political instability in the coming future. Djibouti’s onerous port fees and Ethiopia’s reliance on this single corridor to the sea motivated Abiy to diversify his country’s options. Somaliland became his only option so they signed an MoU on this in January 2024.

The next eleven months were marked by HSM’s clumsy diplomatic manoeuvrings in response to the aforesaid agreement, which threw the Horn back into uncertainty since he and his dual patrons (Egypt and Eritrea) began sabre-rattling about the consequences of the Ethio-Somaliland deal. The situation deteriorated to the point where it looked like Ethiopia and Egypt might fight a proxy war in Somalia and/or Somaliland amidst the transition to a new AU-led military mission (AUSSOM) at the start of 2025.

That worst-case but increasingly likely scenario was offset almost at the last minute after the second Turkish-mediated talks between the Ethiopian and Somali leaders in mid-December. While the MoU’s status remains unclear, most observers have concluded in the two and a half months since then that it was de facto suspended, apparently in exchange for Somalia including Ethiopia in AUSSOM. If that’s the case, then it represents a pragmatic compromise between these two, which is a pleasant surprise.

War is always to every average person’s detriment so all efforts should be undertaken to avoid it if realistically possible without subordinating one side to the other out of desperation. It had hitherto appeared almost inevitable that a proxy war would soon be waged in Somalia between Ethiopia and Egypt due to all sides’ (those three’s, Eritrea’s, and Somaliland’s) seemingly unshakable positions. That’s why it was so unexpected that Turkish President Tayyip Recep Erdogan was able to avert this disaster.

If the Ethio-Somali rapprochement continues, then the risk of another regional war will greatly decrease, thus returning to the traditional scenario of Egypt egging Eritrea on to attack Ethiopia. Somalia’s (now-former?) dual patrons will understandably be upset as will Ethiopia’s (now-former?) Somalilander ally. All three would be limited in terms of what they can do though, with the first two being unlikely to provoke a regional war due to the absence of pretext while the second will just look elsewhere for recognition.

None of those three might forgive their respective (now-former?) ally since the Ethio-Somali rapprochement was unforeseen by their policymakers and upended their regional plans. The best-case scenario is that Egypt learns its lesson and stops meddling in the Horn, Somaliland secures recognition from the US, India, UK, Russia, and/or the UAE, and Eritrea enters into its own rapprochement with Ethiopia once President Isaias Afwerki passes away and if a more pragmatic leader takes his place.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#Africa #Egypt #Eritrea #Ethiopia #Geopolitics #HornOfAfrica #Russia #Somalia #Somaliland

Somali president makes surprise visit to Ethiopia amid strained relations

Prior to the trip to Addis Ababa, Mohamud visited Uganda for a continental summit on agricultural development

^{Kennedy Abate (Voice of America (VOA News))}

It’s Premature To Jump To Conclusions About The Pentagon’s Review Of AUKUS

It’s Premature To Jump To Conclusions About The Pentagon’s Review Of AUKUS

By Andrew Korybko

The US is unlikely to exit AUKUS, even as a goodwill gesture to China in the context of Trump’s self-declared “total reset” in their ties, but it could curtail the number of nuclear-powered attack submarines that it gives Australia if it determines that the original pledge can’t be comfortably met.

The Pentagon’s announcement that it’ll review AUKUS over the next 30 days to ensure that “this initiative of the previous administration is aligned with the President’s America First agenda” sparked speculation that the US might leave Australia and the UK in the lurch by pulling out of this pact. Its primary pillar will see the US sell Australia three second-hand nuclear-powered attack submarines with the option to buy two more, AUKUS’ real importance goes beyond this large-scale arms sale.

AUKUS can be conceptualized as an “Asian NATO” that can expand, whether formally or informally via the AUKUS+ framework, to include other countries like Japan and the Philippines which share an interest in containing China. It therefore essentially replaces the Quad’s previously US-envisaged role as an anti-Chinese regional military integration platform. The most tangible manifestation of this alliance in action is the so-called “Squad” that was recently formed between the US, Australia, Japan, and the Philippines.

Accordingly, the US’ hypothetical exit from AUKUS after the end of the Pentagon’s ongoing 30-day review could shatter these grand strategic plans, potentially alleviating the worsening security dilemma between China and the US in the Western Pacific in parallel with their newly announced trade deal. It’s premature to jump to that conclusion, however, since Defence News published an insightful article explaining the nuances behind this review as perceived by its initiator Elbridge Colby.

He’s the new Under Secretary of Defence for Policy and was quoted in their article as having previously expressed concern about the US’ shipbuilding capabilities: If we can produce the attack submarines in sufficient number and sufficient speed, then great. But if we can’t, that becomes a very difficult problem because we don’t want our servicemen and women to be in a weaker position. It should be the policy of the United States government to do everything we can to make this work.”

This suggests that he’s less interested in exiting AUKUS than he is in potentially curtailing the scope of its primary pillar, the sale of US nuclear-powered attack submarines to Australia, which could drop from 3-5 if the Pentagon determines that the US can’t comfortably meet its original pledge. Colby can be described as a “China hawk”, albeit more rational than his establishment peers, so it’s difficult imagining him being interested in doing away with AUKUS’ role as a regional military integration platform.

Nevertheless, whatever pragmatic changes might potentially follow the Pentagon’s review could be presented as a partially inspired by goodwill in the context of Trump’s self-declared “total reset” in ties with China, provided of course that their new trade deal is ultimately signed. In that scenario, the US would continue pressuring China via AUKUS, though tensions could de-escalate a bit due to this initiative’s reduced nuclear submarine scope even if the regional military integration role remains intact.

Therein lies the main point, namely that the aforesaid role is too important to the US’ grand strategic plans to be abandoned under any circumstances, even in the very far-fetched scenario that it takes on different branding if the US exits AUKUS. Regardless of however much their ties might soon normalize or even improve, it’s in the US’ enduring interests as policymakers on both sides of the aisle see it (whether rightly or wrongly) to maintain military pressure on China, and this likely won’t ever change.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#AUKUS #Australia #China #Geopolitics #UK #UnitedKingdom #USA

Here Are The Three Goals That Trump Wants To Achieve Through His Global Trade War

Here Are The Three Goals That Trump Wants To Achieve Through His Global Trade War

By Andrew Korybko

He hopes to strengthen the US’ supply chain sovereignty, renegotiate its ties with all countries with a view towards getting them to distance themselves from China, and shape the emerging world order.

Trump’s decision to tariff the entire world to varying extents as revenge for their tariffs against the US has shaken the global economy to its core. Instead of restoring free and fair trade like he claims to want, which would give American companies an advantage, he might inadvertently accelerate regionalization trends and the subsequent division of the world into a collection of trade blocs. Even in that scenario, however, he could still advance the three unstated goals that are responsible for this policy.

1. The first is to strengthen the US’ supply chain sovereignty so as to eliminate the leverage that other countries have over it. This might not be pursued solely for the sake of it, but perhaps also as contingency planning, thus hinting at concerns about a major war. The two most likely adversaries are China and Iran, and a hot conflict with either would throw the global economy into turmoil. Trump might therefore want to prioritize reshoring in order for the US to preemptively minimize the consequences.
2. The second goal builds upon the first and relates to the US prompting every country to renegotiate their bilateral ties, during which time the US could offer to reduce tariffs in exchange for certain concessions. These could take the form of distancing themselves from China to a degree and gradually replacing it with the US with their top trade partner. Other incentives could also be dangled such as technology-sharing and military deals. The purpose would be to weaken China by chipping away its foreign trade.
3. And finally, the last goal is to shape the emerging world order, to which end the US had to speed up the end of the present one by shaking the global economy to its core like Trump just did. Obtaining supply chain sovereignty and replacing China as the top trade partner for as many countries as possible would give the US’ leverage over a sizeable portion of the world. While it’s premature to speculate the ways in which the US could exploit this, it’ll almost certainly be in the context of its systemic rivalry with China.

Even if Trump’s global trade war unintentionally turbocharges regionalization trends and the subsequent division of the world into a collection of trade blocs instead of serving as the unprecedented power play that he expects, the US could still take advantage of this to implement its “Fortress America” policy. This refers to the US restoring its unipolar hegemony over the Western Hemisphere, which would make it strategically autarkic if it receives preferential access to these countries’ resources and markets.

In that event, the US would survive and could even thrive even if it’s pushed out of the Eastern Hemisphere upon losing the major war that it might be planning or if the consequences thereof make that part of the world too dysfunctional for the US to manage, which could lead to the US returning to its 1920s-like isolationism. To be clear, the US is unlikely to voluntarily abandon the Eastern Hemisphere, but it would still make sense to plan for that possibility just in case circumstances compel it to do so.

All in all, Trump’s global trade war is an epochal event that’ll leave a lasting impact on International Relations regardless of its outcome, but it’s too early to say for sure exactly what’ll come from it. The only thing that can be said with any certainty is that Trump has a grand plan in mind even if he doesn’t ultimately achieve any of his goals, the three most likely of which were touched upon in this analysis. In any case, the old era of globalization is now over, but it remains to be seen what’ll replace it and when.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#China #Geopolitics #Iran #Trade #USA

A Cost-Benefit Analysis Of The Proposed Congolese-US Minerals-Security Deal

A Cost-Benefit Analysis Of The Proposed Congolese-US Minerals-Security Deal

By Andrew Korybko

The US might be able to replace Chinese companies’ dominant role in the DRC’s gigantic minerals industry if it plays its cards right but must avoid being dragged into a quagmire through mission creep.

Reuters reported last week that Erik Prince had already reached a deal with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) sometime before its latest crisis to improve tax collection, reduce cross-border smuggling of minerals, and secure mines in its mineral-rich historical Katanga region. This news follows the DRC’s pursuit of a related deal with the US that would see it provide American companies with privileged access to its critical mineral deposits in exchange for military equipment and training.

The regional context concerns the reportedly Rwandan-backed M23 rebels’ invasion of the mineral-rich eastern DRC on the pretext of coercing Kinshasa into implementing prior military-political agreements and to root out Hutu rebel groups that they allege are partially comprised of fugitive genocidaires. Reuters claimed that Prince’s PMCs wouldn’t be deployed to areas of active conflict even though they were originally supposed to work in the North Kivutian capital of Goma that’s now occupied by M23.

Scant details have emerged about the security terms of the Congolese-US deal that’s being discussed but it’s unlikely that quagmire-averse Trump would commit American troops to the conflict. Rather, he’s more likely to deploy them to the mineral-rich historical Katanga region for training purposes or possibly even outsource these responsibilities to Prince’s PMCs, many of whom are veterans. In any case, Trump is probably very serious about clinching a deal due to the global context, which will now be described.

His global trade war/“economic revolution” is mostly aimed against China as explained in the preceding hyperlinked analyses. It’s not just about competing for markets abroad or rebalancing their bilateral trade deficit, but containing China, which could take the form in this case of the US getting the DRC to curtail China’s access to its critical minerals. Chinese companies already control most of the DRC’s mineral deposits so it would be a strategic coup if the DRC replaces them with American ones.

Therein lies the primary challenge since US support, both from Prince’s PMC and the Pentagon, has to meet enough of the DRC’s interests in order for it to take the economic and legal risks that replacing Chinese companies with American ones would entail but without also risking another quagmire. The DRC under its present leadership wants to restore the state’s writ over its M23-occupied resource-rich eastern periphery instead of granting broad Bosnian-like autonomy to that region or ceding it to Rwanda.

It’s here where masterful diplomacy must come into play otherwise Rwanda might carry out another regime change in the DRC like it did in erstwhile Zaire by installing a leader, perhaps former President Joseph Kabila despite his father turning against his Rwandan allies, who’ll grant these concessions. In that scenario, the US might not only lose out on this critical mineral opportunity, but China could also possibly further entrench its influence and thus partially counteract some of Trump’s pressure upon it.

Massad Boulos, the father-in-law of Trump’s daughter Tiffany, has been tasked by him with laying the groundwork for this complicated mineral-security-diplomatic arrangement but it’s premature to predict whether he’ll succeed. All that’s known for sure is that the stakes are significant in the context of the newly intensifying Sino-US dimension of the New Cold War since America could deal a powerful strategic blow to the People’s Republic if it replaces its rival’s role in the DRC’s critical minerals industry.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#Africa #DemocraticRepublicOfCongo #DRC #Geopolitics #USA

What Explains Russia’s Swift Policy Recalibration Towards The Latest Congolese Crisis?

What Explains Russia’s Swift Policy Recalibration Towards The Latest Congolese Crisis?

By Andrew Korybko

The latest Congolese Crisis has the potential to decisively shift the balance of power in the New Cold War depending on how it develops and what the outcome might be.

The latest Congolese Crisis broke out over the weekend after the reportedly Rwandan-backed M23 rebels seized the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) eastern city of Goma along the country’s mineral-rich periphery. Russia’s position as articulated by Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzia on Sunday during an emergency UNSC briefing was impressively balanced as explained here on Tuesday. He then recalibrated it later that same day upon blaming M23 for the latest crisis.

His latest UNSC briefing saw him declare that “Russia strongly condemns the actions of M23. We call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and for a withdrawal of the rebels of this illegal armed group from the towns, villages and territories they have seized. We also call on external players to stop supporting M23 and recall their military units.” This is in marked contrast to what he said just two days prior where he placed equal blame on them and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).

Nebenzia also said at the time that both the majority-Tutsi M23’s and majority-Hutu FDLR’s foreign state patrons, contextually understood to be Rwanda and the DRC respectively though not named for reasons of diplomatic sensitivity, must “stop their interaction with (such) illegal armed groups.” This swift policy recalibration left some observers scratching their heads but it’s arguably attributable to two major developments that took place earlier on Tuesday.

The first is that rioters in Kinshasa attacked the embassies of countries that they accused of supporting M23, which included African nations like Rwanda, Kenya, and Uganda alongside Western ones like the US, France, and Belgium. Russia enjoys close security ties with Rwanda in the Central African Republic (CAR), has cultivated excellent ones with Uganda over the past few years, and is trying to make inroads in Kenya, all while being presently being engaged in a proxy war with the West in Ukraine.

Accordingly, the radical shift in public opinion in the DRC against the West could be seen by Russia as an opportunity to further expand its soft power in this resource-rich nation with a view towards eventually replacing Western contracts there, which provides a partial explanation for Russia’s shift against M23. Moreover, Russia has also been keeping an eye on the US’ Lobito Corridor, which is a transcontinental rail project aimed at linking Angola, DRC, Zambia, and Tanzania.

Its purpose is to redirect mineral exports from Asia to America, after which new local elite can be groomed in preparation for geopolitically pivoting the region away from China and towards the US in the New Cold War. The latest embassy attacks suggest that public opinion might no longer accept the Lobito Corridor, which could be targeted in the future, thus possibly leading to its curtailment or cancelation. That could provide yet another opportunity for Russia to replace the West’s possibly lost role in the DRC.

Unlike the West, Russia doesn’t need to turn the DRC or other African states into vassals since it’s self-sufficient in resources, including minerals. For that reason, its strategic goal is to empower them to become more sovereign and consequently deprive the West of the resources that it extracts from there to maintain its declining unipolar hegemony, which makes it a much better partner. It therefore wouldn’t make sense for Russia to remain balanced in this crisis given the enticing strategic opportunities at stake.

The second development occurred shortly after those attacks and concerns the African Union’s Peace and Security Council’s (PSC) communique later that day. It condemned M23’s offensive while calling on that group, FDLR, and others to “immediately and unconditionally cease their attacks and permanently disband and lay down their arms”. The communique also demanded M23’s withdrawal from Goma and the surrounding region alongside other groups’ while condemning foreign support for it and FDLR.

While it might seem balanced at first glance, it’s clearly more critical of M23 than of any other group, including FDLR. M23 is basically being accused of setting into motion the latest violence, which thus makes it more responsible than anyone else for the regional humanitarian and security consequences. The communique also strongly alludes to Rwandan support for their actions. Given that the PSC is the AU’s equivalent of the UNSC, it’s natural that Russia would take its African policy cues from that body.

Their communique combined with the anti-Western embassy attacks in Kinshasa earlier that day to compel Russia into recalibrating its policy towards the latest Congolese Crisis during that afternoon’s UNSC briefing. Nebenzia importantly didn’t condemn Rwanda, with whom his country’s armed forces coordinate in the CAR in defence of its UN-recognized government, but he still made it known that Russia considers M23 to be the aggressor that’s responsible for this crisis.

This new approach will likely result in Russia’s soft power expanding by leaps and bounds in the DRC, which is altogether a much more promising regional partner than Rwanda if Moscow was forced to choose between them, though Moscow might still remain careful not to ruin ties with Kigali. Not only do they cooperate in the CAR as was mentioned above and have pretty good bilateral relations, but Rwanda is a regional military superpower, and it’s never wise to get on such countries’ bad side if one can help it.

Russia isn’t scared of Rwanda, it just doesn’t want to enter into a needless rivalry that might later be exploited by the West to divide-and-rule them if that bloc’s ties with Kigali ever improve, in which case they might make any rapprochement conditional on Rwanda actively containing Russia in the region. The scenario of Rwandan forces in the CAR turning their guns against the Russians there would be a nightmare in itself and could possibly turn into a geostrategic disaster if it leads to their withdrawal.

Although the CAR is a Russian ally that agreed to let it establish a base there, its government is also cavorting with American mercenaries as explained here last September, so it can’t be ruled out that Rwanda might be enticed by the West into kicking Russia out of the CAR if offered the right incentives. To be clear, there’s no indication that anything of the sort is being discussed, but the scenario is realistic enough and might explain why Russia is still reluctant to condemn Rwanda despite condemning M23.

Russia’s increasingly pro-DRC position therefore isn’t expected to transform into an overtly anti-Rwandan one due to the abovementioned CAR factor even if its rhetoric against M23 becomes even harsher. The Kremlin hopes to reap a soft power windfall from the Congolese Crisis by replicating the PSC’s approach and riding the waves of rising anti-Western sentiment in the DRC, which it hopes will one day enable it to replace the West’s possibly lost role there for the purpose of depriving that bloc of its mineral wealth.

Russia doesn’t want to exploit the Congolese or keep those resources for itself, which are indispensable for the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”/“Great Reset”, but simply to ensure that the West no longer has privileged access to them for maintaining its declining unipolar hegemony. Observers should therefore pay much more attention to the latest Congolese Crisis since it has the potential to decisively shift the balance of power in the New Cold War depending on how it develops and what the outcome might be.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#CAR #CentralAfricanRepublic #Congo #DemocraticRepublicOfCongo #DRC #Russia #Rwanda #UNSC

The Future Of US-Pakistani Ties Is Uncertain Amidst Reported American Deep State Differences

The Future Of US-Pakistani Ties Is Uncertain Amidst Reported American Deep State Differences

By Andrew Korybko

At stake is whether the US continues prioritizing ties with Pakistan’s military rulers or promotes civilian-led democratic rule aimed at normalizing ties with India so as to more robustly contain China.

Drop Site News published a report in early April about how “The State Department and the Pentagon Are Battling the Deep State Over the Future of India and China”, the gist of which is that those first two institutions are allegedly at odds with the CIA over the future of US-Pakistani ties. The State Department and the Pentagon “want to pivot away from the military and empower civilian leadership and democratic rule in Pakistan” while the CIA “sees the military and security establishment as a more reliable partner”.

The rationale is geopolitical since those who want to radically change the US’ decades-long policy with Pakistan, which Drop Site News’ unnamed sources assess is representative of the America First wing’s rising influence, envisage this greatly aiding the Trump Administration’s plans against China. According to them, “a civilian-led Pakistan will have a mandate to resolve its long-simmering conflict with India, freeing New Delhi to focus more directly on its eastern borders and act as a counterweight to China.”

While no means to the end of promoting civilian-led democratic rule in Pakistan were suggested in their report, a carrot-and-stick approach could be employed in pursuit of this goal. The most relevant issues that this policy could be applied towards concern Pakistan’s political agenda in Afghanistan (i.e. weakening Taliban rule), any potential anti-terrorist actions that it might undertake there, arms sales, tariffs, and trade with and investment from Russia. A few words will now be said about these subjects.

In brief, Taliban-ruled Afghanistan is suspected of harbouring Islamabad-designated terrorists who’ve become Pakistan’s most pressing national security threat in recent years, ergo the need to either coerce its neighbour into kicking them out or punishing it for refusing to do so. American political and military assistance is respectively required in order to raise the chances of success. Failing to secure such before any major move in these directions risks the US branding Pakistan as a “rogue state” with all that entails.

On the topic of arms sales, the vast majority of Pakistan’s equipment comes from China, but it also fields a fleet of F-16s. These are formidable in and of themselves but also function to uphold bilateral ties. The US’ possible withholding of spares and/or decision not to sell any new equipment to Pakistan in the future, either of which could occur under the pretext of protesting its long-range missile program but really be about promoting political change, would thus escalate political tensions.

As for tariffs, the US is Pakistan’s largest export destination at approximately $6 billion a year, which amounts to 18% of total exports. Trump’s global trade war is therefore expected to hit its textile industry very hard according to reports, which could exacerbate the country’s economic-financial crisis and possibly lead to another round of political unrest if newly planned talks don’t swiftly resolve this issue. The economy is one of Pakistan’s weak points and the US could aggressively press its advantage.

Redirecting exports from the US to China in the event that a deal isn’t soon reached, which might be easier said than done, could mitigate the economic-financial consequences of Trump’s tariffs while worsening political ties with the US due to the Sino-American systemic rivalry. That might be self-defeating from the perspective of Pakistan’s overall interests since it could then prompt the previously mentioned military pressure on an anti-Chinese pretext and accelerate the US’ ongoing pivot to India.

About that, the scenario of being abandoned by America terrifies Pakistani policymakers since they fear the interconnected economic-financial, political (resultant large-scale protests), and regional security (vis-à-vis a fully US-backed India) consequences. Likewise, the US also wants to avoid that since it fears the global security consequences if nuclear-armed Pakistan “goes rogue” in revenge, especially if it’s emboldened by China. This balance of interests, or rather fears of the other, maintains the status quo.

At the same time, the current state of affairs impedes the America First wing’s “Pivot (back) to Asia” for more muscularly containing China since Pakistan continues providing the People’s Republic with reliable access to the Indian Ocean, thus facilitating Chinese exports to Europe and resource imports from Africa. The grand strategic significance is that Pakistan could partially neutralize the commercial impact of the US blockading the Strait of Malacca for Chinese ships during a crisis.

In exchange, Pakistan can rely on China for political, economic, and military support, all of which helps prevent Pakistan from falling too far behind India in the context of their decades-long rivalry. Accordingly, any concessions to the US that Pakistan might make on its relations with China risk being at the expense of its national security interests as policymakers understand them to be, though these might be manageable in two possibly connected scenarios.

The first is that more trade with and investment from Russia, which the US could encourage via sanctions waivers in the event that the nascent Russian–US “New Détente” evolves into a strategic partnership, could alleviate some of the economic-financial consequences from China. China might still continue arming Pakistan due to their shared threat perception of India, but it’s also possible that the US gradually replaces Pakistan’s reliance on Chinese arms, though at the expense of the US’ pivot to India.

The second scenario is that the Kashmir Conflict is finally resolved, which the America First wing reportedly believes requires civilian-led democratic rule in Pakistan, thus unlocking new economic-financial opportunities for replacing lost Chinese ones while reducing mutual threat perceptions. The abovementioned Russian and US roles would become more important than ever if that happens, but this best-case scenario from their perspective and India’s is less likely than the first, which itself is uncertain.

The public isn’t privy to the interplay between America’s two competing deep state factions on this issue so nobody can say with confidence exactly what’ll happen, only what each’s interests are and how the one pushing for radical change (the State Department and the Pentagon) could try to purse this. If the CIA prevails and the status quo is retained, then the Trump Administration risks having to curtail the scope of its “Pivot (back) to Asia” and could even be pulled back into Afghanistan by mission creep.

Drop Site News reported in early February that “Pakistan’s Military Hopes to Drag Trump Back into War in Afghanistan”, which would open a Pandora’s box of problems for him such as being very unpopular at home, imperilling the US’ pivot to India, and worsening already high tensions with Iran. On the other hand, abandoning Pakistan if it unilaterally intervenes in Afghanistan at scale without first securing US support could risk it “going rogue” in revenge as was earlier explained, thus creating a dilemma.

So long as Pakistan’s de facto military regime refuses to implement any (possibly US-pressured) concessions towards imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan and continues to want to control his opposition party, thus making civilian-led democratic rule impossible, problems with the US will persist unless the CIA comes out on top in its competition with the State Department and the Pentagon. Whatever the outcome, it’ll have a huge impact on global affairs, hence the importance of following it.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#China #Geopolitics #Pakistan #PakistanArmy #Russia #USA

Voice of East

2025-04-03 11:20:53

Here Are The Three Goals That Trump Wants To Achieve Through His Global Trade War

Here Are The Three Goals That Trump Wants To Achieve Through His Global Trade War

By Andrew Korybko

He hopes to strengthen the US’ supply chain sovereignty, renegotiate its ties with all countries with a view towards getting them to distance themselves from China, and shape the emerging world order.

Trump’s decision to tariff the entire world to varying extents as revenge for their tariffs against the US has shaken the global economy to its core. Instead of restoring free and fair trade like he claims to want, which would give American companies an advantage, he might inadvertently accelerate regionalization trends and the subsequent division of the world into a collection of trade blocs. Even in that scenario, however, he could still advance the three unstated goals that are responsible for this policy.

1. The first is to strengthen the US’ supply chain sovereignty so as to eliminate the leverage that other countries have over it. This might not be pursued solely for the sake of it, but perhaps also as contingency planning, thus hinting at concerns about a major war. The two most likely adversaries are China and Iran, and a hot conflict with either would throw the global economy into turmoil. Trump might therefore want to prioritize reshoring in order for the US to preemptively minimize the consequences.
2. The second goal builds upon the first and relates to the US prompting every country to renegotiate their bilateral ties, during which time the US could offer to reduce tariffs in exchange for certain concessions. These could take the form of distancing themselves from China to a degree and gradually replacing it with the US with their top trade partner. Other incentives could also be dangled such as technology-sharing and military deals. The purpose would be to weaken China by chipping away its foreign trade.
3. And finally, the last goal is to shape the emerging world order, to which end the US had to speed up the end of the present one by shaking the global economy to its core like Trump just did. Obtaining supply chain sovereignty and replacing China as the top trade partner for as many countries as possible would give the US’ leverage over a sizeable portion of the world. While it’s premature to speculate the ways in which the US could exploit this, it’ll almost certainly be in the context of its systemic rivalry with China.

Even if Trump’s global trade war unintentionally turbocharges regionalization trends and the subsequent division of the world into a collection of trade blocs instead of serving as the unprecedented power play that he expects, the US could still take advantage of this to implement its “Fortress America” policy. This refers to the US restoring its unipolar hegemony over the Western Hemisphere, which would make it strategically autarkic if it receives preferential access to these countries’ resources and markets.

In that event, the US would survive and could even thrive even if it’s pushed out of the Eastern Hemisphere upon losing the major war that it might be planning or if the consequences thereof make that part of the world too dysfunctional for the US to manage, which could lead to the US returning to its 1920s-like isolationism. To be clear, the US is unlikely to voluntarily abandon the Eastern Hemisphere, but it would still make sense to plan for that possibility just in case circumstances compel it to do so.

All in all, Trump’s global trade war is an epochal event that’ll leave a lasting impact on International Relations regardless of its outcome, but it’s too early to say for sure exactly what’ll come from it. The only thing that can be said with any certainty is that Trump has a grand plan in mind even if he doesn’t ultimately achieve any of his goals, the three most likely of which were touched upon in this analysis. In any case, the old era of globalization is now over, but it remains to be seen what’ll replace it and when.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#China #Geopolitics #Iran #Trade #USA

Towards Tri-Multipolarity: The Golden Billion, The Sino-Russo Entente, And The Global South

Towards Tri-Multipolarity: The Golden Billion, The Sino-Russo Entente, And The Global South By Andrew Korybko The global systemic transition’s impending evolution towards tri-multipolarity could se…

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Analysing Russia’s Response To The Latest Congolese Crisis

Analysing Russia’s Response To The Latest Congolese Crisis

By Andrew Korybko

Russia’s draft military agreement with the Congo coupled with its close security cooperation with Rwanda in the Central African Republic are responsible for its impressively balanced position.

Russia’s Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzia shared his country’s response to the latest Congolese Crisis during the emergency UNSC briefing on Sunday that followed the reportedly Rwandan-backed M23 rebels seizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) eastern city of Goma. The roots of this long-running conflict are complex but boil down to security dilemma, resource, and ethnic reasons that readers can learn more about upon reviewing the following three background briefings:

* 8 November 2022: “A Quick Recap Of The Latest Congolese Conflict”

* 9 November 2022: “Investigating The French Factor In The Latest Phase Of The Congolese Conflict”

* 29 May 2024: “Congo’s Polish Spy Scandal Is Worth Paying Attention To After The Recent Failed Coup Attempt”

In short, Rwanda accuses the DRC of backing the majority-Hutu Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR and tied to the 1994 genocide), while the DRC accuses Rwanda of backing the majority-Tutsi M23 as part of a power play over its eastern regions’ minerals. These resources are thought to be at the heart of this conflict, which is driven by (partially externally exacerbated) differences between DRC-residing Hutus and Tutsis, the latter of which are considered by some locals to not be indigenous.

Nebenzia began by condemning M23’s offensive, which has displaced 400,000 people thus far, and expressing alarm at its use of advanced weapons systems. He elaborated by talking about “the use of heavy artillery close to civilian infrastructure” and “the continued use of electronic warfare means, which poses a threat, inter alia, to civilian aviation.” This last point might allude to the shooting down of the plane carrying the Rwandan and Burundian Presidents in 1994 that triggered the infamous genocide.

He then expressed condolences to the families of those peacekeepers who were killed in the latest fighting and declared Russia’s support for the UN and Southern African Development Community’s peacekeeping operations in the Eastern DRC. Nebenzia’s next move was to call for restoring the Angolan-mediated Rwandan-DRC talks that broke down late last year. He also importantly said that “real progress on the diplomatic track will be feasible not until the State stops its interaction with illegal armed groups.”

M23 and the FDLR were mentioned by name, after which he added that “when it comes to the parameters of this process, it is for Rwanda and the DRC to decide whether these parameters are to be defined within the relaunched Nairobi process or within other initiatives. In any case, it is clear that this issue requires a comprehensive approach and certain flexibility by both sides.” This shows that Russia recognizes the security dilemma roots of the latest Congolese Crisis and their associated ethnic ones.

He then moved along to addressing the resource ones by reminding everyone of how “We must also not forget that the central element of the crisis is the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources… It is also well known that there are other groups and external ‘players’ involved in this criminal business. We all know very well who they are, and we know that they line their pockets by smuggling ‘bloody’ natural resources from the east of the DRC.” This hints at a Western role in exacerbating tensions.

It also leaves open the possibility that the reportedly Rwandan-backed M23 might be acting as Western proxies to seize the DRC’s minerals, though the Russian Foreign Ministry’s call for a ceasefire the day later instead of that group’s unilateral withdrawal suggest that Moscow isn’t yet convinced. The same goes for RT’s decision to interview Vincent Karega, the former Rwandan Ambassador to the DRC who’s now ambassador-at-large in the Great Lakes Region, and then promote it on their front page on Tuesday.

Karega predictably repeated Kigali’s position that the DRC’s alleged marginalization of its Tutsi minority and failure to implement previous agreements for integrating M23 into the national army are responsible for the latest Congolese Crisis. As could have been expected, he also denied reports that several thousand Rwandan troops have invaded the DRC to help M23 with its offensive. The importance of interviewing him and then promoting it is that it shows Russia’s balanced position towards the crisis.

Accordingly, while observers can read between the lines of Nebenzia’s briefing to intuit that Moscow blames the M23 for the violence and suspects that there might be a Western trace, it’s premature to claim that Russia is against Rwanda. After all, a superficial comparison of the Congolese and Ukrainian Crises suggests that M23 and Rwanda are playing similar roles as the Donbass militia and Russia, and Eastern DRC has lots of mineral wealth just like Donbass has plenty of lithium wealth in particular.

Important differences still exist though to make the aforesaid an imperfect comparison. For example, Rwanda was a close US ally during the Congo Wars but fell out of favour in recent years due to its growing ties with China and Russia as well as M23’s rebellion, while Russia never played any such role as Rwanda did in advancing the US’ regional agenda. Moreover, the DRC’s minerals are already being extracted, while Donbass’ lithium has yet to be. Another difference is the nature of their special operations.

Russia’s officially acknowledged one has gone to great lengths to avoid harming civilians whereas Rwanda’s reportedly ongoing on that it still officially denies has already been devastating for them. Furthermore, there were credible reasons in the run-up to Russia’s special operation for Moscow to suspect that the West was pushing Ukraine to launch an offensive against the Russians in Donbass, while no similar such trigger event apparently existed with regard to Rwanda and the Eastern DRC’s Tutsis.

In any case, the similarities are close enough that Russia might have felt uncomfortable laying the entire blame on M23 and their reported Rwandan patrons in spite of its draft military agreement with the DRC from last March. Russia might also envisage mediating between them given its close security ties with Rwanda in the Central African Republic. Of course, its position might change depending on whether the conflict expands and the ways in which this might happen, but for now it’s impressively balanced.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#CAR #CentralAfricanRepublic #Congo #DemocraticRepublicOfCongo #DRC #Geopolitics #Russia #UNSC

What Comes Next After The Jaffar Express Terrorist Attack In Pakistan?

What Comes Next After The Jaffar Express Terrorist Attack In Pakistan?

By Andrew Korybko

Regardless of whether or not Pakistan authorizes kinetic action against “Balochistan Liberation Army” camps in Afghanistan, the state must adequately address the indigenous causes of this conflict without further delay otherwise it’ll never stand any chance of restoring stability to its largest region.

Pakistan is reeling after this week’s hijacking of the Jaffar Express by the terrorist-designated “Balochistan Liberation Army” (BLA). It’s impossible to independently confirm the details given strict state censorship, but around 400 people were taken hostage, including servicemen traveling home on leave. The BLA demanded the release of what they described as political prisoners, but the military staged a daring operation to end the day-long ordeal instead. At least two dozen people were killed.

The Baloch Conflict owes its origins to Balochistan’s contentious incorporation into Pakistan but has evolved in recent years to take on shades of “resource nationalism”. What’s meant by this is that some locals believe that their resource-rich region, the largest in Pakistan at nearly half the country’s size, isn’t receiving its fair share of wealth. The BLA and its supporters also accuse Pakistan of selling the region out to China. Pakistan denies these claims and has always blamed Afghanistan and India for the conflict.

It therefore wasn’t surprising when the Foreign Office’s spokesman said on Thursday that “India has been involved in terrorism in Pakistan. In the particular attack on Jaffar express, the terrorists had been in contact with their handlers and ring leaders in Afghanistan.” While the Afghan dimension is likely true owing to the Taliban sheltering the BLA and its new de facto TTP allies, which the group considers to be a means of asymmetrically restoring the balance of power with Pakistan, the Indian angle is questionable.

Pakistan’s accusation against India is premised on their history of proxy warfare against one another over the decades, which makes it reasonable to suspect India of backing Baloch militants against Pakistan as response to Pakistan backing Kashmiri ones against India, among others. There’s also Pakistan’s capture of Kulbhushan Jadhav in 2016, who Islamabad accused of being an Indian spy tasked with organizing terrorist attacks in Balochistan, while India has always insisted that he’s innocent of these charges.

Taken together, they form the cornerstone upon which the Foreign Office put forth its latest accusation, but it’s bereft of proof and instead comes off as a deflection from the conflict’s indigenous causes and the Taliban’s indisputably more direct role in what happened. After all, the BLA receives sanctuary in Afghanistan, so the Taliban is much more to blame for what happened. Even if the Taliban pleads ignorance and claims that it can’t control its borders, which isn’t true, then that’s also a problem.

Whichever way one looks at it, the Indian angle is therefore questionable, but Pakistan pushing it is meant to accomplish three goals. First, it’s intended to rally Pakistanis behind the government by blaming their historical rival for this latest terrorist attack. Second, Pakistan also hopes to rally the international community – or at least some of its SCO partners like China – against India. And finally, Pakistan might authorize kinetic action in Afghanistan, but on what it’ll present as an anti-Indian basis.

Building upon the last point, this could resemble Russia’s special operation in the sense of how Russia militarily intervened in Ukraine on an anti-NATO basis after accusing the bloc of exploiting Ukraine as a proxy, which Russia claimed could become a launching pad for more aggression if it wasn’t stopped. Likewise, Pakistan might carry out comparatively smaller-scale strikes and/or incursions in Afghanistan and only target terrorist groups, but it could justify them on similar grounds.

The benefit in presenting things this way is that Pakistan can continue to claim that it has no problem with Afghanistan per se, just with how its historical Indian rival is allegedly exploiting that country as a proxy, which could become a launching pad for more aggression if it isn’t stopped. The problem though is that this motive is much more questionable than Russia’s vis-à-vis NATO in its own special operation in Ukraine so Afghans as a whole might regard any larger-scale Pakistani kinetic action as a hostile act.

Even if Pakistan eschews such a response to this latest terrorist attack for whatever reason, officially tying India into what happened suggests that it has no interest in addressing the conflict’s indigenous causes, instead preferring to blame everything on its neighbour like always. That’ll only lead to an even wider rift emerging between Balochis and the rest of the country, which can in turn result in more BLA sympathizers or even recruits, thus intensifying the already self-sustaining cycle of instability there.

The larger that the BLA’s pool of sympathizers and recruits becomes, the greater the unconventional threat that Pakistan faces in Balochistan, which could embolden the military regime into doubling down on its controversial “preemptive” anti-terrorist policies like “forced disappearances”. The most effective way to reduce the aforesaid pool is to empower responsible locals through meaningful economic and political partnerships with the state for showing them that they have more to gain through unity.

For example, Baloch veterans could be appointed to lead new projects in their home region, and these would be obligated to reinvest a percentage of their proceeds into local initiatives. These same figures and other similarly trusted ones could also be supported by the state as alternative community leaders for counteracting the pernicious influence of separatist-inclined tribal leaders. That’s easier said than done, but it should be attempted without delay otherwise the BLA’s pool will keep growing.

The combination of political radicalism and state failure is most responsible for perpetuating the Baloch Conflict, not foreign forces, though the Taliban’s recent assistance has definitely been important. Without adequately addressing these indigenous causes, which requires a complete rethinking on the part of the Pakistani government, outsiders will always be able to exploit this conflict. Accordingly, cross-border kinetic action in Afghanistan can be helpful, but a lasting solution requires much more than that.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#Afghanistan #Balochistan #BLA #India #Pakistan #PakistanArmy #Terrorism #Terrorists

Creative Ethiopian Diplomacy Might Deter An Egyptian-Backed Eritrean-TPLF Offensive

Creative Ethiopian Diplomacy Might Deter An Egyptian-Backed Eritrean-TPLF Offensive

By Andrew Korybko

Economic-diplomatic initiatives with the UAE and Saudi Arabia could pair with a proposed Congolese-like economic-security deal with the US to get Egypt’s three patrons to stop it before it’s too late.

The Ethiopian Foreign Minister warned his US counterpart about an impending Eritrean-TPLF offensive which, given the regional context, would be backed by aspiring hegemon Egypt. Eritrea is now allied with a hardline faction of its former TPLF enemies in pursuit of their shared Egyptian patron’s grand strategic goal of “Balkanizing” Ethiopia. These developments follow Ethiopia’s surprise rapprochement with Somalia, which defused the hitherto most likely regional conflict scenario (at least for now).

It’s imperative that this offensive is averted. Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Africa at around 130 million people and its fastest-growing economy. It’s also one of China’s top BRI partners on the continent, though it multi-aligns between Russia, the US (with whom it cooperates against Somali-based terrorists), India, the Gulf, the EU, and Turkiye too. A large-scale conflict could thus lead to mass casualties, unprecedented refugee flows to Europe and the Gulf, and a regional terrorist caliphate.

Creative Ethiopian diplomacy might be the key to ensuring regional peace. Egypt is dependent on financing from UAE and Saudi Arabia so they could play a role in deterring its proxy war plans. For that to happen, they must obtain greater stakes in Ethiopia’s stability, ergo why new investment opportunities should be proposed without delay. If clinched, then Egypt’s financial patrons might pull the strings to dissuade their junior partner from endangering their new regional projects via Eritrea-TPLF.

Apart from the aforesaid economic-diplomatic initiative, Ethiopia would do well to consider a Congolese-like economic-security deal with the US. This could take the form of giving US companies privileged access to its largely untapped mining industry in exchange for guarantees against Egyptian-backed Eritrean-TPLF aggression and assistance in resolving their protracted border dispute. Trump’s attention could be piqued due to the mineral aspect and his obsession with winning the Nobel Peace Prize.

Just like Egypt is financially dependent on the UAE and Saudi Arabia, so too is its military dependent on US aid, so each could deter Cairo in their own way or perhaps in coordination. The point is that Egypt’s latest hegemonic plot, which is the continuation of its long-running goal to subjugate and then “Balkanize” the Horn of Africa’s Ethiopian core, could be thwarted through its patrons’ influence. The greater their stakes in Ethiopia, the greater their will in deterring their junior partner could become.

The parallel Emirati-Saudi and US tracks complement one another. The first pair are BRICS affiliates (the UAE is a formal member like Ethiopia and Egypt while the second’s official status is ambiguous) so a “mini-lateral” could form between them all within this group for preventing intra-BRICS conflict. As for the US, Trump is paranoid that BRICS is conspiring to topple the dollar, so Ethiopia’s prospective proposal for a Congolese-like economic-security deal could reassure him of its intentions and reduce US pressure.

Altogether, this creative Ethiopian diplomacy might deter an Egyptian-backed Eritrean-TPLF offensive, but only if Cairo’s patrons rein in their rogue junior partner. A large-scale conflict could further destabilize the Gulf of Aden-Red Sea region, catalyse unprecedented refugee flows to Europe and the Gulf, and create a strategic opening for Somali-based terrorists to exploit. Hopefully the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the US realize that it’s better to stop Egypt now than to deal with the fallout of its plans later.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#Africa #BRICS #Egypt #Eritrea #Ethiopia #Geopolitics #Russia #SaudiArabia #TPLF #UAE #USA

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2025-07-06 09:26:40

Is The US-Mediated Peace Deal Between Congo And Rwanda A Turning Point?

Is The US-Mediated Peace Deal Between Congo And Rwanda A Turning Point?

By Andrew Korybko

The US’ interest in enforcing compliance is driven by its pursuit of the Eastern DRC’s critical minerals.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda recently signed a US-mediated peace deal in DC that can be read in full here at the State Department’s site and was summarized here at RT. It aims to resolve their long-running conflict over the DRC-backed “Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda” (FDLR) and the Rwandan-backed “March 23 Movement” (M23) that exploded in January after M23 captured Goma, the capital of the DRC’s North Kivu Province. Here are three background briefings:

* 28 January: “Analysing Russia’s Response To The Latest Congolese Crisis”

* 29 January: “What Explains Russia’s Swift Policy Recalibration Towards The Latest Congolese Crisis?”

* 24 April: “A Cost-Benefit Analysis Of The Proposed Congolese-US Minerals-Security Deal”

To oversimplify, the DRC and Rwanda respectively consider M23 and FDLR to be existential threats and are also engaged in a struggle over the lawless Eastern DRC’s large-scale illegal mining industry, which China reportedly plays a major role in via ownership and exports through Rwanda. The DRC therefore sought US diplomatic intervention and security guarantees in exchange for privileged mining rights with the innuendo that Chinese companies might then be replaced by US ones as a reward.

The US-mediated deal accordingly includes: a commitment by the conflicting parties to end support for armed groups; a related commitment to support the UN’s mission in the DRC (MONUSCO); the creation of a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) with the US and Qatar as observers; the creation of a Joint Oversight Committee (JOC) for dispute resolution comprised of them, the US, Qatar, and the AU; and bilateral and regional economic integration. There are other details, but these are the main ones.

The bilateral integration clause specifically mentions the potential involvement of the US government and investors in formalizing mineral supply chains through forthcoming deals while also containing a clause about independent economic oversight of bilateral and regional projects with an implied US role. This’ll give the US stakes in ensuring that both parties respect the deal and cooperate within the JCSM, absent which the JOC could request a ramping up of MONUSCO’s activities against their armed proxies.

The first part about ending support for armed groups will clearly be the most difficult to achieve, but the conflicting parties stand to gain by formalizing the lawless Eastern DRC’s large-scale illegal mining industry, which could come about through the US’ direct state and commercial involvement therein. The trade-off though is that the DRC and Rwanda would thus likely allow the US to replace the role of Chinese companies in this trade even at the possible expense of their ties with the People’s Republic.

If this comes to pass, then the past quarter-century of regional instability might finally end to the benefit of the Eastern DRC’s locals, but the US’ legal seizure of China’s illegal mining operations there could lead to the DRC being pressured to replace China’s legal ones in the Southeast, albeit via legally dubious moves. In that case, then the US would gain a strategic edge in the global tech race through its control over these critical minerals, which it might weaponize against China and worsen Great Power tensions.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#Africa #China #DemocraticRepublicOfCongo #DRC #Geopolitics #USA

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Zelensky Has No Feasible Alternative To Accepting Trump’s Lopsided Resource Deal

Zelensky Has No Feasible Alternative To Accepting Trump’s Lopsided Resource Deal

By Andrew Korybko

He’d sacrifice his political career, his envisaged legacy in Ukrainians’ eyes, and part of his country’s economic sovereignty, but he’d avert a much worse scenario than if he rejected this deal.

Trump warned last weekend that Zelensky will have “some problems – big, big problems” if he “tries to back out of the rare earth deal” amidst reports that the latest version of this agreement is very lopsided. It allegedly compels Ukraine to contribute half of its revenue from all resource projects and related infrastructure into a US-controlled investment fund, pay off all US aid from 2022 onward through these means, and give the US the right of first offer on new projects and a veto over resource sales to others.

These tougher terms can be considered punishment for Zelensky picking his infamous fight with Trump and Vance at the White House in late February, but the whole package is being sold to Ukraine as a “security guarantee” from the US. The argument goes that America won’t let Russia threaten these projects, which also include pipelines and ports, thus leading to it at the very least resuming 2023-levels of military-intelligence aid and maybe even directly escalating with Russia to get it into back down.

Ukraine kinda already has such Article 5-like guarantees from the US and other major NATO countries per the bilateral pacts that it clinched with them all throughout last year as explained here, but this proposed arrangement gives the US tangible stakes in deterring or immediately stopping hostilities. The trade-off though is that Ukraine must sacrifice part of its economic sovereignty, which is politically uncomfortable since Zelensky told his compatriots that they’re fighting to preserve its full sovereignty.

If Zelensky agrees to Trump’s lopsided resource deal, then the optics of any ceasefire, armistice, or peace treaty would pair with de facto global recognition of Russian control over the fifth of Ukraine’s pre-2014 territory that Kiev still claims as its own to craft the perception of a joint asymmetrical partition. Not only might Zelensky’s political career end if Ukraine was then forced to hold truly free and fair elections, but his envisaged legacy in Ukrainians’ eyes as this century’s top “freedom fighter” would also be shattered.

He doesn’t have any feasible alternative though since going behind Trump’s back to reach a comparatively better deal with the Brits and/or Europeans wouldn’t result in the “security guarantees” that he’s convinced himself that Ukraine needs in order to compromise with Russia. No one other than the US has any chance of militarily taking on Russia, let alone the political will, and not to mention solely over their investments in a war-torn third country whose resource wealth is reportedly questionable.

If Zelensky keeps dillydallying, then Trump might once again temporarily suspend military and intelligence aid to Ukraine as leverage while tacking on even more punitive terms as revenge. The conflict with Russia would also naturally continue, thus making it impossible for Ukraine to develop its resource industry and related infrastructure even if it reached a deal with someone else. The longer that the conflict lasts, the greater the likelihood that Russia will destroy more of those same assets too.

But if Zelensky accepts the latest deal on offer, then he’d obtain the “security guarantees” that he’s looking for, thus making him more likely to accept a ceasefire and then possibly leading to Trump putting further pressure on Putin to follow suit such as imposing strict secondary sanctions on Russian oil clients. Zelensky would sacrifice his political career, his envisaged legacy in Ukrainians’ eyes, and part of his country’s economic sovereignty, but he’d avert a much worse scenario than if he rejected this deal.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Egypt Draws Red Line On U.S. Gaza Deal: GERD Dispute Takes Backseat To Homeland Security

Egypt Draws Red Line On U.S. Gaza Deal: GERD Dispute Takes Backseat To Homeland Security

By Andrew Korybko

Preserving its perceived national interests vis-à-vis Gaza is seen as much more important of a priority.

It was concluded here in late July after Trump’s recent remarks on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) that he has ulterior motives for supporting Egypt in this dispute. These suspicions were lent credence after Arab News reported that “high-level Egyptian diplomatic sources” told their sister site that Cairo rejected the price that it has to pay for “decisive (US) intervention”. They claim that Egypt must support Israel’s Gazan relocation plan and maybe even eventually host many, if not all, Gazans too.

That’s hitherto been a red line from the perspective of Egypt’s national security interests since it suspects that Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Hamas militants might infiltrate into the country under the cover of refugees and thenceforth get to work trying to overthrow the government yet again. Nevertheless, it’s what the US considers to be the easiest solution to this humanitarian crisis, ergo why this demand was reportedly made of Egypt in exchange for “decisively intervening” in the GERD dispute.

The US also knows that this is a red line for Egypt as explained above; therefore, it’s trying to force Egypt into a dilemma over its perceived national security priorities. After all, Egypt has falsely claimed for years that GERD supposedly represents an existential threat while being careful not to openly describe the Gazans as such, yet it reportedly just rejected the US’ terms for taking its side over Ethiopia. Arab News’ “high-level Egyptian diplomatic sources” are thus inadvertently discrediting their country’s narrative.

Quite clearly, the potential hosting of Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Hamas militants who might infiltrate the country under the cover of refugees represents much more of an existential threat to Egypt than its officials ever claimed that GERD did, consequently accounting for their choice. Truth be told, it’s a wise one if they maintain it and don’t reverse course for whatever reason since there are limits to what the US can do to coerce Ethiopia into some kind of deal with Egypt, which will now be touched upon.

Contrary to Trump’s claims, GERD wasn’t financed by the US, so it has no plausible pretext for intervening in this dispute without Ethiopia’s permission. GERD has also already been built so there’s no realistic scenario where the US gets Ethiopia to suspend the project. Another point is that crippling sanctions and other forms of hybrid war pressure, such as supporting a potentially imminent Egyptian-backed Eritrean-TPLF offensive, could backfire against the US’ EU and Gulf allies.

Egypt might have thus wagered that it’s better to preserve its national security interests vis-à-vis the scenario of Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Hamas militants infiltrating into the country under cover of refugees than to sacrifice this as the price for the US “decisively intervening” in the GERD dispute. As earlier mentioned, if Egypt maintains this choice, then it would be a wise one from their perspective but also beneficial for Ethiopia by averting the scenario of Egyptian-requested US pressure upon it.

In fact, Ethiopia might even flip the dynamics against Egypt at this pivotal moment if it agrees to host some displaced Gazans like Axios’ recent reported suggested that it’s considering, in which case the US might do Ethiopia a favour vis-à-vis Egypt by deterring it from backing any Eritrean-TPLF offensive. Should this come to pass, and it remains to be seen but can’t be discounted either, then Egypt might therefore come to deeply regret that it ever asked the US to take its side against Ethiopia in the GERD dispute.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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The Ethio-Somali Rapprochement Is A Pleasant Surprise

The Ethio-Somali Rapprochement Is A Pleasant Surprise

By Andrew Korybko

It had hitherto appeared almost inevitable that a proxy war would soon be waged in Somalia between Ethiopia and Egypt due to all sides’ (those three’s, Eritrea’s, and Somaliland’s) seemingly unshakable positions.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed just visited Mogadishu in a reciprocal trip after Somali Prime Minister Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) travelled to Addis in early January and mid-February. This follows their second Turkish-mediated talks from mid-December and comes right after their top military representatives agreed to develop a “Status Of Forces Agreement” (SOFA) per their leaders’ will. That breakthrough paved the way for Abiy to visit Mogadishu as the latest phase of their rapprochement.

The larger context enables observers to better appreciate what’s happening. Somalia was manipulated by nearby Egypt and Eritrea into denying landlocked Ethiopia the sea access that it requires to preemptively avert socio-economic and therefore political instability in the coming future. Djibouti’s onerous port fees and Ethiopia’s reliance on this single corridor to the sea motivated Abiy to diversify his country’s options. Somaliland became his only option so they signed an MoU on this in January 2024.

The next eleven months were marked by HSM’s clumsy diplomatic manoeuvrings in response to the aforesaid agreement, which threw the Horn back into uncertainty since he and his dual patrons (Egypt and Eritrea) began sabre-rattling about the consequences of the Ethio-Somaliland deal. The situation deteriorated to the point where it looked like Ethiopia and Egypt might fight a proxy war in Somalia and/or Somaliland amidst the transition to a new AU-led military mission (AUSSOM) at the start of 2025.

That worst-case but increasingly likely scenario was offset almost at the last minute after the second Turkish-mediated talks between the Ethiopian and Somali leaders in mid-December. While the MoU’s status remains unclear, most observers have concluded in the two and a half months since then that it was de facto suspended, apparently in exchange for Somalia including Ethiopia in AUSSOM. If that’s the case, then it represents a pragmatic compromise between these two, which is a pleasant surprise.

War is always to every average person’s detriment so all efforts should be undertaken to avoid it if realistically possible without subordinating one side to the other out of desperation. It had hitherto appeared almost inevitable that a proxy war would soon be waged in Somalia between Ethiopia and Egypt due to all sides’ (those three’s, Eritrea’s, and Somaliland’s) seemingly unshakable positions. That’s why it was so unexpected that Turkish President Tayyip Recep Erdogan was able to avert this disaster.

If the Ethio-Somali rapprochement continues, then the risk of another regional war will greatly decrease, thus returning to the traditional scenario of Egypt egging Eritrea on to attack Ethiopia. Somalia’s (now-former?) dual patrons will understandably be upset as will Ethiopia’s (now-former?) Somalilander ally. All three would be limited in terms of what they can do though, with the first two being unlikely to provoke a regional war due to the absence of pretext while the second will just look elsewhere for recognition.

None of those three might forgive their respective (now-former?) ally since the Ethio-Somali rapprochement was unforeseen by their policymakers and upended their regional plans. The best-case scenario is that Egypt learns its lesson and stops meddling in the Horn, Somaliland secures recognition from the US, India, UK, Russia, and/or the UAE, and Eritrea enters into its own rapprochement with Ethiopia once President Isaias Afwerki passes away and if a more pragmatic leader takes his place.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#Africa #Egypt #Eritrea #Ethiopia #Geopolitics #HornOfAfrica #Russia #Somalia #Somaliland

Trump’s Latest Remarks About GERD Raise Questions About His Understanding Of This Dispute

Trump’s Latest Remarks About GERD Raise Questions About His Understanding Of This Dispute

By Andrew Korybko

Siding with Egypt signals support for its next proxy war on Ethiopia that could destabilize key US allies.

Trump scandalously predicted during his first term that Egypt might bomb the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) so it wasn’t surprising that he brought those two’s dispute several time this year so far. The first was during his call with Sisi in February, he then posted on social media about it twice over the summer, and he finally mentioned it again during his meeting with NATO chief Rutte. Each time he described it as a regional problem that the US is helping to resolve in order to avert war.

His framing of that aforesaid problem, especially in his latest remarks where he lent credence to Egypt’s discredited fearmongering that GERD’s completion would cut off the Nile’s flow if its construction didn’t do so already, raise questions about his understanding of this dispute at the very least. GERD’s purpose is to help fully electrify what’s the second most populous country in Africa at around 130 million people and its fastest-growing economy, not blackmail Egypt for unknown reasons like Cairo speculates.

Only 55% of Ethiopians had electricity as of 2022, with the remainder mostly residing in the rural areas that are prone to foreign-exacerbated unrest and even terrorist insurgencies. Fully electrifying Ethiopia is therefore an economic and security imperative, the successful fulfilment of which stabilizes the region and beyond by reducing the risk of huge refugee outflows and new terrorist sanctuaries. Regrettably, Egypt has long aspired for hegemony in the Horn, to which end it’s sought to destabilize Ethiopia.

This has taken the form of supporting Eritrea (both its prior rebel-separatist cause and its recent anti-Ethiopian campaign since late 2022), the TPLF government-turned-rebels-turned-regional-government during the Northern Conflict from 2020-2022, and previously (and soon once again?) Somalia as proxies. Falsely fearmongering about GERD was always just a public means for falsely justifying the aforesaid meddling, both of which it still continues in pursuit of three interconnected hegemonic goals.

The first is to “Balkanize” Ethiopia along ethno-regional lines, which segues into the second goal of expanding Egypt’s sphere of influence over the divided-and-ruled remnants, with this facilitating the final one of exploiting the hydrological, mineral, and labour resources within Ethiopia’s then-former lands. Trump evidently doesn’t know that Egypt’s furtherance of these goals could destabilize his EU and Gulf allies by risking huge refugee outflows and leading to the creation of new terrorist sanctuaries.

Therefore, in order for the American dimension of the creative Ethiopian diplomacy that was proposed here in early July to bear fruit, Trump’s gross misunderstanding of the Egyptian-Ethiopian rivalry and the GERD dispute within it must first be corrected. This can most realistically be achieved via a forthcoming diplomatic campaign that engages the US and its two aforesaid partners with more direct stakes in Ethiopia’s stability, all three of whom have close ties with Egypt, and candidly discussing everything.

This is more urgent than ever after Ethiopia’s top diplomat warned earlier in the month about an impending Eritrean-TPLF offensive that would be Egyptian-backed given the regional context. If the proposed diplomatic campaign doesn’t achieve tangible results, namely all three but especially the US coercing Egypt into reconsidering this serious proxy war escalation then it would suggest that Trump has ulterior motives for supporting Egypt and thus doesn’t innocently misunderstand this regional dispute.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#Africa #Egypt #Eritrea #Ethiopia #EU #Geopolitics #GERD #GrandEthiopianRenaissanceDam

The Amended Minerals Deal Will Likely Lead To More American Weapons Packages For Ukraine

The Amended Minerals Deal Will Likely Lead To More American Weapons Packages For Ukraine

By Andrew Korybko

That would greatly complicate Russia’s goal of demilitarizing Ukraine and thus imperil the peace talks.

The US and Ukraine finally signed their minerals deal after amending the draft agreement to remove a proposal for Ukraine to pay back past US military aid. A clause was added though whereby future US military aid, including technology and training, is considered part of the US’ contribution to their joint fund. More weapons packages will likely be in the cards since the US now has economic stakes in Ukraine and the value of the aid that it sends to defend them can be counted toward their joint fund.

Such an arrangement imbues the US with more policymaking flexibility than if it had conceded to Ukraine’s demand for concrete security guarantees. Authorizing another weapons package at this diplomatically delicate moment in the peace process could spook Russia and thus lead to the talks’ collapse. At the same time, however, this deal will likely lead to such packages being authorized after a ceasefire on the pretext of defending US investments and contributing to their joint fund.

What this means in practice is that Russia shouldn’t expect the US to fully dump Ukraine in any realistic scenario from here on out. Trump just rewarded Zelensky for this agreement by “inform[ing] Congress of [his] intention to green-light the export of defense-related products to Ukraine through direct commercial sales (DCS) of $50 million or more” according to the Kyiv Post citing unnamed diplomatic sources. This signals his newfound interest in resuming DCS in lieu of large-scale weapons packages.

Although this sum is insignificant compared to the over $1.6 billion in DCS authorized between 2015-2023 that the Kyiv Post reminded their audience about, and nowhere near what the US Government directly provided since 2022, it still importantly hints at his calculations. If Trump comes to believe that Zelensky is responsible for the peace talks’ collapse, then he might continue to withhold weapons packages as punishment, but he could still green-light more DCS deals.

Likewise, if he comes to believe that Putin is responsible for this, then he might authorize large-scale weapons packages as punishment. Either way, US arms will likely continue flowing into Ukraine due to their amended minerals deal, with the only variables being the quality, scale, pace, and terms of these weapons shipments. This greatly complicates Russia’s goal of demilitarizing Ukraine, especially seeing as how the US will struggle to stop Europe from arming Ukraine no matter how hard the US might try.

Accordingly, Russia might calculate that it’s better to concede to Ukraine’s partial demilitarization given the difficulty of achieving its full demilitarization, but the threat that this poses could be managed by demanding a demilitarized “Trans-Dnieper” region controlled by non-Western peacekeepers. Even if that proposal isn’t agreed to, Russia might still push for geographic limits on Ukraine’s deployment of certain weapons, which would require a UNSC-approved monitoring and enforcement mechanism to work.

So long as Trump is sincere about reaching a deal with Putin, then he should agree to this compromise or a variation thereof to keep the peace process alive, otherwise Putin might find it politically impossible to approve of any agreement that entails abandoning his goal to demilitarize Ukraine. That’s essentially what’s at stake now given that the amended terms of the US’ minerals deal with Ukraine greatly complicate Russia’s attainment of this objective that’s among the reasons for its special operation.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#Geopolitics #Russia #Ukraine #USA

Is The US-Mediated Peace Deal Between Congo And Rwanda A Turning Point?

Is The US-Mediated Peace Deal Between Congo And Rwanda A Turning Point?

By Andrew Korybko

The US’ interest in enforcing compliance is driven by its pursuit of the Eastern DRC’s critical minerals.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda recently signed a US-mediated peace deal in DC that can be read in full here at the State Department’s site and was summarized here at RT. It aims to resolve their long-running conflict over the DRC-backed “Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda” (FDLR) and the Rwandan-backed “March 23 Movement” (M23) that exploded in January after M23 captured Goma, the capital of the DRC’s North Kivu Province. Here are three background briefings:

* 28 January: “Analysing Russia’s Response To The Latest Congolese Crisis”

* 29 January: “What Explains Russia’s Swift Policy Recalibration Towards The Latest Congolese Crisis?”

* 24 April: “A Cost-Benefit Analysis Of The Proposed Congolese-US Minerals-Security Deal”

To oversimplify, the DRC and Rwanda respectively consider M23 and FDLR to be existential threats and are also engaged in a struggle over the lawless Eastern DRC’s large-scale illegal mining industry, which China reportedly plays a major role in via ownership and exports through Rwanda. The DRC therefore sought US diplomatic intervention and security guarantees in exchange for privileged mining rights with the innuendo that Chinese companies might then be replaced by US ones as a reward.

The US-mediated deal accordingly includes: a commitment by the conflicting parties to end support for armed groups; a related commitment to support the UN’s mission in the DRC (MONUSCO); the creation of a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) with the US and Qatar as observers; the creation of a Joint Oversight Committee (JOC) for dispute resolution comprised of them, the US, Qatar, and the AU; and bilateral and regional economic integration. There are other details, but these are the main ones.

The bilateral integration clause specifically mentions the potential involvement of the US government and investors in formalizing mineral supply chains through forthcoming deals while also containing a clause about independent economic oversight of bilateral and regional projects with an implied US role. This’ll give the US stakes in ensuring that both parties respect the deal and cooperate within the JCSM, absent which the JOC could request a ramping up of MONUSCO’s activities against their armed proxies.

The first part about ending support for armed groups will clearly be the most difficult to achieve, but the conflicting parties stand to gain by formalizing the lawless Eastern DRC’s large-scale illegal mining industry, which could come about through the US’ direct state and commercial involvement therein. The trade-off though is that the DRC and Rwanda would thus likely allow the US to replace the role of Chinese companies in this trade even at the possible expense of their ties with the People’s Republic.

If this comes to pass, then the past quarter-century of regional instability might finally end to the benefit of the Eastern DRC’s locals, but the US’ legal seizure of China’s illegal mining operations there could lead to the DRC being pressured to replace China’s legal ones in the Southeast, albeit via legally dubious moves. In that case, then the US would gain a strategic edge in the global tech race through its control over these critical minerals, which it might weaponize against China and worsen Great Power tensions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#Africa #China #DemocraticRepublicOfCongo #DRC #Geopolitics #USA

Addressing Strategic Risks in US-Pakistan Critical Mineral Cooperation

Addressing Strategic Risks in US-Pakistan Critical Mineral Cooperation

By Andrew Korybko

Pakistan might be handing the US a poisoned chalice.

The US sent one of its top diplomats for South Asia to attend the Pakistan Minerals Investment Forum in Islamabad last week, during which time he conveyed the Trump Administration’s interest in critical mineral cooperation with Pakistan and met with senior political and military officials to discuss this. These resources are integral to the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” and that’s why the US is negotiating such partnerships across the world with countries as varied as Ukraine, the Congo, and now Pakistan.

Each of these three entail strategic risks, but it’s only the last one that will be discussed in this analysis. To begin with, the bulk of Pakistan’s mineral resources are located in its Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces, which are respectively suffering terrorist insurgencies waged by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). The former is fighting to impose a radical Islamic dictatorship, the latter wants independence, and both are designated by the US as terrorists.

1. Accordingly, the first strategic risk that critical mineral cooperation with Pakistan entails is that these groups target American companies and nationals in these two regions. This is a plausible scenario since the BLA in particular is infamous for targeting Chinese workers, who they accuse of extracting their region’s wealth. As for the TTP, it’s waging war against the partially US-armed Pakistani state. Both groups are therefore expected to consider American companies and nationals to be legitimate targets.
2. The second strategic risk builds upon the first and relates to the US being convinced by Pakistan that the aforesaid threats to its mining companies could be mitigated through preferential arms deals. The Trump Administration would do well to think twice about that though since Pakistan’s much more significant arms relationship with China hasn’t made its workers any safer and perceived American favouritism of Pakistan by India could complicate their ties upon which a lot of the US’ “Pivot (back) to Asia” depends.
3. Segueing into the third strategic risk, Pakistan might be offering the US critical mineral cooperation at this time not only to cause trouble in Indo-US ties, but also to relieve reported pressure upon its ruling military establishment by the America First faction. They believe that civilian-led democratic rule would facilitate the main anti-Chinese goal of the US’ “Pivot (back) to Asia” as explained here so the ruling military establishment that stands to lose from this might be trying to buy them off with a mineral deal.
4. The fourth strategic risk is that Pakistan doesn’t comply with whatever strings the US might attach to a mineral deal in exchange for relieving pressure upon its military rulers. For instance, they might agree to distance Pakistan in some way from China, logistically facilitate mineral exports from Afghanistan if the US clinches a similar such deal there, and/or allow CIA drone bases for spying on and threatening Iran. It’s possible that these would just be false promises to secure a deal and enrich corrupt military officials.
5. And finally, the last strategic risk is that the US gets embroiled in another “War on Terror” if “mission creep” leads to it fighting the TTP and BLA with Pakistan in order to secure its mineral investments. The “sunk-cost fallacy” could also play a role in these calculations too. Coupled with potential complications in Indo-US ties and the derailing of the US’ “Pivot (back) to Asia”, the strategic costs of critical mineral cooperation with Pakistan could far outweigh the expected benefits, thus making it a poisoned chalice.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#BLA #Geopolitics #Pakistan #PakistanArmy #TTP #USA