The European Parliament Confirmed Poland’s Centrality To The Bloc’s Eastern Security Strategy

The European Parliament Confirmed Poland’s Centrality To The Bloc’s Eastern Security Strategy

By Andrew Korybko

Poland is at a geostrategic crossroads amidst the nascent Russian-US “New Détente” whereby it can either remain a stalwart American ally despite its misgivings about the rapid Russian-US rapprochement, rely more on France to balance the US, or pivot away from the US towards France.

Most observers missed last week’s European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence despite its importance. Article 15 “stresses that the East Shield and Baltic Defence Line should be the flagship EU projects for fostering deterrence and overcoming potential threats from the East”, both of which are tied to Poland, while other articles loosen financial restrictions for investing in defence. Polish Defence Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz praised the resolution on both counts.

For those who aren’t aware, Poland’s East Shield and the Baltic Defence Line are complementary projects that aim to build a series of high-tech fortifications along these four countries’ shared borders with Russia and Belarus, hence why they’re considered by some to be a single megaproject. Finland’s related border defence plans are oftentimes grouped together with them to expand its sense of scale as running from the Arctic to Central Europe. Here are four background briefings to bring readers up to speed:

* 22 January 2024: “The ‘Baltic Defence Line’ Is Meant To Accelerate The German-Led ‘Military Schengen’”

* 13 May 2024: “Poland’s Border Fortification Buildup Has Nothing To Do With Legitimate Threat Perceptions”

* 25 May 2024: “A New Iron Curtain Is Being Built From The Arctic To Central Europe”

* 28 June 2024: “The ‘EU Defence Line’ Is The Latest Euphemism For The New Iron Curtain”

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk foresaw last week’s resolution earlier in the month when he declared that “The Shield East, which is not solely a Polish project after Finnish and Baltic involvement in it, as well the EU’s eastern border, have become a priority and are no more questioned.” This came just several days after European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen unveiled the bloc’s “ReArm Europe Plan”, part of which includes offering members €150 billion worth of loans for defence investments.

It was with all this in mind that Tusk said the day after the resolution’s passing following his meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara that responsibility for Poland’s eastern border plans should be shared by the EU and NATO. He also suggested that they consider this border to be a “common” one in order for it to then be “easier for us to finance and organize this” initiative. Tusk’s de facto request for more European financing and foreign troops was made in the context explained below:

* 19 February 2025: “Poland Is Once Again Poised To Become The US’ Top Partner In Europe”

* 6 March 2025: “France, Germany, & Poland Are Competing For Leadership Of Post-Conflict Europe”

* 14 March 2025: “France’s Next Quarterly Nuclear Drills Might Become Prestige-Building Exercises With Poland”

* 15 March 2025: “Poland’s Talk About Obtaining Nukes Is Likely A Misguided Negotiation Tactic With The US”

Poland is at a geostrategic crossroads amidst the nascent Russian–US “New Détente” whereby it can either remain a stalwart American ally despite its misgivings about the rapid Russian-US rapprochement, rely more on France to balance the US, or pivot away from the US towards France. The outcome of May’s presidential election will likely determine which way it goes since a conservative or populist victory would raise the odds of the first or second scenarios while a liberal-globalist one would raise the third’s.

Tusk is essentially seeking to secure more European financing and foreign troops before the elections so as to ensure that the next president feels pressured by precedent into relying more on France to balance the US than remaining a stalwart American ally if they’re not from his party. From the conservative and populist perspectives, it’s a net positive to have more stakeholders in Polish security as long as Poland doesn’t have to cede any more of its sovereignty, so they might appreciate what Tusk has achieved.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#EU #Europe #EuropeanParliament #France #Geopolitics #Poland

Voice of East

2025-02-24 11:53:07

Here’s What I Learned From Analysing The New Cold War Every Day For Three Years Straight

Here’s What I Learned From Analysing The New Cold War Every Day For Three Years Straight

By Andrew Korybko

What ties these five trends together is Trump’s historic return to the presidency, his successful purge of the “deep state” that enabled him to pursue his long-sought “New Détente” with Russia, and Putin’s receptiveness to his American counterpart’s grand strategic plan of a comprehensive partnership.

I’m a Moscow-based American political analyst with a PhD. in Political Science from MGIMO, and this is my third yearly review of the New Cold War after I published by first and second on each anniversary of the special operation here and here. I’ve been analysing this subject every day since 24 February 2022, beginning at now-defunct OneWorld till mid-2022 and continuing at my Substack to the present. Here’s what I learned from doing this daily for my third year straight:

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* Trump’s Election Changed The Course Of History

Trump’s historic election victory was a game-changer in the New Cold War since everything would have been altogether different had Kamala won instead. Unlike her and Biden, he envisages responsibly managing the US’ geopolitical rivalry with Russia by brokering peace in Ukraine as the first step, after which he plans to initiate similarly motivated talks with Iran and China to that same end. Diplomacy and deal-making now take precedence over risking World War III through reckless provocations.

* The Consequences Of Ceding Sovereignty

The EU and Ukraine are learning the consequences of ceding their sovereignty to the US after Trump began treating them as the vassals that they are. The first now fears that America will abandon it as part of Trump’s “Pivot (back) to Asia” for more muscularly containing China while the second has no say in the nascent Russian-US talks over its ongoing conflict. Each ceded their sovereignty to the US with the false expectation that their allied liberal-globalists in the “deep state” would stop Trump’s return.

* Strategic Patience vs. Strategic Escalation

World War III might have already broken out long ago had Putin not exercised strategic patience by declining time and again to meaningfully respond to Ukraine’s many US-backed provocations. He only began to practice a policy of strategic escalation in late November last year to deter the outgoing Biden Administration from provoking the aforesaid after it dangerously allowed Ukraine to use the US’ long-range missiles against targets in Russia’s pre-2014 borders. This pragmatic approach deserves credit.

* Diplomacy: The Art Of The Possible

Trump’s DOGE-driven purge of the “deep state” enabled him to advance his first term’s plans for a “New Détente” with Russia via the initiation of talks with it over Ukraine, which aims to ensure its neutrality in the Sino-US dimension of the New Cold War in exchange for a geopolitical and economic partnership. Russia’s proposal during their talks for joint energy projects in the Arctic could be a first step towards this end, but mutual compromises of the sort detailed here are required for solidifying their “New Détente”.

* From Populist-Nationalism To Civilization-States

Russia and Trump’s America both regard the emergence of civilization-states as the next phase of the global systemic transition. The first’s Eurasian Union and the second’s “Fortress America” policy, which consists of incorporating Canada and Greenland, fulfil this role. They also support populist-nationalist movements across the world that share their civilization-state vision of the future and might accordingly join forces in helping them come to power in order to accelerate this process as explained here and here.

———-

What ties these five trends together is Trump’s historic return to the presidency, his successful purge of the “deep state” that enabled him to pursue his long-sought “New Détente” with Russia, and Putin’s receptiveness to his American counterpart’s grand strategic plan of a comprehensive partnership. The successful conclusion of their nascent talks and the clinching of the aforementioned partnership will revolutionize International Relations while their failure could abruptly revive the risk of World War III.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#DonaldTrump #Geopolitics #NATO #NewColdWar #Russia #Ukraine #USA

Trump claims his victory prevented WW3

US President Donald Trump has said his electoral victory in November prevented World War III

^RT

Analysing The Russian Ambassador’s Latest Statements About Ethiopia

Analysing The Russian Ambassador’s Latest Statements About Ethiopia

By Andrew Korybko

Ethiopia can always rely on Russia and vice versa since they’re one of each other’s oldest partners.

Russian Ambassador to Ethiopia Evgeny Terekhin spoke to ENA during this week’s Russia-Ethiopia Business Forum in Addis, during which time he made some statements about his host country that are worth analysing. In the order that they were shared in ENA’s report, he referenced Ethiopia’s peaceful quest for sea access by saying that “We understand that the absence of sea access is a very big problem for a country.” This shows that Russia doesn’t consider it to be aggressive or destabilizing, but normal.

He added that “This issue must be settled between the neighbouring countries in a spirit of good neighbourliness and dialogue, without external interference.” Being the world-class diplomat that he is, Terekhin didn’t directly mention neighbouring Somalia’s sabre-rattling over this issue or the recently formed Asmara Axis between that country, Egypt, and Eritrea against Ethiopia. Nevertheless, reading between the lines, he’s hinting that Egypt and Eritrea shouldn’t meddle in this dispute.

On a related note, he then told ENA that “We see Ethiopia as a nucleus of regional security, playing a decisive role in maintaining peace and security in this area.” This can be interpreted as him reaffirming that its Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland doesn’t destabilize the region. Rather, as was explained here at length when analysing that agreement, it aims to stabilize the region by preemptively averting crises that could be caused by Ethiopia’s dependence on maritime logistics beyond its control.

Next, Ambassador Terekhin candidly admitted that “Our trade relationship has yet to reach the level of our political relationship” even though “Ethiopia has a longstanding tradition of friendship with Russia, built on mutual understanding and respect”, both of which are true. The reasons why bilateral trade hasn’t approached anywhere near its potential are beyond the scope of this analysis, but their over 125-year-long relations provide a solid basis for making up for lost time through their latest Business Forum.

Those who’d like to learn more about one of Russia’s oldest partnerships in the world can review this brief report here that was published last year by the Russian Academy of Sciences or this more detailed one here by the Russian International Affairs Council think tank. They illustrate the depth and strength of their relations, thus dispelling any speculation that Russia would ever turn against Ethiopia, such as in the scenario that Egypt or Eritrea made the expansion of their bilateral ties dependent on it doing so.

And finally, the last statement that Ambassador Terekhin shared with ENA was that “Addis Ababa, as the diplomatic capital of Africa, reflects Ethiopia’s influential role not only within the African Union but also on the broader continent. For Russia, this makes Ethiopia a priority partner in economic and trade relations.” His description of Ethiopia as Russia’s “priority partner” can be interpreted as him reminding other regional countries of the privileged role that Ethiopia plays in Russia’s African grand strategy.

Chairman of the Coordination Committee on Economic Cooperation with African Countries (AFROCOM) Igor Morozov added further substance to the aforesaid assessment by telling ENA in a separate interview that “We opened here our continental office. From Ethiopia we have decided to enter other African countries and African markets.” He therefore essentially considers Ethiopia to be a nucleus of economic development and a gateway to the rest of the continent. No other country plays this role for Russia.

Reflecting on what was shared in this analysis, it’s clear that Russian-Ethiopian relations will continue strengthening due to their many mutual complementarities and their leaders’ shared multipolar vision. Ethiopia can always rely on Russia and vice versa since they’re one of each other’s oldest partners. With that in mind, Ethiopia might request Russia to help mitigate tensions with Somalia, Egypt, and Eritrea over Somaliland given Moscow’s ties with all three, in which case they’d do well to listen to suggestions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#Africa #AFROCOM #Egypt #Eritrea #Ethiopia #Geopolitics #Russia

Trump’s Special Envoy Shed More Light On His Boss’ Ukrainian Peace Plan

Trump’s Special Envoy Shed More Light On His Boss’ Ukrainian Peace Plan

By Andrew Korybko

Trump will implement a comprehensive economic, diplomatic, and military pressure campaign against Russia if Putin rejects a ceasefire, but it’s unclear whether Trump will coerce Zelensky into territorial concessions first in order to make it easier for Putin to compromise on his prior demands for this.

Trump’s Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg told the New York Post more about how his boss plans to bring Putin to the peace table. According to him, the US might ratchet up its energy-related sanctions on Russia and associated secondary ones on its clients if he refuses. This would occur together with more diplomatic pressure, likely upon China and India to have their leaders convince Putin to reconsider, and “some type of military pressures and levers that you’re going to use underneath those”.

The immediate goal is “to stop the killing — just stop it — and then you go from there”, so in other words, the abovementioned approach would be aimed at getting Russia to agree to a ceasefire. This aligns with what was assessed here in late January about Trump’s plans. The problem though is that Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova confirmed on the same day as Kellogg’s interview that “A temporary ceasefire or, as many say, freezing the conflict, is unacceptable” for Russia.

One day earlier, however, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov suggested that his country’s position on not holding talks with Zelensky due to the Ukrainian leader’s illegitimacy might be reversed for pragmatism’s sake so it’s possible that the aforementioned one about rejecting a ceasefire might be too. That could occur if Trump coerces Zelensky into withdrawing from at least Kursk and Donbass along with declaring that Ukraine won’t join NATO, thus satisfying some of Russia’s goals as recently explained here.

Ukraine would then lift martial law and finally hold its long-delayed elections, which could potentially lead to the US replacing Zelensky like Russia’s foreign spy agency claimed last week is supposedly in the cards. That scenario sequence aligns with Russian and US interests, but it can’t be ruled out that some of the last administration’s Russophobic hawks remain in positions of influence within the US’ “deep state” and end up dissuading Trump from coercing Zelensky into territorial concessions first.

Without Ukraine withdrawing from Kursk and Donbass, it’s unlikely that Putin could justify compromising on last June’s ceasefire demands that Ukraine withdraw from all the territory that Russia claims as its own and declare that it won’t join NATO. He can accept a delay on implementing the second till after the next parliamentary elections since Ukraine’s goal of joining NATO was enshrined as an amendment to the Constitution in 2019 and therefore can’t be removed without parliament’s support.

What Putin would be loath to accept is freezing the Line of Contact (LOC) even if the US coerces Ukraine into withdrawing from Russia’s Kursk Region as a quid pro quo since it would suggest that their sneak attack there last summer forced him to give up on his demands to disputed territory. Lending credence to that interpretation could raise the risk that Ukraine launches another sneak attack elsewhere along their international border if post-election peace talks stall in order to coerce more concessions from him.

Putin might settle for Ukraine only withdrawing from Kursk and Donbass in exchange for a ceasefire since the first is universally recognized as Russian, the second is at the heart of their territorial dispute, and demanding more might provoke the US into enforcing its secondary sanctions against China and India. As Kellogg recently said, sanctions enforcement is “only about a three” on a scale of one to ten so it could be increased if needed, which would put Putin in a tough position if Xi and Modi then pressure him.

China and India could be coerced into drastically curtailing or outright abandoning their large-scale import of discounted Russian oil if the US imposes super-strict Iranian-like sanctions on Russia explicitly aimed at “driv[ing] [its] export of oil to zero” through full secondary sanctions enforcement. The consequences of them complying could spike the price of oil worldwide and throw countless economies into a tailspin, however, which is why the US has thus far eschewed this policy.

Trump already imposed 10% tariffs on China and he’s expected to negotiate hard with India during Modi’s trip to DC late next week, which might even see them launch free trade talks, so each Asian giant has their own self-interested reasons for avoiding any further economic pressure from the US. They might therefore curtail their imports of discounted Russian oil as a compromise to the US in exchange for no secondary sanctions enforcement and to not destabilize the global market instead of defy it on this.

Even in that case, Russia’s foreign revenue flow upon which a share of its state budget depends would be disrupted, which might parallel their leaders pressuring Putin to reconsider his rejection of a ceasefire since it would be indirectly responsible for harming the economic interests of all three. If the “military pressures and levers that [the US is] going to use underneath those” take the form of ramping up arms shipments to Ukraine, including long-range missiles, then it might suffice for prompting a rethink.

There’s also the possibility that Russia “goes rogue” in the sense of continuing to pursue its maximum goals in the conflict in spite of American, Chinese, and Indian pressure, hoping that the Ukrainian frontlines soon collapse and Trump then abandons this geopolitical project instead of tries to salvage it. This “hawkish” thinking on Moscow’s part could be predicted on its decisionmakers assuming that Trump would accept this defeat without fear of it ruining his reputation and won’t escalate to brinksmanship.

While that’s plausible, the counterargument can be made that Trump doesn’t want to bear responsibility for what would be the greatest American geopolitical defeat ever and won’t let the $183 billion that the US invested into this conflict go to waste without at least securing control over Western Ukraine. In that event, Russia might still ultimately be coerced into compromising on its maximum goals but after having needlessly burned bridges with China and India, which could leave it isolated in the post-conflict future.

Returning to the lede, the likelihood of Trump implementing a comprehensive pressure campaign against Russia if Putin rejects a ceasefire in Ukraine might get him to compromise on his original demands for this, though only if Ukraine first withdraws from Kursk and Donbass. It’s in the US’ interests not to perpetuate this conflict since MAGA thought leader Steve Bannon warned that Trump risks his own Vietnam if that happens while Trump is eager to “Pivot (back) to Asia” pronto in order to contain China.

Trump would therefore do well to coerce Zelensky into withdrawing from those two regions instead of “escalating to de-escalate” against Russia if Putin doesn’t agree to simply freeze the LOC. As Kellogg told the New York Post, “Very frankly, both sides in any negotiation have to give; that’s just the way it is in negotiations…Is it gonna be acceptable to everybody? No. But you try to run this balance.” That’s precisely the approach that Trump should follow otherwise he risks derailing his foreign policy agenda.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#DonaldTrump #Geopolitics #NATO #Russia #Ukraine #USA

Voice of East

2024-11-09 17:00:41

The Clock Is Ticking For Russia To Achieve Its Maximum Goals In The Ukrainian Conflict

The Clock Is Ticking For Russia To Achieve Its Maximum Goals In The Ukrainian Conflict

By Andrew Korybko

Trump’s reported plan for a Western/NATO peacekeeping mission in Ukraine places Russia in the dilemma of either pre-empting this with another large-scale nationwide offensive, targeting those forces after they enter at the risk of sparking World War III, or tacitly accepting this endgame.

The Wall Street Journal’s report that Trump’s peace plan for Ukraine envisages the creation of an 800-mile demilitarized zone that would be patrolled by Europeans adds a lot of urgency to Russia’s nearly 1000-day-long struggle to achieve its maximum goals in this conflict. The potential entrance of conventional Western/NATO forces into Ukraine as peacekeepers places Russia in the dilemma of accepting yet another “red line” being crossed or risking World War III by targeting them.

To refresh everyone’s memory since it’s been so long since the special operation started, Russia officially aims to: 1) demilitarize Ukraine; 2) denazify it; and 3) restore its constitutional neutrality, among other supplementary and informal goals. September 2022’s referenda then added the official goal of removing Ukrainian forces from the entirety of the four regions that Russia now claims as its own, including the areas of Kherson and Zaporozhye on the other side of the Dnieper, which will be challenge.

At the same time, Putin has repeatedly refused to reciprocally escalate in response to egregious Ukrainian provocations like its bombing of the Kremlin, early warning systems, strategic airfields, oil refineries, and residential buildings, et al, all due to him not wanting the conflict to spiral out of control. For as responsible of an approach as this is, the drawback is that it created the perception that he might accept the crossing of even more “red lines”, including conventional Western/NATO forces in Ukraine.

Putin’s aversion to escalation might therefore be exploited by Trump, who was reportedly handed a plan in June advising him to give Ukraine whatever it wants if Russia refuses whatever peace deal he proposes, ergo the high likelihood of a conventional Western/NATO intervention to decisively freeze the conflict. Trump’s track record of “escalating to de-escalate” with North Korea and Iran suggests that he’d also go through with this plan against Russia, hence why it should take this scenario seriously.

Provided that Putin lacks the political will to risk an unprecedented escalation by targeting those conventional Western/NATO forces, and his behaviour thus far in response to other provocations suggests that this is indeed the case, then he’ll have to race against the clock to achieve his maximum goals. It’ll still take some time for the US to get key stakeholders like Poland on board, where 69% of the public is against dispatching troops to Ukraine in any capacity, so this likely won’t happen by mid-January.

In any case, Russia no longer has a hypothetically indefinite amount of time like before to: 1) demilitarize Ukraine; 2) denazify it; 3) restore its constitutional neutrality; and 4) remove Ukrainian forces from the entirety of the four regions that Russia now claims as its own, including those areas across the Dnieper. Even though the military-strategic dynamics of the conflict favour it, and capturing Pokrovsk could lead to huge gains in Donetsk, it’ll be very difficult to achieve all these goals by the time an intervention occurs.

To explain in the order that they were mentioned, Ukraine was initially supposed to be demilitarized upon the swift success of the special operation in its early phase, but the UK and Poland (whose role most observers aren’t aware of) convinced Zelensky to rubbish spring 2022’s draft peace treaty. That document would have greatly slashed its military capabilities, but it’s no longer realistic to imagine that he’d agree to this, especially after being given tens of billions of dollars’ worth of NATO arms.

NATO is also unlikely to agree to ask for them back due to the perception (regardless of its veracity) that Ukraine must be able to “deter” Russia from supposedly recommencing the conflict after it finally ends. The Taliban’s swift capture of Afghanistan after Biden’s bungled withdrawal from there was viciously lambasted by Trump, who’d go down in history as an even bigger loser if he agreed to “demilitarize” Ukraine and was then played for a fool by Putin if Russia steamrolls through it sometime later.

The only viable way in which Russia could implement Ukraine’s demilitarization in today’s context is to control as much of its territory as possible in order to ensure that no threatening weapons are deployed there. The problem though is that Russia is unlikely to obtain military control over all of Ukraine, or even just significant parts of its territory east of the Dnieper in proximity to the internationally recognized border across which Kiev’s shells still regularly fly, by the time of a Western/NATO intervention.

One of the reasons why the special operation’s opening phase didn’t result in ending the conflict on Russia’s terms is because the West informed Zelensky about how overextended its military logistics had become and thus encouraged him to exploit that to push it back like he ultimately did. Given how cautious of a leader Putin is, he’s unlikely to act out of character once more by ordering a repeat of this same risky strategy even if the frontlines collapse and Russia is able to roll into other regions.

Another unforeseen challenge that Russia experienced during the special operation’s opening phase was actually holding the broad swaths territory that it nominally controlled. Ukraine’s hidden Javelin and Stinger stockpiles inflicted enough losses behind Russia’s lines to engender the large-scale pullback that coincided with the failure of spring 2022’s peace talks. There’s also the obvious difficulty of swiftly capturing large cities like Kharkov, Sumy, and Zaporozhye, which hasn’t yet happened.

Moving along to Russia’s second maximum goal of denazifying Ukraine after explaining how tough it’ll be to achieve the first one of militarizing it, this too can’t succeed without a political agreement that’s no longer realistic in today’s context after such a chance slipped away in spring 2022. What Russia has in mind is Ukraine promulgating legislation that aligns with these goals, such as banning the glorification of World War II-era fascists and rescinding restrictions on ethnic Russians’ rights.

Zelensky has no reason to go along with this anymore like he flirted with doing in early 2022 and Trump’s team doesn’t seem to care all that much about this issue anyhow. It’s therefore unclear how Russia can achieve this before a Western/NATO intervention except in the unlikely scenario of a Russian-friendly Colour Revolution and/or military coup, neither of which the US would accept, and both of which would probably thus prompt the aforesaid intervention out of desperation to salvage “Project Ukraine”.

The third maximum goal of restoring Ukraine’s constitutional neutrality is comparatively more likely but nevertheless moot at this point given that the raft of security guarantees that it already clinched with NATO states since the start of this year de facto amount to continued Article 5 support. Contrary to popular perceptions, this clause doesn’t obligate the dispatch of troops, but only for each country to do whatever it deems fit to help allies under attack. Their existing military aid to Ukraine aligns with this.

Coercing Ukraine to rescind 2019’s constitutional amendment making NATO membership a strategic objective would therefore be a superficial concession to Russia on the US’ part to make Trump’s peace plan a little less bitter for Putin to swallow. As with the previous two maximum goals, Zelensky has no reason to comply with Putin’s demands in this regard since the latter’s forces aren’t in a position to impose this upon him, thus meaning that it can only realistically be done if Trump orders him to.

As the reader probably already picked up on, the common theme is that Russia’s inability to militarily coerce Zelensky into complying with its maximum goals greatly reduces the possibility that they’ll be achieved, which also holds true for the final one of obtaining control over all its new regions’ land. It’s unimaginable that Zelensky will voluntarily cede Zaporozhye with its over 700,000 population, for example, or that Trump will accept the Western opprobrium that would follow coercing him to do so.

The same goes for letting Russia cross the Dnieper to obtain control over that region’s and Kherson’s areas on the other side, thus creating the opportunity for it to build up its forces there in the future for a lightning strike across Ukraine’s western plains in the event that the conflict ever rekindles after it ends. There’s no way that Trump would ever give Putin such an invaluable military-strategic gift so Russia’s supporters shouldn’t deceive themselves by getting their hopes up thinking that this will happen.

The only way in which Russia can achieve its maximum goals before the entrance of Western/NATO troops into Ukraine as peacekeepers is through military means, which would require another large-scale multi-pronged offensive of the sort that characterized the special operation’s early days. Even then, however, the high risk of once again overextending its military logistics, being ambushed by Stingers/Javelins, and thus risking reputational costs and even on-the-ground losses, will remain.

As such, there are really only three options left for Russia: 1) escalate now before Western/NATO troops enter Ukraine and either coerce Zelensky into agreeing to these demands or capture and hold enough land in order to demilitarize as much of the country as possible; 2) escalate after they enter at the risk of sparking a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis that could spiral into World War III; or 3) accept the fait accompli of freezing the conflict along the Line of Contact and begin preparing the public accordingly.

It’s unclear which option Putin will choose since he hasn’t yet signalled a preference for any of them. Nevertheless, it’s timely to quote 19^th-century Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov, who famously said that “Russia is not sulking; she is composing herself.” Russia knows that the clock is ticking for achieving its maximum goals before Trump likely orders Western/NATO peacekeepers to enter Ukraine. The Kremlin is quiet for now precisely because policymakers have yet to decide what to do.

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Readers might be interested in reviewing the following analyses for more insight into Russia’s dilemma:

* 14 July 2022: “Korybko To Azerbaijani Media: All Sides Of The Ukrainian Conflict Underestimated Each Other”

* 12 November 2022: “20 Constructive Critiques Of Russia’s Special Operation”

* 1 November 2024: “Trump 2.0 would be no easy ride for Vladimir Putin”

* 7 November 2024: “Here’s What Trump’s Peace Plan Might Look Like & Why Russia Might Agree To It”

* 8 November 2024: “View from Moscow: Russia tepidly welcomes Trump’s return”

They illustrate the challenges inherent in Russia achieving its maximum goals anytime soon.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

Korybko To Azerbaijani Media: All Sides Of The Ukrainian Conflict Underestimated Each Other

OneWorld is publishing the full-length English version of the interview that Andrew Korybko gave to Oxu.

^{Andrew Korybko (Andrew Korybko's Newsletter)}

Why Is Russia Re-Engaging With The IMF?

Why Is Russia Re-Engaging With The IMF?

By Andrew Korybko

The relationship between Russia, the IMF, and BRICS isn’t what most folks have been led to believe.

IMF Communications Director Julie Kozack confirmed during a press briefing on Thursday that the first Article IV consultations with Russia since 2021 will take place next week. She also praised BRICS expansion. Both of these caught multipolar enthusiasts off guard since they assumed that Russia wouldn’t ever re-engage with the IMF, which they consider to be BRICS’ rival. What follows are the exact words that she said, which will then be analysed in the larger context of Russia’s financial grand strategy:

“The IMF and all of our member countries have a mutual obligation to conduct Article IV Consultations. It’s in our articles of agreement. Actually, in the case of Russia, since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the economic situation has been exceptionally unsettled, which has made it difficult to anchor Article IV Consultations, especially thinking about the outlook and policy frameworks for both the near- and the medium-term.

Now that the economic situation is more settled, Article IV Consultations with Russia are resuming, as I said at the beginning, in line with the obligations of both the Fund and the member country.

As part of the upcoming Article IV Consultation, the team will hold bilateral discussions with the Russian authorities. It will hold both virtual discussions from September 16th, and then the team will travel to the country for in person meetings. As is the case for all Article IV Consultations, the team will meet with a number of different stakeholders to discuss the country’s economic developments, prospects, and policies. And I think that I’ll leave it at that.

…

With respect to the BRICS or any other groups of countries, our view is that improved and expanding international cooperation and deepening trade and investment ties among groups of countries should be welcomed and encouraged, provided that they aim at reducing fragmentation and reducing trade and investment costs among members. The decision to join such initiatives is a sovereign decision of each member country. And I’ll leave it at that.”

Readers should also be aware that Russia appointed a new Executive Director to the organization earlier this month, Ksenia Yudaeva. She’s an advisor to the Bank of Russia’s chief but also under US sanctions. Kozack declined to comment when asked whether Yudaeva would be allowed to serve at the IMF’s headquarters in DC upon taking over her new role in November. In any case, the importance is that Russia is actively re-engaging with the IMF, and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently hinted at why.

He told students earlier this month that “[the G7] are trying to retain their preferential and undeservedly privileged positions at the IMF and the WTO. They stall the reforms of these institutions in order to maintain their domineering influence. But this process cannot be stopped, and it will continue.” Russia believes that reforms at both global bodies are integral to speeding up financial multipolarity processes, with Lavrov implying that Russia should contribute to this inevitable trend instead of self-isolate from it.

Likewise, the IMF also realized that such reforms must be carried out sooner than later so as to not self-isolate from the Global South, ergo Kozack’s praise of BRICS expansion. Observers shouldn’t forget that all BRICS members are also part of the IMF, and as shocking as it sounds, the BRICS Bank confirmed last summer that they comply with Western sanctions against Russia. Readers can learn more “politically inconvenient” facts about BRICS here, which enumerates nearly a dozen associated analyses at the end.

What’s sufficient for the average reader to know is that BRICS is a network of countries that voluntarily coordinate their financial policies in order to accelerate that dimension of multipolarity. Nearly all of its members with the exception of co-founder Russia and new addition Iran are in direct relationships of complex economic-financial interdependence with the West, especially the US. This limits their freedom of action in this regard and is why financial multipolarity will be a gradual process, not a fast one.

Any sudden systemic shocks, such as coordinating the dollar’s collapse (which is a lot more difficult to achieve than some have made it seem), would deeply affect their own economies due to this interdependence. Even Putin acknowledged during a Q&A earlier this month that “we are not conducting a policy of de-dollarisation. We did not renounce settlements in dollars; they denied us such settlements, and we were simply forced to look for other options; this is it.”

Russia isn’t in a direct relationship of complex economic-financial interdependence with the West anymore after that bloc’s US leader forced the EU to largely “decouple” from it, but he’s well aware of how destabilizing sudden systemic shocks can be for its top trade partners and thus wants to avoid that. Although Russia is self-sufficient in raw materials, it still relies on foreign trade as an important source of revenue and a means of obtaining spare aircraft parts, high-tech products, and other goods.

Inflicting sudden systemic shocks on the West could therefore shock the Chinese and Indian economies too, thus leading to less energy sales to them as well as less high-tech and other product imports. This explains why Russia still accounts for nearly a fifth of the EU’s gas needs despite the bloc’s participation in NATO’s proxy war on it through Ukraine. The same goes for why Russia still sells critical minerals to them and the US too, although Putin just suggested restrictions on this “if this does not harm us”.

That’s a significant caveat since the insight shared in this analysis illustrated the relationship of complex interdependence that Russia has with China, India, and others, who themselves are also in their own such relationships with the West, thus making Russia and the West indirectly dependent on one another. Considering this, completely cutting the West off from all Russian resources would also risk plunging China and India into recessions too, thus provoking their ire and boomeranging back against Russia.

It could also be considered an act of war by NATO and exploited to justify escalating the bloc’s involvement in their proxy war on Russia in Ukraine. If those countries could manage on their own without Russian resources, then they obviously wouldn’t be financing their geopolitical rival to this day. Likewise, Russia wouldn’t be supplying its geopolitical rivals to this day either if it felt comfortable managing the far-reaching systemic shocks brought about by completely cutting them off.

All of this circles back to why Russia is re-engaging with the IMF, namely to play a role in gradually reforming this global body alongside China, India, and others in order to advance their shared goal of accelerating financial multipolarity processes. The IMF praised BRICS expansion precisely because all members apart from Russia and Iran are in direct relationships of complex economic-financial interdependence with the West, thus enabling each to keep the other in check to an extent.

IMF membership and the aforesaid interdependence with the West that it brings impede the pace of BRICS’ financial multipolarity plans, while BRICS works from within the IMF to still keep these plans moving in the desired direction. With the exception of Russia and Iran, BRICS therefore has a symbiotic relationship with the IMF, and this in turn deters Russia from catalysing a series of sudden systemic shocks against the West by cutting off its resource sales (both critical minerals and energy) to them.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#BRICS #Geopolitics #IMF #Russia

Russia Has A Better Chance Of Mediating Afghan-Pakistani Tensions Than China Does

Russia Has A Better Chance Of Mediating Afghan-Pakistani Tensions Than China Does

By Andrew Korybko

Russia’s grand geo-economic plans in this part of Eurasia are dependent on the resolution of these tensions, while China’s will continue being advanced regardless of whatever happens with them.

Russian Ambassador to Pakistan Albert Khorev told TASS over the weekend that his country supports Pakistan and Afghanistan’s respective counter-terrorism efforts. He then added that it encourages both of them to resolve their border tensions through bilateral or multilateral means. This suggests a desire to mediate between them. China has already tried to do so but has struggled to achieve anything, yet Russia has a better chance of success for the reasons that’ll now be explained.

Russia’s grand geo-economic plan in this part of Eurasia is to pioneer parallel connectivity and energy corridors to India via Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. To that end, Russia must cultivate equally excellent relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan, help resolve their border tensions, and then do the same with Pakistan and India’s. The first step has already been achieved upon strategically partnering with the Taliban last summer and then clinching a strategic resource pact with Pakistan in December.

The second step will be much more difficult to fulfil but therein lies the purpose behind Ambassador Khorev’s latest remarks regarding Russia’s support for Pakistan and Afghanistan’s respective counter-terrorism efforts. On the one hand, he acknowledged his host country’s problems with Afghan-emanating terrorist threats, but on the other, he shied away from blaming the Taliban for them like Islamabad does and instead offered to provide them with vague “necessary assistance”.

The goal appears to be to empower each in their own way, the first through political support for stopping all terrorist infiltration from Afghanistan, and the second by possibly equipping them with small arms and potentially training their special forces to fight ISIS-K. Left unsaid is any reference to Pakistan’s claims that the Taliban backs the TTP (“Pakistani Taliban”) and other terrorist groups, however, though commenting on this either way would ruin Russia’s careful balancing act.

To be sure, China has already applied the same approach towards this issue, but it lacks the geo-economic vision that Russia does wherein the improvement of Afghan-Pakistani ties is integral to the success of its broader regional policy. Pakistan and Afghanistan don’t need to trade across one another’s territory in order to do business with China since the first employs the Belt & Road Initiative’s China-Pakistan Economic Corridor flagship to that end while the second has rail access to it via Central Asia.

Therefore, although China does indeed want its neighbouring partners to work more closely together, this isn’t required to advance its geo-economic interests. The situation is altogether different with Russia, whose grand geo-economic plan necessitates Afghanistan and Pakistan patching up their problems in order to pioneer parallel connectivity and energy corridors that could one day ideally reach India. Those two therefore naturally understand that Russia has much greater stakes in mediation than China does.

Neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan would receive additional economic benefits from China upon resolving their tensions, but Pakistan could finally receive more direct overland connectivity with Russia and perhaps even energy from it with time too if that happens, both via Afghanistan. Likewise, Afghanistan could profit from its middleman role in these corridors, especially if they ever extend to India. No such benefits stand to be reaped from China if Beijing were to successfully mediate between them.

Accordingly, it’s incumbent on Russia to utilize creative means for moving this diplomatic process along to the best of its ability, which could include sharing detailed plans of its proposed connectivity and energy investments in both in Afghanistan and Pakistan should they agree to resolve their disputes. These could include specific projects, the estimated amount that’ll be invested, lending terms if required, the possibility for joint ownership of some sort, and the local labour that might be employed.

It might still not be enough for a breakthrough, but it would still be more than what China has offered to do if they make peace, which is nothing. Moreover, such a detailed proposal could later be returned to if the political and/or military situation changes and they decide to patch up their problems, in which case they’d have a mutual interest in reviving Russia’s plans. It’s too early to predict what’ll happen either way, just that Russia is expected to push for peace, and its efforts will be more meaningful than China’s.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#AfghanTaliban #Afghanistan #China #Geopolitics #Pakistan #Russia #Taliban #TehrikITalibanPakistan #TTP

Voice of East

2024-12-17 11:23:22

Russia And Pakistan Will Comprehensively Expand Cooperation In The Resource Sector

Russia And Pakistan Will Comprehensively Expand Cooperation In The Resource Sector

By Andrew Korybko

Pakistan wants to reduce its disproportionate dependence on China, hence why it prefers for Russia to modernize its resource infrastructure instead of China, which aligns with US strategic goals.

Express Tribune reported on the outcome of the ninth Pakistan-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation. The protocol that they inked comprehensively expands cooperation in the resource sector. This includes energy and mineral exploration, oilfield services, a gas pipeline, industrial communication, shared standards, equipment, LNG, coal and chemical cooperation, and hydroelectric power and water management. Here are some background briefings:

* 31 July: “Assessing The Prospects Of Pakistan’s Reported Strategic Roadmap For Trade With Russia”

* 19 September: “Russian-Pakistani Relations Are Surprisingly Taking On Strategic Dimensions”

* 9 October: “It’ll Take Time To Reap The Fruits Of The First-Ever Russian-Pakistani Trade & Investment Forum”

The primary obstacles to their cooperation up until this point were financial and political, the first with regard to Pakistan’s infamous lack of funds and the second due to the US’ influence over its government. It remains unclear how they were surmounted, but it could be that Pakistan will offer Russia preferential stakes in these projects in lieu of cash while the US might have allowed this to happen in order for its historical ally’s decrepit resource infrastructure to finally modernize.

Elaborating more on the last point, private American companies might not be willing to bear the tremendous costs that this could entail due to how long it’ll take to receive a return on their investments, but state Russian companies might not have the same concerns. Moreover, from the US’ strategic perspective, if its own private companies can’t take on these projects due to the unfavourable terms, then it’s better for Russian ones to do so than Chinese ones if Washington is forced to choose.

That’s because the US is competing with China for influence over Pakistan, not with Russia, which will never approach anywhere near those two’s level of influence there. While it might appear to observers that Russia’s strategic resource inroads in Pakistan could erode American influence, they actually serve as a counterweight to China’s by denying the People’s Republic more influence in this sector. The US’ premier influence over Pakistan’s military, political system, and elites remains unaffected by this.

Viewed from an admittedly controversial zero-sum perspective, the gradual growth of Russian influence in parts of the Pakistani economy therefore erodes China’s influence over the country, which in turn strengthens America’s overall strategic position. Sanctioned Russia urgently requires new markets, and it’s willing to pay higher costs for access to them so long as it’s promised high rates of return in the long term through preferential stakes in these projects, thus explaining its national interest in this context.

Readers should also be aware that this is part of Russia’s “Pivot to (South) Asia” that was described in detail here late last month and aims to preemptively avert disproportionate dependence on China. Pakistan also wants to reduce its own already existing such dependence on China, hence why it prefers for Russia to modernize its resource infrastructure, which aligns with US strategic goals. If this trend continues, then it’ll one day be possible to speak about the Russian-US-Chinese interplay in Pakistan.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#China #Economy #Pakistan #Russia #Trade #USA

Pakistan Russia eye energy projects

Ink protocol for executing mega schemes exploring oil and gas deposits

^{Zafar Bhutta (The Express Tribune)}

Lavrov Accused The Biden Admin Of Wanting To Return US Military Infrastructure To Afghanistan

Lavrov Accused The Biden Admin Of Wanting To Return US Military Infrastructure To Afghanistan

By Andrew Korybko

This should be seen only as a signal that Russia is aware of this plot, not as anything deeper such as it expecting Trump to follow through on Biden’s plans or hinting that ties with Pakistan might become troubled in that event.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told Putin during their Security Council meeting on the same day as Trump’s inauguration and while reviewing regional conflicts that “Let us not forget Afghanistan, where the Americans are also trying to restore their presence to some extent, using neighbouring countries for this and thinking about returning their military infrastructure there. I am saying all this in terms of the policies carried out by the previous administration.” His accusation is worthy of further analysis.

The US’ most realistic access point to Afghanistan is Pakistan, which had passively assisted its two-decade-long military occupation of that neighbouring country but at the same time also clandestinely backed the Taliban against foreign forces and the Afghan National Army alike. April 2022’s post-modern coup against former multipolar Prime Minister Imran Khan was meant to improve ties with the US and facilitate what Russia just accused it of but was deprioritized due to the ongoing proxy war in Ukraine.

Even so, the US still attempted to cultivate influence in the broader region, including in Central Asia. This never amounted to anything significant due to the moderating effect that Russia and China had on the potential plans that some in those countries might have been cooking. Their policymakers ultimately realized that it’s better not to provoke either of them through enhanced security partnerships with the US than to go through with the aforesaid at the possible expense of regional stability and bilateral trade.

Pakistan went a different way than they did, however, since its post-coup regime continued holding out hope of restoring their traditional role in aiding US military operations in Afghanistan in exchange for personal (including financial) benefits. This explains why it kept kowtowing to the US on everything apart from symbolically voting against Russia at the UNGA, which it was allowed by the US to do in order to keep open the possibility of having Russia modernize Pakistan’s resource industry instead of China.

Readers can learn more about this rationale here, which covers the Machiavellian ways in which the US is attempting to adapt to the emerging Multipolar World Order, but Pakistani-US ties have recently become troubled as was shortly thereafter explained here. In brief, Pakistan’s long-range ballistic missile program made the US suspect that it has illegal proliferation motives or possibly even hostile ones, while its brutal crackdown on the opposition goes far beyond what the US approved.

These greatly reduced its attractiveness to the US as an entry point to Afghanistan since policymakers apparently thought that Pakistan would leverage its logistical assistance to the American military there to continue with those two courses of action that recently prompted the US’ concern. In that event, the first might eventually lead to security risks while the second could risk further instability that might result in a national crisis which turns Pakistan into more of an American liability than a regional asset.

Having explained the larger context within which Lavrov made his latest remarks about Afghanistan, which hint at Russia’s suspicions that Pakistan wants to facilitate the return of US military infrastructure there, it’s now time to discuss what this could mean for their impressively close bilateral relations. As proven by Russia continuing to sell energy to the EU despite the bloc arming Ukraine, there’s no precedent to speculate that it’ll curtail or possibly cancel cooperation with much friendlier Pakistan.

In this particular case, Pakistan could passively assist the US in fostering Afghan-emanating security challenges (primarily unconventional/terrorist ones) along its southern “strategic borders” in Central Asia, but this is nowhere near as threatening as what the EU is currently doing in Ukraine. It’s also unclear whether Trump would be interested in turning a blind eye to the US’ two new concerns with Pakistan in order to return US military infrastructure to Afghanistan with all the risks that it entails.

Getting bogged down in Afghanistan once again isn’t something that he’s interested in, let alone in putting US troops’ lives on the line in the same conflict zone where Biden disastrously withdrew from and which provoked harsh criticism from Trump at the time, so nothing might come of this. Moreover, his administration is considered to be very Indophilic and might accordingly push back against any move in that direction since it could worsen ties with India, which is now the US’ top regional partner.

For these reasons, Lavrov’s latest remarks about Afghanistan and their innuendo about Pakistan conspiring to return US military infrastructure there should be seen only as a signal that Russia is aware of this plot, not as anything deeper. While some Russian policymakers might be disappointed that Pakistan is even considering this, others might be motivated to redouble Russia’s rapprochement with Pakistan in the hopes that it’ll be dissuaded or to capitalize on its potentially worsening ties with the US.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#Afghanistan #Geopolitics #Pakistan #Russia #USA

Voice of East

2024-12-17 11:23:22

Russia And Pakistan Will Comprehensively Expand Cooperation In The Resource Sector

Russia And Pakistan Will Comprehensively Expand Cooperation In The Resource Sector

By Andrew Korybko

Pakistan wants to reduce its disproportionate dependence on China, hence why it prefers for Russia to modernize its resource infrastructure instead of China, which aligns with US strategic goals.

Express Tribune reported on the outcome of the ninth Pakistan-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation. The protocol that they inked comprehensively expands cooperation in the resource sector. This includes energy and mineral exploration, oilfield services, a gas pipeline, industrial communication, shared standards, equipment, LNG, coal and chemical cooperation, and hydroelectric power and water management. Here are some background briefings:

* 31 July: “Assessing The Prospects Of Pakistan’s Reported Strategic Roadmap For Trade With Russia”

* 19 September: “Russian-Pakistani Relations Are Surprisingly Taking On Strategic Dimensions”

* 9 October: “It’ll Take Time To Reap The Fruits Of The First-Ever Russian-Pakistani Trade & Investment Forum”

The primary obstacles to their cooperation up until this point were financial and political, the first with regard to Pakistan’s infamous lack of funds and the second due to the US’ influence over its government. It remains unclear how they were surmounted, but it could be that Pakistan will offer Russia preferential stakes in these projects in lieu of cash while the US might have allowed this to happen in order for its historical ally’s decrepit resource infrastructure to finally modernize.

Elaborating more on the last point, private American companies might not be willing to bear the tremendous costs that this could entail due to how long it’ll take to receive a return on their investments, but state Russian companies might not have the same concerns. Moreover, from the US’ strategic perspective, if its own private companies can’t take on these projects due to the unfavourable terms, then it’s better for Russian ones to do so than Chinese ones if Washington is forced to choose.

That’s because the US is competing with China for influence over Pakistan, not with Russia, which will never approach anywhere near those two’s level of influence there. While it might appear to observers that Russia’s strategic resource inroads in Pakistan could erode American influence, they actually serve as a counterweight to China’s by denying the People’s Republic more influence in this sector. The US’ premier influence over Pakistan’s military, political system, and elites remains unaffected by this.

Viewed from an admittedly controversial zero-sum perspective, the gradual growth of Russian influence in parts of the Pakistani economy therefore erodes China’s influence over the country, which in turn strengthens America’s overall strategic position. Sanctioned Russia urgently requires new markets, and it’s willing to pay higher costs for access to them so long as it’s promised high rates of return in the long term through preferential stakes in these projects, thus explaining its national interest in this context.

Readers should also be aware that this is part of Russia’s “Pivot to (South) Asia” that was described in detail here late last month and aims to preemptively avert disproportionate dependence on China. Pakistan also wants to reduce its own already existing such dependence on China, hence why it prefers for Russia to modernize its resource infrastructure, which aligns with US strategic goals. If this trend continues, then it’ll one day be possible to speak about the Russian-US-Chinese interplay in Pakistan.

---

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

---

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#China #Economy #Pakistan #Russia #Trade #USA

Pakistan Russia eye energy projects

Ink protocol for executing mega schemes exploring oil and gas deposits

^{Zafar Bhutta (The Express Tribune)}

The Clock Is Ticking For Russia To Achieve Its Maximum Goals In The Ukrainian Conflict

The Clock Is Ticking For Russia To Achieve Its Maximum Goals In The Ukrainian Conflict

By Andrew Korybko

Trump’s reported plan for a Western/NATO peacekeeping mission in Ukraine places Russia in the dilemma of either pre-empting this with another large-scale nationwide offensive, targeting those forces after they enter at the risk of sparking World War III, or tacitly accepting this endgame.

The Wall Street Journal’s report that Trump’s peace plan for Ukraine envisages the creation of an 800-mile demilitarized zone that would be patrolled by Europeans adds a lot of urgency to Russia’s nearly 1000-day-long struggle to achieve its maximum goals in this conflict. The potential entrance of conventional Western/NATO forces into Ukraine as peacekeepers places Russia in the dilemma of accepting yet another “red line” being crossed or risking World War III by targeting them.

To refresh everyone’s memory since it’s been so long since the special operation started, Russia officially aims to: 1) demilitarize Ukraine; 2) denazify it; and 3) restore its constitutional neutrality, among other supplementary and informal goals. September 2022’s referenda then added the official goal of removing Ukrainian forces from the entirety of the four regions that Russia now claims as its own, including the areas of Kherson and Zaporozhye on the other side of the Dnieper, which will be challenge.

At the same time, Putin has repeatedly refused to reciprocally escalate in response to egregious Ukrainian provocations like its bombing of the Kremlin, early warning systems, strategic airfields, oil refineries, and residential buildings, et al, all due to him not wanting the conflict to spiral out of control. For as responsible of an approach as this is, the drawback is that it created the perception that he might accept the crossing of even more “red lines”, including conventional Western/NATO forces in Ukraine.

Putin’s aversion to escalation might therefore be exploited by Trump, who was reportedly handed a plan in June advising him to give Ukraine whatever it wants if Russia refuses whatever peace deal he proposes, ergo the high likelihood of a conventional Western/NATO intervention to decisively freeze the conflict. Trump’s track record of “escalating to de-escalate” with North Korea and Iran suggests that he’d also go through with this plan against Russia, hence why it should take this scenario seriously.

Provided that Putin lacks the political will to risk an unprecedented escalation by targeting those conventional Western/NATO forces, and his behaviour thus far in response to other provocations suggests that this is indeed the case, then he’ll have to race against the clock to achieve his maximum goals. It’ll still take some time for the US to get key stakeholders like Poland on board, where 69% of the public is against dispatching troops to Ukraine in any capacity, so this likely won’t happen by mid-January.

In any case, Russia no longer has a hypothetically indefinite amount of time like before to: 1) demilitarize Ukraine; 2) denazify it; 3) restore its constitutional neutrality; and 4) remove Ukrainian forces from the entirety of the four regions that Russia now claims as its own, including those areas across the Dnieper. Even though the military-strategic dynamics of the conflict favour it, and capturing Pokrovsk could lead to huge gains in Donetsk, it’ll be very difficult to achieve all these goals by the time an intervention occurs.

To explain in the order that they were mentioned, Ukraine was initially supposed to be demilitarized upon the swift success of the special operation in its early phase, but the UK and Poland (whose role most observers aren’t aware of) convinced Zelensky to rubbish spring 2022’s draft peace treaty. That document would have greatly slashed its military capabilities, but it’s no longer realistic to imagine that he’d agree to this, especially after being given tens of billions of dollars’ worth of NATO arms.

NATO is also unlikely to agree to ask for them back due to the perception (regardless of its veracity) that Ukraine must be able to “deter” Russia from supposedly recommencing the conflict after it finally ends. The Taliban’s swift capture of Afghanistan after Biden’s bungled withdrawal from there was viciously lambasted by Trump, who’d go down in history as an even bigger loser if he agreed to “demilitarize” Ukraine and was then played for a fool by Putin if Russia steamrolls through it sometime later.

The only viable way in which Russia could implement Ukraine’s demilitarization in today’s context is to control as much of its territory as possible in order to ensure that no threatening weapons are deployed there. The problem though is that Russia is unlikely to obtain military control over all of Ukraine, or even just significant parts of its territory east of the Dnieper in proximity to the internationally recognized border across which Kiev’s shells still regularly fly, by the time of a Western/NATO intervention.

One of the reasons why the special operation’s opening phase didn’t result in ending the conflict on Russia’s terms is because the West informed Zelensky about how overextended its military logistics had become and thus encouraged him to exploit that to push it back like he ultimately did. Given how cautious of a leader Putin is, he’s unlikely to act out of character once more by ordering a repeat of this same risky strategy even if the frontlines collapse and Russia is able to roll into other regions.

Another unforeseen challenge that Russia experienced during the special operation’s opening phase was actually holding the broad swaths territory that it nominally controlled. Ukraine’s hidden Javelin and Stinger stockpiles inflicted enough losses behind Russia’s lines to engender the large-scale pullback that coincided with the failure of spring 2022’s peace talks. There’s also the obvious difficulty of swiftly capturing large cities like Kharkov, Sumy, and Zaporozhye, which hasn’t yet happened.

Moving along to Russia’s second maximum goal of denazifying Ukraine after explaining how tough it’ll be to achieve the first one of militarizing it, this too can’t succeed without a political agreement that’s no longer realistic in today’s context after such a chance slipped away in spring 2022. What Russia has in mind is Ukraine promulgating legislation that aligns with these goals, such as banning the glorification of World War II-era fascists and rescinding restrictions on ethnic Russians’ rights.

Zelensky has no reason to go along with this anymore like he flirted with doing in early 2022 and Trump’s team doesn’t seem to care all that much about this issue anyhow. It’s therefore unclear how Russia can achieve this before a Western/NATO intervention except in the unlikely scenario of a Russian-friendly Colour Revolution and/or military coup, neither of which the US would accept, and both of which would probably thus prompt the aforesaid intervention out of desperation to salvage “Project Ukraine”.

The third maximum goal of restoring Ukraine’s constitutional neutrality is comparatively more likely but nevertheless moot at this point given that the raft of security guarantees that it already clinched with NATO states since the start of this year de facto amount to continued Article 5 support. Contrary to popular perceptions, this clause doesn’t obligate the dispatch of troops, but only for each country to do whatever it deems fit to help allies under attack. Their existing military aid to Ukraine aligns with this.

Coercing Ukraine to rescind 2019’s constitutional amendment making NATO membership a strategic objective would therefore be a superficial concession to Russia on the US’ part to make Trump’s peace plan a little less bitter for Putin to swallow. As with the previous two maximum goals, Zelensky has no reason to comply with Putin’s demands in this regard since the latter’s forces aren’t in a position to impose this upon him, thus meaning that it can only realistically be done if Trump orders him to.

As the reader probably already picked up on, the common theme is that Russia’s inability to militarily coerce Zelensky into complying with its maximum goals greatly reduces the possibility that they’ll be achieved, which also holds true for the final one of obtaining control over all its new regions’ land. It’s unimaginable that Zelensky will voluntarily cede Zaporozhye with its over 700,000 population, for example, or that Trump will accept the Western opprobrium that would follow coercing him to do so.

The same goes for letting Russia cross the Dnieper to obtain control over that region’s and Kherson’s areas on the other side, thus creating the opportunity for it to build up its forces there in the future for a lightning strike across Ukraine’s western plains in the event that the conflict ever rekindles after it ends. There’s no way that Trump would ever give Putin such an invaluable military-strategic gift so Russia’s supporters shouldn’t deceive themselves by getting their hopes up thinking that this will happen.

The only way in which Russia can achieve its maximum goals before the entrance of Western/NATO troops into Ukraine as peacekeepers is through military means, which would require another large-scale multi-pronged offensive of the sort that characterized the special operation’s early days. Even then, however, the high risk of once again overextending its military logistics, being ambushed by Stingers/Javelins, and thus risking reputational costs and even on-the-ground losses, will remain.

As such, there are really only three options left for Russia: 1) escalate now before Western/NATO troops enter Ukraine and either coerce Zelensky into agreeing to these demands or capture and hold enough land in order to demilitarize as much of the country as possible; 2) escalate after they enter at the risk of sparking a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis that could spiral into World War III; or 3) accept the fait accompli of freezing the conflict along the Line of Contact and begin preparing the public accordingly.

It’s unclear which option Putin will choose since he hasn’t yet signalled a preference for any of them. Nevertheless, it’s timely to quote 19^th-century Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov, who famously said that “Russia is not sulking; she is composing herself.” Russia knows that the clock is ticking for achieving its maximum goals before Trump likely orders Western/NATO peacekeepers to enter Ukraine. The Kremlin is quiet for now precisely because policymakers have yet to decide what to do.

———-

Readers might be interested in reviewing the following analyses for more insight into Russia’s dilemma:

* 14 July 2022: “Korybko To Azerbaijani Media: All Sides Of The Ukrainian Conflict Underestimated Each Other”

* 12 November 2022: “20 Constructive Critiques Of Russia’s Special Operation”

* 1 November 2024: “Trump 2.0 would be no easy ride for Vladimir Putin”

* 7 November 2024: “Here’s What Trump’s Peace Plan Might Look Like & Why Russia Might Agree To It”

* 8 November 2024: “View from Moscow: Russia tepidly welcomes Trump’s return”

They illustrate the challenges inherent in Russia achieving its maximum goals anytime soon.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

Ukraine’s Territorial Concessions Might Precede A Ceasefire That Leads To New Ukrainian Elections

Ukraine’s Territorial Concessions Might Precede A Ceasefire That Leads To New Ukrainian Elections

By Andrew Korybko

The path to peace will predictably be paved by a ceasefire, which will itself likely require some territorial concessions on Ukraine’s part in order for Russia to agree to compromising on Putin’s associated demands, then new elections can be held for legitimizing peace talks.

Trump’s Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg told Reuters that he’d like to see Zelensky hold parliamentary and presidential elections, though that outlet’s sources in Kiev claim that Washington has yet to formally request this of him. Ukrainian law stipulates that they can’t be conducted during times of marital law, ergo the need to first lift it. That won’t happen without a ceasefire, however, but therein lies the problem since Russia’s terms for such are unacceptable for Ukraine.

Putin said last June that Russia will freeze hostilities only after Ukraine withdraws from all the territory that his country claims as its own and declares that it no longer wants to join NATO. Negotiations can resume immediately afterwards, but he specified at the time that they’d have to be held with the parliamentary speaker instead of Zelensky, whose legal term expired at the end of May per Putin’s reading of the Ukrainian Constitution. He then reiterated this position last week but added a twist.

According to him, Zelensky could still hypothetically participate in negotiations, but he’d be powerless to sign anything. This followed Zelensky claiming that October 2022’s prohibition on talks with Russia applied to everyone but himself. He then told the Associated Press over the weekend around the same time as Kellogg’s interview with Reuters that he’s interested in resuming talks with Russia but doesn’t think that it wants a ceasefire. Amidst these statements from Kellogg, Putin, and Zelensky were Trump’s.

He claimed that “We’re having very serious discussions (with Russia) about that war, trying to get it ended”, but said that he hadn’t yet talked to Putin about it, thus implying that talks are only taking place at the embassy level. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Rybakov confirmed on the same day that “there is no progress” on organizing those leaders’ upcoming call. Nevertheless, their inevitable conversation will likely concern a ceasefire, and particularly the compromise that Trump hopes to broker.

This could see him proposing the following to Putin: 1) Ukraine withdraws from Kursk and Donbass, the latter of which is at the centre of the territorial dispute with Russia, but stays where it’s at everywhere else; 2) Neither side rescinds their territorial claims to the other; 3) a carrot-and-stick approach is applied towards Russia and Ukraine for ensuring compliance with the ceasefire; 4) Ukraine then holds its next elections; and 5) the new government enters into peace talks with Russia after assuming office.

Ukraine can be coerced into agreeing to this by threatening to withhold military aid from it while threats of maximally disbursing such to Ukraine alongside the imposition of maximum secondary sanctions against Russia’s top energy clients (China and India) could coerce it into compliance as well. As an incentive to Russia, which has been steadily advancing for the past two years, the US might agree to demilitarize the “trans-Dnieper” region and place it under the control of non-Western peacekeepers.

That proposal forms one of the two dozen compromises that were shared at the end of this analysis here and was elaborated on in detail here. Its full implementation or some variation thereof might ultimately prove pivotal in terms of getting Russia to agree a ceasefire without Ukraine first completely complying with the terms that Putin shared last June as regards withdrawing from all the territory that his country claims as its own. Trump’s negotiators would therefore do well to seriously consider this proposal.

If they get Ukraine and Russia to agree to a ceasefire, then the previously mentioned threats could remain as sticks for encouraging compliance while the carrots could include more reconstruction aid to Ukraine and phased sanctions relief for Russia, thus increasing the odds that it holds. As part of the perks for Russian compliance, the US might even agree to let the EU resume pipeline gas imports from Russia, whether via the remaining undamaged part of Nord Stream and/or across Ukraine if it gets Kiev to agree.

As for the subsequent election step in this process, there US might prefer for Zelensky not to run for re-election otherwise it could back one of his potential opponents as part of a “phased leadership transition” for facilitating a peace deal, which is premised on Putin wanting him out of the way. Between the hypothetical ceasefire and the next elections, Zelensky might still participate in talks, but Russia wouldn’t allow him to sign anything so he’d only take part in them for self-serving political reasons.

In any case, the legal changes that Russia’s declared goals of restoring Ukraine’s constitutional neutrality and denazifying its society entail can only be advanced after the elections legitimize a new parliament, which could then bring these about under US pressure (the second goal perhaps only partially). Prior to that, the size of the armed forces could be curtailed in partial compliance with Russia’s demilitarization goal as a trust-building measure, but Russia’s spring 2022 demands might not ever be met in full.

As can be seen, Trump’s plan to broker a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia mostly depends on the second’s agreement since the first can be much more easily coerced into this, thus necessitating pragmatic compromises that satisfy some of Putin’s ceasefire demands from last June. This could take the form of forcing Ukraine into withdrawing from Donbass, seriously considering a demilitarized “Trans-Dnieper” region controlled by non-Western peacekeepers, and promising phased sanctions relief.

Putin might agree to these terms if they’re accompanied by threats of maximally disbursing military aid to Ukraine alongside the imposition of maximum secondary sanctions against Russia’s top energy clients (China and India). He’s continually proven his preference for avoiding escalations, notably reaffirmed last November through Russia’s unprecedented use of the hypersonic Oreshniks for de-escalation purposes vis the US, while a sizeable share of Russia’s budgetary revenue is dependent on Asian energy imports.

These factors would work in Trump’s favour if he proposes the ceasefire terms that were discussed together with the threatened consequences if Putin rejects them. The path to peace will predictably be paved by a ceasefire, which will itself likely require some territorial concessions on Ukraine’s part in order for Russia to agree to compromising on Putin’s associated demands, then new elections can be held for legitimizing peace talks. This is the most realistic sequence for diplomatically ending the conflict.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Voice of East

2025-01-22 08:27:33

Did Trump Just Drop Some Hints About His Peace Plan For Russia-Ukraine Conflict?

Did Trump Just Drop Some Hints About His Peace Plan For Russia-Ukraine Conflict?

By Andrew Korybko

Trump’s known for his capriciousness, however, so it might be that he either didn’t mean to hint at anything at all in his latest remarks about Russia or he might unexpectedly change his mind about the compromises that he considers to be acceptable for each party during his upcoming call with Putin.

Trump said a few words about Russia shortly after his reinauguration while signing Executive Orders in the Oval Office. They’re important to interpret since they might hint at his peace plan, which he’s yet to officially reveal, but reports have circulated claiming that he’ll “escalate to de-escalate” through more sanctions against Russia and armed aid to Ukraine if Putin rejects whatever deal he offers. He’ll likewise allegedly cut Ukraine off if Zelensky rejects the same deal. Here’s what he said on Monday afternoon:

“Zelenskyy told me he wants to make a deal, I don’t know if Putin does … He might not. I think he should make a deal. I think he’s destroying Russia by not making a deal. I think, Russia is kinda in big trouble. You take a look at their economy, you take a look at their inflation in Russia. I got along with [Putin] great, I would hope he wants to make a deal.

He’s grinding it out. Most people thought it would last about one week and now you’re into three years. It is not making him look good. We have numbers that almost a million Russian soldiers have been killed. About 700,000 Ukrainian soldiers are killed. Russia’s bigger, they have more soldiers to lose but that’s no way to run a country.”

Starting from the beginning, his claim that Zelensky “wants to make a deal” coupled with his uncertainty about Putin’s willingness might be meant to portray the latter as an obstacle to peace, thus possibly setting the stage for the previously mentioned punitive measures. As for his opinion that Putin is “destroying Russia”, that’s hyperbole but frames his counterpart as the weaker of the two, especially when contrasted with Trump’s declaration earlier that day about the start of an American Golden Age.

He then elaborated by pointing to Russia’s inflation rate, which is implied to be the result of the West’s unprecedented sanctions and correspondingly hinting at the possibility of some relief in exchange for Putin agreeing to compromise instead of continuing to pursue his maximum goals. Building upon that, citing Ukraine’s grossly inflated estimate of Russian losses might belie ignorance of the facts if he truly believes their numbers, but it could also reaffirm his expectation that Putin must compromise.

To explain, Trump seems to believe that Western sanctions’ effect on the Russian economy and the battlefield losses that Russia has suffered (both of which are exaggerated in the context that he referred to them) justify proposing compromises from Putin, not giving into his demands. For this reason, it’s likely that the earlier reports about him planning to propose something less than what his counterpart signalled would be acceptable are true, after which he’ll “escalate to de-escalate” if it’s rejected.

Observers can only speculate about the substance of his envisaged proposal, but it might look something like what was suggested at the end of this analysis here, particularly with regards to the proverbial carrots that Trump might offer Putin with regard to Ukraine’s neutrality and phased sanctions relief. As for the compromises that might be requested of Russia, these could include freezing the Line of Contact while being asked to accept only the partial demilitarization of Ukraine and practically no denazification.

Trump’s known for his capriciousness, however, so it might be that he either didn’t mean to hint at anything at all in his latest remarks about Russia or he might unexpectedly change his mind about the compromises that he considers to be acceptable for each party during his upcoming call with Putin. Nobody can therefore say with certainty what he had in mind, let alone what he’ll ultimately do, but this analysis is premised on the assumption that he might have even subconsciously let part of his plan slip.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Trump team preparing early talks with Putin – CNN

Donald Trump’s team is preparing a phone call with Vladimir Putin to discuss the Ukraine conflict and a potential meeting, CNN reports

^RT

It’ll Take Time To Reap The Fruits Of The First-Ever Russian-Pakistani Trade And Investment Forum

It’ll Take Time To Reap The Fruits Of The First-Ever Russian-Pakistani Trade And Investment Forum

By Andrew Korybko

It’s always beneficial whenever business people from different countries, especially former rivals like Russia and Pakistan, meet to discuss ways to fulfil their mutual desire to ramp up trade and investment.

The first-ever Russian-Pakistani trade and investment forum was held in Moscow last week, the highlight of which was a barter agreement being reached for Russia to swap chickpeas and lentils with Pakistan for tangerines and rice. Privatization Minister Abdul Aleem Khan expressed hope that his country’s exports to Russia can grow to $4 billion in the next five years after both sides discussed business visas, transport and logistic problems, banking channels, and alternative payment forms during the forum.

Pakistan and Russia sign first-ever barter trade deal: on the sidelines of the Pak-Rus Trade & Investment Forum, an MOU on barter trade was signed between LLC “Astarta Agrotrading” and Pak Meskay & Femtee Trading Company and National Fruit Processing Factory 🇵🇰🤝🇷🇺 pic.twitter.com/DIMCOGWBak

— Pakistan Embassy Russia (@PakinRussia) October 1, 2024

The participation of over 100 Russian companies and 70 Pakistani businesspeople shows how seriously both sides treated this historic event. Khan also met with Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk, who had just visited Pakistan last month during a trip that drew attention to the increasingly strategic dimension of their relations. They importantly discussed the role of the North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) via Iran for facilitating bilateral trade during their latest talks in Moscow.

These are promising developments, but serious problems still exist, first and foremost the natural limits of barter trade between them. There’s only so much that they can realistically swap with one another, plus each still has to pay logistics costs for traversing the NSTC or conducting trade by sea. The only reason why they’re bartering is because Pakistan lacks the reserves required to comfortably make more purchases from Russia. It’s also scared of US secondary sanctions if it’s caught using dollars in their trade.

Another point is that Russia isn’t interested in stockpiling Pakistani rupees unless it’s provided with preferential investment opportunities in the energy, industrial, or mining sectors to profit from this otherwise largely illiquid currency. They might have discussed such possibilities during the forum, but the fact that its top takeaway was an agricultural barter agreement and nothing more suggests that they’re still far away from reaching any deal on much more strategic investments of the kind mentioned.

That’s not to say that the forum was a failure though. It’s always beneficial whenever businesspeople from different countries, especially former rivals like Russia and Pakistan, meet to discuss ways to fulfil their mutual desire to ramp up trade and investment. Their business cultures, economies, and legal systems are so different though that only a large-scale event of this sort attended by prominent Russian companies and Pakistani businesspeople together with each side’s officials could help make that happen.

The purpose wasn’t to reach deals then and there, but to prospect business opportunities and then rely to the expertise available at the event to learn more about how any potential agreements would work if they were reached. There’s so much for each side to still learn from the other that it took over 15 months since Pakistan’s decision in June 2023 to allow barter trade with Russia for last week’s largely symbolic proof-of-concept deal to be reached.

Therefore, it’ll take time to reap the fruits of the first-ever Russian-Pakistani trade and investment forum, and it’s highly unlikely that Pakistan will fulfil Khan’s goal of exporting $4 billion worth of products to Russia by 2030 when the bulk of their $1 billion bilateral trade is Russian wheat exports to his country. Nevertheless, any tangible progress on this would still be mutually beneficial, and Russia will certainly appreciate the gesture of Pakistan doing its best to increase their trade in defiance of American pressure.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Why Did Trump Threaten To Modify Or Rescind India’s Sanctions Waiver For Iran’s Chabahar Port?

Why Did Trump Threaten To Modify Or Rescind India’s Sanctions Waiver For Iran’s Chabahar Port?

By Andrew Korybko

Threatening the viability of the North-South Transport Corridor pressures Iran, India, and Russia in one fell swoop in a diplomatic-economic masterstroke.

Trump 2.0 is considered to be Indophilic in large part due to his team’s understanding of how India can serve as a partial economic-military counterweight to China in Eurasia, yet he just signed an Executive Order to “modify or rescind sanctions waivers…including those related to Iran’s Chabahar port project”. That port is pivotal to the North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) that India relies on to balance China in Central Asia and prevent Russia’s disproportionate dependence on it, both of which align with US goals.

The Biden Administration also threatened to rescind this waiver, albeit not as directly nor in an official way like Trump 2.0 just did, in response to last May’s ten-year Chabahar Port deal between India and Iran. The latest threats coincided with an Indian government report about how maritime traffic along that route soared by 43% last year and container traffic by 34%. It also precedes Prime Minister Modi’s trip to DC late next week where they’re expected to discuss trade ties, military issues, and Russia.

The last part could take the form of India explaining the role that it plays in preemptively averting Russia’s potentially disproportionate dependence on China through its large-scale purchase of discounted oil and the plans that they have to scale real-sector trade across the NSTC. Modi might therefore request sanctions waivers otherwise India might either feel compelled to risk a crisis with the US by defying it on Russia-Iran or it’ll abandon its Eurasian balancing act to their mutual detriment.

Having explained Chabahar Port’s strategic importance to the US by way of India employing it to balance Chinese influence in Central Asia and on Russia, it’s now time to look at the reasons why Trump would risk jeopardizing this through that particular clause in his latest Executive Order. What follows are three explanations that aren’t mutually exclusive. It might even be that Trump only had the first one in mind but then realized that the second and third could also be used to his benefit.

There’s no doubt that modifying or rescinding India’s sanctions waiver for Chabahar Port is intended to coerce Iran into concessions to the US since the Executive Order in which this is decreed explicitly concerns the resumption of his first term’s “maximum pressure” policy. The future of the Iranian economy is even more dependent on the NSTC than the Indian and Russian ones are so threatening its viability is meant to raise the chances that it complies with his demands on missiles and nuclear energy.

Nevertheless, seeing as how India and Russia also have important stakes in the NSTC, he might also hope that one or both could then encourage Iran to cut a (likely lopsided) deal with the US in exchange for him then retaining the essence of his first term’s original sanctions waiver as a reward. Building upon that and regardless of whether or not the following was already what he was planning, another possibility is that his threat to modify or rescind that waiver is intended to put pressure on India in a bilateral context.

Trump earlier criticized Modi’s use of tariffs, but the run-up to their summit has seen rumours of them launching free trade talks, so Trump might think that threatening Modi’s Eurasian balancing act could prompt trade concessions. It’s of grand strategic importance for India to prevent Russia from becoming China’s junior partner so India might compromise on trade with the US for a Chabahar waiver in order to retain this balancing act without risking a crisis with the US by defying its Iranian sanctions threats.

The last explanation for why Trump threatened to modify or rescind this waiver is that he wants to pressure Russia by reminding it that the alternative valve from Western sanctions pressure that it’s relied upon for preemptively averting potentially disproportionate dependence on China could soon be cut off. The purpose could be to increase the odds that Putin accepts tough compromises on his maximum goals in the special operation in exchange for India retaining this waiver and thus keeping the NSTC viable.

In this scenario, Russia would be compelled to choose between these tough compromises or becoming China’s junior partner out of desperation to continue the special operation in pursuit of its maximum goals, which would entail selling all natural resources to China at bargain-basement prices. Putin has held off on that till now, even declining to clinch such an agreement over the long-negotiated Power of Siberia II pipeline during his most recent trip to Beijing last May, so he might cut a deal with Trump.

More clarity is expected by the end of the month since Modi’s trip to DC will take place from 12-14 February, the next Munich Security Conference is from 14-16 February, Trump’s Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg will then reportedly visit Kiev on 20 February to share Trump’s peace plan with Zelensky after first briefing Western leaders about it in Munich, and then he might visit Moscow to talk with Putin about it since he’ll be in the neighbourhood if Trump doesn’t call him first.

Bloomberg reported that Trump’s plan includes “potentially freezing the conflict and leaving territory occupied by Russian forces in limbo while providing Ukraine with security guarantees” in order to create the conditions for Ukraine to hold its long-delayed presidential and parliamentary elections. This sequence was forecast several days prior to that report here, which pointed out that it would necessitate compromises from Putin.

The Russian leader’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov then revealed that talks with Zelensky are hypothetically possible even though Moscow considers the Ukrainian leader’s continued tenure to be illegitimate in a reversal of Kremlin policy which suggests that Putin might be seriously considering some compromises. That might not be connected to Trump’s Executive Order from the day prior to Peskov’s remark, but it’s possible that forthcoming NSTC-related pressure might contribute to convincing Putin to cut a deal.

Reflecting on the insight that was shared in this analysis, it’s arguably the case that Trump’s threat to modify or rescind India’s sanctions waiver for Iran’s Chabahar Port is motivated by him wanting to pressure Iran, India, and Russia in one fell swoop in a diplomatic-economic masterstroke. This doesn’t mean that he’ll successfully extract the compromises (or even concessions in some cases) that he expects, but just that he’s trying to proverbially kill three birds with one stone, which is very clever.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Voice of East

2024-11-09 17:00:41

The Clock Is Ticking For Russia To Achieve Its Maximum Goals In The Ukrainian Conflict

The Clock Is Ticking For Russia To Achieve Its Maximum Goals In The Ukrainian Conflict

By Andrew Korybko

Trump’s reported plan for a Western/NATO peacekeeping mission in Ukraine places Russia in the dilemma of either pre-empting this with another large-scale nationwide offensive, targeting those forces after they enter at the risk of sparking World War III, or tacitly accepting this endgame.

The Wall Street Journal’s report that Trump’s peace plan for Ukraine envisages the creation of an 800-mile demilitarized zone that would be patrolled by Europeans adds a lot of urgency to Russia’s nearly 1000-day-long struggle to achieve its maximum goals in this conflict. The potential entrance of conventional Western/NATO forces into Ukraine as peacekeepers places Russia in the dilemma of accepting yet another “red line” being crossed or risking World War III by targeting them.

To refresh everyone’s memory since it’s been so long since the special operation started, Russia officially aims to: 1) demilitarize Ukraine; 2) denazify it; and 3) restore its constitutional neutrality, among other supplementary and informal goals. September 2022’s referenda then added the official goal of removing Ukrainian forces from the entirety of the four regions that Russia now claims as its own, including the areas of Kherson and Zaporozhye on the other side of the Dnieper, which will be challenge.

At the same time, Putin has repeatedly refused to reciprocally escalate in response to egregious Ukrainian provocations like its bombing of the Kremlin, early warning systems, strategic airfields, oil refineries, and residential buildings, et al, all due to him not wanting the conflict to spiral out of control. For as responsible of an approach as this is, the drawback is that it created the perception that he might accept the crossing of even more “red lines”, including conventional Western/NATO forces in Ukraine.

Putin’s aversion to escalation might therefore be exploited by Trump, who was reportedly handed a plan in June advising him to give Ukraine whatever it wants if Russia refuses whatever peace deal he proposes, ergo the high likelihood of a conventional Western/NATO intervention to decisively freeze the conflict. Trump’s track record of “escalating to de-escalate” with North Korea and Iran suggests that he’d also go through with this plan against Russia, hence why it should take this scenario seriously.

Provided that Putin lacks the political will to risk an unprecedented escalation by targeting those conventional Western/NATO forces, and his behaviour thus far in response to other provocations suggests that this is indeed the case, then he’ll have to race against the clock to achieve his maximum goals. It’ll still take some time for the US to get key stakeholders like Poland on board, where 69% of the public is against dispatching troops to Ukraine in any capacity, so this likely won’t happen by mid-January.

In any case, Russia no longer has a hypothetically indefinite amount of time like before to: 1) demilitarize Ukraine; 2) denazify it; 3) restore its constitutional neutrality; and 4) remove Ukrainian forces from the entirety of the four regions that Russia now claims as its own, including those areas across the Dnieper. Even though the military-strategic dynamics of the conflict favour it, and capturing Pokrovsk could lead to huge gains in Donetsk, it’ll be very difficult to achieve all these goals by the time an intervention occurs.

To explain in the order that they were mentioned, Ukraine was initially supposed to be demilitarized upon the swift success of the special operation in its early phase, but the UK and Poland (whose role most observers aren’t aware of) convinced Zelensky to rubbish spring 2022’s draft peace treaty. That document would have greatly slashed its military capabilities, but it’s no longer realistic to imagine that he’d agree to this, especially after being given tens of billions of dollars’ worth of NATO arms.

NATO is also unlikely to agree to ask for them back due to the perception (regardless of its veracity) that Ukraine must be able to “deter” Russia from supposedly recommencing the conflict after it finally ends. The Taliban’s swift capture of Afghanistan after Biden’s bungled withdrawal from there was viciously lambasted by Trump, who’d go down in history as an even bigger loser if he agreed to “demilitarize” Ukraine and was then played for a fool by Putin if Russia steamrolls through it sometime later.

The only viable way in which Russia could implement Ukraine’s demilitarization in today’s context is to control as much of its territory as possible in order to ensure that no threatening weapons are deployed there. The problem though is that Russia is unlikely to obtain military control over all of Ukraine, or even just significant parts of its territory east of the Dnieper in proximity to the internationally recognized border across which Kiev’s shells still regularly fly, by the time of a Western/NATO intervention.

One of the reasons why the special operation’s opening phase didn’t result in ending the conflict on Russia’s terms is because the West informed Zelensky about how overextended its military logistics had become and thus encouraged him to exploit that to push it back like he ultimately did. Given how cautious of a leader Putin is, he’s unlikely to act out of character once more by ordering a repeat of this same risky strategy even if the frontlines collapse and Russia is able to roll into other regions.

Another unforeseen challenge that Russia experienced during the special operation’s opening phase was actually holding the broad swaths territory that it nominally controlled. Ukraine’s hidden Javelin and Stinger stockpiles inflicted enough losses behind Russia’s lines to engender the large-scale pullback that coincided with the failure of spring 2022’s peace talks. There’s also the obvious difficulty of swiftly capturing large cities like Kharkov, Sumy, and Zaporozhye, which hasn’t yet happened.

Moving along to Russia’s second maximum goal of denazifying Ukraine after explaining how tough it’ll be to achieve the first one of militarizing it, this too can’t succeed without a political agreement that’s no longer realistic in today’s context after such a chance slipped away in spring 2022. What Russia has in mind is Ukraine promulgating legislation that aligns with these goals, such as banning the glorification of World War II-era fascists and rescinding restrictions on ethnic Russians’ rights.

Zelensky has no reason to go along with this anymore like he flirted with doing in early 2022 and Trump’s team doesn’t seem to care all that much about this issue anyhow. It’s therefore unclear how Russia can achieve this before a Western/NATO intervention except in the unlikely scenario of a Russian-friendly Colour Revolution and/or military coup, neither of which the US would accept, and both of which would probably thus prompt the aforesaid intervention out of desperation to salvage “Project Ukraine”.

The third maximum goal of restoring Ukraine’s constitutional neutrality is comparatively more likely but nevertheless moot at this point given that the raft of security guarantees that it already clinched with NATO states since the start of this year de facto amount to continued Article 5 support. Contrary to popular perceptions, this clause doesn’t obligate the dispatch of troops, but only for each country to do whatever it deems fit to help allies under attack. Their existing military aid to Ukraine aligns with this.

Coercing Ukraine to rescind 2019’s constitutional amendment making NATO membership a strategic objective would therefore be a superficial concession to Russia on the US’ part to make Trump’s peace plan a little less bitter for Putin to swallow. As with the previous two maximum goals, Zelensky has no reason to comply with Putin’s demands in this regard since the latter’s forces aren’t in a position to impose this upon him, thus meaning that it can only realistically be done if Trump orders him to.

As the reader probably already picked up on, the common theme is that Russia’s inability to militarily coerce Zelensky into complying with its maximum goals greatly reduces the possibility that they’ll be achieved, which also holds true for the final one of obtaining control over all its new regions’ land. It’s unimaginable that Zelensky will voluntarily cede Zaporozhye with its over 700,000 population, for example, or that Trump will accept the Western opprobrium that would follow coercing him to do so.

The same goes for letting Russia cross the Dnieper to obtain control over that region’s and Kherson’s areas on the other side, thus creating the opportunity for it to build up its forces there in the future for a lightning strike across Ukraine’s western plains in the event that the conflict ever rekindles after it ends. There’s no way that Trump would ever give Putin such an invaluable military-strategic gift so Russia’s supporters shouldn’t deceive themselves by getting their hopes up thinking that this will happen.

The only way in which Russia can achieve its maximum goals before the entrance of Western/NATO troops into Ukraine as peacekeepers is through military means, which would require another large-scale multi-pronged offensive of the sort that characterized the special operation’s early days. Even then, however, the high risk of once again overextending its military logistics, being ambushed by Stingers/Javelins, and thus risking reputational costs and even on-the-ground losses, will remain.

As such, there are really only three options left for Russia: 1) escalate now before Western/NATO troops enter Ukraine and either coerce Zelensky into agreeing to these demands or capture and hold enough land in order to demilitarize as much of the country as possible; 2) escalate after they enter at the risk of sparking a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis that could spiral into World War III; or 3) accept the fait accompli of freezing the conflict along the Line of Contact and begin preparing the public accordingly.

It’s unclear which option Putin will choose since he hasn’t yet signalled a preference for any of them. Nevertheless, it’s timely to quote 19^th-century Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov, who famously said that “Russia is not sulking; she is composing herself.” Russia knows that the clock is ticking for achieving its maximum goals before Trump likely orders Western/NATO peacekeepers to enter Ukraine. The Kremlin is quiet for now precisely because policymakers have yet to decide what to do.

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Readers might be interested in reviewing the following analyses for more insight into Russia’s dilemma:

* 14 July 2022: “Korybko To Azerbaijani Media: All Sides Of The Ukrainian Conflict Underestimated Each Other”

* 12 November 2022: “20 Constructive Critiques Of Russia’s Special Operation”

* 1 November 2024: “Trump 2.0 would be no easy ride for Vladimir Putin”

* 7 November 2024: “Here’s What Trump’s Peace Plan Might Look Like & Why Russia Might Agree To It”

* 8 November 2024: “View from Moscow: Russia tepidly welcomes Trump’s return”

They illustrate the challenges inherent in Russia achieving its maximum goals anytime soon.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Korybko To Azerbaijani Media: All Sides Of The Ukrainian Conflict Underestimated Each Other

OneWorld is publishing the full-length English version of the interview that Andrew Korybko gave to Oxu.

^{Andrew Korybko (Andrew Korybko's Newsletter)}

Russian-Pakistani Relations Are Surprisingly Taking On Strategic Dimensions

Russian-Pakistani Relations Are Surprisingly Taking On Strategic Dimensions

By Andrew Korybko

Nothing major has yet to be agreed to, but that might change if Pakistan musters the political will to defy the US, which Russia evidently thinks is possible.

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk’s trip to Pakistan has become a milestone in their relations after the wide range of issues that they agreed to more closely cooperate on. This broadly includes trade, industry, energy, connectivity, science, technology, and education. In particular, they also reached a deal for Russia to modernize Pakistani agriculture with machinery and fertilizer plant upgrades, while talks are underway over the possibility of building a new steel mill in Karachi.

Overchuk also met with Chief Of Army Staff Asim Munir to discuss defence and regional security issues, which follows reports of Russian drone sales to Pakistan amidst the upsurge of terrorism there. Another development of importance was Pakistan acceding to the existing MoU for creating a Central Eurasian Corridor between Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Russia. Of relevance, Russia said that it would support Pakistan joining BRICS and that they’re discussing an FTA too.

These last three goals might not be achieved anytime soon though due to deteriorating Pakistani-Taliban relations impeding trans-Afghan trade, India’s right to veto Pakistan’s membership in BRICS per the group’s consensus principle, and Pakistan’s continued refusal to recognize Eurasian Union member Armenia. Nevertheless, the bigger picture is that Russian-Pakistani relations are surprisingly taking on strategic dimensions, which few could have foreseen for the reasons that’ll now be explained.

This analysis here from over the summer elaborated more on the prior doubts about this, but they can be summed up as “Pakistan’s failure to liberate itself from the yoke of American vassalage; the lack of funds for financing these projects; American and Chinese jealousy if Pakistan gives preferential investment terms to Russia (let alone agrees to grossly lopsided barter arrangements); and worsening Baloch-TTP terrorist threats.” They’ve also yet to clinch their long-negotiated strategic energy deal.

What appears to have happened is that both sides have found common ground between themselves and with regard to their respective partners. On the bilateral front, each is sincerely interested in apolitical economic cooperation, with the Pakistani economy urgently requiring more foreign investment while the Russian one urgently needs more export markets. This accounts for why Overchuk proposed that Pakistan rely more on the North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) for facilitating their trade.

He also suggested that the NSTC and BRI could be paired together, which of course raised eyebrows among many in India, whose observers were already closely monitoring his visit. Some clarification is therefore in order. Candidly speaking, Russia has already invested so much time into negotiating what it truly believes to be a game-changing strategic energy deal with Pakistan that it’s reluctant to move on after they’ve thus far failed to make any progress on this, hence Overchuck’s sweettalking.

His rhetoric about BRI, BRICS, and an FTA is seemingly meant to move the aforesaid talks along seeing as how none of these three ambitious goals is solely within Russia’s ambit to agree to. The NSTC is just a multilateral transport corridor; BRICS is basically a talking club which requires consensus before anyone else can join or even sit in on their meetings; and the same goes for an FTA with the Eurasian Union. Both sides know this, but casual observers might not, which is why some could have been concerned.

From the perspective of an average Indian, it might therefore seem like Russia is pivoting towards Pakistan at their country’s expense, with the possibility emerging in their minds of political tensions developing between these decades-long strategic partners over Russia’s newfound support of Pakistan. The reality though is a lot more mundane as was explained since Overchuck is just trying to have Russia stay on Pakistan’s good side so that they can finally make progress on their strategic energy talks.

Apart from the unintended blowback that these optics might entail for popular Indian perceptions of Russia’s regional policy, Russia and Pakistan both benefit from the way that others view their ties. Russia wants the world to see that even the loyal decades-long American partners like Pakistan are cooperating with it nowadays, thus representing yet another failure of the West’s containment policy, while Pakistan wants to incentivize China and the US into offer it better deals by baiting them with Russia.

Russia and Pakistan haven’t yet reached any flagship agreements, with everything that’s been reached up until this point representing low-level cooperation that each already has with many other countries. While it’s indisputably an achievement for these former Old Cold War rivals to put their past behind them by comprehensively ramping up cooperation, ergo why Overchuck’s visit was described as a milestone in the introduction to this analysis, nothing major has yet to be agreed to.

Each is therefore using the optics of this trip to advance their respective interests vis-à-vis third parties while still expanding the scope of their relations to advance their national interests as well. It’s important for observers to understand that there’s a lot of hype but very little substance. Both are making a big deal about their ties, but they’re still unimpressive when compared to what they already have with others. Even so, if Pakistan musters the political will, then they might truly become strategic one day.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Here’s What Some Of Russia’s Brightest Minds Think About The World Majority And Its Interests

Here’s What Some Of Russia’s Brightest Minds Think About The World Majority And Its Interests

By Andrew Korybko

The World Majority envisages gradual and responsible reforms that elevate their roles in global governance with a view towards making International Relations more equitable.

The Valdai Club, which is one of Russia’s most prestigious think tanks and its top elite networking platform, published a detailed report by some of the brightest minds in the country on “The World Majority and Its Interests”. Its 31 pages deserve to be read in full, but for those with limited time, the present piece will summarize the most important insight shared therein. It’ll be seen that it’s a collection of pretty common observations whose importance rests in being confirmed by such top-level experts.

The report begins by searching for a definition of the “World Majority”, though with all respect to the highly esteemed authors’ efforts, it appears indistinguishable from the Global South. Both refer to the global majority that refused to submit to Western pressure to sanction Russia and/or arm Ukraine. They stood firm not due to pro-Russian reasons, but in defence of their hard-earned sovereignty. Accordingly, they’re not expected to always follow Russia’s policies, though Moscow shouldn’t take offense at this.

Their approach to the evolving international order will likely follow India’s, which pioneered the policy of multi–alignment that’s seen the world’s most populous country participate in the Quad, BRICS, and the SCO. The prioritization of national interests as each country’s leadership sincerely understands them to be will therefore characterize the World Majority’s foreign policy. They probably won’t revive the Non-Aligned Movement, however, since current divisions are far more complex than during the Old Cold War.

Instead, they’ll balance or multi-align between competing pairs of rivals in pursuit of maximum benefit from both, being very careful not to take anyone’s side except in extraordinary circumstances since this would risk weakening their strategic autonomy. This approach enables countries like India to serve as bridges between the West and its top rivals like Russia. Vietnam, Turkiye, and the Gulf States are also playing a similar role according to the report’s authors.

They also importantly observed that “the World Majority countries are not ready to propose or seriously discuss an abstract ‘new international order.’ They seek greater fairness regarding their interests, but are not willing to embark on a revolutionary path in order to achieve it.” This contradicts the wishful thinking expectations of many in the Alt-Media Community (AMC) who’ve been misled by the ideological zeal of their top influencers into imagining that the World Majority is as “revolutionary” as they are.

The World Majority envisages gradual and responsible reforms that elevate their roles in global governance with a view towards making International Relations more equitable. With few exceptions, they all participate in the global market economy and are therefore very fearful of sudden shocks to it, thus explaining why they so strongly opposed the West’s pressure to cut off their agricultural and energy trade with Russia. Had they complied, then their economies could have crashed.

The report then segued into some discussion about specific country examples such as India, the Gulf States, African countries, Southeast Asian countries, and Latin American and Caribbean countries. Readers can review each part if they’re interested but nothing too unique was shared in any of them. They all adhere to the policymaking model hitherto described, albeit with some national specificities such as varying vulnerability to Western pressure, especially in the financial and developmental realms.

For these reasons, the authors advise Russia not to overreact whenever partners implement policies that don’t perfectly align with its own, let alone when they try to multi-align between Russia and the West. Supplementary advice is that “attempts to fit them into one’s own speculative geopolitical schemes would be a mistake”, which is also relevant for the AMC. Russia should also learn more about every World Majority country since they hint near the end that it might be lacking in expertise towards some.

All in all, the most important purpose of the report is that it lent authority to the observations that some have already noticed about the World Majority/Global South and applied towards their own work, such as in this analysis here from spring 2023. There’s not much else novel about it other than being the first comprehensive collection of such observations to be published in Russia by one of its top think tanks. Even so, average readers will still benefit from at least reviewing it, which they’re encouraged to do.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Russia-NATO Proxy War: Putin Is Finally Climbing The Escalation Ladder

Russia-NATO Proxy War: Putin Is Finally Climbing The Escalation Ladder

By Andrew Korybko

He wants to deter the even greater provocations that the West might now be plotting, such as destabilizing and then invading Belarus, with the intent of coercing him into freezing the existing LOC and then possibly accepting the deployment of Western/NATO peacekeepers there.

Putin surprised the world on Thursday when he addressed the nation to inform them that Russia had tested a new hypersonic medium-range missile earlier that morning in an attack against a famous Soviet-era industrial complex in the Ukrainian city of Dnepropetrovsk. He explained that this was a response to the US and UK recently allowing Ukraine to use their long-range missiles inside of Russia. Their decision resulted in the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine “assuming elements of a global nature” in his words.

As was explained here with regards to the “moment of truth” that this latest phase of the conflict led to, he was faced with the choice of either escalating or continuing his policy of strategic patience, the first of which could foil attempts by Trump to reach a peace deal while the second could invite more aggression. Putin chose the former and did so in a creative way that few foresaw. The Oreshnik missile system whose existence he disclosed on Thursday has Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs).

It’s essentially the same sort of weapon that Russia could use in the event of a nuclear conflict with the West since the aforesaid feature coupled with its hypersonic speed means that it’s impossible to intercept. In other words, Putin rattled Russia’s nuclear sabre in the most convincing way possible short of testing a nuclear weapon, which his government previously confirmed that it wouldn’t do for the reasons that were explained here. He’s therefore finally climbing the escalation ladder.

Putin hitherto declined to escalate in response to the over 1,000 days’ worth of NATO-backed Ukrainian provocations that included bombing the Kremlin, early warning systems, strategic airfields, nuclear power plants, and the Crimean Bridge, among many other sensitive targets, so as to avoid World War III. He also prioritized political goals over military ones up until this point, but that’s all changing now since he realized that his strategic patience was interpreted as weakness and only invited more aggression.

Seeing as how Ukraine’s latest use of Western weapons inside of Russia’s pre-2014 territory isn’t unprecedented due to the HIMARS already having been used in Belgorod and Kursk Regions, the latter of which Ukraine invaded with NATO’s support over the summer, the question arises of why it took over three months for his views to change. It should also be noted that Russia didn’t significantly respond to Ukraine fielding the F-16s despite Lavrov previously warning that they could be nuclear-equipped.

Russia might have therefore received intelligence that the West is plotting an even greater provocation in the future. Belarusian media just aired a documentary exposing a Western plot to destabilize and invade their country, which readers can learn more about by reviewing the seven analyses that were listed in this one here. Correspondingly, it was assessed that “Russia’s Updated Nuke Doctrine Aims To Deter Unacceptable Provocations From NATO”, and the aforesaid would certainly constitute such.

Putin’s strategic patience would have finally reached its limits if he caught wind that anything of the sort was afoot, which would explain why he’d order the Oreshnik to be used against that Soviet-era industrial complex in Central Ukraine in order to send an unmistakable message to the West to reconsider its plans. Recalling how concerned he is about avoiding World War III, it also makes sense why his spokesman confirmed that Russia informed the US about this approximately half an hour ahead of time.

After all, launching an intermediate-range hypersonic missile westward without any advance notification could have prompted the US to panic by interpreting this as the start of a potential nuclear first strike by Russia, thus setting into motion the exact same scenario that he’s worked so hard to avoid. His motive was to deter the West from carrying out unacceptable provocations that cross Russia’s most sensitive redlines, which the West might be plotting out of desperation to “escalate to de-escalate” on its terms.

It was written here, here, and here that Trump might resort to that, but the latest ATACMS escalation – which can be regarded as a provocation due to these missiles having a much longer range than the HIMARS – suggests that the “Collective Biden” decided to do so first out of fear that whatever deal he might reach with Putin would compromise on too many of the US’ interests. Accordingly, Putin might now have decided to beat the US to the punch by “escalating to de-escalate” on Russia’s terms instead.

Thursday morning was the first time that a MIRV was used in combat, which is much more significant than the US “boiling the frog” by expanding the range of the missiles that Ukraine has already been able to use inside of Russia’s pre-2014 borders after once again signalling its escalatory plans long in advance, especially since few saw it coming and the US only had around a 30-minute notice. Putin also warned that Russia’s new doctrine allows it to use such weapons against those who arm Ukraine.

It’s unlikely that he’ll throw caution to the wind by launching Oreshniks against military targets in NATO countries at the risk of sparking World War III, but it can’t be ruled out that the next escalation that he’s considering in response to more aggression could be bombing Moldova instead. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zakharova said earlier in the week that the Western-backed government there is “turning the country at a rapid pace into a logistics hub used to supply the Ukrainian armed forces.”

It’s not a NATO member though so Russia could bomb it without crossing the West’s red lines while still signalling that he’s not the pushover that they convinced themselves that he was after misreading the reasons for his strategic patience if they still keep provoking him even after Thursday’s escalation. They want him to accept Western/NATO peacekeepers along the Line of Contact (LOC), Ukraine’s continued militarization, its future membership in NATO, and no change in its anti-Russian legislation.

By contrast, Putin wants to expel Ukraine from the four regions that voted to join Russia in September 2022, no Western/NATO peacekeepers along the LOC, Ukraine’s demilitarization, the restoration of its constitutional neutrality, and the rescinding of its anti-Russian legislation. Beating the West to the punch by “escalating to de-escalate”, or at least finally climbing the escalation ladder in response to their provocations, is therefore aimed at achieving as many of these maximum goals as he can.

If he sticks to his guns and doesn’t waver from his newfound approach, which is arguably long-overdue since some believe that he should have begun applying it after the failure of spring 2022’s peace talks, then he stands a much greater chance of achieving at least part of the most important ones. NATO can always conventionally intervene in Ukraine west of the Dnieper to salvage some of its geopolitical project so Russia should assume that it won’t be able to demilitarize or denazify that part of the country.

What it can do, however, is employ military and diplomatic means (both individually and in combination through its abovementioned newfound approach) to obtain control over all the territory that it claims as its own east of the Dnieper, possibly including Zaporozhye’s eponymous city of over 700,000 people. The new LOC could then be patrolled by purely non-Western forces deployed as part of a UN mandate while Ukraine might be coerced to demilitarize everything that remains under its control east of the Dnieper.

All heavy weapons would have to be withdrawn westward as part of a massive demilitarized zone (DMZ), while the possibility also exists that this “Trans-dnieper” region might also receive political autonomy or at least cultural autonomy to protect the rights of ethnic Russians and those who speak that language. This scenario was first tabled here in March and could take the form shown below, with the western part of the country in blue possibly hosting NATO troops as part of the arrangement that’ll then be described:

Ukraine could be deterred from breaking the ceasefire due to the DMZ placing it at a disadvantage, while Russia would be deterred by the “security guarantees” that Ukraine clinched with a bunch of NATO countries this year, which amount to de facto Article 5 support. While Russia could storm into the DMZ, NATO could also storm into Western Ukraine or possibly even cross the Dnieper, whether due to a swift intervention or having already deployed its troops west of the river per tacit agreement with Russia.

What was detailed in the three preceding paragraphs is the maximum that Russia can realistically achieve given the new military-strategic circumstances in which it finds itself over 1,000 days since the special operation began. Putin finally started climbing the escalation ladder in order to deter the even greater provocations that the West might now be plotting with the intent of coercing him into freezing the existing LOC and then possibly accepting the deployment of Western/NATO peacekeepers there.

Such a scenario would be completely unacceptable for him from the perspective of Russia’s national security interests and his own reputational ones after promising to check NATO’s expansion in Ukraine. Keeping that bloc west of the Dnieper while demilitarizing everything east of it and north of the administrative borders of the four former Ukrainian regions that joined Russia in September 2022, tentatively known as the “Trans-dnieper” region, would be a tolerable compromise though.

Trump might deem this to be pragmatic enough of a deal for him to go along with since it could still be spun by all relevant parties to the conflict as a victory (e.g. Russia gained land and created a DMZ deep inside Ukraine; Ukraine continued to exist as a state; and the US de facto incorporated Western Ukraine into NATO). It could even enter into force prior to that if either side “escalates to de-escalate” before his inauguration and this is the “mutually face-saving” compromise that they reach to avoid World War III.

Of course, it would be better if they agree to this without sparking a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis that risks spiralling out of control, hence why their diplomats should begin discussing it now or a third country’s ones like India’s should propose it behind the scenes to get the ball rolling. Putin’s newfound (and arguably long-overdue) approach signals that he won’t accept freezing the existing LOC, nor especially the deployment of NATO/Western peacekeepers there, and will escalate to avert that.

He might even go as far as using tactical nukes in Ukraine (and/or NATO’s logistics hub in Moldova) if he feels that he’s being cornered by the evolving circumstances in which the West might soon place him through its possibly forthcoming greater provocations (e.g. destabilizing and invading Belarus). The West must therefore start taking Putin seriously after he finally began climbing the escalation ladder otherwise the worst-case scenario of World War III might become unavoidable if they push him too far.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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2024-11-07 17:00:46

Here’s What Trump’s Peace Plan Might Look Like And Why Russia Might Agree To It

Here’s What Trump’s Peace Plan Might Look Like And Why Russia Might Agree To It

By Andrew Korybko

Putin might agree to freeze the conflict along the Line of Contact in spite of prior rhetoric against this scenario in the event that Trump threatens to escalate the conflict as punishment if he doesn’t.

Trump’s pledge to resolve the Ukrainian Conflict in 24 hours is unrealistic, but he’ll inevitably propose a peace plan at some point in time, thus raising questions about what it would look like and whether Russia would agree to it. More than likely, he’ll seek to freeze the conflict along the Line of Contact (LOC), wherever it may be by that time, as he’s not expected to coerce Ukraine into withdrawing from the regions whose administrative borders Russia claims in their entirety.

Nor is Russia expected to obtain control over them by the time that Trump’s proposal is made. It still hasn’t removed Ukrainian forces from Donbass, which is at the heart of its claims, and therefore is unlikely to capture Zaporozhye city, that namesake’s areas on the side of the Dnieper River, nor Kherson Region’s aforesaid adjacent lands either. It might gain some more territory if Pokrovsk is captured, but the US might dangerously “escalate to de-escalate” to stop a run on the river if Ukraine is then routed.

This could take the form of threatening a conventional NATO intervention if the political will exists to spark a Cuban-like brinskmanship crisis, the odds of which would greatly increase if Russia made any move in that scenario to cross the Dnieper and thus risk the collapse of that bloc’s Ukrainian project. Be that as it may, no such run on the river is expected, with the most that Russia might do is lay siege to Zaporozhye city, but even that might not materialize by the time that Trump shares his peace plan.

Russia will therefore almost certainly be asked to freeze the conflict along the LOC, albeit without rescinding its territorial claims just like Ukraine won’t either, under the threat of Trump ramping up military support to Ukraine if the Kremlin refuses to cease hostilities. This prediction is predicated on summer’s report that some of his advisors suggested that he do precisely that as punishment for Russia rubbishing whatever peace plan that he ultimately offers it.

Considering his tough-talking personality and proclivity for “escalating to de-escalate” on his terms if he feels disrespected, which he flirted doing with North Korea during his first term as a negotiating tactic, he’s thus expected to comply with the aforesaid suggestion in that event. Given Putin’s consummate pragmatism as he understands his style to be and his aversion to escalations, he might very well comply, but he could also request that Trump coerce Zelensky into making concessions to facilitate this.

These might include rescinding 2019’s constitutional amendment making NATO membership a strategic objective, promulgating legislation that Russia considers to advance its denazification goals, freezing further weapons shipments to Ukraine, and carving out a buffer zone within part of Ukrainian territory. In the order that they were mentioned, the first one would be superficial after this year’s raft of security guarantees between Ukraine and several NATO countries already made it a de facto member of the bloc.

To explain, they all entail commitments to resume their existing military support for Ukraine if its conflict with Russia flares up again upon its eventual end, and this self-same support arguably aligns with NATO’s Article 5. Contrary to popular perceptions, it doesn’t obligate them to send troops, but only to provide whatever support they believe is necessary to aid allies under attack. This is what they’re already doing, yet Russia never escalated in response to this being enshrined in their bilateral military deals.

As for the second speculative concession that Putin might request that Trump coerce Zelensky into making, the returning American leader and his team haven’t ever signalled any interest in helping Russia denazify Ukraine, and coercing it into promulgating legislation might be seen as bad optics abroad. Since Russia can’t force Ukraine to do this, that particular goal of the special operation will likely remain unfulfilled, in which case it probably wouldn’t be discussed much anymore by officials and the media.

Moving along to the third, Trump probably wouldn’t agree to freeze arms shipments to Ukraine, but they might naturally be curtailed as he refocuses America’s military priorities on containing China in Asia instead of continuing to contain Russia in Europe. About that, his reported plan to encourage NATO members to take more responsibility for their defence is already being implemented under Biden as explained here, and they might continue arms shipments even if the US curtails its own.

Even so, the potentially natural curtailment of US arms shipments to Ukraine could be spun as partially fulfilling Russia’s demilitarization goal, as could any buffer zone that Trump might agree to coerce Ukraine into carving out on its own territory to prevent it from shelling Russian cities. That’ll be a hard sell for Putin to make, and Trump might be pressured by the “deep state” (the permanent members of the US’ military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies) into resisting, but it can’t be ruled out either.

The reason for this cautious optimism is because it would provide a “face-saving” means for Russia to freeze the conflict despite not achieving its maximum objectives instead of risking a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis by rejecting Trump’s expected proposal to “save face” at home and abroad. Trump wouldn’t make idle threats and certainly wouldn’t let Putin call his bluff even if that was the case so he’s expected to go through with arming Ukraine to the teeth if his peace deal falls flat.

That said, he also campaigned on ending the Ukrainian Conflict, and he’d personally prefer to replenish America’s depleted stockpiles in parallel with arming its Asian allies to the teeth against China instead continuing to arm Ukraine and risking a major crisis with Russia. His Sino-centric New Cold War focus is shared by a minority of the “deep state”, the majority of whom want to continue prioritizing Russia’s containment in Europe over China’s in Asia but who still never recklessly escalated with Russia thus far.

They’ve indeed escalated, but this was always preceded by signalling their intent to do so (such as via the provisioning of various arms) long before this happened, thus giving Russia enough time to calculate a response instead of risking an “overreaction” that could spiral into war with NATO. These anti-Russian hawks might therefore begrudgingly go along with any buffer zone that Trump might agree to if it avoids a potentially uncontrollable escalation like what he might threaten to do if Russia doesn’t take his deal.

Subversive “deep state” elements might even try to provoke such an escalation in order to avert that buffer zone scenario or any other that they consider to be unacceptable concessions to Russia, which remains a risk before and after his inauguration, but it’s clearly not their faction’s preferred scenario. This conclusion is arrived at by recalling on the abovementioned observation about how they always signalled their escalatory intentions far in advance thus far at least in order to avoid a major escalation.

Even if Trump doesn’t comply with any of Putin’s speculative requests to help the latter “save face” by freezing the conflict despite not achieving his country’s maximum goals in the conflict, he could always dangle the carrot of phased sanctions relief of the sort proposed by Richard Haass earlier this week. The former President of the hugely influential Council on Foreign Relations suggested that this could encourage Russia’s compliance with a ceasefire, and it’s possible that Putin might agree to this.

The Russian economy weathered the West’s unprecedented sanctions regime, but Russia’s grand plans to create alternative financial institutions and pivot to the non-West haven’t been as successful. This analysis here about how the latest BRICS Summit achieved nothing of tangible significance at all points out how none of this association’s ambitious initiatives were rolled out. It also hyperlinks to proof that the Chinese-based New Development Bank and the SCO Bank surprisingly comply with US sanctions.

Moreover, “Russia & China’s US-Provoked Payment Problems Caught Most BRICS Enthusiasts By Surprise” in early September after RT published a feature analysis about this politically inconvenient development, which shows that the Chinese centrepiece of Russia’s grand plans isn’t fully on board with them. There’s also the similarly inconvenient fact that Russia’s pivot to the non-West mostly only consists of resource sales to such countries and has yet to become anything more significant.

It accordingly wouldn’t be surprising if Putin appreciated promises of phased sanctions relief in exchange for agreeing to freeze the conflict along the LOC no matter how disappointing of an end this may be to its special operation in the eyes of its most zealous supporters. After all, Foreign Minister Lavrov told a group of ambassadors last month that Russia demands “the lifting of Western anti-Russian sanctions”, so it’s clearly on the collective Kremlin’s mind no matter what its perception managers claim.

Even if Trump makes such promises, however, keeping them would be difficult since many of America’s anti-Russian sanctions are codified into law after being voted on by Congress. They might go along with any request to rescind them, but they also might not, thus throwing a wrench in Russia’s plans. The US also can’t force the EU to rescind its respective sanctions, and anti-Russian countries like Poland and the Baltic States might create obstacles to the resumption of trade with Russia if the EU’s ties with it thaw.

Should they be implemented even if only semi-successfully, then Trump could claim a victory in “un-uniting” Russia and China like he promised to do even if those two’s trade continues to grow (mostly through Chinese resource imports and replacing lost Western products on Russian shelves). He could also sell this phased sanctions relief proposal to anti-Russian “deep state” hawks and the Europeans on that basis to help secure their support and deflect from claims that he’s doing it as a favour to Putin.

Reflecting on the insight that was shared in this analysis, Trump’s peace plan isn’t expected to have any surprises, nor would it be surprising if Russia agrees to it for the reasons that were explained. The US holds the cards and will only agree to any of Putin’s speculatively requested concessions in order to make it easier for him to “save face” for freezing the conflict despite not achieving his maximum goals. Neither wants a major escalation and both are fatigued with this proxy war so such a deal might work.

It’ll therefore be interesting to see how the rhetoric from Russian officials and their global media ecosystem might change as reports leak out about what exactly Trump has in mind. He and the minority “deep state” faction that supports him are motivated by their desire to “Pivot (back) to Asia” in order to more muscularly contain China, hence their interest in wrapping up this proxy war. As for Russia, it’s beginning to realize that a compromise of some sort is inevitable and must thus prepare the public.

Something unexpected might of course happen to completely change this analysis such as if hawks on either side convince their respective presidents to double down on the conflict, but the arguments made therein cogently account for each side’s interests, especially Russia’s. If everything more or less unfolds as written, then observers can expect a “Great Media/Perception Reset” in terms of Russia’s narrative towards the conflict, which would be required to facilitate whatever compromises Putin might make.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Trump promises to drive wedge between Russia and China

Donald Trump has vowed to sow division between Russia and China

^RT

Lavrov Elaborated On Russia’s Envisaged Denazification Of Ukraine

Lavrov Elaborated On Russia’s Envisaged Denazification Of Ukraine

By Andrew Korybko

The insight that he shared is extremely relevant in the context of the ongoing Russian-US talks.

The denazification of Ukraine is one of the explicitly stated goals of Russia’s special operation, but it’s probably the vaguest of them all, perhaps even intentionally so in order to give the Kremlin flexibility. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov just elaborated on it in detail though over the weekend during a Q&A session at this year’s Antalya Diplomacy Forum. The present piece will review what he said before analysing it in the context of the ongoing Russian-US talks for ending their proxy war in Ukraine.

Lavrov never once said the word “denazification”, but he spent a significant amount of time talking about things that are connected with this goal. The relevant part begins around halfway through his answer to a question about the Kremlin’s working relations with the Trump Administration. At some point he brought up how Trump’s unofficial Envoy to Russia Steve Witkoff recognized the importance of resolving the territorial dimension of this conflict, which prompted Lavrov to issue an interesting clarification.

In his words, “We are not about territories. We are about people who live on these lands, whose ancestors lived there for centuries, who founded cities like Odessa”, which preceded him touching upon how Ukraine has deprived them of their human, linguistic, and religious rights from 2014 onward. He also brought up how Zelensky dehumanized ethnic Russians and recently said how much he hates them. A few words about Ukraine’s glorification of Nazi-era collaborators rounded out the rest of his answer.

His interlocutor then told him how Ukraine won’t accept anything less than a return to its prewar borders, which Lavrov responded to by saying that “It’s not about them accepting. It’s about making 100% certain that the people who have been living there for centuries are not deprived of their inherent rights”. He then accused the EU of covering up for a Nazi regime and ignoring the human rights situation in Ukraine. Lavrov also said that Russia is restoring these same rights in the regions that voted to join it.

Observers should remember that Russia legally regards the entirety of the four disputed regions as having unified with their historical homeland after September 2022’s referenda and that one of the constitutional amendments that were passed in 2020 prohibits ceding any of the country’s territory. As can be intuited from Lavrov’s de facto elaboration of denazification over the weekend, a large part of this goal has to do with restoring the rights of indigenous Russians that were taken from them by Kiev.

From Russia’s legal perspective, it now has direct responsibility for implementing this across all of Donbass (Donetsk and Lugansk), Kherson, and Zaporozhye, but it doesn’t yet control the entirety of their territories. That which has already come under its control was achieved via military means while the remainder is being pursued via hybrid military-diplomatic ones of continuing to advance on the ground while holding talks with the US partially centered on ensuring Ukraine’s voluntary withdrawal from here.

Denazification in the rest of rump Ukraine, which is understood in this context mostly as restoring the rights of its indigenous Russian minority, will only be pursued via diplomatic means per what Lavrov clarified with regard to how “We are not about territories” in the sense of Russia’s goals in this conflict. Its only associated one came over half a year into the conflict after September 2022’s referenda led to the constitutional imperative of obtaining control over the entirety of these new regions as explained.

The locals overwhelmingly voted to join Russia in order for it to restore their rights that were taken from them by Kiev, or in other words, to directly implement denazification as it’s now better understood to mean after Lavrov’s latest clarification. The newly interconnected constitutional and humanitarian imperatives of achieving this across all of those regions explains why Russia continues to employ hybrid military-diplomatic means to this end.

It’s in connection with this that Witkoff reportedly advised Trump that the fastest way to broker a ceasefire in Ukraine is to recognize the legitimacy of Russia’s claims over those disputed territories, but Trump’s Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg allegedly pushed back against his proposal. Kellogg is back in the news after his suggestion to divide Ukraine into spheres of influence between Russia and the West upon freezing the Line of Contact and imposing a 15-mile demilitarized zone (DMZ) along both sides.

Lavrov hinted during his Q&A session that these Western peacekeepers would really be deployed to fight Russia, which his colleague Rodion Miroshnik separately lent credence to by warning about how this could lead to “a new level of escalation”. Another argument against Kellogg’s suggestion is that it wouldn’t ensure that the rights of indigenous Russians on Kiev’s side of his proposed DMZ, both within Russian-claimed lands and beyond, are restored. Denazification would therefore remain incomplete.

Lavrov addressed these implications by wondering aloud that “you want to have peacekeepers to keep the same regime which is now headed by Zelensky? You don’t want to ask this regime whether it would be interested in implementing the international commitments including the UN Charter regarding the rights of minorities for national minorities language and religious rights?”, before declaring that “they want to use this force not to keep peace, but to keep and protect the Nazi regime, and this is the key.”

His last point aligns with what Miroshnik said last week about how Western peacekeepers’ additional goal in Ukraine would be “to take control over [Ukraine’s] political regime militarily while retaining external governance of this land regardless of how negotiations may end.” With his and Lavrov’s words in mind, observers can intuit that denazification also implies regime change in Ukraine due to Russia’s belief that Zelensky won’t ever restore the rights that Kiev took away from indigenous Russians.

In full contravention of their publicly stated values, the Europeans want to indefinitely perpetuate this sordid state of affairs through the plans that some of them have to dispatch troops there under the cover of peacekeepers like Lavrov and Miroshnik explained, which is unacceptable for Russia. Credible fears of being targeted by Russia if they send their forces to Ukraine, the US’ refusal to extend Article 5 defence guarantees to their troops there, and internal divisions within this coalition could hamstring this plan.

So long as Western peacekeepers don’t occupy Ukraine, then Russia’s implied long-term hopes for regime change will remain possible since Zelensky could be democratically replaced during the next elections, but only if they’re truly free and fair, which of course can’t be taken for granted. The formal deployment of foreign forces could help him defraud the election or lead to his patrons replacing him with another like-minded figure whose policies towards indigenous Russians would remain the same.

Either scenario, Zelensky’s (likely) fraudulent re-election or his replacement with a like-minded figure, would greatly impede the maximum implementation of Russia’s denazification goal in this conflict. In that case, Russia would probably double down on military means over diplomatic ones for denazifying the rest of the four disputed regions that remain under Ukrainian control, which would force the US to choose between escalating against Russia or coercing Ukraine into withdrawing from there.

If Trump is serious about reducing the risks of World War III with Russia by miscalculation and speedily “Pivoting (back) to Asia” in order to more muscularly contain China, which first requires resolving the Ukrainian Conflict, then he’ll go with the second option despite the pushback that he’ll receive. His opponents will predictably criticize him for forcing people who didn’t participate in September 2022’s referenda to either accept coming under Russian control or flee into rump Ukraine.

The optics could easily be manipulated to accuse Trump of betraying democratic values and even supporting “ethnic cleansing” if this leads to a mass exodus, but he could compellingly counter by arguing that the greater good of averting World War III and ending the killing justifies this. He might also add that letting the conflict continue could turn populated areas within the Russian-claimed but Ukrainian-controlled lands, like Zaporozhye city with its almost one million residents, into wastelands.

If Trump coerces Ukraine into withdrawing from the disputed territories, then it’s possible that Russia could reciprocate this compromise by limiting its denazification goal to the entirety of its new regions instead of extending it to the rest of rump Ukraine. The odds of this mutual compromise would rise by a lot if Trump also coerces Ukraine into agreeing to a demilitarized “Trans-Dnieper” region controlled by non-Western peacekeepers and Russia gives the US privileged resource investments in return.

What’s most important to know is that the Kremlin’s flexibility on denazification only realistically relates to whether or not it’ll insist on this being implemented in rump Ukraine. Up until now and judging by all public statements on this issue, Russia’s minimum demand in this respect is that the entirety of its new regions be denazified, which can only happen upon obtaining full control of them. If this can’t be achieved by diplomatic means, then military ones will continue being employed, with all that entails.

Trump should therefore take Witkoff’s reported advice seriously by recognizing the legitimacy of Russia’s claims over those disputed regions in order to avoid being placed in the dilemma of having to choose between escalating against Russia or coercing Ukraine into withdrawing from there. Truth be told, the US is already in such a dilemma, it just hasn’t realized it yet. It’s therefore better to peacefully resolve this now than to wait for the media to figure it out and put more pressure on him to escalate against Russia.

In pursuit of this, Russia could limit its denazification goal if the US assists it in achieving this in its new regions, which could set the basis for expanding the range of their mutual compromises in Ukraine by opening the door to discuss the “Trans-Dnieper” and resource dimensions that were proposed. Through these means, Russia and the US could overcome the impasse in their negotiations, thus preventing hardliners on both sides from exploiting this to undermine their talks in furtherance of maximalist goals.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Voice of East

2025-03-12 17:57:50

Will Putin Agree To A Ceasefire?

Will Putin Agree To A Ceasefire?

By Andrew Korybko

There are five compelling arguments for either scenario.

Ukraine just agreed to a month-long ceasefire after talks with the US in Jeddah, but it’s conditional on Russia agreeing to the same, which remains uncertain. Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff is expected to pay his second trip to Moscow in just as many months later this week, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz plans to speak to Russian officials soon, while Trump said that he hopes to talk to Putin by Friday. All three will try to convince Putin to silence the guns. Here’s why he might not agree to do that:

———-

1. Russia Wants To Liberate All The Occupied Territories

Putin declared last June that he’d only agree to a ceasefire if Ukraine withdrew from the entirety of the four regions that voted to join Russia in September 2022 and publicly abandoned its plans to join NATO. That was shortly before Ukraine invaded Russia’s universally recognized Kursk Region. Agreeing to a ceasefire now with no guarantee that it’ll lead to the liberation of those five regions could result in the indefinite occupation of at least some of them if the front lines harden into a Korean-DMZ.

2. The Front Lines Might Soon Collapse To Russia’s Benefit

It’s obvious that one of the primary reasons why Ukraine agreed to a month-long ceasefire conditional on Russia agreeing to the same, apart from resuming the US’ previously cut military and intelligence aid, is to prevent the front lines from soon collapsing to Russia’s benefit. Aware of this, Russia might decide to carry on – perhaps advancing while negotiating additional terms to the proposed ceasefire – in order to take full advantage of this, thus raising the chances of speedily liberating all the occupied territories.

3. Russia Wants To Scare Away Western Peacekeepers

European peacekeepers might enter Ukraine during the month-long ceasefire, or some of their “mercenaries” who are already there might simply switch uniforms to then take on this role instead, which Russia already said would be absolutely unacceptable and make them legitimate targets. Keeping the conflict going might therefore scare them away from this and thus ensure that de facto NATO forces are kept as far away from Russia’s western border as possible.

4. Some Of The Russian Public Don’t Want A Ceasefire

A significant share of the Russian public, including veterans of the special operation, are thought to be against any ceasefire since they’d consider it to be stopping halfway instead of finishing the job after all the sacrifices that were paid to get this far. The authorities are sensitive to public opinion on the conflict, especially from veterans, so their opposition to this might be taken into consideration more than outside observers expect and could thus push Putin a lot closer to rejecting a ceasefire than most other factors.

5. Putin Might Really Believe That Trump Is Bluffing

And finally, the most decisive factor might be that Putin truly believes that Trump is bluffing about “escalating to de-escalate”, whether economically-financially through the strict enforcement of secondary sanctions against India, China, etc., and/or militarily by going all-in backing Ukraine. If that’s the case, then it follows that Putin only entertained negotiations to see whether he could achieve his maximum goals through diplomatic means, absent which he’d continue pursuing them militarily.

—–

There’s also the chance that Putin agrees to a ceasefire, which could be explained in the following ways:

1. Russia Wants To Avert Disproportionate Dependence On China

Trump’s tweet last Friday suggested that he plans strict secondary sanctions enforcement against India and China if Putin rejects a ceasefire, which could lead to the first complying and thus placing Russia in the position where it would become much more dependent on the second. Russia has thus far relied on India as its friendly counterbalance vis-a-vis China, but if Putin is informed that this might no longer be the case if Russia keeps fighting, then he might opt for peace to avoid becoming China’s junior partner.

2. It Also Wants To Beat China To The Chase With The “New Détente”

Putin wouldn’t just be rejecting a ceasefire, but also a “New Détente” with the US, which could lead to China replacing Russia in this arrangement if Trump travels to China next month like the latest reports claim and then negotiates a deal for ending their trade war. The recalibrated triangulation that might follow wouldn’t be in Russia’s interests, especially if the US gets China to comply with sanctions in order to coerce Russia into peace, so Putin might agree to a ceasefire in order to avert this scenario as well.

3. The “New Détente” Could Geopolitically Revolutionize The World

Putin might calculate that beating China to the chase with the “New Détente” and becoming more of a strategic partner to the US than the EU are worth pragmatic compromises on Ukraine since these two outcomes could geopolitically revolutionize the world to Russia’s grand strategic advantage. If that’s what he’s thinking, then he might defy popular expectations to boldly agree to a ceasefire, after which publicly financed media would explain the rationale to Russia’s supporters at home and abroad.

4. Additional (& Even Secret) Terms Might Be Attached To The Ceasefire

Building upon the above, additional (and even secret) terms might be attached to the ceasefire for guaranteeing that Western peacekeepers won’t enter Ukraine and that the US won’t maximally rearm it during that period, which Russia could get the US to agree to via creative resource diplomacy. Giving the US privileged access to Russian energy and minerals, especially the rare earth ones that it needs for competing with China, might be all that it takes for Trump to put the kibosh on those two aforesaid fears.

5. Putin Might Really Believe That Trump Is Serious

And finally, the most decisive factor might be that Putin truly believes that Trump is serious about “escalating to de-escalate”, in which case he might prefer not to risk a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis that could hypothetically end with Russia compromising on much more than if it agreed to a ceasefire. Putin is a pragmatist who prefers managing tensions instead of exacerbating them, with the only recent exception being the decision to use the Oreshniks as explained here, so he might take Trump up on this.

———-

Everyone will soon find out whether or not Putin agrees to a ceasefire, but whichever decision he makes, the five reasons that were shared for each scenario would compellingly explain his choice. It’s anyone’s guess what he’ll do since each scenario’s arguments are persuasive and he knows that this is his most fateful decision since the special operation. Putin might therefore ask their respective Kremlin proponents to debate amongst themselves in front of him one last time before making up his mind.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Trump may meet Xi in China as soon as April despite escalating trade war, insiders say

US President Donald Trump could visit China as early as next month, according to multiple diplomatic sources, as the American leader has appeared focused on ...

^{South China Morning Post (Yahoo News)}

Russia And The US’ Diplomatic Choreography At The UN Shows Their Commitment To A “New Détente”

Russia And The US’ Diplomatic Choreography At The UN Shows Their Commitment To A “New Détente”

By Andrew Korybko

Any claims of Russia “backstabbing” or “selling out” China are absurd and driven by a desire to sow discord.

The “New Détente”, which refers to the ongoing efforts between Russia and the US to enter into a rapprochement in the New Cold War similar in spirit to what they agreed to half a century ago during the Old Cold War, is no longer speculation after the US’ pivot towards Russia at the UN. The US joined Russia in vetoing a resolution from the General Assembly that condemned Russia for its special operation and then Russia sided with the US in supporting the latter’s more neutral one in the Security Council.

This diplomatic choreography was clearly coordinated between Putin and Trump to show the entire world that they’re committed to the “New Détente”. In parallel with what was unfolding on the world stage, each leader also spoke highly about the future of their economic ties, with Trump hyping everyone up to expect “major economic transactions” while Putin hinted at cooperation in the aluminium and rare earth industries. This followed their representatives discussing Arctic energy cooperation in Riyadh.

It was foreseen in early January that “Creative Energy Diplomacy Can Lay The Basis For A Grand Russian-American Deal”, which readers can learn more about from the preceding hyperlinked analysis. The two dozen compromises suggested near the end have already been agreed upon in part as proven by the US withholding Article 5 guarantees from NATO countries’ troops in Ukraine, ruling out its membership in NATO, discussing energy cooperation with Russia, and flirting with other forms of sanctions relief.

Unlike what some have claimed, Trump isn’t trying to pull a so-called “Reverse Nixon” by incentivizing Russia to turn against China like his predecessor half a century ago incentivized China to turn against the erstwhile USSR, which is unrealistic to expect in any case. Rather, as explained in the analysis about creative energy diplomacy, the purpose is to incentivize Russia into placing limits on its resource and eventually military cooperation with China in order to erode its strategic advantages vis-à-vis the US.

From Trump’s view, this will avert the scenario of Russia turbocharging China’s superpower rise and thus even the odds of reaching a grand deal with the People’s Republic that’ll be more in the US’ favour, while Putin sees this as managing the global balance of power. From his perspective, Russia is incentivizing the US into relieving pressure upon it and unofficial paying reparations for the proxy war via investments into its resource industry and economy as a whole, all while redirecting the US’ military focus elsewhere.

The Kissinger-inspired pragmatism behind this arrangement is predictably opposed by each country’s most zealous supporters, both at the civil society and state levels, but more on the US’ side than Russia’s. Furthermore, even though China officially supports the emerging Russian-US rapprochement, it’s likely still very suspicious of this process but is playing it cool for now in order to not attract negative attention. These trends must be managed by both parties in order for their envisaged “New Détente” to succeed.

Trump is ignoring his powerless opponents at the civil society level and European state one while purging his much more powerful opponents at the domestic (“deep”) state level through Musk’s DOGE, with the outcome of Trump’s efforts in turn shaping what Putin will ultimately do. Since nothing tangible has been achieved thus far, the Russian leader doesn’t seem to be doing anything other than sending positive signals, but that could change if Trump agrees to the compromises that Putin requires for cutting a deal.

In that scenario, Russian publicly funded media’s narratives towards the US and the New Cold War more broadly could drastically shift, which would be expected to also influence the information products of those Russian-friendly members of the Alt-Media Community who take their cues from the Kremlin. To be clear, these figures and outlets are free-thinkers, but they trust Putin and the media that’s under his authority for guidance to better understand the global systemic transition and specific processes therein.

Dissident elements might no longer be platformed by Russian publicly funded media nor invited to Russia for conferences since their views would no longer conform with the Kremlin’s so that could motivate them to rethink their opposition to the “New Détente” in furtherance of their career interests. No such potentially high-profile dissent is expected at the domestic (“deep”) state level though due to the differences between Russia and the US’ systems so such forces are expected to easily fall into line.

As regards China’s speculative suspicions of the Russian-US rapprochement, Trump, Putin, their top diplomats, and other representatives are expected to make a concerted effort to allay their counterparts’ fears about this process in order to avoid an overreaction that could worsen China’s ties with each. That said, China is known for reacting calmly even to events that it disapproves of so no significantly negative response is expected, though Chinese-friendly Alt-Media figures might be a totally different story.

It’s entirely possible that they’d either be tacitly encouraged to fearmonger about the “New Détente”, including by sensationally claiming that Russia “sold out” to the US, or might interpret everything on their own this way and sincerely believe that expressing these views somehow helps China. In any case, it can’t be ruled out that the Alt-Media Community might bifurcate into Russian-friendly and Chinese-friendly halves wherein the influential Iranian-led Resistance segment aligns with the latter out of spite.

That last prediction is predicated on how upset many of these figures are after “Russia Dodged A Bullet By Wisely Choosing Not To Ally With The Now-Defeated Resistance Axis” as Israel systematically destroyed their regional network in West Asia over the course of the latest war. That outcome could be offset though if Iran later enters into its own “New Détente” with the US, after which it too could signal to its like-minded Alt-Media allies to shift their narratives like Russia might have earlier done by then.

All the insight shared thus far is conditional on the “New Détente” succeeding, the odds of which are increasing by the day as shown by the latest Russian-US developments and their respective leaders’ statements, hence the need to forecast the impact that this could have on the information sphere. The best-case scenario is that the pro-Chinese part of the Alt-Media Community doesn’t overreact on its own or is encouraged by China to respond that way so that the US can then more easily reach a deal with it.

Putin also endorsed Trump’s bold proposal for halving their defence budgets if everything works out between them, with the Russian leader even proposing that China do so too if it’s interested. He therefore clearly wants to promote or even help broker a Sino-US deal for resolving the root causes of their own security dilemma exactly as he and Trump are trying to do with theirs. Any claims of Russia “backstabbing” or “selling out” China are accordingly absurd and driven by a desire to sow discord.

If everything evolves along the trajectory that was outlined in this analysis, then the onus will be on China and to a lesser extent on Iran whether to get with the program by negotiating their own comprehensive deals with the US or to continue to defy it at the expense of jeopardizing world peace. Russia and the US’ diplomatic choreography at the UN, and Putin and Trump’s arguably coordinated economic-resource partnership statements, show that they trust each other and truly want peace.

China and Iran have repeatedly expressed that they trust Russia, both at the national and leadership levels, so it would be a moment of truth for them whether they’d then follow its lead by entering into their own talks with the US or go the opposite way in a sign that they never really trusted Russia. Whatever they do will in turn inform Russian policymakers, Putin chief among them, of their true intentions and could thus lead to pragmatic and peaceful recalibrations of Russia’s policy towards them.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Vance’s Munich Speech Vindicated Putin’s Summer 2022 Prediction About Political Change In Europe

Vance’s Munich Speech Vindicated Putin’s Summer 2022 Prediction About Political Change In Europe

By Andrew Korybko

The Russian leader was the first to talk about a European-wide populist-nationalist revolution and to foresee the emergence of civilization-states as the next phase of the global systemic transition.

Vice President Vance excoriated the Europeans in his keynote speech at last week’s Munich Security Conference, which can be read in full here. He accused the ruling liberal-globalist elite of becoming the greatest threat to their own civilization after straying from its traditional values and massively importing migrants. Vance made it clear that Trump 2.0 won’t support them against their own people, especially the populist-nationalists who they’re actively cancelling, censoring, and persecuting.

He very strongly implied that the US wants these same like-minded movements to rise to power across Europe, which would amount to a continent-wide revolution of the sort that Putin was the first to predict back in June 2022 while speaking at that year’s St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. His speech can be read in full here, but what follows is the pertinent excerpt that’s since been vindicated by none other than the new American Vice President nearly three years after being mocked by Western leaders:

“A direct result of the European politicians’ actions and events this year will be the further growth of inequality in these countries, which will, in turn, split their societies still more, and the point at issue is not only the well-being but also the value orientation of various groups in these societies. Indeed, these differences are being suppressed and swept under the rug.

Frankly, the democratic procedures and elections in Europe and the forces that come to power look like a front, because almost identical political parties come and go, while deep down things remain the same. The real interests of people and national businesses are being pushed further and further to the periphery.

Such a disconnect from reality and the demands of society will inevitably lead to a surge in populism and extremist and radical movements, major socioeconomic changes, degradation and a change of elites in the short term. As you can see, traditional parties lose all the time. New entities are coming to the surface, but they have little chance for survival if they are not much different from the existing ones.”

The populist-nationalists that have since risen all across Europe wouldn’t have anywhere near the support that they do had it not been for the ruling liberal-globalist elite’s counterproductive compliance with the US’ anti-Russian sanctions. The massive import of civilizationally dissimilar immigrants, many of whom refuse to assimilate and integrate into European society, played a major role as well but it was the economic consequences of these sanctions that led to their surge in popularity over the past three years.

The public at large threw their weight behind populist-nationalists as a result of these socio-cultural (migrant-related) and especially economic (sanctions-related) changes, the latter of which have accelerated since 2022 unlike the former that peaked in 2015 and has since mostly stabilized. Forecasting the further worsening of these economic trends amidst the then-newly imposed sanctions and prognosticating their political consequences, Putin soon thereafter elaborated on his prediction.

He did this at the ceremony welcoming four former Ukrainian regions to Russia on 30 September 2022. His full speech can be read here and was analysed here at the time, which focused on the last two-thirds of his speech about the global struggle for democracy against the Western elite, both across the world and within the West itself. There’s too much to cite so readers are encouraged to at least read through the analysis if they don’t have the time to read through the full speech, but here are a few highlights:

“People cannot be fed with printed dollars and euros…That is why politicians in Europe have to convince their fellow citizens to eat less, take a shower less often and dress warmer at home. And those who start asking fair questions like ‘Why is that, in fact?’ are immediately declared enemies, extremists and radicals. They point back at Russia and say: that is the source of all your troubles. More lies.

…

Let me repeat that the dictatorship of the Western elites targets all societies, including the citizens of Western countries themselves. This is a challenge to all. This complete renunciation of what it means to be human, the overthrow of faith and traditional values, and the suppression of freedom are coming to resemble a ‘religion in reverse’ – pure Satanism.

…

As I have already said, we have many like-minded people in Europe and the United States, and we feel and see their support. An essentially emancipatory, anti-colonial movement against unipolar hegemony is taking shape in the most diverse countries and societies. Its power will only grow with time. It is this force that will determine our future geopolitical reality.”

Putin was talking about the exact same populist-nationalists who are now on the verge of electorally coming to power all across Europe and whose movements were just endorsed by Vance at Munich. The confluence of interests between Russia and Trump’s America as regards these political forces was also just touched upon in this analysis here, which mentions how these three – Russia, Trump’s America, and Europe’s populist-nationalists – embrace Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin’s civilization-state model.

Vance showed his adherence to these views by talking about the US and Europe’s “shared civilization”, which aligns with the essence of Dugin’s teachings about how International Relations are evolving in the direction of civilization-states like the West and the Russian World, et al. Trump 2.0, whose return to power can be described as the “Second American Revolution”, and Europe’s populist-nationalists can be considered the vanguards of the West’s civilizational revival that Trump calls the “American Golden Age”.

Putin embraced Dugin’s civilization-state model long ago, with his most famous expression thereof being the article that he wrote in July 2021 “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, which explicitly talks about these kindred people’s “civilizational ties”. He’s since made repeated references to the uniqueness of Russian Civilization, thus being ahead of his Western counterparts, who are only just now starting to speak in the same way.

Considering all of this, it was veritably the case that Vance just vindicated Putin’s prediction about political change in Europe, which could lead to a “new world order” if successful. The West’s coalescence into a civilization-state can accelerate a return to t“spheres of influence” modelled off of the “19^th-Century Great Power Chessboard” paradigm wherein Great Power-led civilization-states like Russia and the US-led West cut deals with one another over smaller countries instead of using them against each other.

While this approach is admittedly controversial, it’s the embodiment of realpolitik in contemporary global affairs, pragmatically eschewing ideological imperatives in favour of interests-driven agreements. Should the US-led West begin applying it, or rather return to this model of diplomacy that it previously practiced for centuries, then it would tremendously restore stability to International Relations. It’s premature to predict if this will happen, let alone when, just that it’s now a credible scenario to monitor.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Voice of East

2025-02-14 15:05:13

Why Might Russia Repair Its Ties With The West And How Could This Reshape Its Foreign Policy?

Why Might Russia Repair Its Ties With The West And How Could This Reshape Its Foreign Policy?

By Andrew Korybko

To be clear, the explanations and forecasts shared in this analysis concern the scenario of a Russian rapprochement with the West upon the successful conclusion of peace talks with the US, they’re not in any way a declaration of what will absolutely come to pass.

Trump’s proposal to return Russia to the G7 and Orban’s prediction about it being “reintegrated into…the European security system and even the European economic and energy system” after the Ukrainian Conflict ends hint at a Russian rapprochement with the West. Russian-US peace talks are underway, and if they succeed in bringing about any of the aforesaid outcomes, then this would have to be cogently accounted for as would the future of Russian foreign policy. Here are some explanations and forecasts:

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* Russia Neutralized Ukrainian-Emanating Threats From NATO

The nearly three-year-long special operation saw Russia destroy all of NATO’s stockpiles that it sent to Ukraine, which could have otherwise been used to help launch a conventional proxy invasion of Russia one day had Russia not decisively stopped the bloc’s clandestine expansion into Ukraine. Although the risk of World War III spiked at times during the interim due to some very dangerous US-backed Ukrainian provocations, that risk has now largely decreased due to Russia’s victory over NATO’s Ukrainian proxy.

* Trump’s Return Revolutionized Russian-US Relations

The “Department Of Government Efficiency’s” purge of warmongering liberal-globalists, who hitherto controlled the US’ permanent military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies (“deep state”), immediately after Trump’s inauguration is responsible for the commencement of Russian-US talks. These fast-moving processes revolutionized Russian-US relations and consequently contributed to Russia recalibrating its threat assessment of the US, which in turn reopened previously closed opportunities.

* Pragmatic Mutual Compromises Are Finally Possible

While it remains to be seen exactly what form they’d take, whatever agreement might emerge from the ongoing Russian-US talks will almost certainly entail pragmatic mutual compromises, which would have become possible due to the aforesaid factors. Neither Putin nor Trump are maximalists, and both have proven their pragmatism in the past, so it’s reasonable to expect them to meet each other in the middle. The example that they set could then become the norm for resolving other states’ disputes and conflicts.

* Russia Never Rejected Cooperation With Any Country

It was the US-led West that rejected cooperation with Russia, not the inverse, since Russia always maintained that it’ll cooperate with any friendly country. For that reason, today’s enemies could become tomorrow’s partners if they reverse their unfriendly policies. After all, former enemies like Turkiye, Iran, and China are now some of Russia’s closest partners, and ties with Germany were excellent prior to 2022 despite the Nazis’ genocide of the Soviets, so the precedent exists for a rapprochement with the West.

* Its Multipolar Moves Were Always Gradual & Responsible

Apart from the special operation, which was a last-ditch attempt to safeguard Russia’s national security after NATO’s clandestine expansion into Ukraine, all of Russia’s multipolar moves were always gradual and responsible. Creating a BRICS currency for example, which Russia confirmed that it isn’t doing, could throw the fragile and interconnected order into chaos to everyone’s detriment. Any perceived slowdown of multipolar moves on its part after a rapprochement with the West would therefore be an illusion.

* Russia & Trump’s America Both Prefer Populist-Nationalists

For the first time since the end of the Old Cold War, America under Trump’s second administration now openly prefers populist-nationalist leaders and movements over liberal-globalists, which aligns with Russia’s preference from over the past decade. This convergence of interests might even see them working together in third countries as part of a new modus vivendi to liberate them from the yoke of the liberal-globalist holdovers that the US is now actively purging from its “deep state”.

* Both Are Also Favourable Towards The Rise Of Civilization-States

Professor Alexander Dugin’s prediction about the rise of civilization-states came true after Russia’s Eurasian Union took on such contours in the name of the Russian World while Trump 2.0 made claims to Canada and Greenland as part of a complementary “Fortress America” policy. They might therefore jointly support populist-nationalist movements in civilizational anchor states who endeavour to build their own similar regional spheres of influence in the emerging multipolar-civilizational world order.

* Russia Is Neutral Amidst The Sino-US Dimension Of The New Cold War

Just like China is neutral amidst the Russo-US dimension of the New Cold War, so too is Russia neutral towards the Sino-US one, despite each being one another’s top strategic partner. They’re importantly not allies though and that’s why neither is obligated to support the other against the US, thus explaining why China doesn’t arm Russia or recognize its control over the New Regions, which further justifies Russian neutrality if the Sino-US rivalry foreseeably intensifies after the Ukrainian Conflict ends.

* Multi-Alignment Is The Mainstay Of Russian Foreign Policy

Russia has always sought to balance between its diverse foreign partners, but its grand strategic goal of serving as a bridge between China and the EU that adds value to trade in each direction was offset by the special operation that it was compelled to wage. A meaningful rapprochement with the West could lead to the resumption of this policy, albeit in new conditions after what just happened and the impending intensification of the Sino-US rivalry, which would restore its briefly abandoned balancing act.

* Russia Will Always Promote Multipolarity Across The World

There’s no realistic chance that Russia will ever stop promoting multipolarity since its enduring national security interests depend on the successful completion of these processes across the world. Even if ties improve with the West, Russia will still promote regionalization in the Global South to accelerate the rise of civilization-states and their associated spheres of influence, which can hasten the creation of a “new world order” that’s more predictable for larger players at least. This is arguably Russia’s endgame.

———-

To be clear, the explanations and forecasts shared above concern the scenario of a Russian rapprochement with the West upon the successful conclusion of peace talks with the US, they’re not in any way a declaration of what will absolutely come to pass. That scenario remains credible, though its likelihood can’t be confidently assessed, due to recent events. The purpose of this exercise is therefore solely to predict Russia’s motives if this happens and the possible consequence for its foreign policy.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Fatal NATO promise, trusting Putin & killing BRICS: Key takeaways from Trump briefing

US President Trump spoke to reporters on Thursday, sharing more details and thoughts about a recent phone call with his Russian counterpart

^RT

Here’s What I Learned From Analysing The New Cold War Every Day For Three Years Straight

Here’s What I Learned From Analysing The New Cold War Every Day For Three Years Straight

By Andrew Korybko

What ties these five trends together is Trump’s historic return to the presidency, his successful purge of the “deep state” that enabled him to pursue his long-sought “New Détente” with Russia, and Putin’s receptiveness to his American counterpart’s grand strategic plan of a comprehensive partnership.

I’m a Moscow-based American political analyst with a PhD. in Political Science from MGIMO, and this is my third yearly review of the New Cold War after I published by first and second on each anniversary of the special operation here and here. I’ve been analysing this subject every day since 24 February 2022, beginning at now-defunct OneWorld till mid-2022 and continuing at my Substack to the present. Here’s what I learned from doing this daily for my third year straight:

———-

* Trump’s Election Changed The Course Of History

Trump’s historic election victory was a game-changer in the New Cold War since everything would have been altogether different had Kamala won instead. Unlike her and Biden, he envisages responsibly managing the US’ geopolitical rivalry with Russia by brokering peace in Ukraine as the first step, after which he plans to initiate similarly motivated talks with Iran and China to that same end. Diplomacy and deal-making now take precedence over risking World War III through reckless provocations.

* The Consequences Of Ceding Sovereignty

The EU and Ukraine are learning the consequences of ceding their sovereignty to the US after Trump began treating them as the vassals that they are. The first now fears that America will abandon it as part of Trump’s “Pivot (back) to Asia” for more muscularly containing China while the second has no say in the nascent Russian-US talks over its ongoing conflict. Each ceded their sovereignty to the US with the false expectation that their allied liberal-globalists in the “deep state” would stop Trump’s return.

* Strategic Patience vs. Strategic Escalation

World War III might have already broken out long ago had Putin not exercised strategic patience by declining time and again to meaningfully respond to Ukraine’s many US-backed provocations. He only began to practice a policy of strategic escalation in late November last year to deter the outgoing Biden Administration from provoking the aforesaid after it dangerously allowed Ukraine to use the US’ long-range missiles against targets in Russia’s pre-2014 borders. This pragmatic approach deserves credit.

* Diplomacy: The Art Of The Possible

Trump’s DOGE-driven purge of the “deep state” enabled him to advance his first term’s plans for a “New Détente” with Russia via the initiation of talks with it over Ukraine, which aims to ensure its neutrality in the Sino-US dimension of the New Cold War in exchange for a geopolitical and economic partnership. Russia’s proposal during their talks for joint energy projects in the Arctic could be a first step towards this end, but mutual compromises of the sort detailed here are required for solidifying their “New Détente”.

* From Populist-Nationalism To Civilization-States

Russia and Trump’s America both regard the emergence of civilization-states as the next phase of the global systemic transition. The first’s Eurasian Union and the second’s “Fortress America” policy, which consists of incorporating Canada and Greenland, fulfil this role. They also support populist-nationalist movements across the world that share their civilization-state vision of the future and might accordingly join forces in helping them come to power in order to accelerate this process as explained here and here.

———-

What ties these five trends together is Trump’s historic return to the presidency, his successful purge of the “deep state” that enabled him to pursue his long-sought “New Détente” with Russia, and Putin’s receptiveness to his American counterpart’s grand strategic plan of a comprehensive partnership. The successful conclusion of their nascent talks and the clinching of the aforementioned partnership will revolutionize International Relations while their failure could abruptly revive the risk of World War III.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#DonaldTrump #Geopolitics #NATO #NewColdWar #Russia #Ukraine #USA

Voice of East

2025-02-14 15:05:13

Why Might Russia Repair Its Ties With The West And How Could This Reshape Its Foreign Policy?

Why Might Russia Repair Its Ties With The West And How Could This Reshape Its Foreign Policy?

By Andrew Korybko

To be clear, the explanations and forecasts shared in this analysis concern the scenario of a Russian rapprochement with the West upon the successful conclusion of peace talks with the US, they’re not in any way a declaration of what will absolutely come to pass.

Trump’s proposal to return Russia to the G7 and Orban’s prediction about it being “reintegrated into…the European security system and even the European economic and energy system” after the Ukrainian Conflict ends hint at a Russian rapprochement with the West. Russian-US peace talks are underway, and if they succeed in bringing about any of the aforesaid outcomes, then this would have to be cogently accounted for as would the future of Russian foreign policy. Here are some explanations and forecasts:

———-

* Russia Neutralized Ukrainian-Emanating Threats From NATO

The nearly three-year-long special operation saw Russia destroy all of NATO’s stockpiles that it sent to Ukraine, which could have otherwise been used to help launch a conventional proxy invasion of Russia one day had Russia not decisively stopped the bloc’s clandestine expansion into Ukraine. Although the risk of World War III spiked at times during the interim due to some very dangerous US-backed Ukrainian provocations, that risk has now largely decreased due to Russia’s victory over NATO’s Ukrainian proxy.

* Trump’s Return Revolutionized Russian-US Relations

The “Department Of Government Efficiency’s” purge of warmongering liberal-globalists, who hitherto controlled the US’ permanent military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies (“deep state”), immediately after Trump’s inauguration is responsible for the commencement of Russian-US talks. These fast-moving processes revolutionized Russian-US relations and consequently contributed to Russia recalibrating its threat assessment of the US, which in turn reopened previously closed opportunities.

* Pragmatic Mutual Compromises Are Finally Possible

While it remains to be seen exactly what form they’d take, whatever agreement might emerge from the ongoing Russian-US talks will almost certainly entail pragmatic mutual compromises, which would have become possible due to the aforesaid factors. Neither Putin nor Trump are maximalists, and both have proven their pragmatism in the past, so it’s reasonable to expect them to meet each other in the middle. The example that they set could then become the norm for resolving other states’ disputes and conflicts.

* Russia Never Rejected Cooperation With Any Country

It was the US-led West that rejected cooperation with Russia, not the inverse, since Russia always maintained that it’ll cooperate with any friendly country. For that reason, today’s enemies could become tomorrow’s partners if they reverse their unfriendly policies. After all, former enemies like Turkiye, Iran, and China are now some of Russia’s closest partners, and ties with Germany were excellent prior to 2022 despite the Nazis’ genocide of the Soviets, so the precedent exists for a rapprochement with the West.

* Its Multipolar Moves Were Always Gradual & Responsible

Apart from the special operation, which was a last-ditch attempt to safeguard Russia’s national security after NATO’s clandestine expansion into Ukraine, all of Russia’s multipolar moves were always gradual and responsible. Creating a BRICS currency for example, which Russia confirmed that it isn’t doing, could throw the fragile and interconnected order into chaos to everyone’s detriment. Any perceived slowdown of multipolar moves on its part after a rapprochement with the West would therefore be an illusion.

* Russia & Trump’s America Both Prefer Populist-Nationalists

For the first time since the end of the Old Cold War, America under Trump’s second administration now openly prefers populist-nationalist leaders and movements over liberal-globalists, which aligns with Russia’s preference from over the past decade. This convergence of interests might even see them working together in third countries as part of a new modus vivendi to liberate them from the yoke of the liberal-globalist holdovers that the US is now actively purging from its “deep state”.

* Both Are Also Favourable Towards The Rise Of Civilization-States

Professor Alexander Dugin’s prediction about the rise of civilization-states came true after Russia’s Eurasian Union took on such contours in the name of the Russian World while Trump 2.0 made claims to Canada and Greenland as part of a complementary “Fortress America” policy. They might therefore jointly support populist-nationalist movements in civilizational anchor states who endeavour to build their own similar regional spheres of influence in the emerging multipolar-civilizational world order.

* Russia Is Neutral Amidst The Sino-US Dimension Of The New Cold War

Just like China is neutral amidst the Russo-US dimension of the New Cold War, so too is Russia neutral towards the Sino-US one, despite each being one another’s top strategic partner. They’re importantly not allies though and that’s why neither is obligated to support the other against the US, thus explaining why China doesn’t arm Russia or recognize its control over the New Regions, which further justifies Russian neutrality if the Sino-US rivalry foreseeably intensifies after the Ukrainian Conflict ends.

* Multi-Alignment Is The Mainstay Of Russian Foreign Policy

Russia has always sought to balance between its diverse foreign partners, but its grand strategic goal of serving as a bridge between China and the EU that adds value to trade in each direction was offset by the special operation that it was compelled to wage. A meaningful rapprochement with the West could lead to the resumption of this policy, albeit in new conditions after what just happened and the impending intensification of the Sino-US rivalry, which would restore its briefly abandoned balancing act.

* Russia Will Always Promote Multipolarity Across The World

There’s no realistic chance that Russia will ever stop promoting multipolarity since its enduring national security interests depend on the successful completion of these processes across the world. Even if ties improve with the West, Russia will still promote regionalization in the Global South to accelerate the rise of civilization-states and their associated spheres of influence, which can hasten the creation of a “new world order” that’s more predictable for larger players at least. This is arguably Russia’s endgame.

———-

To be clear, the explanations and forecasts shared above concern the scenario of a Russian rapprochement with the West upon the successful conclusion of peace talks with the US, they’re not in any way a declaration of what will absolutely come to pass. That scenario remains credible, though its likelihood can’t be confidently assessed, due to recent events. The purpose of this exercise is therefore solely to predict Russia’s motives if this happens and the possible consequence for its foreign policy.

---

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

---

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#EU #Geopolitics #Multipolarity #NATO #Russia #TheWest #USA

Fatal NATO promise, trusting Putin & killing BRICS: Key takeaways from Trump briefing

US President Trump spoke to reporters on Thursday, sharing more details and thoughts about a recent phone call with his Russian counterpart

^RT

A Russian-US “New Détente” Would Revolutionize International Relations

A Russian-US “New Détente” Would Revolutionize International Relations

By Andrew Korybko

Here’s the full interview that I gave to Newsweek’s Tom O’Connor, excerpts of which were included in his article about “What A Trump-Putin Détente Means for Russia and Iran’s Partnership”.

1. Russia and Iran have pursued closer ties in recent years while they have also faced conflict with parties supported by the United States. Now there is hope that a peaceful settlement may be reached for the Ukraine issue, while the situation remains tense in the Middle East. Do you feel that Russia could prove helpful in supporting diplomacy as it relates to the Iranian nuclear issue given President Putin’s good standing with the leadership of Iran, the U.S. and the Arab nations in the region?

I agree on both counts that a peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian issue appears likely and that Russia can then encourage Iran to reach its own such settlement with the US over the nuclear issue. The ongoing Russian-US talks can be interpreted as driven by the mutual desire for a “New Détente” brought about by their exhaustion after three years of fighting an intense proxy war. It’s therefore natural that resolving one issue can have a domino effect by seeing Russia and the US cooperate on other issues.

The Iranian nuclear one is important for both of them but in different ways: Russia is concerned about what the US and Israel might do if Iran doesn’t agree to a new nuclear deal, which could destabilize Russia’s southern periphery, while the US is concerned about Iran allegedly developing nukes. If they reach a peaceful settlement in Ukraine, especially one that leads to strategic cooperation on resources like Arctic gas and rare earth minerals, then each would have an interest in helping the other on this.

To that end, Russia could share with Iran what it’s learned from engaging with Trump 2.0, namely his administration’s very different worldview when compared to his predecessor’s. Given the trust between Russia and Iran at the national and leadership levels, coupled with what could by then the peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian issue that leads to a “New Détente” between Russia and the US, Iran might very well be receptive to this. It also helps that President Pezeshkian is considered to be a “reformist”.

In American political parlance, this means that he’s a “moderate” and is thus already predisposed in principle to talking with the US in pursuit of pragmatic deals, which could first take the form of phased sanctions relief. In particular, the US could begin by waiving sanctions for Russian and Indian companies that cooperate with Iran via the North-South Transport Corridor as a trust-building measure, which could then expand to the level of rescinding direct sanctions on a step-by-step basis if a deal is reached.

2. How has the fall of the former Syrian government of President Assad affected the relationship between Russia and Iran, given their shared experience in the Syrian Arab Republic?

Russia and Iran cooperated on fighting terrorism in Syria but also arguably competed with one another there as well over which of them would be the Assad Government’s top partner. Russia air support was pivotal in defeating ISIS, but then Moscow tabled a draft constitution in January 2017 during the first Astana Summit that Damascus essentially discarded and made no progress on. That led to Iran courting Syria, which expanded its role in the “Resistance Axis” as a counterweight to potential Russian pressure.

The reasons behind the Assad Government’s downfall are complex and still being debated among experts, but few would argue that his refusal to make pragmatic concessions to the opposition under Russian mediation and his armed forces’ inability to adapt to the times were fatal in combination. The years of peace that followed the last ceasefire were essentially wasted. Part of this, however, might have to do with Syria clumsily “balancing” between its competing Russian and Iranian patrons.

Had it picked one and stuck with them, then that senior partner could have taken full responsibility for the diplomatic processes required for reaching a lasting peace as well as the military reforms required for defending against the rebels if they violated the ceasefire, yet that never happened. Assad didn’t want to dump Russia since it provided international legitimacy and development assistance while dumping Iran was never considered due to the importance of the IRGC and Hezbollah’s ground presence.

If Assad chose Iran over Russia, then Israel might have preemptively “demilitarized” Syria like it ultimately did in mid-December shortly after his fall out of fear that it would turn into a “terrorist state”, while choosing Russia over Iran could have forced him into a peace deal that he didn’t want to make. He wanted to have his cake and eat it too, but in the end, neither of his patrons was able to save him since each concluded on their own that the opportunities that he lost made his government unsalvageable.

Assad’s fall might therefore have taught Russia and Iran the importance of more candid discussions with one another about sensitive issues such as their relations with third countries. Instead of ignoring their competition in Syria and discouraging their media and foreign supporters from discussing it, they could have all addressed it head-on with the intent of more effectively managing it for the greater good. This lesson might come in handy amidst Trump’s stated goal of reaching another deal with Iran.

Russia could share with Iran what it’s learned from engaging with Trump 2.0, and their candid exchange of views could better inform Iran of the US’ new worldview, how it envisages accomplishing this, and the way in which it negotiates so that any potential talks between them can be as fruitful as possible. Their updated Russian-Iranian Strategic Partnership pact from mid-January shows that there’s no bad blood between them over Syria, whether Assad’s fall or their competition there, and that each trusts the other.

It’s therefore entirely feasible that their privileged relations with one another can see Russia help the US reach a deal with Iran in the event that Russia and the US first agree on a peaceful settlement to the Ukrainian issue per their mutual desire for a “New Détente” that could revolutionize the world order. If successful, then the next in line for the US to make a deal with could be China, which Russia could also help it with as well in pursuit of their increasingly shared vision for the future of International Relations.

3. Israel has continued to promote bellicose rhetoric toward Iran, with some officials openly calling on President Trump to pursue strikes against the nation’s nuclear program or even carry out a strategy toward regime change, similar to “colour revolutions” seen elsewhere in the world. Do you feel Russia may be willing to expand its security relationship with Iran to include improving defence cooperation, selling more advanced weaponry such as aircraft and air defence equipment and/or reaching mutual defence guarantees as established with the DPRK?

Russia is likely exploring the expansion of its military-technical ties with Iran after they updated their strategic partnership last month, but this would be predicated from Russia’s perspective on maintaining the regional balance of power with the aim of deterring an Israeli and/or US attack. For his part, Trump doesn’t seem interested in embroiling the US in another war, whether a conventional or proxy one. His goal is to wrap everything up in Eastern Europe and then West Asia in order to “Pivot (back) to Asia”.

What’s meant by this is that he wants to restore the US’ military-diplomatic focus on Asia that followed the withdrawal from Iraq, which can lead to muscularly containing China and thus raise the odds that it’ll agree to an economic-centric comprehensive deal that would be more in the US’ favour. Reaching agreements with China’s Russian and then Iranian strategic partners first, both of whom have enormous resource reserves, is meant to bolster the chances that Beijing will follow suit instead of holding out.

That’s because there’s the possibility that these deals could result in limiting those countries’ resource exports to China, not formally of course, but in the event that the US and its partners (including the Indo-Pacific Rim countries of India, South Korea, and Japan) offer better prices and partnership terms. It’s here where the US’ sanctions can be creatively leveraged by granting waivers to American and friendly countries’ companies to help bring about the desired change in those countries’ resource export trends.

The Chinese economy is still very much dependent on exports despite its current dual-circulation strategy as well as on resource imports, which makes it extremely vulnerable to its largest importers’ and suppliers’ trends. Trump 2.0 therefore appears to be trying to macro-economically engineer these selfsame trends that would be required for weakening the Chinese economy to the point where Beijing considers cutting an economic-centric deal with Washington on more of the latter’s terms than before.

Russia seems to understand what the US wants to do and how it plans to bring this about, whether due to its own analysis of Trump 2.0 or because its representatives explicitly conveyed this to them, which explains Putin’s seemingly abrupt interest in cutting a deal and even partnering with the US. If both are successful, then the US’ threat perception of Russia will disappear while its overall focus then turns towards Iran and China, thus relieving some of the past three years’ worth of intense pressure on Russia.

Once again standing in the US’ way by offering mutual defence guarantees to Iran, which were noticeably missing from their newly updated strategic partnership pact last month, would therefore defeat the whole purpose of cutting a deal with the US and even economically partnering with it afterwards. In fact, the preceding rationale very strongly suggests that Russia would try to take the diplomatic lead in encouraging Iran to cut its own such deal with the US in order to take the pressure off of both of them.

The more protracted that Sino-US talks are, which could even even descend into a global rivalry along the lines of the Soviet-US one after World War II, the better it would be for Russia and Iran if they already reached their own deals with the US since they could then balance between both camps. The same goes for India, which still counts China as its top trade partner in spite of their border dispute but is overall much closer with the US, and these three could cooperate to maximize their collective influence.

A new Non-Alignment Movement, which could tentatively be coined the Neo-NAM, might then arise to help maintain the global balance of power and economic influence between those two superpowers. All the while, Russia, Iran, and India, as Chinese partners who by then would have also cut their own deals with the US (India’s being focused on trade unlike the other two’s mostly geopolitical and resource deals), would be in a prime global position. This could in turn herald the Golden Age that Trump wants.

Excerpts from this interview were included in Tom O’Connor’s article for Newsweek about “What A Trump-Putin Détente Means for Russia and Iran’s Partnership”.

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Why Might Russia Repair Its Ties With The West And How Could This Reshape Its Foreign Policy?

Why Might Russia Repair Its Ties With The West And How Could This Reshape Its Foreign Policy?

By Andrew Korybko

To be clear, the explanations and forecasts shared in this analysis concern the scenario of a Russian rapprochement with the West upon the successful conclusion of peace talks with the US, they’re not in any way a declaration of what will absolutely come to pass.

Trump’s proposal to return Russia to the G7 and Orban’s prediction about it being “reintegrated into…the European security system and even the European economic and energy system” after the Ukrainian Conflict ends hint at a Russian rapprochement with the West. Russian-US peace talks are underway, and if they succeed in bringing about any of the aforesaid outcomes, then this would have to be cogently accounted for as would the future of Russian foreign policy. Here are some explanations and forecasts:

———-

* Russia Neutralized Ukrainian-Emanating Threats From NATO

The nearly three-year-long special operation saw Russia destroy all of NATO’s stockpiles that it sent to Ukraine, which could have otherwise been used to help launch a conventional proxy invasion of Russia one day had Russia not decisively stopped the bloc’s clandestine expansion into Ukraine. Although the risk of World War III spiked at times during the interim due to some very dangerous US-backed Ukrainian provocations, that risk has now largely decreased due to Russia’s victory over NATO’s Ukrainian proxy.

* Trump’s Return Revolutionized Russian-US Relations

The “Department Of Government Efficiency’s” purge of warmongering liberal-globalists, who hitherto controlled the US’ permanent military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies (“deep state”), immediately after Trump’s inauguration is responsible for the commencement of Russian-US talks. These fast-moving processes revolutionized Russian-US relations and consequently contributed to Russia recalibrating its threat assessment of the US, which in turn reopened previously closed opportunities.

* Pragmatic Mutual Compromises Are Finally Possible

While it remains to be seen exactly what form they’d take, whatever agreement might emerge from the ongoing Russian-US talks will almost certainly entail pragmatic mutual compromises, which would have become possible due to the aforesaid factors. Neither Putin nor Trump are maximalists, and both have proven their pragmatism in the past, so it’s reasonable to expect them to meet each other in the middle. The example that they set could then become the norm for resolving other states’ disputes and conflicts.

* Russia Never Rejected Cooperation With Any Country

It was the US-led West that rejected cooperation with Russia, not the inverse, since Russia always maintained that it’ll cooperate with any friendly country. For that reason, today’s enemies could become tomorrow’s partners if they reverse their unfriendly policies. After all, former enemies like Turkiye, Iran, and China are now some of Russia’s closest partners, and ties with Germany were excellent prior to 2022 despite the Nazis’ genocide of the Soviets, so the precedent exists for a rapprochement with the West.

* Its Multipolar Moves Were Always Gradual & Responsible

Apart from the special operation, which was a last-ditch attempt to safeguard Russia’s national security after NATO’s clandestine expansion into Ukraine, all of Russia’s multipolar moves were always gradual and responsible. Creating a BRICS currency for example, which Russia confirmed that it isn’t doing, could throw the fragile and interconnected order into chaos to everyone’s detriment. Any perceived slowdown of multipolar moves on its part after a rapprochement with the West would therefore be an illusion.

* Russia & Trump’s America Both Prefer Populist-Nationalists

For the first time since the end of the Old Cold War, America under Trump’s second administration now openly prefers populist-nationalist leaders and movements over liberal-globalists, which aligns with Russia’s preference from over the past decade. This convergence of interests might even see them working together in third countries as part of a new modus vivendi to liberate them from the yoke of the liberal-globalist holdovers that the US is now actively purging from its “deep state”.

* Both Are Also Favourable Towards The Rise Of Civilization-States

Professor Alexander Dugin’s prediction about the rise of civilization-states came true after Russia’s Eurasian Union took on such contours in the name of the Russian World while Trump 2.0 made claims to Canada and Greenland as part of a complementary “Fortress America” policy. They might therefore jointly support populist-nationalist movements in civilizational anchor states who endeavour to build their own similar regional spheres of influence in the emerging multipolar-civilizational world order.

* Russia Is Neutral Amidst The Sino-US Dimension Of The New Cold War

Just like China is neutral amidst the Russo-US dimension of the New Cold War, so too is Russia neutral towards the Sino-US one, despite each being one another’s top strategic partner. They’re importantly not allies though and that’s why neither is obligated to support the other against the US, thus explaining why China doesn’t arm Russia or recognize its control over the New Regions, which further justifies Russian neutrality if the Sino-US rivalry foreseeably intensifies after the Ukrainian Conflict ends.

* Multi-Alignment Is The Mainstay Of Russian Foreign Policy

Russia has always sought to balance between its diverse foreign partners, but its grand strategic goal of serving as a bridge between China and the EU that adds value to trade in each direction was offset by the special operation that it was compelled to wage. A meaningful rapprochement with the West could lead to the resumption of this policy, albeit in new conditions after what just happened and the impending intensification of the Sino-US rivalry, which would restore its briefly abandoned balancing act.

* Russia Will Always Promote Multipolarity Across The World

There’s no realistic chance that Russia will ever stop promoting multipolarity since its enduring national security interests depend on the successful completion of these processes across the world. Even if ties improve with the West, Russia will still promote regionalization in the Global South to accelerate the rise of civilization-states and their associated spheres of influence, which can hasten the creation of a “new world order” that’s more predictable for larger players at least. This is arguably Russia’s endgame.

———-

To be clear, the explanations and forecasts shared above concern the scenario of a Russian rapprochement with the West upon the successful conclusion of peace talks with the US, they’re not in any way a declaration of what will absolutely come to pass. That scenario remains credible, though its likelihood can’t be confidently assessed, due to recent events. The purpose of this exercise is therefore solely to predict Russia’s motives if this happens and the possible consequence for its foreign policy.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#EU #Geopolitics #Multipolarity #NATO #Russia #TheWest #USA

Three Arguments Tearing Apart Robert Kagan’s Claims About Trump, Ukraine, And Putin

Three Arguments Tearing Apart Robert Kagan’s Claims About Trump, Ukraine, And Putin

By Andrew Korybko

The exact opposite of what Kagan posited is true: Russia can’t militarily control Ukraine indefinitely; a Russian-American brinksmanship scenario is terrifyingly realistic; and Putin is indeed interested in compromising but only under certain conditions.

Hugely influential neoconservative thinker Robert Kagan recently published a lengthy diatribe at The Atlantic fearmongering about Russia’s total and indefinite control of Ukraine, which he takes for granted if Trump doesn’t redouble aid to Ukraine. It’s premised on the presumptions that Russia can military control all of Ukraine indefinitely, there’s no realistic Russian-American brinksmanship scenario over that country, and Putin is unwilling to compromise. The following three arguments tear apart his claims:

———-

1. Russia Lacks The Means To Militarily Control Ukraine Indefinitely

Ukraine is a geographically enormous country that would require tremendous military resources for anyone to control indefinitely. On top of that, a large segment of its population now has military experience or at least basic arms training, weapons are now proliferating throughout its society with wild abandon, and the entire western part is known to be ultra-nationalist to the point of fascist. It would accordingly require much greater means than Russia has to militarily control Ukraine indefinitely.

Any attempt to do so, however, could expose Russia to an Afghan- and Iraqi-like insurgency that it’s ill-prepared to contain. Its forces would stand out in the ultra-nationalist western part of the country and therefore make easy targets for unconventional warfare (terrorism). These networks are deeply rooted and have existed for decades, lying dormant during most of the Soviet era but still never having been completely dismantled. Their fighters can also be easily supplied by neighboring NATO nations.

Ukraine could therefore turn into “Russia’s Vietnam” in much costlier ways than 1980s Afghanistan did both in terms of troops and treasure. Putin knows this and that’s why spring 2022’s draft peace treaty essentially sought to delegate Ukraine’s demilitarization and denazification to a castrated government. Russia can’t carry out these tasks on its own unilaterally without exposing itself to the aforesaid risks. It requires a compliant Ukrainian government without which neither is likely to ever be achieved in full.

2. Brinksmanship Is Possible If NATO Conventionally Intervenes After A Russian Breakthrough

Unlike what Kagan implied throughout his article, a Russian-American brinksmanship scenario is terrifyingly realistic given the possibility that NATO could conventionally intervene in Ukraine at least up till the Dnieper after a Russian breakthrough. For as averse as Trump is to risking World War III over Ukraine, he also doesn’t want to go down in history as a loser (at least for however long it takes for Ukraine to potentially bleed Russia enough till it withdraws per the above) who “gave Ukraine to Putin”.

This concern is made all the more poignant by how regularly he condemned Biden over the years for his administration’s debacle in Afghanistan, which would look a lot less bad in comparison to Trump letting Putin “take all of Ukraine” like Kagan fearmongers is in the cards if he doesn’t redouble aid to it. If Russian boots were planted on Poland’s south-eastern border, then the US also would struggle to disengage from Europe like Trump reportedly wants as part of his planned “Pivot (back) to Asia”.

It therefore can’t be ruled out that he’d threaten and possibly even authorize a conventional NATO intervention in Ukraine at least up till the Dnieper to “strategically salvage” some of the country if Russia achieves a military breakthrough instead of “surrendering” Ukraine in its entirety. In that case, Putin would be the one thrown into the dilemma of risking World War III over that ultra-nationalist western half of Ukraine, which he might decline doing and instead agree to a grand deal for ending the conflict.

3. Putin Is Indeed Interested In Compromising So Long As It’s A Practical Means To An End

Contrary to the Western elite’s perceptions, Putin is indeed interested in compromising, but this has to entail the fulfilment of at least most Russian goals in Ukraine. The top ones concern the restoration of its constitutionally neutral status, demilitarization, denazification, and recognition (even informal) of the new ground realities (i.e. four more former Ukrainian regions joining Russia). There are other objectives of importance to Russia too but these are the primary ones that Putin must absolutely achieve.

He’s staked his reputation on at least their superficial fulfilment, which gives him some flexibility over the details that might ultimately be agreed to, especially with regard to denazification. Moreover, the new ground realities also cut both ways in the sense of Ukraine having integrated more closely than ever into NATO since the special operation began, not to mention Finland and Sweden joining NATO. He might therefore have to ultimately accept a less-than-ideal endgame in Ukraine and Europe more broadly.

Although Putin recently began to climb the escalation ladder, this wasn’t meant to signal that he plans to continue the conflict till Russian boots are planted on Poland’s south-eastern border, but to “escalate to de-escalate” so as to get the US to concede to some of his main goals. He also knows that Trump doesn’t want to risk World War III over the historically Russian-controlled eastern half of Ukraine so the two dozen compromises suggested at the end of this analysis here might be more feasible than many think.

———-

As can be seen, the exact opposite of what Kagan posited is true: Russia can’t militarily control Ukraine indefinitely; a Russian-American brinksmanship scenario is terrifyingly realistic; and Putin is indeed interested in compromising but only under certain conditions. His falsehoods had to be fact-checked since he’s an influential figure whose words shape American elite discourse. His intended audience should therefore know that they’re being misled into supporting more aid to Ukraine on false premises.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#DonaldTrump #Geopolitics #Russia #Ukraine #USA #VladimirPutin

Creative Energy Diplomacy Can Lay The Basis For A Grand Russian-American Deal

Creative Energy Diplomacy Can Lay The Basis For A Grand Russian-American Deal

By Andrew Korybko

The key to this is the US offering Russia a decent deal in Ukraine with lucrative sanctions-waived energy and tech opportunities that would incentivize Russia into informally agreeing to deprive China of decades-long access to ultra-cheap resources for fuelling its superpower rise at the US’ expense.

Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak shared an update on the proposed Russian gas pipeline to China through Kazakhstan, which was analysed here in November, shortly before the start of the year. He confirmed that “This process, so to speak, is underway. Estimates, the feasibility study and negotiations are now underway.” This statement shouldn’t be misinterpreted as assuming that the project is a done deal like RT implied in its report, however, since it’s more of a message to the US at this point.

The previously mentioned analysis cited last summer’s about the continued Sino-Russo pricing dispute over the Power of Siberia II (POS2) pipeline, which boils down to China demanding bargain-basement prices (reportedly equivalent to Russia’s domestic ones) while Russia obviously wants something better. This impasse hasn’t yet been resolved, and while some like Asia Times’ Yong Jian consider the trans-Kazakh proposal to be an agreed-upon rerouting of POS2, that’s arguably a premature conclusion.

Pricing disputes still exist and the “process” that Novak described has only begun. It’s far from finalized and might still take a while to be completed, if ever, as suggested by the POS2 and Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline precedents. The first, which was earlier known as the “Altai Pipeline” before the decision to reroute it via Mongolia, has been discussed for a full decade already with no deal in sight. The same goes for the second, which was first agreed upon in 2015, but no progress has been made since then either.

Amidst the latest talk of the Russia-Kazakhstan-China (“RuKazChi”) gas pipeline, Russia’s last direct gas pipeline to Europe was just shut down after Ukraine’s decision to let their five-year transit agreement lapse. Russia can still indirectly export gas to Europe via TurkStream, and Europe can always compensate for this long-foreseen loss of 5% of its gas import total via more Russian LNG, but the writing is on the wall that the EU will continue diversifying from Russia under American pressure.

In that event, Russia’s lost budgetary revenue from energy exports to Europe can only realistically be replaced by China, but Russia is still reluctant to agree to the bargain-basement prices that China is reportedly demanding. Its decisionmakers’ thought processes can only be speculated upon given the opacity and sensitivity of these talks, but this might reasonably be due to the expectation that the US’ more muscular containment of China could coerce Beijing into agreeing to better prices with time.

Another possibility, which isn’t mutually exclusive at this point at least, is that they might also be holding out hope that some of their European exports could one day be resumed seeing as how the infrastructure still exists but their partners made a US-pressured political decision to cut off imports. The best-case scenario from their perspective would therefore be that China agrees to prices closer to the market rate while the EU resumes some of their Russian gas imports after the special operation ends.

The reality though is that Russia is unlikely to have its cake and eat it too, and there’s no guarantee that either of its two main gas partners – the EU and China – will behave as expected even at a later date. The EU won’t resume any pipeline imports unless it receives approval from the US while China is known to operate on a much longer timeframe than most so it might hold off on clinching a deal indefinitely until Russia finally accepts its bargain-basement price demands. This places Russia in a very bad position.

Unless something changes, Russia might very well be coerced by the unfortunate circumstances in which it finds itself into agreeing to China’s reported proposal to sell it gas at domestic prices, which could turbocharge China’s superpower rise while placing Russia in a greater position of dependence. That might be preferred by Russian decisionmakers over sitting on these reserves indefinitely without receiving any financial benefit from them as sanctions start to create fiscal and monetary challenges.

From the US’ perspective, it’s worse for Russia to turbocharge China’s superpower rise and enter into a relationship of greater dependence with it that could be exploited by China to procure other resources at equally cheap rates than to allow the partial resumption of Russian exports to Europe. At the same time, such resumptions couldn’t be approved until after the Ukrainian Conflict ends, and this would be politically impossible in any case unless the US could spin the outcome as a victory of sorts over Russia.

Likewise, Russia couldn’t agree to this arrangement unless it too was able to spin the outcome as a victory, especially if the informal terms include a commitment not to build any new pipelines to China in exchange for the abovementioned proposed resumption overcompensating for that lost revenue. Therein lies the need for creative diplomacy of the kind suggested here last month and here the other day, the insight of which will now be blended, summarized, and built upon for the reader’s convenience.

The gist is that the US and Russia could agree to a series of mutual compromises culminating in the partial restoration of an energy bridge between Russia and the West for the purpose of depriving China of its envisaged decades-long access to ultra-cheap Russian resources for fuelling its superpower rise. No one should assume that everything proposed below will enter into force, but these suggestions could help move their talks along. From the US’ side, its possible compromises could take the form of:

* Ukraine finally holding elections as part of a US-backed “phased leadership transition” against Zelensky, who’s the top obstacle to a lasting peace, and then legitimizing the following two agreements;

* Ukraine restoring its constitutional neutrality in order to exclude itself from ever joining NATO and thus resolving the core security concern that provoked Russia’s special operation;

* Ukraine demilitarizing and denazifying everything east of the Dnieper in what had for centuries been Russia’s traditional “sphere of influence” (everything west had traditionally been under Polish influence);

* The US terminating its bilateral security agreement with Ukraine in order to assure Russia that any cessation of hostilities wouldn’t be a ruse for rearming Ukraine and reigniting the conflict at a later date;

* The US agreeing that no Western peacekeepers will deploy along the DMZ between Russia and Ukraine east of the Dnieper (all parties might agree to an entirely non-Western peacekeeping mission though);

* The US also agreeing that Article 5 won’t apply to any Western country whose uniformed troops in Ukraine, which would be unilaterally deployed there in this scenario, come under attack by Russia;

* The US approving the EU’s partial resumption of Russian gas pipeline imports in order to buoy the bloc’s struggling economy via an influx of low-cost fuel (but higher-priced than what China demands);

* The US and EU returning some of Russia’s seized assets as “compensation” for the West retaining control over the European portion of its pipelines;

* The US lifting its sanctions on the Russian-EU energy trade, including Russia’s use of SWIFT, and expanding this to include more countries and spheres as a reward for keeping the peace with Ukraine;

* The US waiving sanctions on Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project for itself, the EU, India, and Japan so that they can replace lost Chinese investment and ensure that they receive this gas instead of China;

* The US replicating the preceding policy on a case-by-case basis to squeeze out and ultimately replace all Chinese investment in Russian energy projects to preclude the possibility of more future exports to it;

* and the US building upon the trust that it hopes to regain with Russia through these compromises to resume frozen strategic arms control talks on a priority basis before the expiry of the New START in 2026.

From Russia’s side, its own compromises could take the form of:

* Agreeing to only the partial demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine west of the Dnieper (ideally with the first influenced by the Istanbul Agreement while the second might remain superficial);

* Limiting its control of Ukrainian-claimed lands to only Crimea and those four regions that voted to join Russia in September 2022’s referenda;

* Tacitly accepting that it won’t be able to assert control over the parts of Kherson and Zaporozhye Regions west of the Dnieper but nevertheless continuing to officially maintain such claims;

* Agreeing to limited military restrictions on its side of the DMZ as a trust-building measure for furthering the rest of the complicated negotiation process and then complying with these terms;

* Informally agreeing to prioritize the development of its Arctic and Pacific fleets over its Baltic and Black Sea ones in a tacit cession of influence to NATO that soberly reflects the current military realities;

* Formally acknowledging the loss of control over the EU and Ukrainian portions of its pipeline infrastructure (ideally in exchange for “compensation”, including the return of some of its seized assets);

* Tacitly accepting that the rest of its seized assets are lost, but possibly agreeing that they can be invested in rebuilding Ukraine and/or Syria or donated to the UN, perhaps to fund a new African project;

* Informally agreeing not to build new pipelines to China or expand energy exports to it so long as sanctions-waived energy investments from and exports to others overcompensate for that lost revenue;

* Unofficially preferring sanctions-waived investment from others (America, Europe, India, Japan, South Korea) in its resource-rich Arctic and Far East regions as opposed to that from China;

* Doing the same with regard to preferring tech imports from them (and Taiwan too, which was Russia’s main source of high-precision machine tools a year ago);

* Tacitly accepting that these sanctions waivers can be rescinded in an instant if Russia reneges on the Ukrainian or Chinese terms of this proposed grand deal;

* and negotiating with the US in good faith on strategic arms control, which could ultimately include restoring limits on intermediate-range missiles in Europe that lead to warehousing the mighty Oreshniks.

For as politically difficult as these compromises might be for each side, the US could spin them as having stopped Russia from controlling all of Ukraine and thus preventing it from planting its boots on the Polish border, while Russia could spin them as having stopped Ukraine from joining NATO and thus preventing that bloc from planting their boots on its exposed western border. Moreover, Russia would relieve pressure upon it in Europe, while the US Navy would control the bulk of China’s energy imports.

The key to this is the US offering Russia a decent deal in Ukraine with lucrative sanctions-waived energy and tech opportunities that would incentivize Russia into informally agreeing to deprive China of decades-long access to ultra-cheap resources for fuelling its superpower rise at the US’ expense. This grand deal is Trump’s to lose, and the world will know that he fumbled it if Russia makes progress on new pipelines to China, which could accompany or be followed by him “escalating to de-escalate”.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#energy #gas #Geopolitics #Russia #USA

Voice of East

2024-11-09 17:00:41

The Clock Is Ticking For Russia To Achieve Its Maximum Goals In The Ukrainian Conflict

The Clock Is Ticking For Russia To Achieve Its Maximum Goals In The Ukrainian Conflict

By Andrew Korybko

Trump’s reported plan for a Western/NATO peacekeeping mission in Ukraine places Russia in the dilemma of either pre-empting this with another large-scale nationwide offensive, targeting those forces after they enter at the risk of sparking World War III, or tacitly accepting this endgame.

The Wall Street Journal’s report that Trump’s peace plan for Ukraine envisages the creation of an 800-mile demilitarized zone that would be patrolled by Europeans adds a lot of urgency to Russia’s nearly 1000-day-long struggle to achieve its maximum goals in this conflict. The potential entrance of conventional Western/NATO forces into Ukraine as peacekeepers places Russia in the dilemma of accepting yet another “red line” being crossed or risking World War III by targeting them.

To refresh everyone’s memory since it’s been so long since the special operation started, Russia officially aims to: 1) demilitarize Ukraine; 2) denazify it; and 3) restore its constitutional neutrality, among other supplementary and informal goals. September 2022’s referenda then added the official goal of removing Ukrainian forces from the entirety of the four regions that Russia now claims as its own, including the areas of Kherson and Zaporozhye on the other side of the Dnieper, which will be challenge.

At the same time, Putin has repeatedly refused to reciprocally escalate in response to egregious Ukrainian provocations like its bombing of the Kremlin, early warning systems, strategic airfields, oil refineries, and residential buildings, et al, all due to him not wanting the conflict to spiral out of control. For as responsible of an approach as this is, the drawback is that it created the perception that he might accept the crossing of even more “red lines”, including conventional Western/NATO forces in Ukraine.

Putin’s aversion to escalation might therefore be exploited by Trump, who was reportedly handed a plan in June advising him to give Ukraine whatever it wants if Russia refuses whatever peace deal he proposes, ergo the high likelihood of a conventional Western/NATO intervention to decisively freeze the conflict. Trump’s track record of “escalating to de-escalate” with North Korea and Iran suggests that he’d also go through with this plan against Russia, hence why it should take this scenario seriously.

Provided that Putin lacks the political will to risk an unprecedented escalation by targeting those conventional Western/NATO forces, and his behaviour thus far in response to other provocations suggests that this is indeed the case, then he’ll have to race against the clock to achieve his maximum goals. It’ll still take some time for the US to get key stakeholders like Poland on board, where 69% of the public is against dispatching troops to Ukraine in any capacity, so this likely won’t happen by mid-January.

In any case, Russia no longer has a hypothetically indefinite amount of time like before to: 1) demilitarize Ukraine; 2) denazify it; 3) restore its constitutional neutrality; and 4) remove Ukrainian forces from the entirety of the four regions that Russia now claims as its own, including those areas across the Dnieper. Even though the military-strategic dynamics of the conflict favour it, and capturing Pokrovsk could lead to huge gains in Donetsk, it’ll be very difficult to achieve all these goals by the time an intervention occurs.

To explain in the order that they were mentioned, Ukraine was initially supposed to be demilitarized upon the swift success of the special operation in its early phase, but the UK and Poland (whose role most observers aren’t aware of) convinced Zelensky to rubbish spring 2022’s draft peace treaty. That document would have greatly slashed its military capabilities, but it’s no longer realistic to imagine that he’d agree to this, especially after being given tens of billions of dollars’ worth of NATO arms.

NATO is also unlikely to agree to ask for them back due to the perception (regardless of its veracity) that Ukraine must be able to “deter” Russia from supposedly recommencing the conflict after it finally ends. The Taliban’s swift capture of Afghanistan after Biden’s bungled withdrawal from there was viciously lambasted by Trump, who’d go down in history as an even bigger loser if he agreed to “demilitarize” Ukraine and was then played for a fool by Putin if Russia steamrolls through it sometime later.

The only viable way in which Russia could implement Ukraine’s demilitarization in today’s context is to control as much of its territory as possible in order to ensure that no threatening weapons are deployed there. The problem though is that Russia is unlikely to obtain military control over all of Ukraine, or even just significant parts of its territory east of the Dnieper in proximity to the internationally recognized border across which Kiev’s shells still regularly fly, by the time of a Western/NATO intervention.

One of the reasons why the special operation’s opening phase didn’t result in ending the conflict on Russia’s terms is because the West informed Zelensky about how overextended its military logistics had become and thus encouraged him to exploit that to push it back like he ultimately did. Given how cautious of a leader Putin is, he’s unlikely to act out of character once more by ordering a repeat of this same risky strategy even if the frontlines collapse and Russia is able to roll into other regions.

Another unforeseen challenge that Russia experienced during the special operation’s opening phase was actually holding the broad swaths territory that it nominally controlled. Ukraine’s hidden Javelin and Stinger stockpiles inflicted enough losses behind Russia’s lines to engender the large-scale pullback that coincided with the failure of spring 2022’s peace talks. There’s also the obvious difficulty of swiftly capturing large cities like Kharkov, Sumy, and Zaporozhye, which hasn’t yet happened.

Moving along to Russia’s second maximum goal of denazifying Ukraine after explaining how tough it’ll be to achieve the first one of militarizing it, this too can’t succeed without a political agreement that’s no longer realistic in today’s context after such a chance slipped away in spring 2022. What Russia has in mind is Ukraine promulgating legislation that aligns with these goals, such as banning the glorification of World War II-era fascists and rescinding restrictions on ethnic Russians’ rights.

Zelensky has no reason to go along with this anymore like he flirted with doing in early 2022 and Trump’s team doesn’t seem to care all that much about this issue anyhow. It’s therefore unclear how Russia can achieve this before a Western/NATO intervention except in the unlikely scenario of a Russian-friendly Colour Revolution and/or military coup, neither of which the US would accept, and both of which would probably thus prompt the aforesaid intervention out of desperation to salvage “Project Ukraine”.

The third maximum goal of restoring Ukraine’s constitutional neutrality is comparatively more likely but nevertheless moot at this point given that the raft of security guarantees that it already clinched with NATO states since the start of this year de facto amount to continued Article 5 support. Contrary to popular perceptions, this clause doesn’t obligate the dispatch of troops, but only for each country to do whatever it deems fit to help allies under attack. Their existing military aid to Ukraine aligns with this.

Coercing Ukraine to rescind 2019’s constitutional amendment making NATO membership a strategic objective would therefore be a superficial concession to Russia on the US’ part to make Trump’s peace plan a little less bitter for Putin to swallow. As with the previous two maximum goals, Zelensky has no reason to comply with Putin’s demands in this regard since the latter’s forces aren’t in a position to impose this upon him, thus meaning that it can only realistically be done if Trump orders him to.

As the reader probably already picked up on, the common theme is that Russia’s inability to militarily coerce Zelensky into complying with its maximum goals greatly reduces the possibility that they’ll be achieved, which also holds true for the final one of obtaining control over all its new regions’ land. It’s unimaginable that Zelensky will voluntarily cede Zaporozhye with its over 700,000 population, for example, or that Trump will accept the Western opprobrium that would follow coercing him to do so.

The same goes for letting Russia cross the Dnieper to obtain control over that region’s and Kherson’s areas on the other side, thus creating the opportunity for it to build up its forces there in the future for a lightning strike across Ukraine’s western plains in the event that the conflict ever rekindles after it ends. There’s no way that Trump would ever give Putin such an invaluable military-strategic gift so Russia’s supporters shouldn’t deceive themselves by getting their hopes up thinking that this will happen.

The only way in which Russia can achieve its maximum goals before the entrance of Western/NATO troops into Ukraine as peacekeepers is through military means, which would require another large-scale multi-pronged offensive of the sort that characterized the special operation’s early days. Even then, however, the high risk of once again overextending its military logistics, being ambushed by Stingers/Javelins, and thus risking reputational costs and even on-the-ground losses, will remain.

As such, there are really only three options left for Russia: 1) escalate now before Western/NATO troops enter Ukraine and either coerce Zelensky into agreeing to these demands or capture and hold enough land in order to demilitarize as much of the country as possible; 2) escalate after they enter at the risk of sparking a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis that could spiral into World War III; or 3) accept the fait accompli of freezing the conflict along the Line of Contact and begin preparing the public accordingly.

It’s unclear which option Putin will choose since he hasn’t yet signalled a preference for any of them. Nevertheless, it’s timely to quote 19^th-century Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov, who famously said that “Russia is not sulking; she is composing herself.” Russia knows that the clock is ticking for achieving its maximum goals before Trump likely orders Western/NATO peacekeepers to enter Ukraine. The Kremlin is quiet for now precisely because policymakers have yet to decide what to do.

———-

Readers might be interested in reviewing the following analyses for more insight into Russia’s dilemma:

* 14 July 2022: “Korybko To Azerbaijani Media: All Sides Of The Ukrainian Conflict Underestimated Each Other”

* 12 November 2022: “20 Constructive Critiques Of Russia’s Special Operation”

* 1 November 2024: “Trump 2.0 would be no easy ride for Vladimir Putin”

* 7 November 2024: “Here’s What Trump’s Peace Plan Might Look Like & Why Russia Might Agree To It”

* 8 November 2024: “View from Moscow: Russia tepidly welcomes Trump’s return”

They illustrate the challenges inherent in Russia achieving its maximum goals anytime soon.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

Korybko To Azerbaijani Media: All Sides Of The Ukrainian Conflict Underestimated Each Other

OneWorld is publishing the full-length English version of the interview that Andrew Korybko gave to Oxu.

^{Andrew Korybko (Andrew Korybko's Newsletter)}

Here’s What Comes Next After Putin And Trump Just Agreed To Start Peace Talks

Here’s What Comes Next After Putin And Trump Just Agreed To Start Peace Talks

By Andrew Korybko

The path ahead will be very difficult due to the sensitive issues that Russia and the US must resolve.

12 February 2025 will go down in history as the day when the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine officially began to end. Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth started everything off by declaring that: Ukraine won’t join NATO; the US doesn’t believe that Ukraine can restore its pre-2014 borders; the US won’t deploy troops to the conflict zone; the US wants the Europeans to assume some peacekeeping responsibilities there instead; but the US won’t extend Article 5 guarantees to EU forces there.

This was followed by Trump and Putin talking for the first time since the former returned to office. They agreed to begin peace talks without delay, which was followed by Trump calling Zelensky to brief him about this and likely coerce the concessions from him that he presumably promised Putin. Trump also suggested that he’ll soon meet Putin in Saudi Arabia and that each of them might then visit each other’s countries as part of the peace process. Here are some background briefings about the larger context:

* 3 January: “Creative Energy Diplomacy Can Lay The Basis For A Grand Russian-American Deal”

* 17 January: “The Merits Of A Demilitarized ‘Trans-Dnieper’ Region Controlled By Non-Western Peacekeepers”

* 3 February: “Territorial Concessions Might Precede A Ceasefire That Leads To New Ukrainian Elections”

* 4 February: “Trump’s Interest In Ukraine’s Rare Earth Minerals Might Backfire On Zelensky”

* 7 February: “Trump’s Special Envoy Shed More Light On His Boss’ Ukrainian Peace Plan”

The first analysis about creative energy diplomacy contains a dozen proposed compromises for each side that could help move their talks along. In fact, the one about the US not extending Article 5 guarantees to EU forces in Ukraine is now policy per Hegseth, so it’s possible that some others might follow. Additionally, Trump just remarked about how unpopular Zelensky has become, which suggests that he’s planning the “phased leadership transition” via new elections that was also proposed in that piece.

It remains to be seen which of these other proposals might soon become US policy, with the same being said for the ones that Russia might implement, such as agreeing to limited military restrictions on its side of the DMZ that’ll likely be created by the end of this process for example. What follows are the five main issues that’ll shape the Russian-US peace talks on Ukraine between their leaders, diplomats, and whichever of their experts might be invited to participate in this via complementary Track II talks:

———-

* Territorial Parameters

The most immediate issue that must be resolved is where the new Russian-Ukrainian border will fall. Hegseth’s claim about Ukraine’s inability to restore its pre-2014 border hints that Trump could coerce Zelensky into withdrawing from at least all of Donbass, which is at the centre of the territorial dimension of their conflict, though it’s possible that his forces might fall back as far as Zaporozhye city. Letting Russia control that city and the parts of its new regions west of the Dnieper is unlikely at this time.

That’s because Trump might not want to take the flak that would follow giving Russia a city of over 700,000 whose residents didn’t vote in September 2022’s referendum. The same goes for the parts of Russia’s new regions west of the river. Instead, he might propose a UN-supervised referendum sometime after the fighting freezes to resolve this aspect of their territorial dispute, all while allowing Russia to continue to officially lay claim to those areas. That might be pragmatic enough for Putin to agree.

* DMZ Terms & Peacekeeper Roles

The next issue to address after the above are the terms of the DMZ along their interim border and the role of the peacekeepers who’d then likely deploy there to monitor it. Hegseth’s declaration that the US will not extend Article 5 guarantees to EU forces there could deter them from playing a major role, which Russia would have to authorize via a UNSC Resolution in any case per Permanent Representative Vasily Nebenzia otherwise they’ll be legitimate targets. Non-Western ones are thus much more agreeable.

As it turns out, the vast majority of UN peacekeepers are from non-Western countries, so they could prospectively deploy there under a UNSC mandate per Nebenzia’s suggestion and possibly even result in the total exclusion of any Western peacekeepers if it’s agreed that none will contribute to this mission. Their terms would have to be acceptable to both Russia and the US in order for this resolution to pass, so it’s unclear exactly what they’ll be able to do or not do, but that directly segues into the next issue.

* Demilitarization & Denazification

Two of Russia’s main goals in the special operation are to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, which it initially sought to do by militarily coercing Ukraine into this per the terms established in spring 2022’s draft peace treaty, though that didn’t succeed due to the UK and Poland. It’s unrealistic to imagine that Trump will agree to let Russia deploy its armed forces throughout the entirety of Ukraine to implement this so it can only be accomplished through similar diplomatic means involving Kiev’s acquiescence.

Therein lies the possible role that UN peacekeepers can play in monitoring and enforcing whatever is ultimately agreed upon for demilitarizing and denazifying Ukraine. This could take the form of inspecting suspected illegal arms sites and all of Ukraine’s cross-border traffic (including at its ports) while having the right to mandate changes to its media reporting and school curricula as need be. This is the only way to ensure that Ukraine remains demilitarized and denazified after the conflict ends.

* Sanctions Relief

Russia has repeatedly demanded the lifting of all Western sanctions, but the argument can be made that “deal-master” Trump wouldn’t ever agree to do this all at once, instead preferring to draft a plan for phased sanctions relief as a reward for Russia’s compliance with a ceasefire, armistice, or peace treaty. This could take the form of what was proposed in the creative energy diplomacy analysis whereby some Russian exports to the EU could resume during the first phase as a trust-building measure.

While Russia would prefer that they all be immediately lifted, its policymakers might conclude that it’s better to accept a phased plan if that’s all that Trump is comfortable offering instead of nothing at all. He’d do well though to engage in the goodwill gesture of lifting sanctions on Russia’s oil exports by sea too since that could convince those policymakers that he’s serious about relieving pressure on Russia. This would in turn make it easier for Putin to sell the compromise of phased sanctions relief at home.

* New Security Architecture

Russia envisaged creating a new European security architecture through mutual agreements with the US and NATO in December 2021 per the security guarantee requests that it shared with them at the time. These were in hindsight meant to diplomatically resolve their security dilemma, whose roots are in NATO’s continued eastward expansion after the Old Cold War and especially its clandestine expansion into Ukraine, in lieu of the special operation that Putin was secretly planning at the time if that failed.

So much has changed since then that separate comprehensive talks on this must start right after whatever agreement they reach on Ukraine. The new issues include NATO’s eastern military buildup, Finland and Sweden’s new memberships, Russia’s hypersonic Oreshniks, their deployment to Belarus, Russia’s deployment of nukes there too, the future of the New START that expires next year, and the new space arms race, et al. Agreeing on a new security architecture will therefore stabilize the world.

———-

As can be seen, the path ahead will be very difficult due to the sensitive issues that Russia and the US must resolve, but their leaders have shown that they have the will to negotiate in good faith. Neither side is likely to achieve their maximum objectives, but diplomacy is the art of the possible, so each will do their utmost to achieve as much as they can in this regard given the circumstances. The best-case scenario is a fair and lasting peace that truly resolves the root causes at the core of this conflict.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#DonaldTrump #Geopolitics #NATO #Russia #Ukraine #USA #VladimirPutin

Voice of East

2025-01-17 07:59:00

The Merits Of A Demilitarized “Trans-Dnieper” Region Controlled By Non-Western Peacekeepers

The Merits Of A Demilitarized “Trans-Dnieper” Region Controlled By Non-Western Peacekeepers

By Andrew Korybko

This proposal is the most realistic means for keeping the peace after an armistice.

Bloomberg cited unnamed “people with knowledge of Kremlin thinking” to report that Russia will only demand that Ukraine restore its constitutional neutrality, “drastically cut back military ties with the NATO alliance”, limit its army, and freeze the front lines, albeit with some territorial swaps. Also, “The Kremlin’s position is that while individual NATO members may continue to send arms to Ukraine under bilateral security agreements, any such weapons should not be used against Russia or to recapture territory.”

To be sure, Bloomberg might have either invented their sources or they’re uninformed of what the Kremlin thinks, but there’s also the possibility that they’re accurately reflecting what it plans to ask for during peace talks. Hopefully Russia’s demands of Ukraine are more than what Bloomberg just reported, however, because the aforesaid requests would be settling for much less than it might otherwise be able to achieve as suggested by some of the proposals made at the end of this analysis here.

For instance, any agreement to limit the Ukrainian Armed Forces is meaningless without a monitoring mission paired with credible enforcement mechanisms to enforce compliance. After all, even written guarantees that individual NATO members won’t arm Ukraine for the purpose of using these weapons against Russia or to recapture territory – not to mention purely verbal ones – could be broken. There’s also the question of how Russia would respond to future drone and missile strikes from Ukraine.

The most realistic way to address these concerns is through the participation of only non-Western countries in monitoring and peacekeeping roles, the latter of which could concern deployment along the entire Russian-Ukrainian border, including the Line of Contact (LOC). About the second-mentioned, the reported territorial swaps could see Russia give back its part of Kharkov Oblast in exchange for Ukraine giving back its part of Kursk Oblast, which each would formally retain their territorial claims to the other.

This would restore the status quo ante bellum along that part of their universally recognized frontier while serving as a legal workaround against their respective constitutional prohibitions on ceding territory, which in Russia’s case is absolute while Ukraine’s requires a national referendum. Accordingly, freezing the LOC through an armistice a la the Korean precedent wouldn’t violate either of their laws, thus retaining Ukraine’s claims to the entirety of its pre-2014 borders and Russia’s to its post-2022 ones.

As for effectively keeping the peace, Russia could be more confidently assured that Ukraine won’t unilaterally violate the armistice with Western encouragement if the proposed non-Western monitoring and peacekeeping contingent is allowed to inspect all trains and cars that cross the Dnieper eastward. Ukraine might undertake a long-term clandestine campaign to rebuild its heavy weaponry presence in proximity to the DMZ ahead of a possible sneak attack so this would be imperative for impeding that.

Likewise, since such equipment could also be smuggled across the river, these forces should also be given the means for patrolling it as well as the right to detain people, seize their contraband, and use lethal force if they come under attack. Kiev should have a special regime since it’s difficult to enforce such checks given the capital’s location on both sides of the river, but one possibility is fencing off its north-eastern, eastern, and south-eastern reaches beyond the city’s limits and conducting checks there.

The ideal scenario should be to demilitarize everything east of the Dnieper and north of the LOC that remains under Kiev’s formal control, the so-called “Trans-Dnieper” region for lack of a better description, while having its DMZ manned by Russia’s closest non-Western partners. The first part of this suggestion would prevent Ukraine from unilaterally violating the armistice while the second would do the same with regards to Russia since it would be loath to attack Indian and other such friendly peacekeepers.

This proposal takes for granted that NATO will continue expanding its influence in Western Ukraine along that side of the Dnieper, but the river will serve as a major obstacle to on-the-ground offensive action by either party, all while they presumably concentrate air defence systems up and down its banks. It’s unrealistic to expect Russia to plant boots its boots on the NATO-Ukrainian border, monitor everything that crosses, and then hold these positions indefinitely as explained here so this is the next best solution.

In the event that Russia or Ukraine detects illegal military activity by the other in the Trans-Dnieper region such as prohibited arms and special forces, then they should already have a protocol agreed upon as part of their armistice for peacefully addressing this prior to resorting to kinetic action if that fails. This could include a formal complaint with evidence, tasking the non-Western monitoring and peacekeeping mission with investigating, and in the worst-case scenario, drone or missile strikes against those targets.

On-the-ground military activity by either party would be strictly prohibited since that would violate the terms of the armistice and instantly risk another conflict, ergo the purpose of the non-Western monitoring and peacekeeping mission along the DMZ, the Dnieper, and around Eastern Kiev for deterring this. There could also be previously agreed and very severe economic, financial, and other consequences from Western and non-Western countries that would immediately enter into effect if that happens.

Basically, the Trans-Dnieper region would function as a no-man’s land or buffer zone, and the locals who feel uncomfortable living there could either relocate elsewhere in Ukraine such as west of the Dnieper or take advantage of Russia’s simplified procedure from summer 2022 for moving eastward instead. As can be seen, the proposal for a demilitarized Trans-Dnieper region that would be monitored and maintained by non-Western peacekeepers would greatly keep the pace, hence why Russia must demand it.

Any armistice or peace treaty that doesn’t include this outcome risks being unilaterally violated by Ukraine with Western encouragement after some time. Its terms, especially those involving severe multidimensional consequences against whichever party sends ground forces into this zone (though importantly not for carrying out surgical strikes), should also reassure the West that Russia won’t violate this deal either. That’s why the US would do well to seriously consider this proposal if Russia brings it up.

Should Russia settle for less by only demanding what Bloomberg reported, then it would be tacitly requesting nothing more than a temporary lull in hostilities to prepare for the next inevitable phase of the conflict. Officially speaking, Russia remains determined to reach a lasting peace that preferably meets as many of its maximum goals as is realistically possible given the new circumstances in which it now finds itself after over 1,000 days of conflict, so it should be receptive to the Trans-Dnieper proposal.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Russia offers fast-track citizenship to all Ukrainians

President Vladimir Putin has signed a decree offering an easier path to Russian citizenship for all Ukrainians

^RT

Putin’s Praise Of Trump’s Approach To Peace Talks Sends A Message To All Of Russia’s Supporters

Putin’s Praise Of Trump’s Approach To Peace Talks Sends A Message To All Of Russia’s Supporters

By Andrew Korybko

The mission that Putin just tasked the FSB with deserves more attention due to what it signifies.

Some of Russia’s supporters at home and abroad have been sceptical of Trump’s commitment to peace talks with Putin, but the latter just praised his counterpart’s approach and thus sent a message to them. He was speaking at a meeting of the board of the Federal Security Service (FSB) when said that his first contacts with Trump and his team “inspire certain hopes”. He elaborated that the US now shares Russia’s desire to repair their relations and work on addressing larger strategic problems in the world.

Putin continued by saying that “our partners demonstrate pragmatism and a realistic vision of things, and have abandoned numerous stereotypes, the so-called rules, and messianic, ideological clichés of their predecessors.” He then warned the FSB about how “A portion of Western elites are still committed to maintaining instability in the world, and these forces will try to disrupt or to compromise the newly resumed dialogue.”

This was followed by him tasking them with “leveraging every possibility offered by diplomacy and special services to thwart such attempts.” Their latest mission deserves more attention due to what it signifies. For starters, it suggests that Putin and Trump are truly approaching a game-changing deal that can be described as a “New Détente” between their countries, the potential details of which were shared in the following five analyses:

* 3 January: “Creative Energy Diplomacy Can Lay The Basis For A Grand Russian-American Deal”

* 13 February: “Here’s What Comes Next After Putin & Trump Just Agreed To Start Peace Talks”

* 14 February: “Why Might Russia Repair Its Ties With The West & How Could This Reshape Its Foreign Policy?”

* 15 February: “Vance’s Munich Speech Vindicated Putin’s Summer 2022 Prediction About Political Change In Europe”

* 25 February: “Russia & The US’ Diplomatic Choreography At The UN Shows Their Commitment To A ‘New Détente’”

Moving along, the next point is that some Western elite might try to stop this “New Détente” since it goes against their interests. Nobody knows which forms this might take, but Putin’s warning about how they could try to disrupt this process hints at provocations against Russia and/or Belarus, while his words about compromising their dialogue could refer to leaks or lies. The FSB must in any case either preemptively avert these scenarios or have plans in place for what Russia should do if they materialize.

Third, the preceding two points imply Putin’s preference for his supporters to publicly back what he’s trying to achieve in the face of resistance from some Western elite or at least not discredit him by questioning his or Trump’s intentions. In other words, the “politically correct” interpretation of recent events is that Russia and the US are sincerely working to comprehensively patch up their problems for the world’s benefit, and anything that challenges this view will be frowned upon by the Kremlin.

The fourth point builds upon the last one by raising the possibility that those supporters who defy the new “politically correct” interpretation of recent events might even be suspected of operating under the influence of the dissident Western elite. This could lead to foreign ones being “cancelled” and domestic ones investigated depending upon the way in which their own dissident views are expressed. And finally, the last point is that Putin wants everyone to trust him as he tries to clinch the real “deal of the century”.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Russia’s Veto Of The UNSC Resolution On Sudan Saved It From A Neocolonialist Plot

Russia’s Veto Of The UNSC Resolution On Sudan Saved It From A Neocolonialist Plot

By Andrew Korybko

The text was ambiguous about the authorities’ legitimacy even though they represent their country at the UN, didn’t call for the RSF to cease its attacks against the SAF, could have led to more arms smuggling to the group under the cover of aid, eroded Sudan’s sovereignty via the ICC, and could have led to a disastrous military intervention.

British Foreign Secretary David Lammy railed against Russia at the UNSC on Monday following the latter’s veto of a draft ceasefire resolution in Sudan, which Russian First Deputy Permanent Representative Dmitry Polyanskiy responded to right afterwards. His words can be read in full here and will be summarized in the present piece, but before doing so, here are five background briefings for readers to review if they forgot about the origins of this conflict or weren’t aware of them to begin with:

* 16 April 2023: “Sudan’s ‘Deep State’ War Could Have Far-Reaching Geostrategic Consequences If It Continues”

* 21 April 2023: “Here’s Why The US Is Trying To Pin The Blame For Sudan’s ‘Deep State’ War On Russia”

* 27 April 2023: “Russia Is Right: ‘Political Engineering’ From Abroad Is Responsible For The Sudanese Crisis”

* 4 May 2023: “The Mainstream Media’s Admissions That American Meddling Ruined Sudan Are Misleading”

* 15 July 2023: “Sudan’s Neighbours Signalled That They’re Disinterested In Fighting A Divide-And-Rule Proxy War”

To oversimplify, the rivalry between Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”) exploded in spring 2023, exacerbated as it was by foreign pressure to complete the political transition. Burhan didn’t believe the rumours that the RSF was backed by Wagner, which were spread to pressure him into scrapping Sudan’s plans to host a Russian naval facility in exchange for Western support.

The military dimension of the conflict has since stalemated even though the humanitarian consequences continue to worsen. An estimated 24.8 million people out of the country’s nearly 50 million total population are now in need of humanitarian assistance, there are over 8 million internally displaced people, and 3 million fled abroad as refugees. These startling facts are the reason why the UNSC tabled the latest draft resolution for a ceasefire, but as could have been expected, the West sought to exploit it.

Polyanskiy began his response to Lammy by condemning the UK’s attempt to impose a ceasefire on Sudan as a way to “score points” with its British-based diaspora after London co-authored the document. He then explained that Russia’s primary objection is that the draft resolution doesn’t confirm that it’s the Sudanese authorities led by Burhan, who’s Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC), that have the sole responsibility for protecting civilians, defending the borders, and inviting foreign forces.

He then delivered his knockout punch: “We have to qualify such a position of our colleagues as nothing but an attempt to give themselves an opportunity to meddle in the affairs of Sudan and facilitate their further engagement in political and social engineering in the country. Precisely that was the case in the spring of 2023, when the attempts to impose decisions that did not enjoy the support of the country’s population laid the groundwork for the tragedy that unfolded in Sudan.”

Polyanskiy followed up by implying that the UK tacitly supports the RSF after the draft text was changed to remove earlier calls for that group to end its siege of Al-Fasher and other towns. The “new distorted language” that replaced the original essentially encourages the RSF to continue hostilities so long as civilians are no longer targeted. The external mechanisms that were proposed to ensure accountability, namely the “International Criminal Court” (ICC), are “totally inept” and erode Sudan’s sovereignty too.

Moving along, he then mentioned how premature it is to consider a possible peacekeeping force when Sudan hasn’t yet suggested such and the UN Secretary General’s own report to the UNSC that was shared upon their request “clearly states that conditions are still unripe” for this. Moreover, the conflict is still in its active phase and spread across a large area, so deploying peacekeepers in those circumstances “could spell total disaster”.

Polyanskiy’s other point of criticism was that the draft ceasefire resolution inappropriately demands that “Sudan open all its borders to humanitarian access while not using the numerous border crossings provided by state authorities to deliver aid. It is not without reason that Port Sudan is imposing restrictions; thus, it has been flagging the threat of arms being sent across the border to feed the rebels.” He then ended by calling for an end to double standards towards Sudan and Israel.

“Certain countries are vociferously crying for a ceasefire” in Sudan “while in the case of Gaza those very countries give ‘carte blanche’ to Israel so that it continues the escalation, overlooking the blatant violations of IHL by the Israeli army. Likewise, they prioritize Israel’s right to self-defence and protection of its citizens, but when it comes to Sudan, they somehow deny the same right to its government and accuse the Sudanese army of all ills.” This was a powerful way to end his response to Lammy.

The reason why Russia vetoed the resolution was because it wanted to save Sudan from a neocolonialist plot to exploit its people’s suffering in order to turn it into a vassal state. The text was ambiguous about the authorities’ legitimacy even though they represent their country at the UN, didn’t call for the RSF to cease its attacks against the SAF, could have led to more arms smuggling to the group under the cover of aid, eroded Sudan’s sovereignty via the ICC, and could have led to a disastrous military intervention.

What’s most interesting about all of this is that Russia’s close Chinese partner voted in support of the resolution for the reasons that its Permanent Representative explained here. They lent some legitimacy to Russia’s concerns but insisted that the draft would have led to a ceasefire which would have in turn protected civilians. As can be seen, Russia and China sometimes have polar opposite views on sensitive issues, which readers can learn more about here, but they responsibly manage these differences.

It’s absurd to imagine that China is part of the UK’s neocolonialist plot to subjugate Sudan as a Western vassal state by exploiting its people’s suffering to that end, however, so observers should simply accept that it and Russia sometimes don’t always see eye on everything. This objective fact debunks the claim that pushed by the Mainstream Media and the Alt-Media Community alike that they’re “allies”, each in pursuit of their own ideological-narrative agenda, and clarifies the real state of relations between them.

Russia and China have excellent relations as proven by them jointly accelerating multipolar processes, but their national interests sometimes diverge on sensitive issues like Sudan, Kashmir, and the Ukrainian Conflict, et al. That’s normal and taking the other side doesn’t mean that they’re doing so to spite their partner or as part of a secret alliance with the West. In this case, all that it shows is that China is either more trusting of or naïve about the West than Russia is, which is an interesting observation to reflect on.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Zelensky’s Political Future Is Shaky Amidst His Vicious Rift With Trump

Zelensky’s Political Future Is Shaky Amidst His Vicious Rift With Trump

By Andrew Korybko

Trump has been on the warpath since the inauguration and is politically neutralizing all of his enemies at home so Zelensky should have known better than to become Trump’s newest enemy abroad and risk his wrath.

Trump came out swinging against Zelensky in a social media post on Wednesday where he accused him of being an unpopular dictator who doesn’t want elections, manipulating America “into a war that couldn’t be won”, and possibly having stolen tens of billions of dollars’ worth of aid from it since 2022. This follows Zelensky accusing him of spewing “Russian disinformation” after Trump earlier claimed that the Ukrainian leader’s approval rating was just 4% when explaining why he won’t hold elections.

Tensions between these two have been brewing for quite a while already and can be traced back to how the Democrats exploited one of their phone calls from Trump’s first term as the pretext for impeaching him. Trump had called Zelensky to inquire about evidence that his government might have been in possession of proving the Biden family’s alleged corruption in Ukraine. That experience left Trump with a very poor but lasting impression of Ukraine in general and Zelensky in particular.

It was gradually reinforced as the Biden Administration openly allied with Zelensky’s throughout the course of the Ukrainian Conflict and even more rumours abounded about other corrupt deals. Credible speculation of misappropriated and even missing funds began to rile Trump as did the obviousness of those their mutual unwillingness to at least freeze hostilities with Russia. Everything became personal once Zelensky let himself be used as a campaign prop by the Democrats in Pennsylvania last September.

His response to Trump’s historic election approximately six weeks later was to try appealing to his ego with insincere praise and even buying him off by offering a vague deal over Ukraine’s rare earth minerals, which Kiev convinced Lindsey Graham over the summer are worth a whopping $10-12 trillion. Zelensky later rebuffed a draft deal from Trump that reports claimed “would amount to a higher share of Ukrainian GDP than reparations imposed on Germany at the Versailles Treaty” if accepted.

Bloomberg then reported earlier this week that Ukraine barely has any rare earth minerals to begin with, thus suggesting that Zelensky was trying to manipulate Trump into providing Ukraine more aid on the false pretext that the US could reap a huge return on its investment via these non-existent resources. To make matters even worse, this came shortly after Zelensky fearmongered on Monday that Ukraine can turn into Afghanistan 2.0 if Trump hastily ends this conflict too, which was meant to get under his skin.

That wasn’t all either since Zelensky had also authorized his forces to bomb partially US-owned oil infrastructure in Russia earlier that day, which came right before the first round of Russian–US talks on Ukraine that he then complained about being excluded from. Those remarks prompted Trump to declare how “disappointed” he was with Zelensky. Instead of shutting his mouth and frenziedly working behind the scenes to repair his troubled ties with Trump, Zelensky accused him of being in cahoots with Russia.

Vice President Vance swiftly warned Zelensky that “badmouthing” Trump will backfire while National Security Advisor Waltz lamented that those two leaders’ ties were “clearly going in the wrong direction.” As can be seen, their vicious rift is entirely due to Zelensky’s unbridled arrogance in thinking that he could manipulate deal-master Trump with false promises of rare earth riches and then inexplicably expecting that public insults will successfully bully him, which are both enormous errors of judgement.

Had Zelensky bit his tongue even after his Afghanistan quip on Monday, then he could have at least tried to claim ignorance of his military bombing partially US-owned oil infrastructure in Russia and blamed his advisors for misinforming him about Ukraine’s rare earth riches, but he dug himself a hole instead. Complaining about being excluded from the Russian-US talks, badmouthing Trump and implying abandonment by the US, and then accusing Trump of spewing “Russian disinformation” were mistakes.

Zelensky is ultimately his own man and must take responsibility for his actions. It’s unimportant who might have speculatively misadvised him since he still went along with what they could have suggested despite Trump’s reputation for never capitulating to those who pressure and especially insult him. Trump has been on the warpath since the inauguration and is politically neutralizing all of his enemies at home so Zelensky should have known better than to become Trump’s newest enemy abroad and risk his wrath.

It’s difficult to imagine any restoration of cordial working relations between Zelensky and Trump after what just happened. In fact, Trump might not even want to talk to Zelensky ever again anymore, but he might still have to as part of the peace process. The only way to avoid the awkwardness that this would entail would be if Zelensky either stepped down, was replaced upon finally holding the elections that he scandalously postponed last year, or was deposed through some other means.

In the interim, Trump might rely on his subordinates like Special Envoy Keith Kellogg to pass along messages between them from here on out unless in the unlikely scenario that Zelensky humiliates himself with a sincere apology and then agrees to do whatever Trump demands of him. Since that’s not foreseeable given his unbridled arrogance, which is arguably connected to the “god complex” that the Democrats and their European allies cultivated in him since early 2022, mediators will have to suffice.

Zelensky might not have much time left to decide what to do, however, since he’s already skating on thin ice given his objective unpopularity (which might not be as bad as Trump claimed but accounts for why he’s against holding elections) and his growing number of rivals at home. As the situation along the front worsens and ties with the US continue deteriorating, both at the personal and national levels, an inflection point might soon be reached whereby a regime change process of some sort is initiated.

Whether this takes the form of him resigning, finally holding elections (in which he might even agree not to run), being pressured to do either of the aforesaid by large-scale protests (which might take on contours of a US-backed Colour Revolution), or is deposed through a coup is anyone’s guess. There’s also the possibility that nothing dramatic will happen but that seems improbable given the viciousness of his rift with Trump and the American leader’s vengeful disposition after all that he’s been put through.

For that reason, observers shouldn’t take Zelensky’s rule over Ukraine for granted since something might suddenly happen, whether it’s naturally occurring, the result of Trump ordering his intelligence services to “take care of” Zelensky, or a blend thereof in the case of US-backed protests or coup attempts. Vance will thus likely be vindicated in warning that Zelensky’s “badmouthing” of Trump will backfire. but it remains to be seen what form that’ll take and whether it’ll succeed in moving along the peace process.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Trump’s Interest In Ukraine’s Rare Earth Minerals Might Backfire On Zelensky

Trump’s Interest In Ukraine’s Rare Earth Minerals Might Backfire On Zelensky

By Andrew Korybko

Instead of abandoning his efforts to freeze the Ukrainian Conflict by doubling down on military aid in the hopes that Zelensky’s forces will then recapture these deposits from Russia, Trump might instead try to cut a deal with Putin for Russia to sell some of these extracted resources to the US.

Trump’s confirmed interest in Ukraine’s rare earth minerals is being interpreted by some as beneficial for Zelensky amidst uncertainty about his commitment to Ukraine. One of the points from Zelensky’s so-called “Victory Plan” calls for letting his country’s allies extract its critical minerals. New Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently warned about the strategic advantage that China derives from its control over the rare earth mineral supply chain so he might have influenced Trump’s views on this issue.

US Senator Lindsey Graham raised awareness of Ukraine’s critical mineral riches during his trip there last June after he claimed that they’re sitting on $10-12 trillion worth of such wealth. Trump 2.0’s foreign policy focus on more muscularly containing China in all ways predictably predisposed him to appreciate the abovementioned point from Zelensky’s “Victory Plan”. The problem though is that the bulk of Ukraine’s critical mineral wealth is under Russian control and Ukrainian forces continue retreating.

At the same time, Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg’s words about how Ukraine needs to hold its long-delayed elections were seen as Trump’s interest in brokering a ceasefire, after which martial law can be lifted, the elections can be held, and the new government can then begin peace talks. This expectation contrasts with what Trump said a few days later about his interest in Ukraine’s (largely Russian-controlled) rare earth mineral deposits and the attendant possibility for proxy escalation.

Instead of abandoning his efforts to freeze the Ukrainian Conflict by doubling down on military aid in the hopes that Zelensky’s forces will then recapture these deposits from Russia, which could perpetuate the proxy war and thus derail his foreign policy agenda, Trump might instead try to cut a deal with Putin. One of the conditions that Trump could make for coercing Ukraine into withdrawing from at least some of the territory that Russia claims as its own might be for Putin to sell the US some of these minerals.

Putin might agree to this depending on how far Trump is able to coerce Ukraine into withdrawing, plus there’s a pragmatic argument in favour of this arrangement in that it could form a trust-building measure for the US one day allowing the EU to partially resume some Russia gas pipeline imports. The purpose would be to restore a degree of Russia and the EU’s pre-conflict complex economic interdependence, albeit this time under US supervision, as a reward for Russia complying with a ceasefire.

Russia requires capital and technology to fully exploit the rare earth deposits that are now under its control, both of which could be provided by the US, with the first possibly involving the return of some seized Russian assets so long as they’re invested into this endeavour. If successfully implemented, then this proposal could lead to more creative diplomacy of the sort suggested at the end of this analysis here for depriving China of Russia’s enormous resource wealth, which aligns with Trump’s foreign policy goals.

Ukraine wouldn’t be left completely in the lurch, however, since other smaller rare earth mineral deposits still remain under its control. These could be given to the US in exchange for continued military aid, even if the latter is curtailed when compared to its height under the Biden Administration in the run-up to summer 2023’s ultimately doomed counteroffensive. If Trump already reaches an agreement with Putin on the Russian-controlled deposits, then Zelensky would have little choice but to agree to this deal.

Far from the full military support that he expected to receive in pursuit of recapturing those lost deposits, he’d only end up with whatever the cost-conscious Trump Administration determines is the absolute minimum that the US considers that Ukraine requires for keeping the peace. This is the best outcome for those on all sides who truly want peace, but it requires substantial will on both the US and Russia’s parts along with the US coercing Ukraine into agreeing, none of which can be guaranteed.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Trump’s Latest Sanctions Threat Against Russia Suggests That He’s Getting Impatient For A Deal

Trump’s Latest Sanctions Threat Against Russia Suggests That He’s Getting Impatient For A Deal

By Andrew Korybko

This moment of truth could even arrive earlier than expected and thus force Putin to compromise or escalate before he’s fully made up his mind either way.

Trump said in an interview with NBC News that “If Russia and I are unable to make a deal on stopping the bloodshed in Ukraine, and if I think it was Russia’s fault — which it might not be — but if I think it was Russia’s fault, I am going to put secondary tariffs on oil, on all oil coming out of Russia. That would be that if you buy oil from Russia, you can’t do business in the United States. There will be a 25% tariff on all oil, a 25- to 50-point tariff on all oil.”

NBC News interpreted this as alluding to what he earlier threatened on social media regarding the imposition of secondary sanctions on those that purchase oil from Venezuela. He wrote that “any Country that purchases Oil and/or Gas from Venezuela will be forced to pay a Tariff of 25% to the United States on any Trade they do with our Country.” As it relates to Russia, this would spike tariffs on China and India, the first of which is already in a trade war with the US while the second wants to avoid one.

This is precisely the former US Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg insinuated in an interview with the New York Post in early February that was analysed here at the time. The takeaway was that such threats might suffice for getting them to nudge Russia into a deal over Ukraine despite whatever apprehensions Putin might have. The consequences of not doing so could be their compliance with the US’ secondary sanctions and all that could entail for the Russian economy if it’s deprived of this revenue.

India is more susceptible to this form of American pressure while China might resist for the reasons explained here, in which case Russia could become disproportionately dependent on China, thus leading to the fait accompli of de facto junior partnership status that Putin has tried his utmost to avoid. Accordingly, it might only be India that tries nudging Russia into a deal over Ukraine while China might not do what Trump expects, instead openly defying his secondary sanctions if they’re then imposed.

This analysis here briefly touches upon the five reasons why Russia might accept or reject a ceasefire in Ukraine, with it becoming increasingly likely that Trump might soon ramp up the pressure on Putin to decide, especially after he also just said that there’s a “psychological deadline” for this. In his words, which followed right after his interview with NBC News, “It’s a psychological deadline. If I think they’re tapping us along, I will not be happy about it.”

The day before, Trump spent a sizeable amount of the day golfing with Finnish President Alexander Stubb, who shared his impression of his counterpart’s approach to Russia with the media. As he phrased it, “When you spend seven hours with someone, you at least get an intuition of the direction in which we’re going…The half-ceasefire has been broken by Russia, and I think America, and my sense is also the President of the United States, is running out of patience with Russia.”

This assessment aligns with what Trump told NBC News the next day and his later quip about a “psychological deadline” for concluding talks with Putin. The American leader’s preference for wielding sanctions as a foreign policy tool might therefore come into play against Russia exactly as was foreseen in early February after Kellogg’s cited interview. This moment of truth could even arrive earlier than expected and thus force Putin to compromise or escalate before he’s fully made up his mind either way.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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De-Dollarization Was Always More Of A Political Slogan Than A Pecuniary Fact

De-Dollarization Was Always More Of A Political Slogan Than A Pecuniary Fact

By Andrew Korybko

Any breakthrough in Russian-US relations would inevitably disappoint those multipolar enthusiasts who bought into the most ideologically dogmatic narratives of the New Cold War and consequently believed that Russia would forever eschew the dollar out of principle.

The three-year-long NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine contributed to the belief that the international community had bifurcated into the West and the World Majority respectively, with the outcome of the aforesaid conflict determining which camp will most powerfully shape the global systemic transition. This paradigm predisposed observers to imagine that BRICS, which represents the World Majority, is actively coordinating de-dollarization policies in order to decouple themselves from the West’s financial clutches.

That perception persists to this day despite last October’s BRICS Summit achieving nothing of tangible significance at all, including on the de-dollarization front, and leading members like India and Russia subsequently confirming in response to Trump’s tariff threats that they’re not creating a new currency. As it turns out, even before Trump initiated the nascent Russian–US “New Détente”, the international community wasn’t as divided over the past three years as many multipolar enthusiasts thought.

Complex interdependencies kept most of the main players together, including Russia and the West after Russia continued selling oil, gas, and critical minerals like uranium to the West in spite of their proxy war. Similar interdependencies account for why Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar declared in mid-November that “India has never been for de-dollarization” and then reaffirmed this position last week when he said that “we have absolutely no interest in undermining the dollar at all.”

He also said that “I don’t think there is a unified BRICS position on [de-dollarization]. I think BRICS members, and now that we have more members, have very diverse positions on this matter. So, the suggestion or the assumption that somewhere there is a united BRICS position against the dollar, I think, is not borne out by facts.” The reason why it’s important to draw attention to his latest words is because of the global context within which they were shared as regards the nascent Russian-US “New Détente”.

Putin’s recent invitation to American companies to cooperate with Russia on strategic resources, including energy in the Arctic and even rare earth minerals in Donbass, will lead to Russia using more dollars in international trade if anything comes of this. That would in turn discredit the perception shared earlier in this analysis of Russia actively de-dollarizing, which Putin himself always said that it was forced by sanctions into doing and thus wouldn’t have ordinarily happened on its own.

A thaw in their tensions brought about by the US brokering an end to their proxy war in a way that meets most of Russia’s interests would therefore naturally see Russia using the dollar yet again. To be sure, it’ll still support the creation of platforms like BRICS Bridge, BRICS Clear, and BRICS Pay, but these would be aimed at preventing dependence on the dollar more so than advancing de-dollarization per se. The rouble will also continue to be used as Russia’s preferred currency in conducting international trade.

Nevertheless, any breakthrough in Russian-US relations would inevitably disappoint those multipolar enthusiasts who bought into the most ideologically dogmatic narratives of the New Cold War and consequently believed that Russia would forever eschew the dollar out of principle. Those who previously criticized India’s pragmatic approach towards this currency, particularly Jaishankar’s comments from mid-November, would then eat crow if Russia ultimately ends up following its lead.

Even if Russia is just partially returned to the dollar’s global ecosystem through the lifting of US sanctions on that currency’s use for facilitating the strategic resource deals that Putin just proposed, then it would likely result in the rest of BRICS moderating their de-dollarization policies as well, if they even had them. China alone might continue making the most progress in this regard, but even it too has been hesitant to go all-out, also due to its complex interdependencies with the West (including its US Treasury holdings).

These observations about Russia, India, and China’s diverse views towards the dollar show that de-dollarization was always more of a political slogan than a pecuniary fact, one that only Russia made tangible progress on but only because it was forced to, though it might soon rebalance as explained. They collectively form RIC, the core of BRICS, so whatever they say or do will influence comparatively smaller countries. There’s nothing wrong with that though, neither in general nor in this context.

Comparatively smaller countries can’t make major impacts on the global economic or financial systems on their own, and in this particular context, almost all of them with few exceptions still have close trading ties with the US that necessitate them remaining within the dollar’s global ecosystem. They couldn’t realistically de-dollarize in the way that the most dogmatic ideologues imagined without immense cost to themselves or replacing their dependence on the US/dollar with China/the yuan.

The most pragmatic approach has always been the one pioneered by India whereby countries strive to use their national currencies more in trade while diversifying their foreign currency baskets in order to avert dependence on any single one. This enables them to strengthen their sovereignty in a meaningful and realistic way without risking the ire of major players by actively dropping their currency and/or actively adopting their rival’s. It’s this balance that will come to define financial multipolarity processes.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Five Takeaways From Trump’s Fateful Decision To Freeze All Military Aid To Ukraine

Five Takeaways From Trump’s Fateful Decision To Freeze All Military Aid To Ukraine

By Andrew Korybko

Transatlantic ties, Russian-US relations, and the nature of American hegemony are all transforming before everyone’s eyes as Trump makes bold moves to force Zelensky to the peace table with Putin.

An unnamed senior Defence Department told the media on Monday evening that Trump decided to freeze all military aid to Ukraine until its leaders demonstrate a good-faith commitment to peace. This comes just several days after Zelensky picked his fight with Trump and Vance at the White House. The Wall Street Journal earlier predicted that Ukraine could only continue fighting at its current level till this summer in such a scenario. Here are five takeaways from this monumental development:

———-

1. Trump Is Serious About Brokering Peace

Zelensky made it clear during his disastrous visit to the White House last Friday that he’s dead-set on fighting till the last Ukrainian unless his country either gets NATO membership or Western troops. Neither of those demands is acceptable to Trump since they’d risk World War III, but so too could that risk continue rising if the conflict doesn’t soon end. Trump therefore realized that the only way to force Zelensky to the peace table with Putin is to freeze all military aid until he moderates his extreme stance.

2. He & Putin Likely Have A Secret Agreement

Trump said last week that “A ceasefire could take place immediately”, which was arguably an inadvertent admission of a secret agreement with Putin. No lasting peace can be reached until after the next Ukrainian presidential elections, but they can’t be held during martial law, ergo the need for a ceasefire. Although Putin earlier conditioned this on Ukraine withdrawing from the disputed regions, he might support a ceasefire to justify the US’ curtailed aid to Ukraine and legitimize Russian-US economic deals.

3. But It’s Not Yet A Comprehensive One

If the aforesaid speculation is accurate, then it doesn’t mean that those two have a comprehensive agreement. Serious issues such as the final Russian-Ukrainian border and the question of peacekeepers have yet to be agreed to and might not be resolved till after the next Ukrainian presidential and parliamentary elections. It’s therefore premature to predict that the Line of Contact will become the final border and that Western peacekeepers will be deployed there, especially since Russia opposes both.

4. Poland Might Have A Pivotal Role To Play

About 90% of Western military aid to Ukraine transits through Poland so Trump might ask it to stop the Europeans from using its territory to arm Ukraine during a ceasefire in exchange for post-conflict perks. He doesn’t want the Brits, French, or Germans emboldening Ukraine to violate the ceasefire or provoke Russia into doing so and can incentivize Poland to prevent this by promising to keep American troops there, possibly redeploy some from Germany to Poland, and turn Poland into its top partner in Europe.

5. The “New Détente” Is Trump’s Top Priority

Every major move that’s taken place since Trump’s call with Putin in mid-February has been predicated on advancing his grand strategic goal of a Russian–US “New Détente”, the gist of which is to revolutionize International Relations through a game-changing comprehensive partnership between them. Readers can learn more about its details from the three preceding hyperlinked analyses, but it’s the pursuit of this goal that ultimately drove Trump to make the fateful decision to freeze all military aid to Ukraine.

———-

Transatlantic ties, Russian-US relations, and the nature of American hegemony are all transforming before everyone’s eyes as Trump makes bold moves to force Zelensky to the peace table with Putin. His latest one was literally one of the worst-case scenarios from Ukraine’s and Europe’s perspective but there’s little that they can do in response other than capitulate to his demands. The US holds all the cards like Trump reminded Zelensky last Friday and those who think otherwise risk paying the price.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Voice of East

2025-03-01 17:00:11

Zelensky Picked His Fight With Trump And Vance After Getting Cold Feet About Making Peace

Zelensky Picked His Fight With Trump And Vance After Getting Cold Feet About Making Peace

By Andrew Korybko

Zelensky was triggered after realizing that the Trump Administration wants to coerce him into peace with Putin and won’t be manipulated into prolonging, let alone escalating, the conflict after signing their rare earth minerals deal like he somehow expected that they would.

Friday’s spectacle in the Oval Office will forever be remembered as one of the most epic failures that any foreign leaders has made after Zelensky delusionally thought that that he could disrespect Vice President Vance on live TV in front of Trump without any consequences while being a guest in their country. Readers can watch the full recording here, which shows Zelensky aggressively reacting to Vance’s benign comment about prioritizing diplomacy with Putin over the prior administration’s failed tough talk.

Everything then spiralled out of control after Zelensky accused Vance of speaking loudly to him, which prompted Trump to contradict Zelensky and tell him to keep quiet since he’s already talked too much, all while brutally berating him in a scene that had never been witnessed before in America’s highest office. Trump and Vance also accused Zelensky of being ungrateful for American aid after he lied about Ukraine being left alone since the start of the conflict and reminded him of how disrespectfully he was behaving.

Trump wrapped everything up by warning that the US might completely end its support for Ukraine if Zelensky doesn’t agree to make peace with Putin before unprecedentedly kicking Zelensky out of the White House. To add insult to injury, White House staffers then ate the lunch that was already prepared for Zelensky and his team with the expectation that they’d sign the rare earth minerals deal that was the reason behind his visit. Trump also posted on social media about how Zelensky disrespected the US.

For as clear-cut as the sequence of events was for any objective observer who watched the roughly 10-minute footage that was hyperlinked to in the introductory paragraph, namely that Zelensky provoked his two hosts by disrespecting Vance, the Financial Times’ Ben Hall had a totally different view. According to him, “it is not hard to imagine that Vance and Trump were spoiling for a fight with the Ukrainian leader…Arguably, the stage was set for an ambush” when Zelensky arrived in the Oval Office.

While it’s true that Zelensky and Trump were just embroiled in a vicious spat prior to the Ukrainian leader’s arrival to the US, his American counterpart invited him to visit because he wanted to patch up their problems by signing the rare earth minerals deal and then discuss a path to peace with Putin. Trump treated Zelensky benevolently prior to Zelensky trying to disrespect Vance, as did Vance, who didn’t say anything personal or insulting before Zelensky suddenly decided to harangue him.

It seems like Zelensky was triggered after realizing that the Trump Administration wants to coerce him into peace with Putin and won’t be manipulated into prolonging, let alone escalating, the conflict after signing their rare earth minerals deal like he somehow expected that they would. For that reason, he then decided to sabotage the talks by creating a spectacle, possibly hoping that it would justify abruptly refusing to sign the aforesaid deal if they were going to use it right afterwards to pressure him to peace.

Zelensky isn’t being advised by anyone with even basic insight into how Trump operates otherwise he’d have known that public pressure on his counterpart always backfires. Zelensky would also never have thought that the US needs Ukraine for anything more than Ukraine needs the US. Trump is already considering a more important rare earth minerals deal with Putin so he doesn’t even need Ukraine’s resources whereas Ukraine has no alternative to American arms and is thus fully dependent on it.

This observation brings the analysis to the penultimate point about how Trump ominously left unanswered a question about whether he’ll suspend military aid to Ukraine like he threatened at the end of his and Vance’s heated exchange with Zelensky. If that’s what he ends up doing, and it’s too early to say for sure, then it would represent the worst-case scenario for the Europeans since Russia could then carry on as far westward as it wants if the front lines collapse without fear of the US intervening.

Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth already confirmed a few weeks ago that the US won’t extend Article 5 guarantees to any NATO country’s troops in Ukraine so the UK, France, and whoever else might have considered dispatching them there in that event will now be forced to think twice about it. In other words, Russia could hypothetically carry on as far as Ukraine’s border with NATO if it wants to, though Putin might stop far short of that if a breakthrough coerces Kiev into complying with his demands.

The final point to make is that what happened in Oval Office on Friday was truly a black swan in the sense that nobody could have expected that Zelensky would ruin his relations with Trump right at the moment when they were supposed to sign their rare earth minerals deal that would then pave the way to peace. Trump even exclaimed during the height of their drama how the US was giving Ukraine cards to play for helping it end the conflict on much better terms than if he didn’t diplomatically involve himself in it.

He was therefore very serious about brokering peace between Zelensky and Putin, hence why he was so exasperated at Zelensky’s blatant disrespect once everything started snowballing after Zelensky began to disrespect Vance, which explains why he unprecedentedly kicked him out of the White House. The “New Détente” that Trump wants to broker with Putin, which readers can learn more about from the five analyses hyperlinked in the middle of this one here, is largely predicated on forcing Zelensky into peace.

Zelensky’s last-minute decision to sabotage the peace process by creating a global spectacle caught Trump off guard, but he wasn’t going to let Zelensky disrespect Vance with impunity, let alone after Zelensky’s disrespect transformed into disrespect for the US. That’s not to say that the “New Détente” is now derailed since Trump and Putin still have the will to enter into a series of mutual compromises aimed at establishing strategic ties, but just that it might now proceed independently of Ukraine.

Accordingly, it was actually Zelensky who ruined everything, not Trump and Vance. They could never have expected that he’d burn Ukraine’s bridges with the US knowing that it’s impossible for Ukraine to replace US military aid. Those two thought that he came to DC to sign the rare earth minerals deal that would then place them all on the path to peace with Putin. Perhaps Zelensky didn’t realize what he was getting into until it was too late, by which time he let his emotions get the best of him, but who knows.

In any case, it’s very difficult to imagine there being any rapprochement between Zelensky and Trump or Ukraine and the US in general without Zelensky leaving office or fully capitulating to Trump’s demands. If he defiantly perpetuates the conflict and the US cuts him off, then Russia will pretty much be given free rein by Washington to do whatever it wants with Ukraine, though it’s unknown how the EU would react. Everything will become clearer by next week though once it’s known exactly what Zelensky plans to do.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Trump leaves question on possible suspension of military aid to Ukraine unanswered

"It doesn't matter what I'm considering," he told reporters

^TASS

Why Did Trump Just Repost His Threat To Impose 100% Tariffs On BRICS Countries?

Why Did Trump Just Repost His Threat To Impose 100% Tariffs On BRICS Countries?

By Andrew Korybko

A full-fledged economic pressure campaign by the US against the BRICS countries might be imminent.

Trump reposted late November’s threat to impose 100% tariffs on BRICS countries if they go through with their alleged plans to create a new currency or support an existing one to replace the dollar, which was analysed here at the time. It was assessed that his threat was based upon false premises since such plans were only floated around by the group and never seriously advanced. Even Putin downplayed them as was proven in the aforesaid analysis citing speeches from the official Kremlin website.

The idea that the BRICS Countries are trying to move away from the Dollar, while we stand by and watch, is OVER. We are going to require a commitment from these seemingly hostile Countries that they will neither create a new BRICS Currency, nor back any other Currency to replace…

— Donald J. Trump Posts From His Truth Social (@TrumpDailyPosts) January 31, 2025

The reality is that BRICS hasn’t achieved anything tangible in the decade since it agreed to create the New Development Bank in 2014, with even last October’s Kazan Summit falling flat despite the unprecedented hype that preceded it as explained in detail here back then. Shortly after Trump’s initial threat, Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar clarified that his country has no de-dollarization plans, which was reaffirmed after his latest threat and also echoed by Russia too.

In any case, it’s worthwhile wondering why Trump would repost the exact same threat two months later, which can be answered by remembering that this immediately preceded his imposition of 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico and 10% on China on the pretext that they won’t help him stop the fentanyl scourge. It might therefore very well be that he’s planning to expand the anti-Chinese dimension of these tariffs on the pretext that Beijing is trying to internationalize the yuan via BRICS as a competitor to the dollar.

As for the group’s other countries, they could be sanctioned on a case-by-case basis on the pretext that they’re either working with China to this end or on the related one that they’re trying to create a new currency within BRICS, with such threats giving him powerful negotiating leverage over them. Seeing as how the BRICS claim is provably false as was earlier shown, the first scenario about implementing tariffs on the pretext of helping China internationalize the yuan is more likely, thus excluding India at least.

To be sure, he might still impose other forms of pressure upon it when negotiating trade-related issues, but there’s no credible basis for alleging that India is conspiring with its Chinese rival to internationalize the yuan amidst their unresolved border dispute that’s only recently thawed. The other countries don’t have any such tensions with China and concomitant obstacles to internationalizing its currency at the dollar’s expense so it’s possible that they might soon be threatened with tariffs on this pretext.

In that case, some of the less economically strong and politically sovereign countries might capitulate to whatever the US demands of them, which could take the form of gradually rebalancing their trade and investment away from China and back towards the US. In practice, this could lead to renegotiated trade and investment deals alongside other means of bringing this about, including underhanded ones that could see these BRICS countries informally creating an unfriendly environment for Chinese businesses.

Nobody should expect that this might happen right away or lead to a rupture in their relations with China, let alone them withdrawing from BRICS, but just that it’s the most logical goal that Trump would be aiming for if he threatens to tariff them on the de-dollarization pretext that he just reposted about. In other words, a full-fledged economic pressure campaign by the US against the BRICS countries might be imminent, one which many of them might prefer to submit to than risk crippling tariffs.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Saudi Arabia Has Good Reason To Dillydally On Formally Joining BRICS

Saudi Arabia Has Good Reason To Dillydally On Formally Joining BRICS

By Andrew Korybko

Making an official decision either way could disrupt the Kingdom’s careful multi-alignment between the West and the World Majority.

Saudi Minister of Economy and Planning Faisal Al-Ibrahim told the World Economic Forum during last month’s Davos Summit that “We’ve been invited to the BRICS, similar to how we’ve been invited to many other multilateral platforms in the past historically. We assess many different aspects of it before a decision is made and right now, we are in the middle of that.” Saudi Arabia has good reason to dillydally on formally joining BRICS too for the reasons that’ll now be explained.

It was posited here in January 2024 when the country first revealed that it hadn’t yet accepted the group’s official membership invitation that this “is due to Western perceptions about this association, Iran’s involvement in the Red Sea Crisis, and Israeli-US pressure”, which still holds true. Regarding the first, Saudi Arabia would arguably feel uncomfortable with its name and national brand being included in the plethora of agenda-driven promotional materials misportraying BRICS as an anti-Western alliance.

The Kingdom used to be solidly in the Western camp but has taken a page from India’s book in recent years by multi-aligning between them and what Russia now calls the World Majority. This grand strategic recalibration is due to Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS), whose character and vision were praised by Putin in late 2022, which was analysed here at the time. MBS understandably doesn’t want to fuel the false perception that he’s pivoting away from the West.

The second reason about Iran’s involvement in the Red Sea Crisis is also still relevant since Saudi Arabia doesn’t want to formally join an organization in which its historic rival is also a member amidst the latest support that the latter has given to the Kingdom’s Houthi enemies. Moreover, Iran also supports Hamas, whose sneak attack on 7 October abruptly delayed work on the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which was supposed to make Saudi Arabia a key node in Euro-Asian trade.

The final reason builds upon the aforementioned and includes joint pressure from its fellow Israeli-American IMEC investors who didn’t want Saudi Arabia joining a group within which Iran is also now a member as the West Asian Wars between Israel and the Iranian-led Resistance Axis were raging. Even though the two main ones in Gaza and Lebanon have since officially ended, neither would look approvingly upon Saudi Arabia formally joining BRICS, which could endanger its ties with both.

MBS wants to revive IMEC as soon as possible since it’s expected to function as an integral part of his “Vision 2030” grand strategic plan (the end date of which will likely be pushed back due to all that’s happened since its announcement in 2016) to revolutionize his country’s socio-economic systems. That’s not possible without a large degree of US involvement and Israel’s cooperation, the latter of which requires formal Saudi recognition of the Jewish State, possibly explaining Bibi’s concessions on Gaza.

Openly defying them by formally joining the same group within which their shared Iranian nemesis is already a member, and doing so right after Trump returns to power amidst reports that he’ll reimpose his “maximum pressure” policy against the Islamic Republic, could lead to both abandoning IMEC. The US and Israel offer Saudi Arabia tangible economic and financial benefits whereas BRICS has yet to provide its members with any whatsoever at all as explained here after the latest Kazan Summit.

Additionally, Trump is under the false impression (subsequently debunked by Indian Minister of External Affairs Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar) that BRICS is focused on de-dollarizing and wants to create a new currency to rival the dollar, so he’d predictably overreact if Saudi Arabia decides to formally join now. That could scuttle MBS’ ambitious IMEC plans that are one of the center-pieces of his “Vision 2030” grand strategic plan so he’s loath to risk such consequences in exchange for literally nothing at all from BRICS.

It therefore makes perfect sense why Saudi Arabia is dillydallying on formally joining BRICS since it presently enjoys all the knowledge-sharing and elite-networking benefits brought about through its partial participation without any of the political or economic risks inherent in being a full member. MBS can therefore maintain his Kingdom’s careful multi-alignment between the West (which includes Israel in this formulation) and the World Majority by indefinitely delaying a decision on this either way.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Voice of East

2025-02-02 11:07:31

Why Did Trump Just Repost His Threat To Impose 100% Tariffs On BRICS Countries?

Why Did Trump Just Repost His Threat To Impose 100% Tariffs On BRICS Countries?

By Andrew Korybko

A full-fledged economic pressure campaign by the US against the BRICS countries might be imminent.

Trump reposted late November’s threat to impose 100% tariffs on BRICS countries if they go through with their alleged plans to create a new currency or support an existing one to replace the dollar, which was analysed here at the time. It was assessed that his threat was based upon false premises since such plans were only floated around by the group and never seriously advanced. Even Putin downplayed them as was proven in the aforesaid analysis citing speeches from the official Kremlin website.

---

The idea that the BRICS Countries are trying to move away from the Dollar, while we stand by and watch, is OVER. We are going to require a commitment from these seemingly hostile Countries that they will neither create a new BRICS Currency, nor back any other Currency to replace…

— Donald J. Trump Posts From His Truth Social (@TrumpDailyPosts) January 31, 2025

---

The reality is that BRICS hasn’t achieved anything tangible in the decade since it agreed to create the New Development Bank in 2014, with even last October’s Kazan Summit falling flat despite the unprecedented hype that preceded it as explained in detail here back then. Shortly after Trump’s initial threat, Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar clarified that his country has no de-dollarization plans, which was reaffirmed after his latest threat and also echoed by Russia too.

In any case, it’s worthwhile wondering why Trump would repost the exact same threat two months later, which can be answered by remembering that this immediately preceded his imposition of 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico and 10% on China on the pretext that they won’t help him stop the fentanyl scourge. It might therefore very well be that he’s planning to expand the anti-Chinese dimension of these tariffs on the pretext that Beijing is trying to internationalize the yuan via BRICS as a competitor to the dollar.

As for the group’s other countries, they could be sanctioned on a case-by-case basis on the pretext that they’re either working with China to this end or on the related one that they’re trying to create a new currency within BRICS, with such threats giving him powerful negotiating leverage over them. Seeing as how the BRICS claim is provably false as was earlier shown, the first scenario about implementing tariffs on the pretext of helping China internationalize the yuan is more likely, thus excluding India at least.

To be sure, he might still impose other forms of pressure upon it when negotiating trade-related issues, but there’s no credible basis for alleging that India is conspiring with its Chinese rival to internationalize the yuan amidst their unresolved border dispute that’s only recently thawed. The other countries don’t have any such tensions with China and concomitant obstacles to internationalizing its currency at the dollar’s expense so it’s possible that they might soon be threatened with tariffs on this pretext.

In that case, some of the less economically strong and politically sovereign countries might capitulate to whatever the US demands of them, which could take the form of gradually rebalancing their trade and investment away from China and back towards the US. In practice, this could lead to renegotiated trade and investment deals alongside other means of bringing this about, including underhanded ones that could see these BRICS countries informally creating an unfriendly environment for Chinese businesses.

Nobody should expect that this might happen right away or lead to a rupture in their relations with China, let alone them withdrawing from BRICS, but just that it’s the most logical goal that Trump would be aiming for if he threatens to tariff them on the de-dollarization pretext that he just reposted about. In other words, a full-fledged economic pressure campaign by the US against the BRICS countries might be imminent, one which many of them might prefer to submit to than risk crippling tariffs.

---

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

---

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#BRICS #China #DonaldTrump #Geopolitics #India #Russia #USA

Trump to enact tariffs on Mexico, Canada and China starting Feb. 1, White House says

President Trump will enact 25% tariffs on Mexico and Canada starting Saturday, as well as a 10% tariff on China.

^{Aimee Picchi (CBS News)}

Russia And Pakistan Will Comprehensively Expand Cooperation In The Resource Sector

Russia And Pakistan Will Comprehensively Expand Cooperation In The Resource Sector

By Andrew Korybko

Pakistan wants to reduce its disproportionate dependence on China, hence why it prefers for Russia to modernize its resource infrastructure instead of China, which aligns with US strategic goals.

Express Tribune reported on the outcome of the ninth Pakistan-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation. The protocol that they inked comprehensively expands cooperation in the resource sector. This includes energy and mineral exploration, oilfield services, a gas pipeline, industrial communication, shared standards, equipment, LNG, coal and chemical cooperation, and hydroelectric power and water management. Here are some background briefings:

* 31 July: “Assessing The Prospects Of Pakistan’s Reported Strategic Roadmap For Trade With Russia”

* 19 September: “Russian-Pakistani Relations Are Surprisingly Taking On Strategic Dimensions”

* 9 October: “It’ll Take Time To Reap The Fruits Of The First-Ever Russian-Pakistani Trade & Investment Forum”

The primary obstacles to their cooperation up until this point were financial and political, the first with regard to Pakistan’s infamous lack of funds and the second due to the US’ influence over its government. It remains unclear how they were surmounted, but it could be that Pakistan will offer Russia preferential stakes in these projects in lieu of cash while the US might have allowed this to happen in order for its historical ally’s decrepit resource infrastructure to finally modernize.

Elaborating more on the last point, private American companies might not be willing to bear the tremendous costs that this could entail due to how long it’ll take to receive a return on their investments, but state Russian companies might not have the same concerns. Moreover, from the US’ strategic perspective, if its own private companies can’t take on these projects due to the unfavourable terms, then it’s better for Russian ones to do so than Chinese ones if Washington is forced to choose.

That’s because the US is competing with China for influence over Pakistan, not with Russia, which will never approach anywhere near those two’s level of influence there. While it might appear to observers that Russia’s strategic resource inroads in Pakistan could erode American influence, they actually serve as a counterweight to China’s by denying the People’s Republic more influence in this sector. The US’ premier influence over Pakistan’s military, political system, and elites remains unaffected by this.

Viewed from an admittedly controversial zero-sum perspective, the gradual growth of Russian influence in parts of the Pakistani economy therefore erodes China’s influence over the country, which in turn strengthens America’s overall strategic position. Sanctioned Russia urgently requires new markets, and it’s willing to pay higher costs for access to them so long as it’s promised high rates of return in the long term through preferential stakes in these projects, thus explaining its national interest in this context.

Readers should also be aware that this is part of Russia’s “Pivot to (South) Asia” that was described in detail here late last month and aims to preemptively avert disproportionate dependence on China. Pakistan also wants to reduce its own already existing such dependence on China, hence why it prefers for Russia to modernize its resource infrastructure, which aligns with US strategic goals. If this trend continues, then it’ll one day be possible to speak about the Russian-US-Chinese interplay in Pakistan.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Three Takeaways From The Impending Launch Of The First Russian-Pakistani Freight Train Service

Three Takeaways From The Impending Launch Of The First Russian-Pakistani Freight Train Service

By Andrew Korybko

The best-case scenario would be for Pakistan to defy the US’ secondary sanctions threats against all those that do business with Iran, patch up its problems with the Taliban, and thus rely on two trade routes to Russia instead of just one, but that might be asking too much of its de facto military junta.

Pakistan Railways Freight CEO Sufiyan Sarfaraz Dogar announced last week that the first Russian-Pakistani freight train service will launch on 15 March and transit across Iran, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. It’ll facilitate the export of Russian energy and industrial products to Pakistan and Pakistan’s export of agricultural ones and textiles to Russia according to reports. This has been a long time in the making and represents the latest milestone in their relations. Here are the top three takeaways:

———-

* Iran’s Irreplaceable Role In Their Expanded Trade Is A Double-Edged Sword

Next month’s plans show that Russia and Pakistan are prioritizing Iran over Afghanistan as the irreplaceable transit state for expanding their bilateral trade, which is sensible considering the continued Pakistani-Taliban tensions that’ll be touched upon next, but it also carries with it some risks. Trump already revived his first administration’s “maximum pressure” policy against Iran and is therefore expected to impose secondary sanctions against all companies that still trade with it without a waiver.

He’s so serious about this that he threatened to modify or rescind the waiver that his first administration extended to India so he’ll predictably come down harshly against Pakistan too. Therein lies the problem since Pakistan has proven in the past that it’ll comply with American sanctions against Iran, most infamously the one that’s obstructing their over-decade-long pipeline plans, so it might very well do the same during the US’ latest sanctions crackdown and therefore abandon this route for trade with Russia.

* Continued Pakistani-Taliban Tensions Impede The Most Direct Trade Route

Russian-Pakistani trade could be more effectively conducted in terms of cost and time by relying on Afghanistan as their irreplaceable transit state, but that’s not possible so long as Pakistani-Taliban tensions persist. In a nutshell, they boil down to the Taliban suspecting that Pakistan’s de facto military junta is secretly allied with the US against them, while Pakistan accuses them of backing Pashtun and Baloch terrorist groups (perhaps as an asymmetrical means of restoring the lopsided balance of power).

Although Russia is better positioned than anyone else to mediate between them, it hasn’t yet formally attempted this, nor might it ultimately succeed in resolving the security dilemma at the core of their disputes. That’s regrettable since remaining reliant on Iran carries with it the abovementioned risk that Pakistan capitulates to the US’ secondary sanctions pressure. The self-evident solution is to patch up their problems for the greater good of Eurasian connectivity but that’s a lot easier said than done.

* At Least The Will Exists On Both Sides To Expand Bilateral Trade Though

Ending everything on a positive note, it’s laudable that the will exists on both sides to expand bilateral trade in spite of the obstacles that were just described. Quite clearly, a faction/school of the Pakistani Establishment still veritably exists which is serious about diversifying from their country’s economic dependence on China and testing the limits of its traditional political dependence on the US, each by means of Russia. This suggests that the higher-ups are hedging their bets a bit on both.

From the Russian side, there’s a consensus on the need to comprehensively develop relations with non-traditional partners like Pakistan at this historic phase of the global systemic transition to multipolarity, though nobody should be under any illusions about this ever being done at India’s expense. The combined effect of the aforesaid imperatives is that the parties are sincerely attempting to make good on their economic agreements from last year in pursuit of their complementary interests as explained.

———-

The impending launch of the first Russian-Pakistani freight train service across Iran, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan is a big deal, but the obstacles posed by Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy against Iran and continued Pakistani-Taliban tensions might limit bilateral trade. The best-case scenario would therefore be for Pakistan to defy the US on Iran, patch up its problems with the Taliban, and thus rely on two trade routes to Russia instead of just one, but that might be asking too much of its de facto military junta.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#Iran #Pakistan #PakistanArmy #Russia #Taliban

The Merits Of A Demilitarized “Trans-Dnieper” Region Controlled By Non-Western Peacekeepers

The Merits Of A Demilitarized “Trans-Dnieper” Region Controlled By Non-Western Peacekeepers

By Andrew Korybko

This proposal is the most realistic means for keeping the peace after an armistice.

Bloomberg cited unnamed “people with knowledge of Kremlin thinking” to report that Russia will only demand that Ukraine restore its constitutional neutrality, “drastically cut back military ties with the NATO alliance”, limit its army, and freeze the front lines, albeit with some territorial swaps. Also, “The Kremlin’s position is that while individual NATO members may continue to send arms to Ukraine under bilateral security agreements, any such weapons should not be used against Russia or to recapture territory.”

To be sure, Bloomberg might have either invented their sources or they’re uninformed of what the Kremlin thinks, but there’s also the possibility that they’re accurately reflecting what it plans to ask for during peace talks. Hopefully Russia’s demands of Ukraine are more than what Bloomberg just reported, however, because the aforesaid requests would be settling for much less than it might otherwise be able to achieve as suggested by some of the proposals made at the end of this analysis here.

For instance, any agreement to limit the Ukrainian Armed Forces is meaningless without a monitoring mission paired with credible enforcement mechanisms to enforce compliance. After all, even written guarantees that individual NATO members won’t arm Ukraine for the purpose of using these weapons against Russia or to recapture territory – not to mention purely verbal ones – could be broken. There’s also the question of how Russia would respond to future drone and missile strikes from Ukraine.

The most realistic way to address these concerns is through the participation of only non-Western countries in monitoring and peacekeeping roles, the latter of which could concern deployment along the entire Russian-Ukrainian border, including the Line of Contact (LOC). About the second-mentioned, the reported territorial swaps could see Russia give back its part of Kharkov Oblast in exchange for Ukraine giving back its part of Kursk Oblast, which each would formally retain their territorial claims to the other.

This would restore the status quo ante bellum along that part of their universally recognized frontier while serving as a legal workaround against their respective constitutional prohibitions on ceding territory, which in Russia’s case is absolute while Ukraine’s requires a national referendum. Accordingly, freezing the LOC through an armistice a la the Korean precedent wouldn’t violate either of their laws, thus retaining Ukraine’s claims to the entirety of its pre-2014 borders and Russia’s to its post-2022 ones.

As for effectively keeping the peace, Russia could be more confidently assured that Ukraine won’t unilaterally violate the armistice with Western encouragement if the proposed non-Western monitoring and peacekeeping contingent is allowed to inspect all trains and cars that cross the Dnieper eastward. Ukraine might undertake a long-term clandestine campaign to rebuild its heavy weaponry presence in proximity to the DMZ ahead of a possible sneak attack so this would be imperative for impeding that.

Likewise, since such equipment could also be smuggled across the river, these forces should also be given the means for patrolling it as well as the right to detain people, seize their contraband, and use lethal force if they come under attack. Kiev should have a special regime since it’s difficult to enforce such checks given the capital’s location on both sides of the river, but one possibility is fencing off its north-eastern, eastern, and south-eastern reaches beyond the city’s limits and conducting checks there.

The ideal scenario should be to demilitarize everything east of the Dnieper and north of the LOC that remains under Kiev’s formal control, the so-called “Trans-Dnieper” region for lack of a better description, while having its DMZ manned by Russia’s closest non-Western partners. The first part of this suggestion would prevent Ukraine from unilaterally violating the armistice while the second would do the same with regards to Russia since it would be loath to attack Indian and other such friendly peacekeepers.

This proposal takes for granted that NATO will continue expanding its influence in Western Ukraine along that side of the Dnieper, but the river will serve as a major obstacle to on-the-ground offensive action by either party, all while they presumably concentrate air defence systems up and down its banks. It’s unrealistic to expect Russia to plant boots its boots on the NATO-Ukrainian border, monitor everything that crosses, and then hold these positions indefinitely as explained here so this is the next best solution.

In the event that Russia or Ukraine detects illegal military activity by the other in the Trans-Dnieper region such as prohibited arms and special forces, then they should already have a protocol agreed upon as part of their armistice for peacefully addressing this prior to resorting to kinetic action if that fails. This could include a formal complaint with evidence, tasking the non-Western monitoring and peacekeeping mission with investigating, and in the worst-case scenario, drone or missile strikes against those targets.

On-the-ground military activity by either party would be strictly prohibited since that would violate the terms of the armistice and instantly risk another conflict, ergo the purpose of the non-Western monitoring and peacekeeping mission along the DMZ, the Dnieper, and around Eastern Kiev for deterring this. There could also be previously agreed and very severe economic, financial, and other consequences from Western and non-Western countries that would immediately enter into effect if that happens.

Basically, the Trans-Dnieper region would function as a no-man’s land or buffer zone, and the locals who feel uncomfortable living there could either relocate elsewhere in Ukraine such as west of the Dnieper or take advantage of Russia’s simplified procedure from summer 2022 for moving eastward instead. As can be seen, the proposal for a demilitarized Trans-Dnieper region that would be monitored and maintained by non-Western peacekeepers would greatly keep the pace, hence why Russia must demand it.

Any armistice or peace treaty that doesn’t include this outcome risks being unilaterally violated by Ukraine with Western encouragement after some time. Its terms, especially those involving severe multidimensional consequences against whichever party sends ground forces into this zone (though importantly not for carrying out surgical strikes), should also reassure the West that Russia won’t violate this deal either. That’s why the US would do well to seriously consider this proposal if Russia brings it up.

Should Russia settle for less by only demanding what Bloomberg reported, then it would be tacitly requesting nothing more than a temporary lull in hostilities to prepare for the next inevitable phase of the conflict. Officially speaking, Russia remains determined to reach a lasting peace that preferably meets as many of its maximum goals as is realistically possible given the new circumstances in which it now finds itself after over 1,000 days of conflict, so it should be receptive to the Trans-Dnieper proposal.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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The US’ Coercion Of Panama Over The Canal Presages Impending Military Tensions With China

The US’ Coercion Of Panama Over The Canal Presages Impending Military Tensions With China

By Andrew Korybko

The US wants to preemptively neutralize as many of the means as possible through which China could asymmetrically respond to this scenario in plausibly deniable ways such as by having its company that controls port facilities on both sides of the canal shut down transit in the event of a crisis.

Panamanian President Jose Raul Mulino declared after meeting with Secretary of State Marco Rubio that his country’s 2017 memorandum of understanding with China on the Belt & Road Initiative won’t be renewed and that it might even terminate the deal earlier. His policy shift was preceded by Trump threatening that “something very powerful is going to happen” if Panama doesn’t neutralize China’s influence over the canal and follows Rubio elaborating on the US’ perceived threat assessment.

He told Megyn Kelly last week that the Hong Kong-based company which built port facilities on both sides of the canal is under the Chinese government’s control and could thus shut down transit through that waterway as part of Beijing’s contingency planning in the event of a crisis with Washington. It’s unimportant whether others share this assessment since all that matters is that this is how Trump 2.0 sees everything and is the reason why it’s coercing Panama over the canal.

That observation presages impending Sino-US military tensions since the US wouldn’t preemptively make these moves without expecting a possible worsening of relations with China. Trump already escalated his famous trade war with China over the weekend by imposing additional 10% tariffs on it but that on its own likely won’t lead to a full-fledged crisis between them. Rather, it’s the US’ opposition to China’s regional territorial claims over Taiwan and the East and South China Seas that could result in this.

Accordingly, there are reasons to expect that the US will more forcefully push back against those aforesaid claims in the coming future, ergo the need to secure the Panama Canal just in case tensions spiral out of control and Beijing orders its company there to shut down transit as a plausibly deniable asymmetrical response. That could greatly harm the US economy together with greatly impeding the US Navy’s ability to rapidly build up its capabilities in the Indo-Pacific in response to a regional crisis there.

Trump 1.0’s National Security Strategy in 2017 already declared China to be the US’ strategic competitor so it follows that his second administration would build upon that by more muscularly containing China. Prior to that, it’s imperative that the US preemptively neutralizes as many of the means as possible through which China could asymmetrically respond to that in plausibly deniable ways, with the Panama Canal scenario being among Trump 2.0’s priorities due to its importance in American grand strategy.

Likewise, remaining bogged down in Eastern Europe fighting a hopeless proxy war with Russia that Rubio admitted that Ukraine can’t win and is actually leading to its destruction has kept tens of thousands of US troops on the other side of Eurasia, hence the need to end the conflict sooner than later so they can subsequently redeploy to the Indo-Pacific for containing China instead. This explains the urgency with which Trump 2.0 wants to at least freeze that conflict and might thus make some concessions to Russia.

Readers can learn more about how that might look here, which is beyond the scope of this analysis, but the point is that everything that Trump is now doing on the world stage is connected in one way or another to his administration’s preparations for impending military tensions with China. Some plans like neutralizing China’s influence over the Panama Canal are more clear-cut while others like his threats to tariff the EU aren’t as easily understandable in this context but they’re all perceived by him in this way.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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The US Will Struggle To Get Europe To Abide By Putin’s Demand To Stop Arming Ukraine

The US Will Struggle To Get Europe To Abide By Putin’s Demand To Stop Arming Ukraine

By Andrew Korybko

A compromise is possible whereby the Europeans are pressured by the US into stockpiling their Ukrainian-destined arms in Poland and Romania for swift shipment across the border if hostilities re-erupt sometime after a ceasefire, armistice, or peace treaty is agreed to.

The official Kremlin readout from Putin’s most recent phone call with Trump shared Putin’s demand that “a complete cessation of providing Kiev with foreign military aid and intelligence must become the key condition for preventing an escalation of the conflict and making progress towards its resolution.” Trump’s temporary suspension of such assistance proves that he has the political will to shut it off for good if he gets what he wants from negotiations with Putin, but the Europeans are a different story.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Trump during a Cabinet meeting on Monday before the end of the 12-hour-long Russian-US talks in Riyadh that day that “You’ve [promoted despite] despite impediments from other countries”, which was arguably an allusion to the Europeans’ warmongering. Although deliberately vague, he might very well have been referring to the EU’s and UK’s plans to continue arming Ukraine in spite of Putin’s demand that this cease as one of his most important conditions for peace.

Poland, Romania, and the Black Sea in descending order serve as the entry points for foreign weapons into Ukraine, none of which the US has full control over. It jointly operates the Rzeszow logistics hub in south-eastern Poland through which an estimated 90-95% of all weapons to Ukraine pass but this facility can continue functioning even if the US pulls out. The situation is similar with Romania’s newly built “Moldova Highway” for facilitating the shipment of arms from Greek ports to Ukraine.

The US military only jointly operates local port facilities in Alexandroupolis while having no direct influence over the “Moldova Highway”, both of which can also continue functioning without it. As for the Black Sea, the new grain deal that the US is negotiating with Russia could either lead to international checks on cargo for detecting arms trafficking or create a plausible cover for this trade. In any case, just like the preceding two, the point is that others besides the US can rely on this route too.

Trump is unlikely to threaten economic sanctions against nominal NATO allies whose countries continue to arm Ukraine even if his own decides to cut it off for good as part of the series of pragmatic compromises that it’s negotiating with Russia for sustainably ending the conflict. The only scenario in which he might rally Congress to pass another arms package is if Russia significantly expands its ground campaign beyond the regions that it claims as its own as was discussed here.

As long as that doesn’t happen, then the US’ Biden-era aid will soon run out and Ukraine will then be entirely dependent on European aid, but it’s unclear whether that drastic curtailment in aid (also keeping in mind their already greatly depleted stockpiles) would suffice for Russia to cease hostilities. Putin might agree to it as part of the series of pragmatic compromises that he’s negotiating with Trump, or he could still lean on his counterpart to exert more pressure on the Europeans to follow in his footsteps.

Trump’s hands would be tied in the second scenario as was just explained, but he could also lead from the front by suggesting that the Europeans instead stockpile the equipment that they want to send to Ukraine in Poland and Romania per their “security guarantee” commitments to Kiev. These refer to the bilateral pacts clinched last year whereby major countries like the UK, France, Poland, Italy, and the US itself basically agreed to resume their existing level of support for Ukraine if hostilities re-erupt.

Whatever weapons the Europeans might still send to Ukraine wouldn’t compensate for the cut-off of US aid so they’d be transferring their equipment to be destroyed for no purpose other than delaying the inevitable political resolution of the conflict, by which time Russia could even gain more ground. Putin might of course prefer for NATO not to stockpile anything in proximity to Ukraine’s borders for swift shipment across if there’s a continuation war, but Russia can’t control what they do on their territory.

Trump and his team would therefore do well to convey these points to the Europeans in order to facilitate the Ukrainian peace process. Putin might not agree to a ceasefire or armistice so long as the Europeans continue arming Ukraine, which would be futile on their part in any case, while they’d just be wasting their weapons that could otherwise be put to better use if hostilities re-erupt and the US thus restores its prior level of support for Ukraine. This proposed compromise might lead to a breakthrough.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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2025-03-12 17:57:50

Will Putin Agree To A Ceasefire?

Will Putin Agree To A Ceasefire?

By Andrew Korybko

There are five compelling arguments for either scenario.

Ukraine just agreed to a month-long ceasefire after talks with the US in Jeddah, but it’s conditional on Russia agreeing to the same, which remains uncertain. Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff is expected to pay his second trip to Moscow in just as many months later this week, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz plans to speak to Russian officials soon, while Trump said that he hopes to talk to Putin by Friday. All three will try to convince Putin to silence the guns. Here’s why he might not agree to do that:

———-

1. Russia Wants To Liberate All The Occupied Territories

Putin declared last June that he’d only agree to a ceasefire if Ukraine withdrew from the entirety of the four regions that voted to join Russia in September 2022 and publicly abandoned its plans to join NATO. That was shortly before Ukraine invaded Russia’s universally recognized Kursk Region. Agreeing to a ceasefire now with no guarantee that it’ll lead to the liberation of those five regions could result in the indefinite occupation of at least some of them if the front lines harden into a Korean-DMZ.

2. The Front Lines Might Soon Collapse To Russia’s Benefit

It’s obvious that one of the primary reasons why Ukraine agreed to a month-long ceasefire conditional on Russia agreeing to the same, apart from resuming the US’ previously cut military and intelligence aid, is to prevent the front lines from soon collapsing to Russia’s benefit. Aware of this, Russia might decide to carry on – perhaps advancing while negotiating additional terms to the proposed ceasefire – in order to take full advantage of this, thus raising the chances of speedily liberating all the occupied territories.

3. Russia Wants To Scare Away Western Peacekeepers

European peacekeepers might enter Ukraine during the month-long ceasefire, or some of their “mercenaries” who are already there might simply switch uniforms to then take on this role instead, which Russia already said would be absolutely unacceptable and make them legitimate targets. Keeping the conflict going might therefore scare them away from this and thus ensure that de facto NATO forces are kept as far away from Russia’s western border as possible.

4. Some Of The Russian Public Don’t Want A Ceasefire

A significant share of the Russian public, including veterans of the special operation, are thought to be against any ceasefire since they’d consider it to be stopping halfway instead of finishing the job after all the sacrifices that were paid to get this far. The authorities are sensitive to public opinion on the conflict, especially from veterans, so their opposition to this might be taken into consideration more than outside observers expect and could thus push Putin a lot closer to rejecting a ceasefire than most other factors.

5. Putin Might Really Believe That Trump Is Bluffing

And finally, the most decisive factor might be that Putin truly believes that Trump is bluffing about “escalating to de-escalate”, whether economically-financially through the strict enforcement of secondary sanctions against India, China, etc., and/or militarily by going all-in backing Ukraine. If that’s the case, then it follows that Putin only entertained negotiations to see whether he could achieve his maximum goals through diplomatic means, absent which he’d continue pursuing them militarily.

—–

There’s also the chance that Putin agrees to a ceasefire, which could be explained in the following ways:

1. Russia Wants To Avert Disproportionate Dependence On China

Trump’s tweet last Friday suggested that he plans strict secondary sanctions enforcement against India and China if Putin rejects a ceasefire, which could lead to the first complying and thus placing Russia in the position where it would become much more dependent on the second. Russia has thus far relied on India as its friendly counterbalance vis-a-vis China, but if Putin is informed that this might no longer be the case if Russia keeps fighting, then he might opt for peace to avoid becoming China’s junior partner.

2. It Also Wants To Beat China To The Chase With The “New Détente”

Putin wouldn’t just be rejecting a ceasefire, but also a “New Détente” with the US, which could lead to China replacing Russia in this arrangement if Trump travels to China next month like the latest reports claim and then negotiates a deal for ending their trade war. The recalibrated triangulation that might follow wouldn’t be in Russia’s interests, especially if the US gets China to comply with sanctions in order to coerce Russia into peace, so Putin might agree to a ceasefire in order to avert this scenario as well.

3. The “New Détente” Could Geopolitically Revolutionize The World

Putin might calculate that beating China to the chase with the “New Détente” and becoming more of a strategic partner to the US than the EU are worth pragmatic compromises on Ukraine since these two outcomes could geopolitically revolutionize the world to Russia’s grand strategic advantage. If that’s what he’s thinking, then he might defy popular expectations to boldly agree to a ceasefire, after which publicly financed media would explain the rationale to Russia’s supporters at home and abroad.

4. Additional (& Even Secret) Terms Might Be Attached To The Ceasefire

Building upon the above, additional (and even secret) terms might be attached to the ceasefire for guaranteeing that Western peacekeepers won’t enter Ukraine and that the US won’t maximally rearm it during that period, which Russia could get the US to agree to via creative resource diplomacy. Giving the US privileged access to Russian energy and minerals, especially the rare earth ones that it needs for competing with China, might be all that it takes for Trump to put the kibosh on those two aforesaid fears.

5. Putin Might Really Believe That Trump Is Serious

And finally, the most decisive factor might be that Putin truly believes that Trump is serious about “escalating to de-escalate”, in which case he might prefer not to risk a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis that could hypothetically end with Russia compromising on much more than if it agreed to a ceasefire. Putin is a pragmatist who prefers managing tensions instead of exacerbating them, with the only recent exception being the decision to use the Oreshniks as explained here, so he might take Trump up on this.

———-

Everyone will soon find out whether or not Putin agrees to a ceasefire, but whichever decision he makes, the five reasons that were shared for each scenario would compellingly explain his choice. It’s anyone’s guess what he’ll do since each scenario’s arguments are persuasive and he knows that this is his most fateful decision since the special operation. Putin might therefore ask their respective Kremlin proponents to debate amongst themselves in front of him one last time before making up his mind.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Trump may meet Xi in China as soon as April despite escalating trade war, insiders say

US President Donald Trump could visit China as early as next month, according to multiple diplomatic sources, as the American leader has appeared focused on ...

^{South China Morning Post (Yahoo News)}

Putin’s Victory Day Truce Is Meant To Reassure Trump Of His Peaceful Intentions

Putin’s Victory Day Truce Is Meant To Reassure Trump Of His Peaceful Intentions

By Andrew Korybko

Putin might be concerned that Zelensky manipulated Trump against him after their latest meeting given Trump’s subsequent angry post about Putin.

The Kremlin announced on Monday that Russia will temporarily suspend military action against Ukraine from midnight on May 7-8 to midnight on May 10-11 for humanitarian reasons in honour of Victory Day. Just like with the recent Easter truce, however, Russia also warned that there’ll be an “adequate and effective response” if Ukraine violates it. The larger context in which this second Russian-initiated truce in recent weeks is taking place concerns Trump’s increasing irritation with Putin.

It was earlier explained how “Five Significant Disagreements Account For Trump’s Newfound Anger With Putin” that manifested itself over the weekend by Trump speculating in a post that “maybe [Putin] doesn’t want to stop the war, he’s just tapping me along”. Trump also threatened banking and secondary sanctions. At the same time, however, Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that new sanctions would prolong the conflict by promptly ending the peace process so Trump might just be bluffing for now.

Be that as it may, Putin might have interpreted Trump’s post as proof of him having been negatively influenced by Zelensky following their latest meeting at the Vatican the day prior during Pope Francis’ funeral, which could explain why he decided upon a Victory Day truce and then announced it so early. Regardless of whatever observers might think about Russia’s terms for ending the conflict, not to mention their feasibility, Putin’s move is arguably meant to reassure Trump of his peaceful intentions.

Putin isn’t “tapping Trump along”, he’s just reluctant to agree to what Reuters reported to be the terms of the US’ finalized peace plan, which entail major concessions that would basically freeze the conflict in exchange for sanctions relief without addressing some of Russia’s core demands. These include Ukraine’s demilitarization and restoring its minorities’ socio-religious rights, especially those of ethnic Russians and Russian Orthodox Christians, though Ukraine’s path to NATO would be blocked if this deal is reached.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov recently confirmed that Russia isn’t seeking Zelensky’s removal and is ready to resume bilateral negotiations without any preconditions, but neither should be interpreted as capitulation, just as attempts to get Ukraine to comply with more of Russia’s demands. Lavrov repeated these selfsame demands in his latest interview with Brazil’s O Globo newspaper, though at the same time, he also just told CBS’ Margaret Brennan that Russia is seeking a “balance of interests”.

This should be interpreted as a sincere willingness to compromise in some creative way that meets more of Russia’s demands, but the Kremlin claimed on Monday that Ukraine has shown no interest in this. Even so, while Russia hopes that the newly announced Victory Day truce might get Ukraine to reconsider, Putin’s primary objective right now is to convince Trump that he’s serious about peace. To that end, once again temporarily ceasing hostilities can help, though it can only do so much.

If tangible progress towards peace isn’t soon achieved, then the US might abandon its mediation efforts, the consequences of which were analysed here. In that scenario, it can’t be ruled out that the US might double down on its armed aid to Ukraine in parallel with imposing secondary sanctions against Russia, which Putin doesn’t want to risk. That’s why he just announced another truce, and so early at that, in order to show Trump that he still wants to attain more of his goals through diplomacy instead of force.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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The UK’s 100-Year Partnership Pact With Ukraine Is Just A Public Relations Stunt

The UK’s 100-Year Partnership Pact With Ukraine Is Just A Public Relations Stunt

By Andrew Korybko

In terms of the bigger picture, the UK definitely wants to play a long-term and highly strategic role in Ukraine, but the extent to which it can execute its lofty plans as contained in last January’s “security guarantee” pact and their latest rehash last week largely depends on the US.

The UK and Ukraine clinched a 100-year partnership pact on Thursday in a development that’s supposed to highlight their enduring commitment to one another, but it’s really just a public relations stunt since the document only rehashes what was previously agreed upon a year ago. The UK extended so-called “security guarantees” to Ukraine on 12 January 2024, which covered everything contained in their latest pact, with the notable exception being that the latter talks about “exploring options” for “military bases”.

While RT importantly drew attention to this, the UK never made a secret about its plans to move in that direction, but the century-long timeframe means that it might not happen in anyone’s lifetime, if at all. This declaration of intent was seemingly timed to coincide with Trump’s return to office since it correspondingly serves morale-boosting purposes among Western and Ukrainian anti-Russian hawks amidst his team’s signals that the US will at least partially disengage from that country moving forward.

Trump’s nominee for Secretary of State Marco Rubio declared during his Senate confirmation hearing the day prior on Wednesday that “This war must end. Everyone should be realistic: Russia, Ukraine, and the US will have to make concessions.” The writing was already on the wall long before that, however, so no one should be surprised. This reinforces the claim that the UK’s 100-year partnership pact with Ukraine, the intent of which was hitherto unknown till this week, is just a superficial response to Trump.

To be sure, some part of their “security guarantees” will probably enter into force, such as more joint arms production. The establishment of a British base in Ukraine is unlikely anytime soon though since it’s unthinkable that Trump would agree to have the US defend the UK per Article 5 if its troops there come under attack by Russia. After all, he wants to partially disengage from Ukraine so as to “Pivot (back) to Asia”, but the aforesaid scenario is a Damocles’ sword preventing that from ever occurring in full.

The British aren’t expected to build such a base without American reassurance that it’ll have their back in that event, but even if they did, it’s almost certain that the US would coerce the UK to back down should London decide to provoke a Cuban-like nuclear brinksmanship scenario if its forces are attacked. That associated clause in their 100-year partnership pact about “exploring” this “option” is therefore the embodiment of this public relations spectacle that might even be forgotten by as early as next week.

In terms of the bigger picture, the UK definitely wants to play a long-term and highly strategic role in Ukraine, but the extent to which it can execute its lofty plans as contained in last January’s “security guarantee” pact and their latest rehash last week largely depends on the US as explained. So long as it successfully disengages from Ukraine at least in part and doesn’t allow for Article 5 to be activated for foreign troops in Ukraine who come under attack from Russia, then these ambitions will be contained.

This observation goes to show just how much the US determines the military-strategic dynamics in post-conflict Ukraine. By behaving responsibly in compromising with Russia, especially if some of the dozen ideas that were proposed at the end of this article here are implemented or at least this proposal here for a demilitarized Trans-Dnieper region, the US can greatly reduce the risk of another war breaking out. The UK wants to further divide-and-rule Europe, but it’ll struggle to succeed if the US isn’t on board.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Five Significant Disagreements Account For Trump’s Newfound Anger With Putin

Five Significant Disagreements Account For Trump’s Newfound Anger With Putin

By Andrew Korybko

The peace process might go kaput if they can’t resolve these issues.

Trump speculated that Russia’s bombing of civilian areas might signal that “maybe [Putin] doesn’t want to stop the war, he’s just tapping me along”, and then reiterated his earlier threat to impose “secondary sanctions” against those who violate the US’ primary ones, which was analysed here. This followed Trump’s latest meeting with Zelensky, who might have negatively influenced over his hitherto largely positive perceptions of Putin, and comes after reports that the US has finalized its peace plan.

Five significant disagreements that have emerged throughout the course of negotiations account for Trump’s volte-face toward Putin.

1. The first was referenced by Trump in his post where he condemned Russia’s bombing of civilian areas. Putin argued earlier in April that Russia is targeting Ukrainian troops there, but the optics of continued Russian strikes against civilian areas amidst peace talks with the US evidently left a very negative impression on Trump, who now doubts Putin’s commitment to peace.
2. The second concerns European peacekeepers in Ukraine, which the US’ reportedly finalized peace plan suggests despite Russia opposing it. Although Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth already declared that the US won’t extend Article 5 mutual defence guarantees to NATO countries’ troops in Ukraine, Russia fears that the US could be manipulated by the Europeans into mission creep if the latter deploy there. Putin therefore prefers for there to be no ambiguity about this and for Trump to scrub it from his plan.
3. Third, it’s unclear whether Ukraine will be obligated to at least partially demilitarize like Kiev provisionally agreed to do during spring 2022’s ultimately failed peace talks, which is one of Russia’s explicitly declared goals in the conflict. Trump is reluctant to support this since he seems to believe that it could embolden Putin to recommence hostilities in the future, especially in the absence of European peacekeepers, but this demand isn’t something that Putin could easily walk away from.
4. The fourth disagreement is over the US’ refusal to accede to Russia’s demand for coercing Ukraine into withdrawing from the disputed territories that are still under Kiev’s control. The New York Times cited a source who described this as “unreasonable and unachievable”, but it’s imperative for Russia after the Kremlin recognized the entirety of these regions as Russian following September 2022’s referenda. Just like with demilitarization, Putin also can’t easily walk away from this either, hence the disagreement.
5. And finally, the US’ reportedly finalized peace plan also requests that Russia hand over the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant and Kakhovka Dam to the US, which is as unacceptable for Putin as the preceding points of accepting European peacekeepers, dropping demilitarization, and curbing his territorial claims.

All five disagreements, including the first-mentioned one about Russia’s continued strikes against military targets in civilian areas, collectively contributed to this impasse right before the diplomatic finish line.

If Putin and Trump can’t resolve these issues, after which Trump would then also have to get Zelensky to agree to their new deal, then the peace process will probably go kaput. Putin and Trump are incentivized to resolve their disputes due to how mutually beneficial the nascent Russian–US “New Détente” is while Zelensky would struggle to continue fighting if the US once again cuts off military aid as punishment for rejecting whatever those two agree to. Be that as it may, it’ll still be very difficult to break this deadlock.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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Zelensky Might Have An Ace Up His Sleeve If He Decides To Run Again

Zelensky Might Have An Ace Up His Sleeve If He Decides To Run Again

By Andrew Korybko

The staggering scale of Ukraine’s military losses likely isn’t reflected in its voter lists, which Zelensky might thus exploit to fraudulently help him win re-election through an avalanche of fake votes.

The Economist cited unnamed Ukrainian sources over the weekend to report that Zelensky might be planning to run for re-election during a deliberately short campaign season that could conclude by mid-summer and thus place his rivals at a major disadvantage by giving them less time to make their case. He’s considering this as a means of preventing Trump and Putin, who he believes are conspiring against him whether on their own or together, from pushing him out of power through upcoming elections.

Zelensky might have an ace up his sleeve if he goes through with this plan, however, since it’s likely that many of the soldiers who were killed might not have been taken off of the Central Election Commission’s voter lists. This could then be exploited to fraudulently help him win re-election through an avalanche of fake votes. After all, Zelensky claimed earlier this year that Ukraine only lost around 46,000 troops, while Russian sources usually allege that over ten times that amount have been killed so far.

For what it’s worth, the latest exchange of fallen soldiers saw Ukraine receive 909 bodies and Russia 43, which is a 21:1 ratio. It’s therefore likely that Russian estimates of Ukrainian losses are closer to reality than Zelensky’s are. That probably being the case, it can consequently be intuited that the yawning discrepancy between Kiev’s official figures and reality isn’t officially reflected in the voter lists. If the latter were updated, then Zelensky wouldn’t be able to keep up the charade of only 46,000 losses.

His government can’t admit that many times more soldiers were killed otherwise morale would plummet, all their prior lies would be exposed, and he’d be further discredited. Accordingly, there’s little chance that he’d allow the voter lists to be updated to reflect the staggering scale of his side’s losses, especially since keeping them hidden could facilitate electoral fraud. There’s no reason why he’d deprive himself of this after already illegitimately remaining in power since the expiry of his term last May.

To the contrary, he has every reason to ensure that Ukraine’s losses aren’t reflected in the voter lists, which he could accomplish by leveraging his influence over corrupt institutions. Anyone who leaks the truth about this, whether with respect to Ukraine’s real losses or his potential attempt to defraud the next elections through these means, could be arrested by the SBU on “national security” pretexts. Ukraine is already a police state in which this agency wields full control so it’s not a far-fetched scenario.

It’s here where the US could make a difference by publicly releasing its official estimates of Ukraine’s losses and demanding that the voter lists are updated to reflect them as the precondition for recognizing the outcome of the next elections. Zelensky would thus be forced into the dilemma of either openly defying the US and correspondingly discrediting the electoral process in the world’s eyes or complying and correspondingly discrediting himself at home by exposing his own prior lies about Ukraine’s losses.

It’ll also take time to properly update the voter lists, and the US might even demand that it supervises this process to reduce the likelihood of fraud, which could extend the amount of time that it takes and therefore result in a longer campaign season than he might be planning. That would assuredly help his rivals, who the US might then back to help push Zelensky out through these means as Trump’s revenge for their fight in the White House in late February. It’ll be interesting to see what comes next.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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