Here’s What Comes Next After Putin And Trump Just Agreed To Start Peace Talks
Here’s What Comes Next After Putin And Trump Just Agreed To Start Peace Talks
The path ahead will be very difficult due to the sensitive issues that Russia and the US must resolve.
12 February 2025 will go down in history as the day when the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine officially began to end. Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth started everything off by declaring that: Ukraine won’t join NATO; the US doesn’t believe that Ukraine can restore its pre-2014 borders; the US won’t deploy troops to the conflict zone; the US wants the Europeans to assume some peacekeeping responsibilities there instead; but the US won’t extend Article 5 guarantees to EU forces there.
This was followed by Trump and Putin talking for the first time since the former returned to office. They agreed to begin peace talks without delay, which was followed by Trump calling Zelensky to brief him about this and likely coerce the concessions from him that he presumably promised Putin. Trump also suggested that he’ll soon meet Putin in Saudi Arabia and that each of them might then visit each other’s countries as part of the peace process. Here are some background briefings about the larger context:
* 3 January: “Creative Energy Diplomacy Can Lay The Basis For A Grand Russian-American Deal”
* 17 January: “The Merits Of A Demilitarized ‘Trans-Dnieper’ Region Controlled By Non-Western Peacekeepers”
* 3 February: “Territorial Concessions Might Precede A Ceasefire That Leads To New Ukrainian Elections”
* 4 February: “Trump’s Interest In Ukraine’s Rare Earth Minerals Might Backfire On Zelensky”
* 7 February: “Trump’s Special Envoy Shed More Light On His Boss’ Ukrainian Peace Plan”
The first analysis about creative energy diplomacy contains a dozen proposed compromises for each side that could help move their talks along. In fact, the one about the US not extending Article 5 guarantees to EU forces in Ukraine is now policy per Hegseth, so it’s possible that some others might follow. Additionally, Trump just remarked about how unpopular Zelensky has become, which suggests that he’s planning the “phased leadership transition” via new elections that was also proposed in that piece.
It remains to be seen which of these other proposals might soon become US policy, with the same being said for the ones that Russia might implement, such as agreeing to limited military restrictions on its side of the DMZ that’ll likely be created by the end of this process for example. What follows are the five main issues that’ll shape the Russian-US peace talks on Ukraine between their leaders, diplomats, and whichever of their experts might be invited to participate in this via complementary Track II talks:
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* Territorial Parameters
The most immediate issue that must be resolved is where the new Russian-Ukrainian border will fall. Hegseth’s claim about Ukraine’s inability to restore its pre-2014 border hints that Trump could coerce Zelensky into withdrawing from at least all of Donbass, which is at the centre of the territorial dimension of their conflict, though it’s possible that his forces might fall back as far as Zaporozhye city. Letting Russia control that city and the parts of its new regions west of the Dnieper is unlikely at this time.
That’s because Trump might not want to take the flak that would follow giving Russia a city of over 700,000 whose residents didn’t vote in September 2022’s referendum. The same goes for the parts of Russia’s new regions west of the river. Instead, he might propose a UN-supervised referendum sometime after the fighting freezes to resolve this aspect of their territorial dispute, all while allowing Russia to continue to officially lay claim to those areas. That might be pragmatic enough for Putin to agree.
* DMZ Terms & Peacekeeper Roles
The next issue to address after the above are the terms of the DMZ along their interim border and the role of the peacekeepers who’d then likely deploy there to monitor it. Hegseth’s declaration that the US will not extend Article 5 guarantees to EU forces there could deter them from playing a major role, which Russia would have to authorize via a UNSC Resolution in any case per Permanent Representative Vasily Nebenzia otherwise they’ll be legitimate targets. Non-Western ones are thus much more agreeable.
As it turns out, the vast majority of UN peacekeepers are from non-Western countries, so they could prospectively deploy there under a UNSC mandate per Nebenzia’s suggestion and possibly even result in the total exclusion of any Western peacekeepers if it’s agreed that none will contribute to this mission. Their terms would have to be acceptable to both Russia and the US in order for this resolution to pass, so it’s unclear exactly what they’ll be able to do or not do, but that directly segues into the next issue.
* Demilitarization & Denazification
Two of Russia’s main goals in the special operation are to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, which it initially sought to do by militarily coercing Ukraine into this per the terms established in spring 2022’s draft peace treaty, though that didn’t succeed due to the UK and Poland. It’s unrealistic to imagine that Trump will agree to let Russia deploy its armed forces throughout the entirety of Ukraine to implement this so it can only be accomplished through similar diplomatic means involving Kiev’s acquiescence.
Therein lies the possible role that UN peacekeepers can play in monitoring and enforcing whatever is ultimately agreed upon for demilitarizing and denazifying Ukraine. This could take the form of inspecting suspected illegal arms sites and all of Ukraine’s cross-border traffic (including at its ports) while having the right to mandate changes to its media reporting and school curricula as need be. This is the only way to ensure that Ukraine remains demilitarized and denazified after the conflict ends.
* Sanctions Relief
Russia has repeatedly demanded the lifting of all Western sanctions, but the argument can be made that “deal-master” Trump wouldn’t ever agree to do this all at once, instead preferring to draft a plan for phased sanctions relief as a reward for Russia’s compliance with a ceasefire, armistice, or peace treaty. This could take the form of what was proposed in the creative energy diplomacy analysis whereby some Russian exports to the EU could resume during the first phase as a trust-building measure.
While Russia would prefer that they all be immediately lifted, its policymakers might conclude that it’s better to accept a phased plan if that’s all that Trump is comfortable offering instead of nothing at all. He’d do well though to engage in the goodwill gesture of lifting sanctions on Russia’s oil exports by sea too since that could convince those policymakers that he’s serious about relieving pressure on Russia. This would in turn make it easier for Putin to sell the compromise of phased sanctions relief at home.
* New Security Architecture
Russia envisaged creating a new European security architecture through mutual agreements with the US and NATO in December 2021 per the security guarantee requests that it shared with them at the time. These were in hindsight meant to diplomatically resolve their security dilemma, whose roots are in NATO’s continued eastward expansion after the Old Cold War and especially its clandestine expansion into Ukraine, in lieu of the special operation that Putin was secretly planning at the time if that failed.
So much has changed since then that separate comprehensive talks on this must start right after whatever agreement they reach on Ukraine. The new issues include NATO’s eastern military buildup, Finland and Sweden’s new memberships, Russia’s hypersonic Oreshniks, their deployment to Belarus, Russia’s deployment of nukes there too, the future of the New START that expires next year, and the new space arms race, et al. Agreeing on a new security architecture will therefore stabilize the world.
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As can be seen, the path ahead will be very difficult due to the sensitive issues that Russia and the US must resolve, but their leaders have shown that they have the will to negotiate in good faith. Neither side is likely to achieve their maximum objectives, but diplomacy is the art of the possible, so each will do their utmost to achieve as much as they can in this regard given the circumstances. The best-case scenario is a fair and lasting peace that truly resolves the root causes at the core of this conflict.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
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The Merits Of A Demilitarized “Trans-Dnieper” Region Controlled By Non-Western Peacekeepers
The Merits Of A Demilitarized “Trans-Dnieper” Region Controlled By Non-Western PeacekeepersThis proposal is the most realistic means for keeping the peace after an armistice.
Bloomberg cited unnamed “people with knowledge of Kremlin thinking” to report that Russia will only demand that Ukraine restore its constitutional neutrality, “drastically cut back military ties with the NATO alliance”, limit its army, and freeze the front lines, albeit with some territorial swaps. Also, “The Kremlin’s position is that while individual NATO members may continue to send arms to Ukraine under bilateral security agreements, any such weapons should not be used against Russia or to recapture territory.”
To be sure, Bloomberg might have either invented their sources or they’re uninformed of what the Kremlin thinks, but there’s also the possibility that they’re accurately reflecting what it plans to ask for during peace talks. Hopefully Russia’s demands of Ukraine are more than what Bloomberg just reported, however, because the aforesaid requests would be settling for much less than it might otherwise be able to achieve as suggested by some of the proposals made at the end of this analysis here.
For instance, any agreement to limit the Ukrainian Armed Forces is meaningless without a monitoring mission paired with credible enforcement mechanisms to enforce compliance. After all, even written guarantees that individual NATO members won’t arm Ukraine for the purpose of using these weapons against Russia or to recapture territory – not to mention purely verbal ones – could be broken. There’s also the question of how Russia would respond to future drone and missile strikes from Ukraine.
The most realistic way to address these concerns is through the participation of only non-Western countries in monitoring and peacekeeping roles, the latter of which could concern deployment along the entire Russian-Ukrainian border, including the Line of Contact (LOC). About the second-mentioned, the reported territorial swaps could see Russia give back its part of Kharkov Oblast in exchange for Ukraine giving back its part of Kursk Oblast, which each would formally retain their territorial claims to the other.
This would restore the status quo ante bellum along that part of their universally recognized frontier while serving as a legal workaround against their respective constitutional prohibitions on ceding territory, which in Russia’s case is absolute while Ukraine’s requires a national referendum. Accordingly, freezing the LOC through an armistice a la the Korean precedent wouldn’t violate either of their laws, thus retaining Ukraine’s claims to the entirety of its pre-2014 borders and Russia’s to its post-2022 ones.
As for effectively keeping the peace, Russia could be more confidently assured that Ukraine won’t unilaterally violate the armistice with Western encouragement if the proposed non-Western monitoring and peacekeeping contingent is allowed to inspect all trains and cars that cross the Dnieper eastward. Ukraine might undertake a long-term clandestine campaign to rebuild its heavy weaponry presence in proximity to the DMZ ahead of a possible sneak attack so this would be imperative for impeding that.
Likewise, since such equipment could also be smuggled across the river, these forces should also be given the means for patrolling it as well as the right to detain people, seize their contraband, and use lethal force if they come under attack. Kiev should have a special regime since it’s difficult to enforce such checks given the capital’s location on both sides of the river, but one possibility is fencing off its north-eastern, eastern, and south-eastern reaches beyond the city’s limits and conducting checks there.
The ideal scenario should be to demilitarize everything east of the Dnieper and north of the LOC that remains under Kiev’s formal control, the so-called “Trans-Dnieper” region for lack of a better description, while having its DMZ manned by Russia’s closest non-Western partners. The first part of this suggestion would prevent Ukraine from unilaterally violating the armistice while the second would do the same with regards to Russia since it would be loath to attack Indian and other such friendly peacekeepers.
This proposal takes for granted that NATO will continue expanding its influence in Western Ukraine along that side of the Dnieper, but the river will serve as a major obstacle to on-the-ground offensive action by either party, all while they presumably concentrate air defence systems up and down its banks. It’s unrealistic to expect Russia to plant boots its boots on the NATO-Ukrainian border, monitor everything that crosses, and then hold these positions indefinitely as explained here so this is the next best solution.
In the event that Russia or Ukraine detects illegal military activity by the other in the Trans-Dnieper region such as prohibited arms and special forces, then they should already have a protocol agreed upon as part of their armistice for peacefully addressing this prior to resorting to kinetic action if that fails. This could include a formal complaint with evidence, tasking the non-Western monitoring and peacekeeping mission with investigating, and in the worst-case scenario, drone or missile strikes against those targets.
On-the-ground military activity by either party would be strictly prohibited since that would violate the terms of the armistice and instantly risk another conflict, ergo the purpose of the non-Western monitoring and peacekeeping mission along the DMZ, the Dnieper, and around Eastern Kiev for deterring this. There could also be previously agreed and very severe economic, financial, and other consequences from Western and non-Western countries that would immediately enter into effect if that happens.
Basically, the Trans-Dnieper region would function as a no-man’s land or buffer zone, and the locals who feel uncomfortable living there could either relocate elsewhere in Ukraine such as west of the Dnieper or take advantage of Russia’s simplified procedure from summer 2022 for moving eastward instead. As can be seen, the proposal for a demilitarized Trans-Dnieper region that would be monitored and maintained by non-Western peacekeepers would greatly keep the pace, hence why Russia must demand it.
Any armistice or peace treaty that doesn’t include this outcome risks being unilaterally violated by Ukraine with Western encouragement after some time. Its terms, especially those involving severe multidimensional consequences against whichever party sends ground forces into this zone (though importantly not for carrying out surgical strikes), should also reassure the West that Russia won’t violate this deal either. That’s why the US would do well to seriously consider this proposal if Russia brings it up.
Should Russia settle for less by only demanding what Bloomberg reported, then it would be tacitly requesting nothing more than a temporary lull in hostilities to prepare for the next inevitable phase of the conflict. Officially speaking, Russia remains determined to reach a lasting peace that preferably meets as many of its maximum goals as is realistically possible given the new circumstances in which it now finds itself after over 1,000 days of conflict, so it should be receptive to the Trans-Dnieper proposal.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
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