Trump’s Special Envoy Shed More Light On His Boss’ Ukrainian Peace Plan
Trump’s Special Envoy Shed More Light On His Boss’ Ukrainian Peace Plan
Trump will implement a comprehensive economic, diplomatic, and military pressure campaign against Russia if Putin rejects a ceasefire, but it’s unclear whether Trump will coerce Zelensky into territorial concessions first in order to make it easier for Putin to compromise on his prior demands for this.
Trump’s Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg told the New York Post more about how his boss plans to bring Putin to the peace table. According to him, the US might ratchet up its energy-related sanctions on Russia and associated secondary ones on its clients if he refuses. This would occur together with more diplomatic pressure, likely upon China and India to have their leaders convince Putin to reconsider, and “some type of military pressures and levers that you’re going to use underneath those”.
The immediate goal is “to stop the killing — just stop it — and then you go from there”, so in other words, the abovementioned approach would be aimed at getting Russia to agree to a ceasefire. This aligns with what was assessed here in late January about Trump’s plans. The problem though is that Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova confirmed on the same day as Kellogg’s interview that “A temporary ceasefire or, as many say, freezing the conflict, is unacceptable” for Russia.
One day earlier, however, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov suggested that his country’s position on not holding talks with Zelensky due to the Ukrainian leader’s illegitimacy might be reversed for pragmatism’s sake so it’s possible that the aforementioned one about rejecting a ceasefire might be too. That could occur if Trump coerces Zelensky into withdrawing from at least Kursk and Donbass along with declaring that Ukraine won’t join NATO, thus satisfying some of Russia’s goals as recently explained here.
Ukraine would then lift martial law and finally hold its long-delayed elections, which could potentially lead to the US replacing Zelensky like Russia’s foreign spy agency claimed last week is supposedly in the cards. That scenario sequence aligns with Russian and US interests, but it can’t be ruled out that some of the last administration’s Russophobic hawks remain in positions of influence within the US’ “deep state” and end up dissuading Trump from coercing Zelensky into territorial concessions first.
Without Ukraine withdrawing from Kursk and Donbass, it’s unlikely that Putin could justify compromising on last June’s ceasefire demands that Ukraine withdraw from all the territory that Russia claims as its own and declare that it won’t join NATO. He can accept a delay on implementing the second till after the next parliamentary elections since Ukraine’s goal of joining NATO was enshrined as an amendment to the Constitution in 2019 and therefore can’t be removed without parliament’s support.
What Putin would be loath to accept is freezing the Line of Contact (LOC) even if the US coerces Ukraine into withdrawing from Russia’s Kursk Region as a quid pro quo since it would suggest that their sneak attack there last summer forced him to give up on his demands to disputed territory. Lending credence to that interpretation could raise the risk that Ukraine launches another sneak attack elsewhere along their international border if post-election peace talks stall in order to coerce more concessions from him.
Putin might settle for Ukraine only withdrawing from Kursk and Donbass in exchange for a ceasefire since the first is universally recognized as Russian, the second is at the heart of their territorial dispute, and demanding more might provoke the US into enforcing its secondary sanctions against China and India. As Kellogg recently said, sanctions enforcement is “only about a three” on a scale of one to ten so it could be increased if needed, which would put Putin in a tough position if Xi and Modi then pressure him.
China and India could be coerced into drastically curtailing or outright abandoning their large-scale import of discounted Russian oil if the US imposes super-strict Iranian-like sanctions on Russia explicitly aimed at “driv[ing] [its] export of oil to zero” through full secondary sanctions enforcement. The consequences of them complying could spike the price of oil worldwide and throw countless economies into a tailspin, however, which is why the US has thus far eschewed this policy.
Trump already imposed 10% tariffs on China and he’s expected to negotiate hard with India during Modi’s trip to DC late next week, which might even see them launch free trade talks, so each Asian giant has their own self-interested reasons for avoiding any further economic pressure from the US. They might therefore curtail their imports of discounted Russian oil as a compromise to the US in exchange for no secondary sanctions enforcement and to not destabilize the global market instead of defy it on this.
Even in that case, Russia’s foreign revenue flow upon which a share of its state budget depends would be disrupted, which might parallel their leaders pressuring Putin to reconsider his rejection of a ceasefire since it would be indirectly responsible for harming the economic interests of all three. If the “military pressures and levers that [the US is] going to use underneath those” take the form of ramping up arms shipments to Ukraine, including long-range missiles, then it might suffice for prompting a rethink.
There’s also the possibility that Russia “goes rogue” in the sense of continuing to pursue its maximum goals in the conflict in spite of American, Chinese, and Indian pressure, hoping that the Ukrainian frontlines soon collapse and Trump then abandons this geopolitical project instead of tries to salvage it. This “hawkish” thinking on Moscow’s part could be predicted on its decisionmakers assuming that Trump would accept this defeat without fear of it ruining his reputation and won’t escalate to brinksmanship.
While that’s plausible, the counterargument can be made that Trump doesn’t want to bear responsibility for what would be the greatest American geopolitical defeat ever and won’t let the $183 billion that the US invested into this conflict go to waste without at least securing control over Western Ukraine. In that event, Russia might still ultimately be coerced into compromising on its maximum goals but after having needlessly burned bridges with China and India, which could leave it isolated in the post-conflict future.
Returning to the lede, the likelihood of Trump implementing a comprehensive pressure campaign against Russia if Putin rejects a ceasefire in Ukraine might get him to compromise on his original demands for this, though only if Ukraine first withdraws from Kursk and Donbass. It’s in the US’ interests not to perpetuate this conflict since MAGA thought leader Steve Bannon warned that Trump risks his own Vietnam if that happens while Trump is eager to “Pivot (back) to Asia” pronto in order to contain China.
Trump would therefore do well to coerce Zelensky into withdrawing from those two regions instead of “escalating to de-escalate” against Russia if Putin doesn’t agree to simply freeze the LOC. As Kellogg told the New York Post, “Very frankly, both sides in any negotiation have to give; that’s just the way it is in negotiations…Is it gonna be acceptable to everybody? No. But you try to run this balance.” That’s precisely the approach that Trump should follow otherwise he risks derailing his foreign policy agenda.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
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#DonaldTrump #Geopolitics #NATO #Russia #Ukraine #USA
Temporary Ukraine ceasefire unacceptable – Moscow
Russia will never accept a “temporary ceasefire” in the Ukraine conflict and is seeking to resolve it for good, Maria Zakharova has saidRT
The Clock Is Ticking For Russia To Achieve Its Maximum Goals In The Ukrainian Conflict
The Clock Is Ticking For Russia To Achieve Its Maximum Goals In The Ukrainian ConflictTrump’s reported plan for a Western/NATO peacekeeping mission in Ukraine places Russia in the dilemma of either pre-empting this with another large-scale nationwide offensive, targeting those forces after they enter at the risk of sparking World War III, or tacitly accepting this endgame.
The Wall Street Journal’s report that Trump’s peace plan for Ukraine envisages the creation of an 800-mile demilitarized zone that would be patrolled by Europeans adds a lot of urgency to Russia’s nearly 1000-day-long struggle to achieve its maximum goals in this conflict. The potential entrance of conventional Western/NATO forces into Ukraine as peacekeepers places Russia in the dilemma of accepting yet another “red line” being crossed or risking World War III by targeting them.
To refresh everyone’s memory since it’s been so long since the special operation started, Russia officially aims to: 1) demilitarize Ukraine; 2) denazify it; and 3) restore its constitutional neutrality, among other supplementary and informal goals. September 2022’s referenda then added the official goal of removing Ukrainian forces from the entirety of the four regions that Russia now claims as its own, including the areas of Kherson and Zaporozhye on the other side of the Dnieper, which will be challenge.
At the same time, Putin has repeatedly refused to reciprocally escalate in response to egregious Ukrainian provocations like its bombing of the Kremlin, early warning systems, strategic airfields, oil refineries, and residential buildings, et al, all due to him not wanting the conflict to spiral out of control. For as responsible of an approach as this is, the drawback is that it created the perception that he might accept the crossing of even more “red lines”, including conventional Western/NATO forces in Ukraine.
Putin’s aversion to escalation might therefore be exploited by Trump, who was reportedly handed a plan in June advising him to give Ukraine whatever it wants if Russia refuses whatever peace deal he proposes, ergo the high likelihood of a conventional Western/NATO intervention to decisively freeze the conflict. Trump’s track record of “escalating to de-escalate” with North Korea and Iran suggests that he’d also go through with this plan against Russia, hence why it should take this scenario seriously.
Provided that Putin lacks the political will to risk an unprecedented escalation by targeting those conventional Western/NATO forces, and his behaviour thus far in response to other provocations suggests that this is indeed the case, then he’ll have to race against the clock to achieve his maximum goals. It’ll still take some time for the US to get key stakeholders like Poland on board, where 69% of the public is against dispatching troops to Ukraine in any capacity, so this likely won’t happen by mid-January.
In any case, Russia no longer has a hypothetically indefinite amount of time like before to: 1) demilitarize Ukraine; 2) denazify it; 3) restore its constitutional neutrality; and 4) remove Ukrainian forces from the entirety of the four regions that Russia now claims as its own, including those areas across the Dnieper. Even though the military-strategic dynamics of the conflict favour it, and capturing Pokrovsk could lead to huge gains in Donetsk, it’ll be very difficult to achieve all these goals by the time an intervention occurs.
To explain in the order that they were mentioned, Ukraine was initially supposed to be demilitarized upon the swift success of the special operation in its early phase, but the UK and Poland (whose role most observers aren’t aware of) convinced Zelensky to rubbish spring 2022’s draft peace treaty. That document would have greatly slashed its military capabilities, but it’s no longer realistic to imagine that he’d agree to this, especially after being given tens of billions of dollars’ worth of NATO arms.
NATO is also unlikely to agree to ask for them back due to the perception (regardless of its veracity) that Ukraine must be able to “deter” Russia from supposedly recommencing the conflict after it finally ends. The Taliban’s swift capture of Afghanistan after Biden’s bungled withdrawal from there was viciously lambasted by Trump, who’d go down in history as an even bigger loser if he agreed to “demilitarize” Ukraine and was then played for a fool by Putin if Russia steamrolls through it sometime later.
The only viable way in which Russia could implement Ukraine’s demilitarization in today’s context is to control as much of its territory as possible in order to ensure that no threatening weapons are deployed there. The problem though is that Russia is unlikely to obtain military control over all of Ukraine, or even just significant parts of its territory east of the Dnieper in proximity to the internationally recognized border across which Kiev’s shells still regularly fly, by the time of a Western/NATO intervention.
One of the reasons why the special operation’s opening phase didn’t result in ending the conflict on Russia’s terms is because the West informed Zelensky about how overextended its military logistics had become and thus encouraged him to exploit that to push it back like he ultimately did. Given how cautious of a leader Putin is, he’s unlikely to act out of character once more by ordering a repeat of this same risky strategy even if the frontlines collapse and Russia is able to roll into other regions.
Another unforeseen challenge that Russia experienced during the special operation’s opening phase was actually holding the broad swaths territory that it nominally controlled. Ukraine’s hidden Javelin and Stinger stockpiles inflicted enough losses behind Russia’s lines to engender the large-scale pullback that coincided with the failure of spring 2022’s peace talks. There’s also the obvious difficulty of swiftly capturing large cities like Kharkov, Sumy, and Zaporozhye, which hasn’t yet happened.
Moving along to Russia’s second maximum goal of denazifying Ukraine after explaining how tough it’ll be to achieve the first one of militarizing it, this too can’t succeed without a political agreement that’s no longer realistic in today’s context after such a chance slipped away in spring 2022. What Russia has in mind is Ukraine promulgating legislation that aligns with these goals, such as banning the glorification of World War II-era fascists and rescinding restrictions on ethnic Russians’ rights.
Zelensky has no reason to go along with this anymore like he flirted with doing in early 2022 and Trump’s team doesn’t seem to care all that much about this issue anyhow. It’s therefore unclear how Russia can achieve this before a Western/NATO intervention except in the unlikely scenario of a Russian-friendly Colour Revolution and/or military coup, neither of which the US would accept, and both of which would probably thus prompt the aforesaid intervention out of desperation to salvage “Project Ukraine”.
The third maximum goal of restoring Ukraine’s constitutional neutrality is comparatively more likely but nevertheless moot at this point given that the raft of security guarantees that it already clinched with NATO states since the start of this year de facto amount to continued Article 5 support. Contrary to popular perceptions, this clause doesn’t obligate the dispatch of troops, but only for each country to do whatever it deems fit to help allies under attack. Their existing military aid to Ukraine aligns with this.
Coercing Ukraine to rescind 2019’s constitutional amendment making NATO membership a strategic objective would therefore be a superficial concession to Russia on the US’ part to make Trump’s peace plan a little less bitter for Putin to swallow. As with the previous two maximum goals, Zelensky has no reason to comply with Putin’s demands in this regard since the latter’s forces aren’t in a position to impose this upon him, thus meaning that it can only realistically be done if Trump orders him to.
As the reader probably already picked up on, the common theme is that Russia’s inability to militarily coerce Zelensky into complying with its maximum goals greatly reduces the possibility that they’ll be achieved, which also holds true for the final one of obtaining control over all its new regions’ land. It’s unimaginable that Zelensky will voluntarily cede Zaporozhye with its over 700,000 population, for example, or that Trump will accept the Western opprobrium that would follow coercing him to do so.
The same goes for letting Russia cross the Dnieper to obtain control over that region’s and Kherson’s areas on the other side, thus creating the opportunity for it to build up its forces there in the future for a lightning strike across Ukraine’s western plains in the event that the conflict ever rekindles after it ends. There’s no way that Trump would ever give Putin such an invaluable military-strategic gift so Russia’s supporters shouldn’t deceive themselves by getting their hopes up thinking that this will happen.
The only way in which Russia can achieve its maximum goals before the entrance of Western/NATO troops into Ukraine as peacekeepers is through military means, which would require another large-scale multi-pronged offensive of the sort that characterized the special operation’s early days. Even then, however, the high risk of once again overextending its military logistics, being ambushed by Stingers/Javelins, and thus risking reputational costs and even on-the-ground losses, will remain.
As such, there are really only three options left for Russia: 1) escalate now before Western/NATO troops enter Ukraine and either coerce Zelensky into agreeing to these demands or capture and hold enough land in order to demilitarize as much of the country as possible; 2) escalate after they enter at the risk of sparking a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis that could spiral into World War III; or 3) accept the fait accompli of freezing the conflict along the Line of Contact and begin preparing the public accordingly.
It’s unclear which option Putin will choose since he hasn’t yet signalled a preference for any of them. Nevertheless, it’s timely to quote 19th-century Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov, who famously said that “Russia is not sulking; she is composing herself.” Russia knows that the clock is ticking for achieving its maximum goals before Trump likely orders Western/NATO peacekeepers to enter Ukraine. The Kremlin is quiet for now precisely because policymakers have yet to decide what to do.
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Readers might be interested in reviewing the following analyses for more insight into Russia’s dilemma:
* 14 July 2022: “Korybko To Azerbaijani Media: All Sides Of The Ukrainian Conflict Underestimated Each Other”
* 12 November 2022: “20 Constructive Critiques Of Russia’s Special Operation”
* 1 November 2024: “Trump 2.0 would be no easy ride for Vladimir Putin”
* 7 November 2024: “Here’s What Trump’s Peace Plan Might Look Like & Why Russia Might Agree To It”
* 8 November 2024: “View from Moscow: Russia tepidly welcomes Trump’s return”
They illustrate the challenges inherent in Russia achieving its maximum goals anytime soon.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
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Korybko To Azerbaijani Media: All Sides Of The Ukrainian Conflict Underestimated Each Other
OneWorld is publishing the full-length English version of the interview that Andrew Korybko gave to Oxu.Andrew Korybko (Andrew Korybko's Newsletter)
