Russia-NATO Proxy War: Putin Is Finally Climbing The Escalation Ladder


Russia-NATO Proxy War: Putin Is Finally Climbing The Escalation Ladder

By Andrew Korybko

He wants to deter the even greater provocations that the West might now be plotting, such as destabilizing and then invading Belarus, with the intent of coercing him into freezing the existing LOC and then possibly accepting the deployment of Western/NATO peacekeepers there.


Putin surprised the world on Thursday when he addressed the nation to inform them that Russia had tested a new hypersonic medium-range missile earlier that morning in an attack against a famous Soviet-era industrial complex in the Ukrainian city of Dnepropetrovsk. He explained that this was a response to the US and UK recently allowing Ukraine to use their long-range missiles inside of Russia. Their decision resulted in the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine “assuming elements of a global nature” in his words.

As was explained here with regards to the “moment of truth” that this latest phase of the conflict led to, he was faced with the choice of either escalating or continuing his policy of strategic patience, the first of which could foil attempts by Trump to reach a peace deal while the second could invite more aggression. Putin chose the former and did so in a creative way that few foresaw. The Oreshnik missile system whose existence he disclosed on Thursday has Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs).

It’s essentially the same sort of weapon that Russia could use in the event of a nuclear conflict with the West since the aforesaid feature coupled with its hypersonic speed means that it’s impossible to intercept. In other words, Putin rattled Russia’s nuclear sabre in the most convincing way possible short of testing a nuclear weapon, which his government previously confirmed that it wouldn’t do for the reasons that were explained here. He’s therefore finally climbing the escalation ladder.

Putin hitherto declined to escalate in response to the over 1,000 days’ worth of NATO-backed Ukrainian provocations that included bombing the Kremlin, early warning systems, strategic airfields, nuclear power plants, and the Crimean Bridge, among many other sensitive targets, so as to avoid World War III. He also prioritized political goals over military ones up until this point, but that’s all changing now since he realized that his strategic patience was interpreted as weakness and only invited more aggression.

Seeing as how Ukraine’s latest use of Western weapons inside of Russia’s pre-2014 territory isn’t unprecedented due to the HIMARS already having been used in Belgorod and Kursk Regions, the latter of which Ukraine invaded with NATO’s support over the summer, the question arises of why it took over three months for his views to change. It should also be noted that Russia didn’t significantly respond to Ukraine fielding the F-16s despite Lavrov previously warning that they could be nuclear-equipped.

Russia might have therefore received intelligence that the West is plotting an even greater provocation in the future. Belarusian media just aired a documentary exposing a Western plot to destabilize and invade their country, which readers can learn more about by reviewing the seven analyses that were listed in this one here. Correspondingly, it was assessed that “Russia’s Updated Nuke Doctrine Aims To Deter Unacceptable Provocations From NATO”, and the aforesaid would certainly constitute such.

Putin’s strategic patience would have finally reached its limits if he caught wind that anything of the sort was afoot, which would explain why he’d order the Oreshnik to be used against that Soviet-era industrial complex in Central Ukraine in order to send an unmistakable message to the West to reconsider its plans. Recalling how concerned he is about avoiding World War III, it also makes sense why his spokesman confirmed that Russia informed the US about this approximately half an hour ahead of time.

After all, launching an intermediate-range hypersonic missile westward without any advance notification could have prompted the US to panic by interpreting this as the start of a potential nuclear first strike by Russia, thus setting into motion the exact same scenario that he’s worked so hard to avoid. His motive was to deter the West from carrying out unacceptable provocations that cross Russia’s most sensitive redlines, which the West might be plotting out of desperation to “escalate to de-escalate” on its terms.

It was written here, here, and here that Trump might resort to that, but the latest ATACMS escalation – which can be regarded as a provocation due to these missiles having a much longer range than the HIMARS – suggests that the “Collective Biden” decided to do so first out of fear that whatever deal he might reach with Putin would compromise on too many of the US’ interests. Accordingly, Putin might now have decided to beat the US to the punch by “escalating to de-escalate” on Russia’s terms instead.

Thursday morning was the first time that a MIRV was used in combat, which is much more significant than the US “boiling the frog” by expanding the range of the missiles that Ukraine has already been able to use inside of Russia’s pre-2014 borders after once again signalling its escalatory plans long in advance, especially since few saw it coming and the US only had around a 30-minute notice. Putin also warned that Russia’s new doctrine allows it to use such weapons against those who arm Ukraine.

It’s unlikely that he’ll throw caution to the wind by launching Oreshniks against military targets in NATO countries at the risk of sparking World War III, but it can’t be ruled out that the next escalation that he’s considering in response to more aggression could be bombing Moldova instead. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zakharova said earlier in the week that the Western-backed government there is “turning the country at a rapid pace into a logistics hub used to supply the Ukrainian armed forces.”

It’s not a NATO member though so Russia could bomb it without crossing the West’s red lines while still signalling that he’s not the pushover that they convinced themselves that he was after misreading the reasons for his strategic patience if they still keep provoking him even after Thursday’s escalation. They want him to accept Western/NATO peacekeepers along the Line of Contact (LOC), Ukraine’s continued militarization, its future membership in NATO, and no change in its anti-Russian legislation.

By contrast, Putin wants to expel Ukraine from the four regions that voted to join Russia in September 2022, no Western/NATO peacekeepers along the LOC, Ukraine’s demilitarization, the restoration of its constitutional neutrality, and the rescinding of its anti-Russian legislation. Beating the West to the punch by “escalating to de-escalate”, or at least finally climbing the escalation ladder in response to their provocations, is therefore aimed at achieving as many of these maximum goals as he can.

If he sticks to his guns and doesn’t waver from his newfound approach, which is arguably long-overdue since some believe that he should have begun applying it after the failure of spring 2022’s peace talks, then he stands a much greater chance of achieving at least part of the most important ones. NATO can always conventionally intervene in Ukraine west of the Dnieper to salvage some of its geopolitical project so Russia should assume that it won’t be able to demilitarize or denazify that part of the country.

What it can do, however, is employ military and diplomatic means (both individually and in combination through its abovementioned newfound approach) to obtain control over all the territory that it claims as its own east of the Dnieper, possibly including Zaporozhye’s eponymous city of over 700,000 people. The new LOC could then be patrolled by purely non-Western forces deployed as part of a UN mandate while Ukraine might be coerced to demilitarize everything that remains under its control east of the Dnieper.

All heavy weapons would have to be withdrawn westward as part of a massive demilitarized zone (DMZ), while the possibility also exists that this “Trans-dnieper” region might also receive political autonomy or at least cultural autonomy to protect the rights of ethnic Russians and those who speak that language. This scenario was first tabled here in March and could take the form shown below, with the western part of the country in blue possibly hosting NATO troops as part of the arrangement that’ll then be described:

Ukraine could be deterred from breaking the ceasefire due to the DMZ placing it at a disadvantage, while Russia would be deterred by the “security guarantees” that Ukraine clinched with a bunch of NATO countries this year, which amount to de facto Article 5 support. While Russia could storm into the DMZ, NATO could also storm into Western Ukraine or possibly even cross the Dnieper, whether due to a swift intervention or having already deployed its troops west of the river per tacit agreement with Russia.

What was detailed in the three preceding paragraphs is the maximum that Russia can realistically achieve given the new military-strategic circumstances in which it finds itself over 1,000 days since the special operation began. Putin finally started climbing the escalation ladder in order to deter the even greater provocations that the West might now be plotting with the intent of coercing him into freezing the existing LOC and then possibly accepting the deployment of Western/NATO peacekeepers there.

Such a scenario would be completely unacceptable for him from the perspective of Russia’s national security interests and his own reputational ones after promising to check NATO’s expansion in Ukraine. Keeping that bloc west of the Dnieper while demilitarizing everything east of it and north of the administrative borders of the four former Ukrainian regions that joined Russia in September 2022, tentatively known as the “Trans-dnieper” region, would be a tolerable compromise though.

Trump might deem this to be pragmatic enough of a deal for him to go along with since it could still be spun by all relevant parties to the conflict as a victory (e.g. Russia gained land and created a DMZ deep inside Ukraine; Ukraine continued to exist as a state; and the US de facto incorporated Western Ukraine into NATO). It could even enter into force prior to that if either side “escalates to de-escalate” before his inauguration and this is the “mutually face-saving” compromise that they reach to avoid World War III.

Of course, it would be better if they agree to this without sparking a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis that risks spiralling out of control, hence why their diplomats should begin discussing it now or a third country’s ones like India’s should propose it behind the scenes to get the ball rolling. Putin’s newfound (and arguably long-overdue) approach signals that he won’t accept freezing the existing LOC, nor especially the deployment of NATO/Western peacekeepers there, and will escalate to avert that.

He might even go as far as using tactical nukes in Ukraine (and/or NATO’s logistics hub in Moldova) if he feels that he’s being cornered by the evolving circumstances in which the West might soon place him through its possibly forthcoming greater provocations (e.g. destabilizing and invading Belarus). The West must therefore start taking Putin seriously after he finally began climbing the escalation ladder otherwise the worst-case scenario of World War III might become unavoidable if they push him too far.


Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.


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Here’s What Trump’s Peace Plan Might Look Like And Why Russia Might Agree To It


Here’s What Trump’s Peace Plan Might Look Like And Why Russia Might Agree To It

By Andrew Korybko

Putin might agree to freeze the conflict along the Line of Contact in spite of prior rhetoric against this scenario in the event that Trump threatens to escalate the conflict as punishment if he doesn’t.


Trump’s pledge to resolve the Ukrainian Conflict in 24 hours is unrealistic, but he’ll inevitably propose a peace plan at some point in time, thus raising questions about what it would look like and whether Russia would agree to it. More than likely, he’ll seek to freeze the conflict along the Line of Contact (LOC), wherever it may be by that time, as he’s not expected to coerce Ukraine into withdrawing from the regions whose administrative borders Russia claims in their entirety.

Nor is Russia expected to obtain control over them by the time that Trump’s proposal is made. It still hasn’t removed Ukrainian forces from Donbass, which is at the heart of its claims, and therefore is unlikely to capture Zaporozhye city, that namesake’s areas on the side of the Dnieper River, nor Kherson Region’s aforesaid adjacent lands either. It might gain some more territory if Pokrovsk is captured, but the US might dangerously “escalate to de-escalate” to stop a run on the river if Ukraine is then routed.

This could take the form of threatening a conventional NATO intervention if the political will exists to spark a Cuban-like brinskmanship crisis, the odds of which would greatly increase if Russia made any move in that scenario to cross the Dnieper and thus risk the collapse of that bloc’s Ukrainian project. Be that as it may, no such run on the river is expected, with the most that Russia might do is lay siege to Zaporozhye city, but even that might not materialize by the time that Trump shares his peace plan.

Russia will therefore almost certainly be asked to freeze the conflict along the LOC, albeit without rescinding its territorial claims just like Ukraine won’t either, under the threat of Trump ramping up military support to Ukraine if the Kremlin refuses to cease hostilities. This prediction is predicated on summer’s report that some of his advisors suggested that he do precisely that as punishment for Russia rubbishing whatever peace plan that he ultimately offers it.

Considering his tough-talking personality and proclivity for “escalating to de-escalate” on his terms if he feels disrespected, which he flirted doing with North Korea during his first term as a negotiating tactic, he’s thus expected to comply with the aforesaid suggestion in that event. Given Putin’s consummate pragmatism as he understands his style to be and his aversion to escalations, he might very well comply, but he could also request that Trump coerce Zelensky into making concessions to facilitate this.

These might include rescinding 2019’s constitutional amendment making NATO membership a strategic objective, promulgating legislation that Russia considers to advance its denazification goals, freezing further weapons shipments to Ukraine, and carving out a buffer zone within part of Ukrainian territory. In the order that they were mentioned, the first one would be superficial after this year’s raft of security guarantees between Ukraine and several NATO countries already made it a de facto member of the bloc.

To explain, they all entail commitments to resume their existing military support for Ukraine if its conflict with Russia flares up again upon its eventual end, and this self-same support arguably aligns with NATO’s Article 5. Contrary to popular perceptions, it doesn’t obligate them to send troops, but only to provide whatever support they believe is necessary to aid allies under attack. This is what they’re already doing, yet Russia never escalated in response to this being enshrined in their bilateral military deals.

As for the second speculative concession that Putin might request that Trump coerce Zelensky into making, the returning American leader and his team haven’t ever signalled any interest in helping Russia denazify Ukraine, and coercing it into promulgating legislation might be seen as bad optics abroad. Since Russia can’t force Ukraine to do this, that particular goal of the special operation will likely remain unfulfilled, in which case it probably wouldn’t be discussed much anymore by officials and the media.

Moving along to the third, Trump probably wouldn’t agree to freeze arms shipments to Ukraine, but they might naturally be curtailed as he refocuses America’s military priorities on containing China in Asia instead of continuing to contain Russia in Europe. About that, his reported plan to encourage NATO members to take more responsibility for their defence is already being implemented under Biden as explained here, and they might continue arms shipments even if the US curtails its own.

Even so, the potentially natural curtailment of US arms shipments to Ukraine could be spun as partially fulfilling Russia’s demilitarization goal, as could any buffer zone that Trump might agree to coerce Ukraine into carving out on its own territory to prevent it from shelling Russian cities. That’ll be a hard sell for Putin to make, and Trump might be pressured by the “deep state” (the permanent members of the US’ military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies) into resisting, but it can’t be ruled out either.

The reason for this cautious optimism is because it would provide a “face-saving” means for Russia to freeze the conflict despite not achieving its maximum objectives instead of risking a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis by rejecting Trump’s expected proposal to “save face” at home and abroad. Trump wouldn’t make idle threats and certainly wouldn’t let Putin call his bluff even if that was the case so he’s expected to go through with arming Ukraine to the teeth if his peace deal falls flat.

That said, he also campaigned on ending the Ukrainian Conflict, and he’d personally prefer to replenish America’s depleted stockpiles in parallel with arming its Asian allies to the teeth against China instead continuing to arm Ukraine and risking a major crisis with Russia. His Sino-centric New Cold War focus is shared by a minority of the “deep state”, the majority of whom want to continue prioritizing Russia’s containment in Europe over China’s in Asia but who still never recklessly escalated with Russia thus far.

They’ve indeed escalated, but this was always preceded by signalling their intent to do so (such as via the provisioning of various arms) long before this happened, thus giving Russia enough time to calculate a response instead of risking an “overreaction” that could spiral into war with NATO. These anti-Russian hawks might therefore begrudgingly go along with any buffer zone that Trump might agree to if it avoids a potentially uncontrollable escalation like what he might threaten to do if Russia doesn’t take his deal.

Subversive “deep state” elements might even try to provoke such an escalation in order to avert that buffer zone scenario or any other that they consider to be unacceptable concessions to Russia, which remains a risk before and after his inauguration, but it’s clearly not their faction’s preferred scenario. This conclusion is arrived at by recalling on the abovementioned observation about how they always signalled their escalatory intentions far in advance thus far at least in order to avoid a major escalation.

Even if Trump doesn’t comply with any of Putin’s speculative requests to help the latter “save face” by freezing the conflict despite not achieving his country’s maximum goals in the conflict, he could always dangle the carrot of phased sanctions relief of the sort proposed by Richard Haass earlier this week. The former President of the hugely influential Council on Foreign Relations suggested that this could encourage Russia’s compliance with a ceasefire, and it’s possible that Putin might agree to this.

The Russian economy weathered the West’s unprecedented sanctions regime, but Russia’s grand plans to create alternative financial institutions and pivot to the non-West haven’t been as successful. This analysis here about how the latest BRICS Summit achieved nothing of tangible significance at all points out how none of this association’s ambitious initiatives were rolled out. It also hyperlinks to proof that the Chinese-based New Development Bank and the SCO Bank surprisingly comply with US sanctions.

Moreover, “Russia & China’s US-Provoked Payment Problems Caught Most BRICS Enthusiasts By Surprise” in early September after RT published a feature analysis about this politically inconvenient development, which shows that the Chinese centrepiece of Russia’s grand plans isn’t fully on board with them. There’s also the similarly inconvenient fact that Russia’s pivot to the non-West mostly only consists of resource sales to such countries and has yet to become anything more significant.

It accordingly wouldn’t be surprising if Putin appreciated promises of phased sanctions relief in exchange for agreeing to freeze the conflict along the LOC no matter how disappointing of an end this may be to its special operation in the eyes of its most zealous supporters. After all, Foreign Minister Lavrov told a group of ambassadors last month that Russia demands “the lifting of Western anti-Russian sanctions”, so it’s clearly on the collective Kremlin’s mind no matter what its perception managers claim.

Even if Trump makes such promises, however, keeping them would be difficult since many of America’s anti-Russian sanctions are codified into law after being voted on by Congress. They might go along with any request to rescind them, but they also might not, thus throwing a wrench in Russia’s plans. The US also can’t force the EU to rescind its respective sanctions, and anti-Russian countries like Poland and the Baltic States might create obstacles to the resumption of trade with Russia if the EU’s ties with it thaw.

Should they be implemented even if only semi-successfully, then Trump could claim a victory in “un-uniting” Russia and China like he promised to do even if those two’s trade continues to grow (mostly through Chinese resource imports and replacing lost Western products on Russian shelves). He could also sell this phased sanctions relief proposal to anti-Russian “deep state” hawks and the Europeans on that basis to help secure their support and deflect from claims that he’s doing it as a favour to Putin.

Reflecting on the insight that was shared in this analysis, Trump’s peace plan isn’t expected to have any surprises, nor would it be surprising if Russia agrees to it for the reasons that were explained. The US holds the cards and will only agree to any of Putin’s speculatively requested concessions in order to make it easier for him to “save face” for freezing the conflict despite not achieving his maximum goals. Neither wants a major escalation and both are fatigued with this proxy war so such a deal might work.

It’ll therefore be interesting to see how the rhetoric from Russian officials and their global media ecosystem might change as reports leak out about what exactly Trump has in mind. He and the minority “deep state” faction that supports him are motivated by their desire to “Pivot (back) to Asia” in order to more muscularly contain China, hence their interest in wrapping up this proxy war. As for Russia, it’s beginning to realize that a compromise of some sort is inevitable and must thus prepare the public.

Something unexpected might of course happen to completely change this analysis such as if hawks on either side convince their respective presidents to double down on the conflict, but the arguments made therein cogently account for each side’s interests, especially Russia’s. If everything more or less unfolds as written, then observers can expect a “Great Media/Perception Reset” in terms of Russia’s narrative towards the conflict, which would be required to facilitate whatever compromises Putin might make.


Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.


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