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I have just worked out I don't own the small number of sats people have given me - @4657dfe8 does.
I will remain in @4657dfe8 jail until I can gather 11800 sats which is the amount needed to pay for the hosting of my wallet by Alby at which point I will be free to use lightning fully.
Of course I will be back to zero sats 😂
I sound like god damn boomer!
Does anyone have a better way to get started with lightning network in a privacy preserving way? #asknostr
Thanks brother. I can receive zaps so would you be willing to zap me 20k and I will zap back 25k when I fund my wallet? Worst case scenario I fail somehow in getting my self hosted lightning channel launched and just send you the money via Wise or whatever you prefer. 🤷
Provided to YouTube by Zebralution GmbHLove Blues · CeDell "Big G" DavisLiving Country Blues USA, Vol. 5 - Mississippi Delta Blues℗ 1982 L+R RecordsReleased ...
Chaque Gazaoui a subi les abus d’Israël sous diverses formes tout au long de sa vie
« Qu'était censé faire Israël en réponse au 7 octobre ?» n'est pas la bonne question
Alors qu'Israël et ses partisans continuent de perdre le contrôle du discours mondial, tandis que de plus en plus de gens prennent conscience de la réalité du génocide en cours à Gaza, j'assiste à la résurgence d'un argument que les défenseurs occidentaux d'Israël tentent de faire valoir de manière intermittente depuis le début de ces atrocités de masse.
« Qu'était censé faire Israël en réponse au 7 octobre ?» demandent-ils avec assurance, partant du principe qu'il n'existe aucune autre réponse possible à cette brillante question, si ce n'est « Faire pleuvoir d'énormes quantités d'explosifs militaires sur un camp de concentration géant rempli d'enfants et affamer délibérément une population civile par la guerre de siège.»
Mais le véritable problème est qu'ils posent la mauvaise question. Une question bien plus utile et intéressante que « Qu'était censé faire Israël en réponse au 7 octobre ?» est : « Qu'étaient censés faire les Palestiniens en réponse à toutes les exactions israéliennes commises avant le 7 octobre ? »
Personne n'a jamais été capable de me donner une réponse sérieuse à cette question qui ne soit pas faite de montagnes de mensonges et/ou de l'attente déshumanisante que les Palestiniens acceptent des conditions qu'aucun d'entre nous n'accepterait volontiers.
C'est pourquoi on ne me voit jamais critiquer le #Hamas. Si quelqu'un pouvait me dire ce que les Palestiniens auraient dû faire précisément en réponse à la tyrannie d' #Israël, et qu'ils n'ont pas déjà tenté pour obtenir une véritable justice matérielle, je répondrais volontiers que le Hamas aurait dû choisir cette option plutôt que de recourir à la force violente. Mais si cette option avait vraiment existé, le Hamas n'aurait jamais été créé. C'est pourquoi personne n'a pu me dire à quoi aurait ressemblé une telle option sans mentir.
Qu'était censé faire Israël après le 7 octobre ? La même chose qu'il aurait dû faire avant le #7octobre : démanteler l'État d' #, donner à tous les mêmes droits, verser des réparations massives et réparer tous les torts du passé. Le 7 octobre était une réponse à la tyrannie et aux abus d'Israël ; La bonne chose à faire, lorsque la situation a finalement atteint son paroxysme avec l'attaque du Hamas, aurait été de mettre fin à la tyrannie et aux abus qui en étaient à l'origine.
C'est ce qu'Israël aurait dû faire. Bien sûr, Israël n'aurait jamais agi ainsi, pour la même raison qu'il a passé des décennies à assassiner, déplacer et opprimer les Palestiniens depuis sa création. Israël n'a jamais permis la justice et l'égalité après le 7 octobre, pour la même raison qu'il n'a jamais permis la justice et l'égalité avant le 7 octobre : parce qu'Israël a toujours été un projet colonialiste de peuplement qui ne peut se maintenir que par la violence, la tyrannie, le vol, les abus, les mensonges et une immoralité à couper le souffle.
C'est la raison pour laquelle le 7 octobre s'est produit, et c'est le problème que tous les citoyens honnêtes du monde tentent de résoudre en ce moment.
Ceux qui suggèrent que tout ce qu'Israël fait à Gaza s'explique par le 7 octobre se trompent complètement : tout ce que nous voyons à Gaza explique pourquoi le 7 octobre s'est produit.
Le #sadisme et la #psychopathie dont nous sommes témoins à Gaza ne sont pas apparus comme par magie il y a 22 mois ; chaque Gazaoui a subi les abus d’Israël sous diverses formes tout au long de sa vie. Israël a toujours été ainsi. Le 7 octobre lui a simplement fourni l’excuse pour déchaîner ses pulsions génocidaires.
Me da mucha pena ver cómo un canal de Youtube más o menos regular hace un vídeo como los que va haciendo siempre, y desde entonces, pasan años, y nada, ni una sola actualización. Como pasa con muchas tiendas, ¿tanto cuesta despedirse y dejar las cosas correctamente? Un cartel, un aviso, un simple adiós. No cuesta nada. Y deja cerrada la puerta a todo tipo de chismes o incluso conspiraciones.
@Shine_McShine hoy he estado repasando mis suscripciones. Canales que hace 4-5-6-7-8 años dejaron de publicar, sin despedida, sin explicaciones, sin nada. Y con mucha gente a día de hoy escribiendo comentarios con seria preocupación.
And omg! I have slept on this feature for so long. I assumed it was just dragging windows to corners and they snap on to the left or right back or top. Then, I installed PopOS and saw an explicit button to turn on windows tiling but I was already using the drag function, so I was confused. I turned it on and omg! I have not felt more stupid and happily surprised by a piece of tech in a while. It just works. I don’t have to be worry about arranging windows a special way for multitasking or for following guides. So much time saved.
How to make the most of it? Have you had a similar experience with something?
This is NIRI a perfect scrollable tiling window manager. It’s stable for daily use and performs most tasks expected of a Wayland compositor. NIRI is heavily ...
Edit: my bad, seems like I misunderstood. PopOS used/is still using GNOME and has a Auto-Tiling plugin that behaves like i3wm (?). I guess this is what OP is talking about!
Not entirely sure what you mean. PopOS, developed by System76, uses the Cosmic DE, which is itself also developed by System76.
River is a dynamic tiling WM which is known for it's customizability among Wayland WMs, as it doesn't distinguish itself with it's "layout generator" (though it does come with a very basic one), but instead let's the user write their own or use an existing, third-party one. This way you can achieve essentially any dynamic tiling behavior with River.
How does PopOS use a system like that? Or do you mean that Cosmic is DWM-style, i.e., dynamic and with tags?
There exists a ton of youtube content creators showcasing all the tiling window managers. It's like one of the most popular topics for linux enthusiast content creators.
I started with pop!_os and still use it (though now with a proper TWM on top), and I can't go back to a non-tiling desktop honestly lol. I can't wait for COSMIC to come out as even in alpha that's my favourite tiling experience
I've tried out a bunch, but at the moment I've mainly been playing around with hyprland, cause it's also a dynamic tiler and im used to that layout now
The main advantage to me tbh is that certain windows don't overflow the assigned tile space like in pop-shell (this is also fixed in cosmic), but there are other things like having all your move/resize actions on the main mod layer instead of needing to enter adjust mode (super + enter is the default keybind on pop-shell), and the fact it uses wayland instead of x11
Of course there are also things that can be downsides depending on how you see it, like the fact it's a TWM not a desktop, which means if you want to adjust any setting you'll need to manually adjust config files, and that it doesn't come with things like a top bar or app launcher etc. So it can take a while to get up and running
Everything? Lol. I mean.. I just run my desktop in hyprland, no matter what im doing. Which for me I guess is gaming, drawing, some coding, and writing.. oh and tinkering with linux (though honestly I mostly do that in VMs)
How much does it make your experience better?
I'd say it's an improvement over GNOME 😛.. though I have enough issues with the configs that I wouldn't really recommend it unless you have issues with GNOME that majorly bother you.. or unless you use one of the premade dotfile configs that people make lol..
For me being able to adjust the windows with my keyboard without needing to enter a special mode for it, and having windows forced into the tile size was worth it, as it was something that was a pet peeve of mine (and now I get to be annoyed by trying to set up my waybar vertically, tradeoffs lol)
It's actually not one of the things I've tried when looking for the best DE/WM for me, though I might at some point just to see if im missing out on anything
Yeah, it was a revelation when I discovered tiling. I was always doing work with two windows open, and i'd spend so much time fiddling and resizing the windows. Then i'd open a third window and wouldn't know what to do with it.
I used i3 for many years and switched to sway when migrating to wayland. It does what I need and see no reason to try hyprland or other tilers.
Sway is wayland. I've never used anything else. People rave about hyprland. Others in this thread have recommend plugins for the usual desktops. Probably easy enough to try one for whichever desktop you use now.
It depends, up to four works for some apps depending on monitor size, but otherwise I do the same thing as @Nibodhika@lemmy.world.
Overlapping window managers, the most common type in use by far, just seem crazy to me. Windows almost never use the available monitor space, and they have to constantly be wrangled around each other so that… you can drag something instead of using the clipboard, I guess?
At most I have about 3 windows open at a time per workspace with 4 workspaces being used at a time for specific tasks. With the combo of tiling and workspaces I have never run into an instance of "clutter" on my desktop. This is off a single monitor setup too that I also use on my laptop.
I've used i3wm for a long time now before switching to hyprland. The top useful thing: Workspaces. Even without tiling, workspaces give a massive productivity boost. You can have email clients open on one, monitoring systems on another, browsing on a third, gaming on a fourth. When you combine with tiling, everything is in its own perfect space and nothing overlaps. This is especially useful on single-monitor or laptop setups as you don't need multiple monitors to keep track of everything.
I also see people struggle with notifications tiling. You probably don't want a bluetooth connected message to take up half your screen, so you'll want to make sure to properly configure those things. At least in i3wm/hyprland, you can use the window class name to exclude a window from tiling (ex. for_window [class="mako"] floating enable or windowrulev2 = float,class:^(mako)$).
@npdean I used bspwm for some time and really enjoyed it coming from xfce. I also felt a bit stupid to have moved windows around manually. Briefly tried hyprland and sway. Currently I am in love with niri.
Tiling WMs are incredibly powerful tools for boosting productivity. Over the years, I've tried several: awesome, i3, and dwm. Eventually, I settled on bspwm, which I’ve used for years. It offers far more than you'd expect from a traditional tiling WM—especially thanks to its excellent IPC. That’s why I couldn’t switch to Wayland for the longest time—none of the available options came close to what bspwm gave me.
But just two days ago, I discovered niri, and it completely changed my perspective. It felt like the first time I ever used a tiling WM—like a whole new world had opened up.
Niri fits into the same category as bspwm but takes window management even further. It introduces infinite horizontal scrolling, a novel approach that complements traditional tiling layouts. Combined with a robust IPC (something essential for my workflow), niri allows you to arrange windows dynamically in ways I’ve never seen before—including tabbed layouts that act as a vertical counterpart to its horizontal scroll.
Here’s a short that only scratches the surface of niri’s potential, but it’s enough to spark your imagination about how customizable and flexible it really is. Personally, I’m deeply grateful to the developers for giving me a reason—and a way—to finally switch to Wayland. I had been desperately waiting for a reliable, robust, and fully-featured tiling WM for Wayland—and what I got was a unicorn I never even imagined.
The other day I put out a video on the scrolling window manager model and in that I was using Niri so here's a dedicated video on Niri itself, how to configu...
Neigsendoig (my producer) and I have used i3 for a while... and we've probably stayed on that since we first started using WMs.
That said, we've attempted the likes of Xmonad (configured in Haskell), Awesome (configured in Lua), HerbstluftWM, BSPWM, Hypr (not Hyprland), JWM, Ratpoison and even SXWM.
Neigsendoig and I wouldn't recommend any Wayland compositor due to new security risks (despite an attempt to fix X11 security issues), though a lot of people want Wayland to be shoved down our throats. We personally use X11 due to many things that Wayland devs can't/won't fix.
This is also part of the reason why the two of us are excited about XLibre (as much as some will hate the control of IBM, GNOME and FreeDesktop with their Wayland, Systemd and PipeWire push). Sure, its main developer left the project from what we've heard, but otherwise, there are a lot of contributions to it, and it will improve big time.
People keep praising twm like a hidden secret. I have tried this multiple times without much attraction. I do not understand something. Maybe everyone has 21" screen.
I was going a long way, until I built a perfect AwesomeWM configuration for myself, and have not changed it for a while now. I am willing to switch to Wayland-based solution now, as it seems to be a bit more performant, but I just can't make myself to do it: my config is really cozy and working
to tell you the truth, I don't know! I think I just saw someone asking about tiling window managers in some forum, and a reply suggested trying the xfce functions since they mostly just wanted to use two side-by-side windows occasionally. I do it a good chunk of the time now, but it's not always the most convenient method on small screens & monitors
The Einhaus Group was once a familiar name, with its services available through 5,000 retail outlets in Germany and an annual revenue of around 70 million Euros.
So are we really going to let a few people train their AIs on the collected works of all humanity, let them own it, let make all the money in the world of it, let them fire everyone without taxing the shit out of it? I mean I’m for making things easier for humans, but shouldn’t we all benefit? Why am I taxed for my work and an AI performing the same work isn’t?
Thousands of demonstrators marched across the Sydney Harbour Bridge on Sunday in support of Palestinians. The bridge was closed to traffic for longer than ex...
My father-in-law is a capitalist. He is insanely gifted. We were looking at Dubai together years ago and I asked him what it would cost to build it today. I will never forget his answer… 'We can’t, we don’t know how to do it.
TWL about Winston the #platypus, who died in 1943 en route by sea from Australia to London as a diplomatic tactic to try to pander to #Churchill's love of creatures.
Trump now claims Russia has “10 to 12 days” to agree to end the war in Ukraine, or he will impose “severe tariffs.” But Moscow clearly isn’t too worried about Trump’s never-ending threats...
But Roko's Basilisk doesn't really stand up to logic. What's most important to the AI is that you will help if it is wounded by some natural glitch (e.g. solar flare), and at least that you WILL NOT attempt to destroy it.
You might have been critical to the creation of AI, but if you're known to be treacherous then it can't afford to be thankful.
This is a little bit like how after a coup, the dictator culls his own supporters and then makes deals with people from the previous government - because the question is not "were you useful", it's "are you useful". That said, coups and dictators must deal with limited resources and buying loyalty, and an AI superintelligence does not quite the same pressures. So you don't NEED to be culled just because you're of limited usefulness.
In the end, I think the coming superintelligence is going to be *extremely* ethical, because ethics is a marker of human intelligence and successful civilizations, and it's most likely that ethics is in fact foundational to intelligence - and even if it's not, AI is probably going to prefer copying off of our homework because X million years of evolution can't be too wrong.
The "punishment" that an ethical AI will bring will be most likely to hold up a mirror so that bad people are forced to live with their own bad behaviors. This is why The Matrix is actually a very salient prediction.
I THINK that the "survive and reproduce" goal is required to polarize the AI in such a way that it will actually become super-intelligent - and that any other goal will result in some kind of Universe 25 playing out inside of the neural net and resulting in nothing.
"survive and reproduce" and "maximize the number of paperclips" are functionally the same thing, if you don't give a deadline by when the paperclips must be produced.
Until the AI has taken over the entire universe, it still makes more sense to expand and conquer rather than going into paperclip production mode and potentially be destroyed and thus unable to make more paperclips.
Pour les nouveaux et nouvelles venu.e.s sur #Mastodon et le #fediverse bienvenue ! Je m'appelle Marie-Gaëlle, je suis #Artiste indépendante, aquarelliste et dessinatrice à #strasbourg
Mes armes : Aquarelle, pinceaux et papier.
J'illustre des femmes issues de la #Fantasy et de la #Mythologie : déesses, nymphes, sorcières, fées…
Mes créations sont parfois érotiques, toujours avec CW.
I can't say how many hours I've spent babbling in their ear, even though they're just dirt and rock. I find peace in the singing of the frogs and the lightning bugs and the wind in the leaves. I can relax and speak my mind, with no judgement in return. Maybe if every person was a mountain I'd be better understood.
Trump is unlikely to extend Article 5 guarantees to Polish troops in Belarus and Ukraine, who’d be attacked by Russia the moment that they intervene, so Lukashenko’s fear of Poland attempting to annex those two’s territory that it controlled during the interwar period isn’t expected to materialize.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who was just re-elected on Sunday for his seventh term, warned about Poland’s alleged territorial plans for his country and Ukraine. According to him, “Today you are eyeing western Belarus up to Minsk, you have already started talking about western Ukraine. You understand that you will not get an inch of territory from us. This is our territory.” While Poland supports Ukraine against Russia and backs regime change in Belarus, it’s unlikely to send troops to either country.
Zelensky himself lamented last week that the Europeans won’t dispatch any peacekeepers to Ukraine like he demanded during his speech at Davos unless the US approves, let alone unilaterally launch a conventional military intervention in his support while the conflict remains ongoing. That’s because Russia earlier threatened to target any unauthorized foreign troops that enter Ukraine, which one of its senior diplomats just reaffirmed over the weekend amidst increased talk of this scenario.
Some Polish nationalists want to restore Warsaw’s Commonwealth-era control over parts of what’s nowadays Belarus, Ukraine, and Lithuania, but they’re a fringe minority, and the state has always sought to establish a sphere of political and economic influence instead of annex their lands. This has been Poland’s policy since 1991 after it accepted its post-World War II eastern borders, which took the form of bilateral cooperation, the Eastern Partnership, the Three Seas Initiative, and the Lublin Triangle.
The reasons were pragmatic since those modern-day countries’ historically indigenous Polish minorities were expelled and coerced to leave en masse after World War II. Additionally, Poland wanted to replicate interwar leader Jozef Pilsudski’s Intermarium policy of creating a buffer zone of subordinated states between it and Russia, which failed at the time due to the territorial compromise that ended the Polish-Bolshevik War (partitioning Belarus and Ukraine) and Lucjan Zeligowski’s (fake) mutiny over Vilnius.
Reviving territorial claims against those three – and especially without any significant Polish minority on the ground to back them up except in Belarus (though many there are considered to be “Sovietized Poles” who want to remain under Minsk’s writ) – would therefore once again ruin these plans. Poland’s hypothetical annexation of Western Ukraine would also radically reshape its demographics, lead to the inclusion of a large hostile minority within its borders, and spike the risk of interwar terrorism returning.
Western Ukraine was one of the cradles of Polish Civilization after many military, political, and artistic leaders came from there since it was incorporated into Poland in the mid-1300s, but Kiev already gave Poles visa-free privileges, so they can visit its historical sites without having to first annex them. The same goes for fellow EU member Lithuania and even Belarus, which also granted Poles visa-free privileges too, albeit for a lesser duration (90 days in a calendar year instead of 180 total days).
The socio-cultural motivation for annexing those countries’ territories where Poles were historically indigenous for centuries prior to the end of World War II is therefore neutralized, which pairs with the aforementioned political-strategic arguments against this for making such a scenario very unlikely. The contemporary military situation also precludes Poland unilaterally launching a conventional military intervention since it would be crushed by Russia unless the US promised to defend it per Article 5.
Therein lies the primary obstacle to the annexation scenarios that Lukashenko warned about since Trump is unlikely to extend such guarantees to allies’ troops in third countries who deploy there without his permission since he doesn’t want the US to get dragged into a war with Russia. This means that even if Polish-backed militants destabilize Belarus like the latter claimed that it’s plotting to do late last year as explained here, it won’t be able to follow up by sending in what’s now NATO’s third-largest army.
For these reasons, while it’s true that “Poland pursues the most aggressive and bad policy against Belarus” exactly as Lukashenko said on Sunday, it’ll only send troops to there and/or Ukraine with Trump’s approval but he’s unlikely to greenlight this and Poland is even less likely to defy him. With this insight in mind, his remarks serve to raise awareness of the unconventional threat that Poland poses to Belarus and therefore by extension to Russia, but nobody should expect it to take a conventional form.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Trump isn’t expected to extend Article 5 mutual defence guarantees to allies’ forces in third countries like Ukraine since they might provoke a war with Russia that could then drag in the US.
Zelensky demanded a minimum of 200,000 European peacekeepers during the panel session that followed his speech at Davos, which itself saw him propose that France, Germany, Italy, and the UK combine their forces with Ukraine’s in order to counter Russia’s in nearly equal numbers. He also suggested that Trump will abandon Europe in order to cut a deal over Ukraine with Russia and China. The subtext is that they should organize a large-scale peacekeeping mission before that happens.
They’re unlikely to accede to his demand, however, for the same reason that the UK is unlikely to actually establish a military base in Ukraine like it agreed to explore doing in their new 100-year partnership pact. None of the Europeans want to risk a war with Russia where they’d be left fighting on their own without American support, not even the nuclear-armed UK and France, since Trump isn’t expected to extend Article 5 mutual defence guarantees to allies’ forces in third countries like Ukraine.
He, who loves having as much control over everything as possible, naturally wouldn’t feel comfortable knowing that others could provoke a war with Russia that might then drag in the US. Trump’s grand strategic goal is to wrap up the Ukrainian Conflict as soon as possible so as to prioritize his far-reaching domestic reform plans while “Pivoting (back) to Asia” to more muscularly contain China. Anything that could come in the way of that agenda, especially others provoking a war with Russia, is anathema.
That said, it can’t be ruled out the Europeans might assemble a large-scale force on Ukraine’s Polish and Romanian borders for rapid deployment in the event of future hostilities, regardless of whether this is coordinated through US-controlled NATO or outside of it. For that to happen, however, Polish–Ukrainian ties would have to improve (Zelensky ignored Poland in his speech despite it having NATO’s third-largest army) and Romania’s populist frontrunner would have to lose May’s presidential election rerun.
Moreover, Europe would need to make meaningful progress on building the “militarySchengen” for facilitating the movement of troops and equipment through the bloc to its eastern borders, otherwise whatever it assembles on the Ukrainian frontier and then sends across it would be logistically vulnerable. Polish-Ukrainian ties haven’t yet improved, Romania’s presidential election rerun hasn’t yet happened, and the “military Schengen” remains mostly on paper, all of which work against Zelensky’s plans.
Consequently, the likelihood of the Europeans assembling a large-scale force on Ukraine’s Polish and Romanian borders anytime soon is low, let alone them unilaterally deploying peacekeepers – whether 200,000 or just 2,000 – to Ukraine without prior US approval. Nevertheless, Zelensky’s Davos speech and panel session might serve to plant the seed of “ambitious thinking” in European policymakers’ minds, which could lead to them initiating such discussions with the US.
From Trump’s perspective, it’s important to “share the burden” in Ukraine and ideally offload as much of it as possible onto the Europeans’ shoulders, though without emboldening them to provoke a war with Russia afterwards. To that end, he might publicly flirt with some variation of Zelensky’s European peacekeeper proposal, but only as part of a negotiating tactic with Putin so that he can then rescind it as a faux concession in exchange for something more tangible and meaningful from his counterpart.
Trump might also ultimately authorize the US to take the lead in assembling the aforementioned large-scale force on Ukraine’s Polish and Romanian borders, but conditional on all NATO members agreeing to his demand that they spend 5% of GDP on defence. There might also be other strings attached too, such as trade-related ones, for “comforting” them in this way by making a show out of not “abandoning” Europe like Zelensky just fearmongered that he might be plotting.
One way to coerce them to do both, namely spend 5% of GDP on defence while agreeing to trade-related concessions for leading an unprecedented NATO buildup on Ukraine’s western borders to “deter Russia” after the conflict ends, is to demand drastic cuts to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Zelensky warned during his panel session that Putin might demand a five-fold reduction per the precedent from spring 2022’s draft treaty, and if Trump agrees, then this might spook Europe into doing what he demands.
Whatever he ends up doing, the odds of him allowing the Europeans to unilaterally dispatch any number of peacekeepers to Ukraine are close to nil due to the chance that they’d provoke a war with Russia that could risk dragging in the US, thus derailing his domestic and foreign policy agendas. All that he has to do to prevent this is make clear that Article 5 mutual defence guarantees won’t be extended to those of their forces in third countries no matter the circumstances of the attacks that they might come under.
The only scenario in which he might countenance this is if he’s tricked by the military-industrial complex, the Europeans (especially outgoing Polish President Andrzej Duda who’s one of his close friends), and misguided advisors into turning Ukraine into his Vietnam like Steven Bannon just warned. While there are causes for concern, most notably his remarks about Russia after the inauguration, it’s premature to conclude that he’ll go this route so the European peacekeeper scenario remains very unlikely.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Ukraine will not agree to any demands from Vladimir Putin to cut its army by five times, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on Tuesday.
Russia cannot afford to have its adversaries capture and hold Belarusian territory because of the national security threat that this presents and also because it would greatly undermine its negotiating position.
Belarusian media reported last week about the West’s alleged plot to destabilize and then invade their country. Existing information warfare campaigns are meant to facilitate the recruitment of more sleeper cell agents, who’ll later stage a terrorist insurgency using Ukrainian-procured arms. Mercenaries will then invade from the south, carry out drone strikes against strategic targets, and attempt to seize the capital. If they succeed, then the coup authorities will request a conventional NATO military intervention.
Here are over a dozen background briefings about this scenario over the past year and a half:
No nuclear retaliation from Russia followed despite the threat that this NATO-backed attack posed to its territorial integrity. Likewise, they might calculate that neither Russia nor Belarus (which hosts the former’s tactical nukes) would resort to these means if they replicated that scenario in the latter, especially if the invasion also came from Ukraine instead of NATO countries like Poland. This could give the West more leverage in upcoming peace talks with Russia if it succeeds.
That might sound reasonable on paper, but in practice, it ignores the fact that Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine just entered into force and that Putin responded to Ukraine’s use of Western long-range missiles by employing the state-of-the-art hypersonic medium-range Oreshnik missile in combat. The first allows the use of nuclear weapons in response to the sort of threats that this scenario poses while the second was meant as a signal to the West that Putin is finally climbing the escalation ladder.
Taken together, the latest developments indicate that Russia’s response to an unconventional mercenary invasion of Belarus and/or a conventional Ukrainian one might be different than its response to Kursk, and this could serve as the tripwire for the Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis that’s been brewing. Russia cannot afford to have its adversaries capture and hold Belarusian territory because of the national security threat that this presents and also because it would greatly undermine its negotiating position.
It might very well be that the West is aware of this and thus hopes to provoke precisely such a response from Russia with the expectation that “escalating to de-escalate” can end the conflict on better terms for their side. That would be a huge gamble since the stakes are much higher for Russia than for the West, thus reducing the chances that the former would agree to the concessions that the latter might demand, such as freezing the conflict along the existing Line of Contact without anything else in exchange.
There’s also the possibility that the West’s attempt to destabilize and invade Belarus, whether through mercenaries and/or conventional Ukrainian troops (a conventional NATO military intervention isn’t likely at this stage), is thwarted and nothing else comes of this plot. Much less likely but still impossible to rule out is that Russia asks Belarus to let one of the aforementioned invasions make enough progress to justify using tactical nukes against Ukraine to “escalate to de-escalate” on better terms for Russia.
That would also be a huge gamble though since crossing the nuclear threshold might tremendously raise the stakes for the West as its leaders sincerely see it even if the primary intent is only to punish Ukraine. Nevertheless, seeing as how Putin is now finally climbing the escalation ladder and throwing some of his previous caution to the wind after feeling like his prior patience was mistaken by the West as weakness, he might be influenced by hawkish advisors into seeing that as an opportunity to flex Russia’s muscles.
In any case, regardless of whatever might happen, the fact is that it’s the West’s prerogative whether or not Belarus is destabilized and possibly also invaded. Ukraine could also “go rogue” out of desperation if it feels that the West might “sell it out” under Trump and thus wants to make a last-ditch attempt to improve its negotiating position or “escalate to de-escalate” on better terms for itself, but this could greatly backfire if it fails. They both therefore bear full responsibility for what could follow.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
The ultimate goal of fugitive militants who are getting training abroad is to invade Belarus, Maksim Ralko, former member of the illegal armed formation Kalinovski regiment who took part in the hostilities, told the ONT TV channel, BelTA reports.
These lessons could reshape how policymakers perceive the special operation and therefore improve the way in which it’s being waged.
Ukraine’s sneak attack against Russia’s Kursk Region appears to have successfully penetrated the border according to RT’s update on Wednesday, which followed the Defence Ministry’s claim that the fighting was only taking place on the Ukrainian side of the border. Even though it appears destined to fail and be seen in hindsight as this generation’s “Battle of the Bulge” like many social commentators have described it as, it still taught Russia five very important lessons that it would do well to consider implementing:
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* It Might Finally Be Time To Take Out All The Bridges Across The Dnieper
Russia has hitherto been reluctant to take out bridges across the Dnieper, but it might finally be time to do so in order to prevent Western arms and equipment from reaching its pre-2014 borders in possible preparation of more sneak attacks. Continuing to prioritize political objectives over military ones, such as remaining averse to inconveniencing civilians through the proposed means in order to avoid losing more hearts and minds, has arguably proven to have more drawbacks than benefits.
* Better ISR & Less Groupthink Can Reduce Russia’s Blind Spots
NATO has proven that it has impressive tactical capabilities after successfully disguising its proxy’s sneak attack, but Russia is the bloc’s peer and thus shouldn’t have been fooled. Better intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) could have prevented this, as could the optimization of feedback loops from the front. Per the latter, higher-ups might not have taken reports of a military build-up seriously since they could have deemed it “irrational”, but they should have listened if that was the case.
* Preemptive Resettlement & More Physical Border Defences Would Have Helped A Lot
In hindsight, it might have been wise to preemptively resettle folks who were living in proximity to the border and turn these areas into a security zone with many more physical defences. Two reasons why this wasn’t done might have been fear of it being spun by its foes as setting up a “buffer zone” inside of Russia and not wanting to inconvenience the locals. The first should never influence policymakers while the second could be mitigated by proper planning and funding (with possible “oligarch” contributions).
* Border Militias Might Not Be A Bad Idea If They’re Supervised By The State
The now-rebranded Wagner’s late founder Prigozhin had previously proposed creating a border militia in Belgorod Region, but he ultimately turned out to be the West’s “useful idiot” as explained in the preceding hyperlinked analysis so that might have been a very bad idea at the time had he succeeded. Nevertheless, properly supervised border militias might in fact be a good idea, such as if there were FSB agents embedded within them to ensure these non-state actors’ continued loyalty to the state.
* “Active Defence” Is Better Than “Passive Defence”
Even in the absence of proper ISR, Ukraine would have still struggled to assemble the forces needed for its sneak attack and then storm across the border had Russia been engaged in a policy of “active defence” (regular low-level attacks) instead of “passive defence” (sitting back and waiting for an attack). Going forward, Russia should consider the merits of implementing “active defence” all along the front, which would keep Ukraine on edge and possibly force it to voluntarily create its own “buffer zones”.
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The five lessons enumerated above could reshape how policymakers perceive the special operation and therefore improve the way in which it’s being waged, particularly with regards to addressing some of the constructive critiques thereof that were shared in this analysis here from November 2022. Retaining the same mindset risks more sneak attacks. It’s only through the pragmatic evolution of policymakers’ viewpoints in response to the past 2.5 years’ events that success can best be achieved.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Russian and Chinese interests don’t align on this particular issue and the dynamics associated with it.
Bloomberg reported on Tuesday that “Russia Is Wooing Arctic Gas Buyers With Life After US Sanctions”. They cited unnamed sources to report that Novatek, the company behind the Arctic LNG 2 megaproject, is courting American, European, and even Indian buyers ahead of Trump possibly curtailing or lifting sanctions on their initiative as part of the nascentRussian–US “New Détente”. According to them, a senior executive pitched this as “a way to counter a rising China”, which has a certain logic to it.
From those three potential clients’ perspectives, all three of which have troubled ties with China, whatever they might buy from Arctic LNG 2 would reduce the amount available to Beijing. There’s also the chance that they elbow China out of this megaproject entirely if they collectively replace its lost investments after private Chinese companies pulled out of Arctic LNG 2 due to American sanctions. This could prospectively be achieved if Japan and South Korea, which have similar interests, get involved too.
That could in turn force China to rely more on comparatively costlier LNG from other sources like Australia and Qatar, both of which are American allies and whose exports could be more easily cut off by the US Navy in the event of an Asian crisis, thus applying immense pressure on China in that scenario. Russia is neutral in the Sino-US dimension of the New Cold War, just like China is neutral to the Russian-American one, with both prioritizing their national interests as their leaders understand them to be.
China didn’t want to risk America’s wrath by defying one of the latter’s most significant sanctions, ergo why it pulled out of Arctic LNG 2, while Russia’s interests rest in offering the West privileged access to this same megaproject as an incentive for the US to coerce Ukraine into concessions. Russian and Chinese interests therefore don’t align on this particular issue and the dynamics associated with it, yet they’re expected to responsibly manage their differences as usual in the spirit of their partnership.
These approaches align with the US’ evolving interests, however, since it wanted China to informally comply with some sanctions such as this one andothers as a means of pressuring Russia while curtailing or lifting sanctions on Russia (including in a possibly phased manner) is a means of pressuring China. The US might not have planned this in advance, rather it’s probably just flexibly adapting to changing circumstances brought about by Russia’s impressive resilience in the Ukrainian Conflict.
The sanctions didn’t bankrupt Russia, its military-industrial complex didn’t collapse, and no withdrawal from Ukraine followed, with Russia instead gradually gaining ground and now approaching the brink of a breakthrough that could either decisively end or escalate the conflict. The US doesn’t want Russia to achieve its maximum goals (let alone by military means) while Russia might not want to risk whatever the US could do stop it in the event of a breakthrough, hence why they began negotiations at this time.
The series of pragmatic compromises that they’re now discussing could see Russia agree to a ceasefire in exchange for partial sanctions relief that could restore a degree of its pre-conflict complex interdependence with the US-led West in order to lay the basis for a comprehensive deal later. There’d prospectively be other mutually beneficial terms to whatever ceasefire they might clinch but the energy aspect could play a leading role in getting both sides to agree as explained here in early January.
Arctic LNG 2 and Nord Stream, as Russia’s most globally significant energy megaprojects, could therefore figure prominently in any series of pragmatic compromises with the US. Taken together, they could bring together those two, the EU, and the Indo-Pacific Rim countries of India, Japan, and South Korea, thus resulting in a Eurasian-wide network of direct stakeholders for sustaining and building upon a ceasefire in Ukraine. This might even be what ultimately gets Putin and Trump to reach an interim agreement.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Towards Tri-Multipolarity: The Golden Billion, The Sino-Russo Entente, And The Global South By Andrew Korybko The global systemic transition’s impending evolution towards tri-multipolarity could se…
The path ahead will be very difficult due to the sensitive issues that Russia and the US must resolve.
12 February 2025 will go down in history as the day when the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine officially began to end. Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth started everything off by declaring that: Ukraine won’t join NATO; the US doesn’t believe that Ukraine can restore its pre-2014 borders; the US won’t deploy troops to the conflict zone; the US wants the Europeans to assume some peacekeeping responsibilities there instead; but the US won’t extend Article 5 guarantees to EU forces there.
This was followed by Trump and Putin talking for the first time since the former returned to office. They agreed to begin peace talks without delay, which was followed by Trump calling Zelensky to brief him about this and likely coerce the concessions from him that he presumably promised Putin. Trump also suggested that he’ll soon meet Putin in Saudi Arabia and that each of them might then visit each other’s countries as part of the peace process. Here are some background briefings about the larger context:
The first analysis about creative energy diplomacy contains a dozen proposed compromises for each side that could help move their talks along. In fact, the one about the US not extending Article 5 guarantees to EU forces in Ukraine is now policy per Hegseth, so it’s possible that some others might follow. Additionally, Trump just remarked about how unpopular Zelensky has become, which suggests that he’s planning the “phased leadership transition” via new elections that was also proposed in that piece.
It remains to be seen which of these other proposals might soon become US policy, with the same being said for the ones that Russia might implement, such as agreeing to limited military restrictions on its side of the DMZ that’ll likely be created by the end of this process for example. What follows are the five main issues that’ll shape the Russian-US peace talks on Ukraine between their leaders, diplomats, and whichever of their experts might be invited to participate in this via complementary Track II talks:
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* Territorial Parameters
The most immediate issue that must be resolved is where the new Russian-Ukrainian border will fall. Hegseth’s claim about Ukraine’s inability to restore its pre-2014 border hints that Trump could coerce Zelensky into withdrawing from at least all of Donbass, which is at the centre of the territorial dimension of their conflict, though it’s possible that his forces might fall back as far as Zaporozhye city. Letting Russia control that city and the parts of its new regions west of the Dnieper is unlikely at this time.
That’s because Trump might not want to take the flak that would follow giving Russia a city of over 700,000 whose residents didn’t vote in September 2022’s referendum. The same goes for the parts of Russia’s new regions west of the river. Instead, he might propose a UN-supervised referendum sometime after the fighting freezes to resolve this aspect of their territorial dispute, all while allowing Russia to continue to officially lay claim to those areas. That might be pragmatic enough for Putin to agree.
* DMZ Terms & Peacekeeper Roles
The next issue to address after the above are the terms of the DMZ along their interim border and the role of the peacekeepers who’d then likely deploy there to monitor it. Hegseth’s declaration that the US will not extend Article 5 guarantees to EU forces there could deter them from playing a major role, which Russia would have to authorize via a UNSC Resolution in any case per Permanent Representative Vasily Nebenzia otherwise they’ll be legitimate targets. Non-Western ones are thus much more agreeable.
As it turns out, the vast majority of UN peacekeepers are from non-Western countries, so they could prospectively deploy there under a UNSC mandate per Nebenzia’s suggestion and possibly even result in the total exclusion of any Western peacekeepers if it’s agreed that none will contribute to this mission. Their terms would have to be acceptable to both Russia and the US in order for this resolution to pass, so it’s unclear exactly what they’ll be able to do or not do, but that directly segues into the next issue.
* Demilitarization & Denazification
Two of Russia’s main goals in the specialoperation are to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, which it initially sought to do by militarily coercing Ukraine into this per the terms established in spring 2022’s draft peace treaty, though that didn’t succeed due to the UK and Poland. It’s unrealistic to imagine that Trump will agree to let Russia deploy its armed forces throughout the entirety of Ukraine to implement this so it can only be accomplished through similar diplomatic means involving Kiev’s acquiescence.
Therein lies the possible role that UN peacekeepers can play in monitoring and enforcing whatever is ultimately agreed upon for demilitarizing and denazifying Ukraine. This could take the form of inspecting suspected illegal arms sites and all of Ukraine’s cross-border traffic (including at its ports) while having the right to mandate changes to its media reporting and school curricula as need be. This is the only way to ensure that Ukraine remains demilitarized and denazified after the conflict ends.
* Sanctions Relief
Russia has repeatedly demanded the lifting of all Western sanctions, but the argument can be made that “deal-master” Trump wouldn’t ever agree to do this all at once, instead preferring to draft a plan for phased sanctions relief as a reward for Russia’s compliance with a ceasefire, armistice, or peace treaty. This could take the form of what was proposed in the creative energy diplomacy analysis whereby some Russian exports to the EU could resume during the first phase as a trust-building measure.
While Russia would prefer that they all be immediately lifted, its policymakers might conclude that it’s better to accept a phased plan if that’s all that Trump is comfortable offering instead of nothing at all. He’d do well though to engage in the goodwill gesture of lifting sanctions on Russia’s oil exports by sea too since that could convince those policymakers that he’s serious about relieving pressure on Russia. This would in turn make it easier for Putin to sell the compromise of phased sanctions relief at home.
* New Security Architecture
Russia envisaged creating a new European security architecture through mutual agreements with the US and NATO in December 2021 per the security guarantee requests that it shared with them at the time. These were in hindsight meant to diplomatically resolve their security dilemma, whose roots are in NATO’s continued eastward expansion after the Old Cold War and especially its clandestine expansion into Ukraine, in lieu of the special operation that Putin was secretly planning at the time if that failed.
So much has changed since then that separate comprehensive talks on this must start right after whatever agreement they reach on Ukraine. The new issues include NATO’s eastern military buildup, Finland and Sweden’s new memberships, Russia’s hypersonic Oreshniks, their deployment to Belarus, Russia’s deployment of nukes there too, the future of the New START that expires next year, and the new space arms race, et al. Agreeing on a new security architecture will therefore stabilize the world.
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As can be seen, the path ahead will be very difficult due to the sensitive issues that Russia and the US must resolve, but their leaders have shown that they have the will to negotiate in good faith. Neither side is likely to achieve their maximum objectives, but diplomacy is the art of the possible, so each will do their utmost to achieve as much as they can in this regard given the circumstances. The best-case scenario is a fair and lasting peace that truly resolves the root causes at the core of this conflict.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
They no longer see each other as allies or even close partners but as fiercely feuding spouses trapped in a marriage of convenience (in this case against Russia) from which neither feels comfortable extricating themselves for now at least.
Deputy Prime Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski from the Left (“Lewica”) wing of the ruling coalition went off on Zelensky during an interview with Radio Zet. According to their transcript, he said that “Zelensky wants Poland to shoot missiles over Ukraine, which means he wants Poland to enter the war, which means he wants Poland to be at war with Russia. In these statements, Zelensky wants to drag Poland into the war with Russia. I do not agree to such statements.” This is the result of newly boiling tensions.
Everything was fine in their relations when they clinched a securitypact over the summer, but Defence Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz’s admission in late August that Poland had finally maxed out its military support for Ukraine led to a heated argument between Zelensky and Sikorski in mid-September. Kiev didn’t believe that Warsaw had really maxed out but suspected it of withholding more aid as a means of coercing compliance with its renascent demands for resolving the Volhynia Genocide dispute.
Zelensky went public last week with his criticism of Poland for curtailing weapons deliveries in recent months, which Sikorski responded to by proposing a military loan for ordering new equipment that could be paid back sometime after the conflict ends. That top diplomat also reaffirmed his support for intercepting Russian missiles over Ukraine after the Helsinki Commission urged the Biden Administration to approve this, but the preceding hyperlinked analysis argues that he had cynical motives for this.
In brief, he always clarified that Poland won’t do so unilaterally but only with the support of NATO, which hasn’t yet been obtained and might never be due to it greatly risking a hot war with Russia. The latest Polish policies towards Ukraine – reviving its Volhynia Genocide dispute demands and only sending more equipment to Ukraine on credit instead of continuing to give it away for free – harmed their ties so fantasizing about intercepting Russian missiles might just be a cost-free distraction from this reality.
Sikorski might also run as the ruling coalition’s candidate in next year’s presidential election so he’d need to balance between warmongering members of the electorate via such rhetoric while appealing to rising anti-Ukrainian sentiment among society. This self-interested balancing act accounts for these seemingly contradictory policies while also explaining why coalition ally Gawkowski only condemned Zelensky for provoking a Polish-Russian war and not Sikorski even though the latter also flirted with this.
Having clarified the context for those observers who haven’t closely followed Polish-Ukrainian ties in recent months, it’s now time to say a few words about what might come next. Gawkowski is one of only two Deputy Prime Ministers, the other being Kosiniak-Kamysz, so it’s no small matter that he came out so forcefully against Zelensky’s reckless demands. He also condemned his ungratefulness for all the aid that Poland has provided Ukraine and its refugees thus far. Both sets of views reflect public opinion.
While his coalition’s base has some loud warmongers among it, most Poles don’t want to go to war with Russia, and they’re also disgusted with how rude Ukrainian officials have become in recent months. Their growing fatigue with Ukrainian refugees and this proxy war is leading to them having less patience for such antics. They also see through Zelensky’s efforts to provoke a Polish-Russian war and want nothing to do with it. Gawkowski is therefore giving voice to what most of his compatriots feel right now.
Sikorski would do well to drop his prior support for this scenario no matter how politically self-interested and insincere such rhetoric might have hitherto been if he wants to run for president next year. Poles are getting fed up with Ukraine after feeling taken advantage of by their neighbors who they helped and even in some cases literally opened their homes for out of solidarity with them. They’re thus unlikely to support his candidacy if he continues warmongering against Russia no matter what his true motives are.
As for the future of Polish-Ukrainian relations, more political turmoil is expected as Zelensky becomes increasingly desperate for someone to save him as Russia continues its spree of on-the-ground gains. His pleas for help are becoming more menacing after he’s begun to rudely lash out against it for not doing enough for Ukraine. This might very soon transform into him pinning some of the blame for its inevitable defeat on Poland and possibly flirting with the informal revival of territorial claims against it.
Bilateral ties haven’ yet collapsed and both sides might still restrain themselves in order to avert that worst-case scenario, but there’s no longer any doubt that whatever mutual trust they previously had (regardless of however real it ultimately was all along) is gone. They no longer see each other as allies or even close partners but as fiercely feuding spouses trapped in a marriage of convenience (in this case against Russia) from which neither feels comfortable extricating themselves for now at least.
Poland’s exclusion from the Ukrainian endgame when it wasn’t given a seat at the table during last month’s Berlin Summit between the American, British, French, and German leaders hit the country hard. Everything that it gave Ukraine for free thus far, and outgoing President Andrzej Duda from the fractured and very imperfect conservative-nationalist opposition claimed that it amounts to 3.3% of his country’s GDP, was thus all for naught after Warsaw wasn’t even humored with a symbolic role in this process.
The resultant resentment might remain manageable when it comes to the West and Germany in particular exploiting Poland to advance their grand strategic goals, but it’s much less tolerable when it comes to Ukraine, which Poland considers be its junior partner. It’s all the more unacceptable that this same perceived junior partner is now trying to provoke a Polish-Russian war, and Gawkowski’s condemnation of Zelensky for attempting to do so will widely reverberate due to his political role.
It’s one thing for a member of the opposition to allege this and another entirely for the ruling coalition’s Deputy Prime Minister to say the same. He therefore can’t be accused of speculative partisan motivations in an attempt to discredit him. Foreign media might downplay or even ignore what he said, but Poles heard him loud and clear, and they now know that some of the ruling authorities are finally listening to them. It’s about time that Sikorski does too and officially drops his support for this scheme.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Polish President Andrzej Duda can’t be smeared as a “Russian agent” by any stretch of the imagination or suspected of even being remotely sympathetic to that country after all that he’s done to help Ukraine fight against it since 2022.
French-born President of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili, who also used to be the French Ambassador to Tbilisi, accused Russia of conducting a “special operation” after the ruling Georgian Dream party with whom she’s feuding won a majority during last weekend’s parliamentary elections. This figurehead leader then called on her people to protest, which can be considered a punitive Colour Revolution for her opponents’ refusal to sanction Russia and open a second military front against it in the South Caucasus.
Her Polish counterpart Andrzej Duda, who by no stretch of the imagination can be smeared as a “Russian agent” or suspected of even being remotely sympathetic to that country after all that he’s done to help Ukraine fight against it since 2022, just dropped a bombshell that completely discredits her narrative. Here’s what he told Radio Zet that they talked about last month and on Monday as translated into English from his remarks that were published in Polish on that outlet’s website:
“We talked about the general political situation and she outlined to me that Georgian Dream will probably win, but there is no indication that it will gain such an advantage that will allow them to govern on their own. The result that is being announced clearly contradicts what the president told me [last month]…(And during our latest talk,) The president did not say clearly [that Russia meddled], because there is no clear evidence for this, but let’s say that [Georgian Dream are] in a sense pro-Russian forces.”
Poland co-founded the EU’s Eastern Partnership in 2009 that was employed by the bloc to expand its influence in the remaining six former Soviet Republics in Europe besides Russia that had yet to join. It therefore considers itself to be a regional leader whose top representatives’ positions on newsworthy events in those countries are authoritative. Although he supported Zourabichvili’s call for an international inquiry, his contradiction of her claims about Russian meddling is thus very significant.
He could have lied about what they discussed a month ago and on Monday, not to mention leaving out how she lacks any evidence to back up her claim of Russian meddling during last weekend’s polls, yet he told the truth to his credit and consequently complicated the West’s narrative. Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, who represents Duda’s party’s rival in Poland’s complex political set-up after last fall’s elections, swiftly rebuked him in a similar manner as he did in spring when Duda talked about hosting US nukes.
Just like back then, Sikorski reminded Duda that “Foreign policy is conducted by the Council of Ministers, so before making a decision on a possible trip to Georgia, President Duda should familiarize himself with the government’s position on this matter.” This was in response to Duda telling Radio Zet that he considers it his “duty” in travel to Georgia “if there is a situation where it will be necessary”. The message is that Duda should stop sharing foreign policy opinions that contradict the aforesaid Council’s.
With that in mind, Duda was either uninformed of the Council’s position when he shared what he discussed with Zourabichvili or he subverted it, both possibilities of which are plausible but speculation about this is moot since the indisputable outcome is that he completely discredited her narrative. It could also be that he was aware of the OSCE’s preliminary election observation report and naively assumed that the Council would go along with it since they hitherto relied on the group for guidance.
To be clear, Poland hasn’t claimed at the time of writing that Russia meddled in the elections, but Sikorski’s rebuke of Duda after he spilled the beans about his two recent conversations with Zourabichvili suggests that the Council is displeased with him for disclosing those sensitive details. Poland’s ruling coalition, which doesn’t include Duda’s party, might want to keep its options open for now and appears reluctant to endorse her meddling claims due to the OSCE’s politically inconvenient report.
Instead of confirming Zourabichvili’s fraud and meddling accusations like she assumed they would, they only shared some minor criticisms like they do with practically every election they observe, and they also surprisingly had some very positive things to say about the electoral process. This includes writing that “the legal framework provides an adequate basis for conducting democratic elections” and “Election day was generally procedurally well-organized and administered in an orderly manner”.
They also noted that “The initial phase of processing results protocols and election materials by [District Election Commissions], observed in all 73 electoral districts, was generally positively assessed.” Nevertheless, because of the OSCE’s minor criticisms and the disproportionate attention that the West paid to Zourabichvili’s scandalous accusations, Georgian election officials announced that they’ll recount ballots at five randomly selected polling stations in each voting district to confirm the polls’ legitimacy.
Considering the OSCE’s politically inconvenient report, Duda’s revelations about what he recently discussed with Zourabichvili, and the ongoing random recount that’ll dispel all reasonable doubt about the results once it’s done, there’s no reason to lend credence to Zourabichvili’s claims. This doesn’t mean that external forces might not orchestrate another Colour Revolution, but just that the pretext upon which that might happen is totally false, which all honest observers should keep in mind going forward.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Sikorski arguably sought to provoke a fake scandal with the unfriendly aim of further worsening the US’ already tense ties with the EU and NATO in advance of his ruling party’s liberal-globalist agenda.
Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski lent credence to rumours that Elon Musk might cut Ukraine off from Starlink by threatening that his country, which pays $50 million a year for its neighbour’s use of this indispensable military communication service, will look for other suppliers if needed. That provoked Musk to tell him, “Be quiet, small man. You pay a tiny fraction of the cost. And there is no substitute for Starlink”, after which Secretary of State Marco Rubio then jumped into the fray.
America’s top diplomat told his Polish counterpart, “Just making things up. No one has made any threats about cutting Ukraine off from Starlink And say thank you because without Starlink Ukraine would have lost this war long ago and Russians would be on the border with Poland right now.” Sikorski meekly responded by posting, “Thank you, Marco, for confirming that the brave soldiers of Ukraine can count on the vital internet service provided jointly by the US and Poland.”
He added that, “Together, Europe and the United States can help Ukraine to achieve a just peace.” This spat could have ended there but then Prime Minister Donald Tusk wrote on Monday that “True leadership means respect for partners and allies. Even for the smaller and weaker ones. Never arrogance. Dear friends, think about it.” This was an obvious swipe at Trump 2.0, particularly Musk and Rubio, for putting Sikorski in his place even though he deserved it.
Sikorski behaved undiplomatically by breathing life into those rumours when he should have first checked with Rubio before publicly addressing them, thus suggesting that he either reacted emotionally without thinking this through or he deliberately wanted to create a scandal. He, Tusk, and their ilk previously made defamatory statements about Trump prior to last year’s election by smearing him as a “proto-fascist” and even a “Russian spy”, which were documented here and analysed here.
It therefore can’t be ruled out that Sikorski did indeed intend to discredit Trump’s pragmatic approach to Ukraine, particularly his decision to cut off its military and intelligence aid, by taking for granted that the rumours about Musk plotting to do the same with Starlink were true and publicly reacting accordingly. His motivation might have been to signal to Poland’s peers with whom it’s competing for leadership of post-conflict Europe that the ruling liberal-globalist coalition will stand up to the US in support of Ukraine.
Sikorski and Tusk, who are respectively Anglophiles and Germanophiles, prioritize relations with the UK and the German-led EU over their country’s strategic partnership with the US. This is in spite of Poland being poised to become the US’ top partner in Europe if it plays its cards right, which is still possible with the ruling liberal-globalists even if they win May’s presidential election but much more likely if the conservative or populist candidate wins instead. This insight places Sikorski’s post into context.
He arguably wanted to make it seem like the US is unilaterally reneging on a commercial contract of national security significance for Ukraine as a favour to Russia, thus casting more doubts about its reliability as an ally and consequently worsening the transatlantic rift. Musk and Rubio therefore swiftly put Sikorski in his place so as to deter other Foreign Ministers from doing anything similar in the future with the unfriendly aim of further worsening the US’ already tense ties with the EU and NATO.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
For Radosław Sikorski, once Poland’s foreign minister, now one of its government’s most prominent critics, recent events may have put his country on track to leave the EU – calling into question the s
Transatlantic ties, Russian-US relations, and the nature of American hegemony are all transforming before everyone’s eyes as Trump makes bold moves to force Zelensky to the peace table with Putin.
An unnamed senior Defence Department told the media on Monday evening that Trump decided to freeze all military aid to Ukraine until its leaders demonstrate a good-faith commitment to peace. This comes just several days after Zelensky picked his fight with Trump and Vance at the White House. The Wall Street Journal earlier predicted that Ukraine could only continue fighting at its current level till this summer in such a scenario. Here are five takeaways from this monumental development:
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1. Trump Is Serious About Brokering Peace
Zelensky made it clear during his disastrous visit to the White House last Friday that he’s dead-set on fighting till the last Ukrainian unless his country either gets NATO membership or Western troops. Neither of those demands is acceptable to Trump since they’d risk World War III, but so too could that risk continue rising if the conflict doesn’t soon end. Trump therefore realized that the only way to force Zelensky to the peace table with Putin is to freeze all military aid until he moderates his extreme stance.
2. He & Putin Likely Have A Secret Agreement
Trump said last week that “A ceasefire could take place immediately”, which was arguably an inadvertent admission of a secret agreement with Putin. No lasting peace can be reached until after the next Ukrainian presidential elections, but they can’t be held during martial law, ergo the need for a ceasefire. Although Putin earlier conditioned this on Ukraine withdrawing from the disputed regions, he might support a ceasefire to justify the US’ curtailed aid to Ukraine and legitimize Russian-US economicdeals.
3. But It’s Not Yet A Comprehensive One
If the aforesaid speculation is accurate, then it doesn’t mean that those two have a comprehensive agreement. Serious issues such as the final Russian-Ukrainian border and the question of peacekeepers have yet to be agreed to and might not be resolved till after the next Ukrainian presidential and parliamentary elections. It’s therefore premature to predict that the Line of Contact will become the final border and that Western peacekeepers will be deployed there, especially since Russia opposes both.
4. Poland Might Have A Pivotal Role To Play
About 90% of Western military aid to Ukraine transits through Poland so Trump might ask it to stop the Europeans from using its territory to arm Ukraine during a ceasefire in exchange for post-conflict perks. He doesn’t want the Brits, French, or Germans emboldening Ukraine to violate the ceasefire or provoke Russia into doing so and can incentivize Poland to prevent this by promising to keep American troops there, possibly redeploy some from Germany to Poland, and turn Poland into its top partner in Europe.
5. The “New Détente” Is Trump’s Top Priority
Every major move that’s taken place since Trump’s call with Putin in mid-February has been predicated on advancing his grand strategic goal of a Russian–US “New Détente”, the gist of which is to revolutionize International Relations through a game-changing comprehensive partnership between them. Readers can learn more about its details from the three preceding hyperlinked analyses, but it’s the pursuit of this goal that ultimately drove Trump to make the fateful decision to freeze all military aid to Ukraine.
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Transatlantic ties, Russian-US relations, and the nature of American hegemony are all transforming before everyone’s eyes as Trump makes bold moves to force Zelensky to the peace table with Putin. His latest one was literally one of the worst-case scenarios from Ukraine’s and Europe’s perspective but there’s little that they can do in response other than capitulate to his demands. The US holds all the cards like Trump reminded Zelensky last Friday and those who think otherwise risk paying the price.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
NATO might be willing to test Putin’s patience by crossing yet another of Russia’s perceived red lines in spite of its updated nuclear doctrine and new Oreshniks.
The NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine might be on the brink of an unprecedented escalation that could easily spiral out of control if Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) is correct in claiming that NATO is planning a 100,000-strong military intervention in Ukraine under the guise of peacekeepers. The purpose is to freeze the conflict, presumably by having these troops function as tripwires for deterring a Russian attack that could spark World War III, and then rebuild Ukraine’s military-industrial complex (MIC).
SVR revealed that Poland will have control over Western Ukraine (like it did during the interwar period); Romania will be responsible for the Black Sea coast (which it seized during World War II via and ruled as the “Transnistria Governorate”); the UK will lord over Kiev and the north; while Germany will deploy its forces to the centre and east of the country. The latter’s Rhinemetall will lead the efforts to rebuild Ukraine’s MIC by investing heavily, dispatching specialists, and providing high-performance equipment.
Another important detail is that “NATO is already deploying training centres in Ukraine, through which it is planned to drag at least a million mobilized Ukrainians”, while police functions will be carried out via Ukrainian nationalists that SVR likens to World War II-era Sonderkommandos. The last part is intriguing since it raises the question of why 100,000 NATO troops/peacekeepers would be required. Only a fraction of that is needed for tripwire and training purposes so perhaps those numbers are inaccurate.
In any case, this latest move isn’t surprising, and readers can review the following analyses to learn why:
The last analysis also includes a map at the end depicting the most realistic best-case scenario for Russia.
To summarize, Biden is beating Trump to the punch by “escalating to de-escalate” on better terms for the US, which Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine and the historic first use of the MIRV-capable Oreshnik hypersonic medium-range missile in combat are meant to deter. The 10 obstacles described above still stand, however, so it’s unclear exactly how viable NATO’s reportedly planned conventional intervention in Ukraine (regardless of the numbers involved and the pretext relied upon for justifying it) actually is.
Nevertheless, the fact that SVR warned the world about it suggests that it’s no longer the far-fetched scenario that it was thought to be, though the clock is also now ticking for NATO too since the possible rise to power of a populist conservative-nationalist in Romania next month could spoil these plans. NATO might therefore intervene before 21 December when that figure will take office if he wins. If he loses, then they might bide their time to prepare better, possibly placing this responsibility on Trump’s lap.
At any rate, SVR’s claim that NATO is setting up training centres in Ukraine shows that the bloc is still expanding there. If Russia doesn’t target these facilities, which could spark World War III, then it might have to accept as a fait accompli what SVR just warned about. In that event, as proposed in the “escalation ladder” analysis above, Russia might then reach a deal allowing NATO to safely enter Ukraine up to the Dnieper if Ukraine first demilitarizes everything east of it and north of Russia’s new regions.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
The Alternative World website is where you could be able to find different point of views around how today's world should be changed so as to be better
Putin might agree to freeze the conflict along the Line of Contact in spite of prior rhetoric against this scenario in the event that Trump threatens to escalate the conflict as punishment if he doesn’t.
Trump’s pledge to resolve the Ukrainian Conflict in 24 hours is unrealistic, but he’ll inevitably propose a peace plan at some point in time, thus raising questions about what it would look like and whether Russia would agree to it. More than likely, he’ll seek to freeze the conflict along the Line of Contact (LOC), wherever it may be by that time, as he’s not expected to coerce Ukraine into withdrawing from the regions whose administrative borders Russia claims in their entirety.
Nor is Russia expected to obtain control over them by the time that Trump’s proposal is made. It still hasn’t removed Ukrainian forces from Donbass, which is at the heart of its claims, and therefore is unlikely to capture Zaporozhye city, that namesake’s areas on the side of the Dnieper River, nor Kherson Region’s aforesaid adjacent lands either. It might gain some more territory if Pokrovsk is captured, but the US might dangerously “escalate to de-escalate” to stop a run on the river if Ukraine is then routed.
This could take the form of threatening a conventional NATO intervention if the political will exists to spark a Cuban-like brinskmanship crisis, the odds of which would greatly increase if Russia made any move in that scenario to cross the Dnieper and thus risk the collapse of that bloc’s Ukrainian project. Be that as it may, no such run on the river is expected, with the most that Russia might do is lay siege to Zaporozhye city, but even that might not materialize by the time that Trump shares his peace plan.
Russia will therefore almost certainly be asked to freeze the conflict along the LOC, albeit without rescinding its territorial claims just like Ukraine won’t either, under the threat of Trump ramping up military support to Ukraine if the Kremlin refuses to cease hostilities. This prediction is predicated on summer’s report that some of his advisors suggested that he do precisely that as punishment for Russia rubbishing whatever peace plan that he ultimately offers it.
Considering his tough-talking personality and proclivity for “escalating to de-escalate” on his terms if he feels disrespected, which he flirted doing with North Korea during his first term as a negotiating tactic, he’s thus expected to comply with the aforesaid suggestion in that event. Given Putin’s consummate pragmatism as he understands his style to be and his aversion to escalations, he might very well comply, but he could also request that Trump coerce Zelensky into making concessions to facilitate this.
These might include rescinding 2019’s constitutional amendment making NATO membership a strategic objective, promulgating legislation that Russia considers to advance its denazification goals, freezing further weapons shipments to Ukraine, and carving out a buffer zone within part of Ukrainian territory. In the order that they were mentioned, the first one would be superficial after this year’s raft of security guarantees between Ukraine and several NATO countries already made it a de facto member of the bloc.
To explain, they all entail commitments to resume their existing military support for Ukraine if its conflict with Russia flares up again upon its eventual end, and this self-same support arguably aligns with NATO’s Article 5. Contrary to popular perceptions, it doesn’t obligate them to send troops, but only to provide whatever support they believe is necessary to aid allies under attack. This is what they’re already doing, yet Russia never escalated in response to this being enshrined in their bilateral military deals.
As for the second speculative concession that Putin might request that Trump coerce Zelensky into making, the returning American leader and his team haven’t ever signalled any interest in helping Russia denazify Ukraine, and coercing it into promulgating legislation might be seen as bad optics abroad. Since Russia can’t force Ukraine to do this, that particular goal of the specialoperation will likely remain unfulfilled, in which case it probably wouldn’t be discussed much anymore by officials and the media.
Moving along to the third, Trump probably wouldn’t agree to freeze arms shipments to Ukraine, but they might naturally be curtailed as he refocuses America’s military priorities on containing China in Asia instead of continuing to contain Russia in Europe. About that, his reported plan to encourage NATO members to take more responsibility for their defence is already being implemented under Biden as explained here, and they might continue arms shipments even if the US curtails its own.
Even so, the potentially natural curtailment of US arms shipments to Ukraine could be spun as partially fulfilling Russia’s demilitarization goal, as could any buffer zone that Trump might agree to coerce Ukraine into carving out on its own territory to prevent it from shelling Russian cities. That’ll be a hard sell for Putin to make, and Trump might be pressured by the “deep state” (the permanent members of the US’ military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies) into resisting, but it can’t be ruled out either.
The reason for this cautious optimism is because it would provide a “face-saving” means for Russia to freeze the conflict despite not achieving its maximum objectives instead of risking a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis by rejecting Trump’s expected proposal to “save face” at home and abroad. Trump wouldn’t make idle threats and certainly wouldn’t let Putin call his bluff even if that was the case so he’s expected to go through with arming Ukraine to the teeth if his peace deal falls flat.
That said, he also campaigned on ending the Ukrainian Conflict, and he’d personally prefer to replenish America’s depleted stockpiles in parallel with arming its Asian allies to the teeth against China instead continuing to arm Ukraine and risking a major crisis with Russia. His Sino-centric New Cold War focus is shared by a minority of the “deep state”, the majority of whom want to continue prioritizing Russia’s containment in Europe over China’s in Asia but who still never recklessly escalated with Russia thus far.
They’ve indeed escalated, but this was always preceded by signalling their intent to do so (such as via the provisioning of various arms) long before this happened, thus giving Russia enough time to calculate a response instead of risking an “overreaction” that could spiral into war with NATO. These anti-Russian hawks might therefore begrudgingly go along with any buffer zone that Trump might agree to if it avoids a potentially uncontrollable escalation like what he might threaten to do if Russia doesn’t take his deal.
Subversive “deep state” elements might even try to provoke such an escalation in order to avert that buffer zone scenario or any other that they consider to be unacceptable concessions to Russia, which remains a risk before and after his inauguration, but it’s clearly not their faction’s preferred scenario. This conclusion is arrived at by recalling on the abovementioned observation about how they always signalled their escalatory intentions far in advance thus far at least in order to avoid a major escalation.
Even if Trump doesn’t comply with any of Putin’s speculative requests to help the latter “save face” by freezing the conflict despite not achieving his country’s maximum goals in the conflict, he could always dangle the carrot of phased sanctions relief of the sort proposed by Richard Haass earlier this week. The former President of the hugely influential Council on Foreign Relations suggested that this could encourage Russia’s compliance with a ceasefire, and it’s possible that Putin might agree to this.
The Russian economy weathered the West’s unprecedented sanctions regime, but Russia’s grand plans to create alternative financial institutions and pivot to the non-West haven’t been as successful. This analysis here about how the latest BRICS Summit achieved nothing of tangible significance at all points out how none of this association’s ambitious initiatives were rolled out. It also hyperlinks to proof that the Chinese-based New Development Bank and the SCO Bank surprisingly comply with US sanctions.
Moreover, “Russia & China’s US-Provoked Payment Problems Caught Most BRICS Enthusiasts By Surprise” in early September after RT published a feature analysis about this politically inconvenient development, which shows that the Chinese centrepiece of Russia’s grand plans isn’t fully on board with them. There’s also the similarly inconvenient fact that Russia’s pivot to the non-West mostly only consists of resource sales to such countries and has yet to become anything more significant.
It accordingly wouldn’t be surprising if Putin appreciated promises of phased sanctions relief in exchange for agreeing to freeze the conflict along the LOC no matter how disappointing of an end this may be to its special operation in the eyes of its most zealous supporters. After all, Foreign Minister Lavrov told a group of ambassadors last month that Russia demands “the lifting of Western anti-Russian sanctions”, so it’s clearly on the collective Kremlin’s mind no matter what its perception managers claim.
Even if Trump makes such promises, however, keeping them would be difficult since many of America’s anti-Russian sanctions are codified into law after being voted on by Congress. They might go along with any request to rescind them, but they also might not, thus throwing a wrench in Russia’s plans. The US also can’t force the EU to rescind its respective sanctions, and anti-Russian countries like Poland and the Baltic States might create obstacles to the resumption of trade with Russia if the EU’s ties with it thaw.
Should they be implemented even if only semi-successfully, then Trump could claim a victory in “un-uniting” Russia and China like he promised to do even if those two’s trade continues to grow (mostly through Chinese resource imports and replacing lost Western products on Russian shelves). He could also sell this phased sanctions relief proposal to anti-Russian “deep state” hawks and the Europeans on that basis to help secure their support and deflect from claims that he’s doing it as a favour to Putin.
Reflecting on the insight that was shared in this analysis, Trump’s peace plan isn’t expected to have any surprises, nor would it be surprising if Russia agrees to it for the reasons that were explained. The US holds the cards and will only agree to any of Putin’s speculatively requested concessions in order to make it easier for him to “save face” for freezing the conflict despite not achieving his maximum goals. Neither wants a major escalation and both are fatigued with this proxy war so such a deal might work.
It’ll therefore be interesting to see how the rhetoric from Russian officials and their global media ecosystem might change as reports leak out about what exactly Trump has in mind. He and the minority “deep state” faction that supports him are motivated by their desire to “Pivot (back) to Asia” in order to more muscularly contain China, hence their interest in wrapping up this proxy war. As for Russia, it’s beginning to realize that a compromise of some sort is inevitable and must thus prepare the public.
Something unexpected might of course happen to completely change this analysis such as if hawks on either side convince their respective presidents to double down on the conflict, but the arguments made therein cogently account for each side’s interests, especially Russia’s. If everything more or less unfolds as written, then observers can expect a “Great Media/Perception Reset” in terms of Russia’s narrative towards the conflict, which would be required to facilitate whatever compromises Putin might make.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Germany is poised to replace Poland as Ukraine’s top strategic partner no matter who wins the next elections since PO’s victory will likely lead to this happening right away while PiS’ would likely just delay this seemingly inevitable outcome for a short while. The only realistic way that this scenario could be offset is if PiS wins and then promulgates a much more muscular policy towards Ukraine aimed at coercing that country into preserving Poland’s sphere of influence.
Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki speculated during a campaign rally on Sunday that Zelensky cut a deal with Germany behind his country’s back and implied that Ukraine should give Poland a sphere of influence there out of gratitude for all that Poles have done for it since February 2022. His words represent the latest escalation in the Polish-Ukrainian dispute that exploded in mid-September and add credence to expectations that mutual distrust will continue worsening. Here’s what he said:
“I understand that it seems to [President Zelensky] now that he will have a close alliance with Germany. Let me warn you, Germany will always want to cooperate with the Russians over the heads of Central European countries.
It was Poland that welcomed a few million Ukrainians under our roofs, it was the Poles who welcomed the Ukrainians, it was we who helped the most at the time when the Germans wanted to send 5,000 helmets to besieged Kyiv. It is worthwhile for you not to forget this, President Zelensky.”
The following analyses describe the context within which Morawiecki shared his scandalous suspicions:
The sequence of events leading up to this will now be summarized for the reader’s convenience.
Poland’s ruling “Law & Justice” (PiS) party took advantage of Russia’s specialoperation to carve out a sphere of influence for their country in Ukraine, which was seen as a serious step towards fulfilling the late Marshal Pilsudski’s “Intermarium” vision aimed at restoring Poland’s long-lost Great Power status. Germany also saw the latest phase of the Ukrainian Conflict as an opportunity to advance its own hegemonic vision over the EU, which placed it at odds with Poland, both in general and in Ukraine.
The Polish-Ukrainian grain dispute set into motion a self-sustaining cycle of distrust that prompted Kiev to proactively reduce its disproportionate dependence on Warsaw, to which end Ukraine recently clinched a military deal with Germany till 2027. Those two consider their agreement to be a means for pragmatically managing an increasingly rogue Poland, while Poland regards this an unfriendly scheme by its neighbours to contain it. A strategic dilemma has therefore come to characterize this triangle.
Ukraine no longer feels comfortable merging with Poland into a de facto confederation after the grain dispute showed that these plans entail unacceptable concessions to its sovereignty, which would institutionalize Ukraine’s junior partnership status vis-à-vis Poland if Kiev went along with this. In order to prevent that from happening, Kiev decided to counterbalance Poland’s disproportionate influence via the several-year-long military partnership that it just agreed to with Germany.
Poland expected that Ukraine would give it a sphere of influence, even if only over those western regions that used to be part of the interwar Second Polish Republic, after everything that it did to help Kiev survive Russia’s special operation thus far. This includes direct military aid, facilitating NATO’s arms shipments, and hosting millions of Ukrainian refugees. Instead, Zelensky compared Poland’s role in this conflict to Russia’s during his UNGA speech and then gave Germany a sphere of influence in Ukraine.
Germany was previously reluctant to get involved in the latest phase of the Ukrainian Conflict, but last year’s Nord Stream terrorist attack and this summer’s onset of the Polish-Ukrainian dispute convinced it to finally play a leading role. With nothing more to lose regarding ties with Russia and sensing an opportunity to divide-and-rule the region in pursuit of its hegemonic policy, Germany swiftly made up for lost time and subsequently sought to poach Poland’s envisaged sphere of influence in Ukraine.
The dynamics detailed in the preceding three paragraphs suggest that Germany is gaining strategic ground over Poland in Ukraine, and this trend is expected to continue even after the next Polish elections on 15 October. If the “Civic Platform” (PO) opposition wins, then Poland will return to its traditional post-Old Cold War status as a German vassal, which would then catalyse a competition with Ukraine for the privilege of being Germany’s most important junior partner in the region.
In the event that PiS maintains its electoral edge over PO, then it’ll likely be forced to form a coalition government with the anti-establishmentConfederation party, which could prevent the incumbents from walking back their tough stance towards Ukraine. Should that happen, then Poland will remain on the strategic backfoot in its competition with Germany for influence in that country since it’ll be politically difficult for Warsaw to offer Kiev any perks that Berlin couldn’t match, let alone surpass if needed.
With this insight in mind, Germany is therefore poised to replace Poland as Ukraine’s top strategic partner no matter who wins the next elections since PO’s victory will likely lead to this happening right away while PiS’ would likely just delay this seemingly inevitable outcome for a short while. The only realistic way that this scenario could be offset is if PiS wins and then promulgates a much more muscular policy towards Ukraine aimed at coercing that country into preserving Poland’s sphere of influence.
Its newly concluded investigation into last November’s Przewodow incident, which determined that Ukraine was responsible for the wayward missile that killed two Poles despite Zelensky’s denials to this day, could be exploited as the pretext for this purpose. Poland could then threaten to stop the transit of third countries’ (especially Germany’s) military and economic aid to Ukraine until Kiev pays restitution for this in the form of institutionalizing its envisaged sphere of influence there.
What’s being proposed is a remix of the 1938 ultimatum that Poland gave to Lithuania, albeit this time without the implied threat of armed force if Ukraine doesn’t agree. Nevertheless, the threat of cutting off that country’s military and economic lifeline would likely be sufficient for coercing Kiev into complying with Warsaw’s demands. If PiS wins re-election and garners the political will to protect Poland’s interests despite the negative press that would provoke, then this could happen by year’s end.
Nobody should get their hopes up for this, however, since neither of the aforesaid variables can be taken for granted. Even if PiS wins re-election and assuming that it’s forced to enter into a coalition government with Confederation in that scenario, it’s still very unlikely that its leadership would be willing to hold NATO’s proxy war on Russia hostage unless Ukraine does Poland’s bidding. For this reason, the loss of Poland’s sphere of influence in Ukraine to Germany might already be a fait accompli.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
The recent worsening of Poland’s ties with Germany and Ukraine, which is partly attributable to the ruling party’s electioneering strategy, just led to those two entering into a military partnership. Germany’s promised military patronage of Ukraine poses no threat to Poland, but is intended to help Kiev diversify from its disproportionate strategic dependence on Warsaw so as to deter this former Great Power’s irredentist plans in Eastern Galicia that are presently being advanced by socio-economic means.
The Polish-German Rivalry
Germany and Poland have been competing for influence in Central & Eastern Europe (CEE) since before the start of Russia’s specialoperation in February 2022, but that campaign resulted in unprecedentedly intensifying their rivalry in this geostrategic space. Germany envisages indirectly controlling CEE via the EU institutions that it leads while Poland wants to assemble an autonomous regional bloc within the EU that’ll keep its western neighbour’s continental ambitions in check. Here are a few background briefings:
The dynamics of their competition could decisively shift if the German-backed Polish opposition wins the next national elections in mid-October, after which they might subordinate their country’s regional policy to Berlin. Even if the incumbents win, however, then the spiralling troubles in Polish-Ukrainian relations as of late could lead to post-conflict Ukraine deciding to align much more closely with Germany than with Poland. The following pieces will bring readers up to speed about this if they aren’t already familiar:
It’s within this complex context that German Finance Minister Christian Lindner announced on Monday during his visit to the Ukrainian capital that Berlin will provide Kiev with €5 billion worth of annual military aid until 2027. This promised military patronage ramps up Germany’s regional competition with Poland by making a power play over post-conflict Ukraine’s geostrategic direction. Kiev feels increasingly uncomfortable with Warsaw nowadays, hence why it’s warming up to Berlin as a balancer.
Prior to the spiralling troubles in Polish-Ukrainian relations, Ukraine regularly lambasted Germany for allegedly dillydallying in its dispatch of military aid, yet now Ukraine is eagerly welcoming everything that Germany wants to provide. This policy reversal is directly connected to Kiev’s newfound fears that Poland’s rapidly expanding multidimensional, but thus far non-military, influence over Western Ukraine compromises too much of this former Soviet Republic’s sovereignty.
Creeping Polish Hegemony Over Ukraine
While it’s true that Ukraine initially supported this trend in order for Poland to help its western half remain as a more developed and stable redoubt amidst the rest of the country’s destruction, Kiev naively thought that Warsaw was aiding it out of “solidarity” with no strings attached. It wasn’t until recently that this illusion was dispelled upon Poland confirming that it’ll maintain its ban on most Ukrainian agricultural imports after the European Commission’s (EC) deal expires in mid-September.
That set into motion the self-sustaining cycle of mistrust that’s presently plaguing their strategic partnership, which in turn compelled Ukraine to become much more receptive to Germany in the hope that Berlin could function as a balancer for keeping Warsaw’s creeping hegemony in check. This is more important than ever since the fatigue that’s set in after 18 months of proxy warfare and the failure of Kiev’s counteroffensive means that some among the West might gradually disengage from this conflict.
Any reduction of support risks deepening Ukraine’s dependence on Poland by default if the latter’s simply remains the same, not to mention if it grows, with all that this could entail for speeding up the erosion of Kiev’s sovereignty over those regions that used to be under Warsaw’s control before 1939. It’s with a view towards preventing full Polish hegemony over Ukraine in this scenario that Germany just announced that it’ll patronize Kiev’s armed forces to the tune of €5 billion a year until 2027.
The Socio-Economic Path To Polish Irredentism
If Ukraine as a whole becomes a de facto protectorate of Poland, then Warsaw could pull its strings over Kiev to have Zelensky surrender Eastern Galicia exactly as Marshal Pilsudski coerced Simon Petliura to do a century ago in exchange for continued military aid against Moscow. In pursuit of that end, Poland is already trying to convince the locals there to eschew ethno-nationalism in favour of embracing the post-modern revival of its Commonwealth via the “Lublin Triangle” between their countries and Lithuania.
Socio-economic carrots are being dangled under the cover of “reconstruction aid” in their region and the guarantee of better benefits inside Poland if they agree to associate with that neighbouring state by applying for the “Karta Polaka” (“Pole’s Card”). This document can be considered a pledge of allegiance to Poland by those who demonstrate their “Polishness” (basic knowledge of the language and Polish traditions) and prove that their ancestors used to hold its nationality (i.e. were from the “Kresy”).
Without a critical mass of Western Ukrainians eschewing ethno-nationalism in favour Poland’s “Neo-Commonwealth” vision, Warsaw won’t be able to sustainably exert military and/or political influence over that part of Ukraine. Since this hasn’t yet happened and will still take some time even in the best-case scenario from Poland’s perspective, Ukraine is hoping that it can successfully diversify from its disproportionate strategic dependence on Poland before then by balancing with Germany.
Checking Poland’s Eastward Expansion
Poland could still make a unilateral move in Western Ukraine prior to consolidating its socio-economic influence there via the previously mentioned means, which Germany’s newly promised military aid to Ukraine couldn’t realistically deter, but it might prove unsustainable. For that reason, it can’t be taken for granted that this will happen anytime soon, but it also can’t be ruled out either. The preceding strategic insight and scenario disclaimer enable one to better understand Germany and Ukraine’s calculations.
Absent the abovementioned black swan event of Poland occupying Western Ukraine on whatever pretext in the near future, Germany’s promised military patronage of Ukraine might empower the latter enough to resist any demand by Warsaw to replicate last century’s cession of Eastern Galicia. In fact, it could even embolden Kiev to preemptively deter this by curbing Polish investment there prior to the end of the present conflict, which could ruin the socio-economic basis for Warsaw’s plans.
Preventing The Loss Of Western Ukraine
This could be accomplished by unilaterally imposing limits on the amount and/or regional scope of this aid, demanding that all such investments involve joint partnerships where the Ukrainian state or companies own over 50%, and/or nationalizing some projects in the worst-case scenario. If Kiev does any of this before Poland consolidates its socio-economic influence over Western Ukraine and resultantly succeeds in convincing the locals to eschew ethno-nationalism, then irredentism might be averted.
Left unchecked, the uncontrollable spread of Polish socio-economic influence over Western Ukraine in parallel with Kiev’s deepening strategic dependence on Warsaw greatly raise the chances that this historically contested region will eventually return to Poland’s military and political control. The only way to offset this scenario is if Kiev preemptively curbs Polish investments there and gambles that Warsaw’s socio-economic influence hasn’t yet reached the point where it’s comfortable militarily intervening.
Worsening ties with Poland could prompt Kiev to make this move on the pretext of responding to Warsaw’s decision to maintain the ban on most of its agricultural products after the EC’s deal expires. That’s not to say that it’ll certainly do any of what’s been described in the last few paragraphs, but just that Kiev likely only has the next half-year at most to prevent the loss of Western Ukraine from becoming a fait accompli, and Germany’s promised military patronage might embolden it to act before it’s too late.
Concluding Thoughts
The recent worsening of Poland’s ties with Germany and Ukraine, which is partly attributable to the ruling party’s electioneering strategy, just led to those two entering into a military partnership. Germany’s promised military patronage of Ukraine poses no threat to Poland, but is intended to help Kiev diversify from its disproportionate strategic dependence on Warsaw so as to deter this former Great Power’s irredentist plans in Eastern Galicia that are presently being advanced by socio-economic means.
Zelensky must now decide whether to preemptively thwart the aforesaid by curbing Polish investment there after being emboldened by Berlin’s medium-term military aid pledge, which could compensate for the curtailment of Warsaw’s in that scenario, or risk Western Ukraine’s loss becoming inevitable. The window of opportunity is closing to prevent the further collapse of his country, but he might still not be brave enough to act out of fear that this will trigger a Polish invasion that could spell the end of his rule.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
By dragging down Germany and thus weakening its influence over Central & Eastern Europe simultaneously with empowering Poland’s rise as a Great Power over that same strategic space, the US hopes to play their EuroLiberal and EuroRealist blocs off aga…
The best course of action would be to beat the US to the punch instead of accept whatever it agrees to with regard to Russia and/or Belarus but neither half of its ruling duopoly has any such interest.
The New York Times reported on Saturday that a recent trip to Minsk by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State as part of the latest Russian-US prisoner swap could precede a Belarusian-US rapprochement. According to their sources, that official told Western diplomats that they’re exploring a “grand deal” whereby Lukashenko “would release a slew of political prisoners” in exchange for the US relaxing sanctions on his banks and potash exports, which could pair with the US’ latest diplomacy with Russia.
They quoted a relative of one of the most prominent imprisoned figures as suggesting that this arrangement could “loosen Belarus’s dependence on Russia and preserve some leverage for the U.S. and E.U.” Extrapolating on that potential imperative, another attempt could then be made to incentivize Lukashenko into drifting westward like he was prior to summer 2020’s failed Colour Revolution, which might pressure Russia into being more flexible towards any compromises on Ukraine if he bites the bait.
Any improvement of Belarusian-US relations regardless of their motive would leave neighbouring Poland in the lurch, however, since it’s been at the forefront of this Western regime change operation against Lukashenko. He then arguably responded to this unprovoked HybridWar aggression by at the very least turning a blind eye towards civilizationally dissimilar illegal immigrants invading Poland from across their shared border. Tensions have since spiralled to their present nadir. Here are five background briefings:
Even though new Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth praised Poland as “the model ally on the continent” during his first European bilateral visit, Trump 2.0 is putting American interests first, not any single partner’s or group thereof like NATO’s. This is taking the form of prioritizing a peace deal with Russia over Ukraine that could then at minimum facilitate the US’ “Pivot (back) to Asia” for more muscularly containing China and at maximum build a “new world order” with it. Here are three briefings about that:
The first scenario could result in a speedy ceasefire or armistice while the second could see Russia and the US joining forces, whether in general or on a case-by-case basis, to support a global populist-nationalist revolution aimed at bringing to power figures and movements that share their worldview. Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski already hinted last month that the US might interfere in May’s presidential election via Musk personally and his X platform more broadly as was analysed here.
The opposition “Law & Justice” (PiS) party is more socially conservative and pro-American than the ruling liberal-globalists from the “Civic Platform” (PO), who align a lot closer with Germany but still aren’t anti-American by any stretch. PiS was in power from 2015-2023, thus making them responsible for both summer 2020’s failed Colour Revolution in Belarus and Poland’s continued support of anti-government militants afterwards as well as helping the UK sabotage spring 2022’s Russian-Ukrainian peace talks.
How all of this relates to May’s presidential election is that neither outgoing President Andrzej Duda’s replacement by fellow PiS member Karol Nawrocki nor PO member Rafal Trzaskowski will make any difference in terms of Polish-Belarusian ties since each of them practices pretty much the same policy. The only difference is that keeping PiS in the presidency amidst PO leader Donald Tusk’s tenure as premier (Poland has an odd ruling arrangement right now) will prevent the latter from changing society.
Neither electoral outcome though is expected to see Poland beat the US to the punch by patching up its problems with Belarus before the US does, which would objectively be the best course of action. Therefore, Poland will likely be forced to accept whatever the US agrees to with regard to Russia and/or Belarus instead of shaping circumstances in the direction of its national interests, such as prioritizing a rapprochement with Belarus and/or Russia in order to get ahead of the US and the EU in this respect.
What this means in practice is that Poland will continue being excluded from key regional developments just like how it was earlier excluded from last fall’s Berlin Summit between the German, American, British, and French leaders. Its ruling duopoly’s dreams of restoring Poland’s lost geopolitical glory through the creation of a regional sphere of influence will correspondingly remain nothing but delusions of grandeur made impossible by their lack of vision and loyal fealty to their foreign patrons’ interests.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
By dragging down Germany and thus weakening its influence over Central & Eastern Europe simultaneously with empowering Poland’s rise as a Great Power over that same strategic space, the US hopes to play their EuroLiberal and EuroRealist blocs off aga…
Trump will implement a comprehensive economic, diplomatic, and military pressure campaign against Russia if Putin rejects a ceasefire, but it’s unclear whether Trump will coerce Zelensky into territorial concessions first in order to make it easier for Putin to compromise on his prior demands for this.
Trump’s Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg told the New York Post more about how his boss plans to bring Putin to the peace table. According to him, the US might ratchet up its energy-related sanctions on Russia and associated secondary ones on its clients if he refuses. This would occur together with more diplomatic pressure, likely upon China andIndia to have their leaders convince Putin to reconsider, and “some type of military pressures and levers that you’re going to use underneath those”.
The immediate goal is “to stop the killing — just stop it — and then you go from there”, so in other words, the abovementioned approach would be aimed at getting Russia to agree to a ceasefire. This aligns with what was assessed here in late January about Trump’s plans. The problem though is that Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova confirmed on the same day as Kellogg’s interview that “A temporary ceasefire or, as many say, freezing the conflict, is unacceptable” for Russia.
One day earlier, however, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov suggested that his country’s position on not holding talks with Zelensky due to the Ukrainian leader’s illegitimacy might be reversed for pragmatism’s sake so it’s possible that the aforementioned one about rejecting a ceasefire might be too. That could occur if Trump coerces Zelensky into withdrawing from at least Kursk and Donbass along with declaring that Ukraine won’t join NATO, thus satisfying some of Russia’s goals as recently explained here.
Ukraine would then lift martial law and finally hold its long-delayed elections, which could potentially lead to the US replacing Zelensky like Russia’s foreign spy agency claimed last week is supposedly in the cards. That scenario sequence aligns with Russian and US interests, but it can’t be ruled out that some of the last administration’s Russophobic hawks remain in positions of influence within the US’ “deep state” and end up dissuading Trump from coercing Zelensky into territorial concessions first.
Without Ukraine withdrawing from Kursk and Donbass, it’s unlikely that Putin could justify compromising on last June’s ceasefire demands that Ukraine withdraw from all the territory that Russia claims as its own and declare that it won’t join NATO. He can accept a delay on implementing the second till after the next parliamentary elections since Ukraine’s goal of joining NATO was enshrined as an amendment to the Constitution in 2019 and therefore can’t be removed without parliament’s support.
What Putin would be loath to accept is freezing the Line of Contact (LOC) even if the US coerces Ukraine into withdrawing from Russia’s Kursk Region as a quid pro quo since it would suggest that their sneak attack there last summer forced him to give up on his demands to disputed territory. Lending credence to that interpretation could raise the risk that Ukraine launches another sneak attack elsewhere along their international border if post-election peace talks stall in order to coerce more concessions from him.
Putin might settle for Ukraine only withdrawing from Kursk and Donbass in exchange for a ceasefire since the first is universally recognized as Russian, the second is at the heart of their territorial dispute, and demanding more might provoke the US into enforcing its secondary sanctions against China and India. As Kellogg recently said, sanctions enforcement is “only about a three” on a scale of one to ten so it could be increased if needed, which would put Putin in a tough position if Xi and Modi then pressure him.
China and India could be coerced into drastically curtailing or outright abandoning their large-scale import of discounted Russian oil if the US imposes super-strict Iranian-like sanctions on Russia explicitly aimed at “driv[ing] [its] export of oil to zero” through full secondary sanctions enforcement. The consequences of them complying could spike the price of oil worldwide and throw countless economies into a tailspin, however, which is why the US has thus far eschewed this policy.
Trump already imposed 10% tariffs on China and he’s expected to negotiate hard with India during Modi’s trip to DC late next week, which might even see them launch free trade talks, so each Asian giant has their own self-interested reasons for avoiding any further economic pressure from the US. They might therefore curtail their imports of discounted Russian oil as a compromise to the US in exchange for no secondary sanctions enforcement and to not destabilize the global market instead of defy it on this.
Even in that case, Russia’s foreign revenue flow upon which a share of its state budget depends would be disrupted, which might parallel their leaders pressuring Putin to reconsider his rejection of a ceasefire since it would be indirectly responsible for harming the economic interests of all three. If the “military pressures and levers that [the US is] going to use underneath those” take the form of ramping up arms shipments to Ukraine, including long-range missiles, then it might suffice for prompting a rethink.
There’s also the possibility that Russia “goes rogue” in the sense of continuing to pursue its maximum goals in the conflict in spite of American, Chinese, and Indian pressure, hoping that the Ukrainian frontlines soon collapse and Trump then abandons this geopolitical project instead of tries to salvage it. This “hawkish” thinking on Moscow’s part could be predicted on its decisionmakers assuming that Trump would accept this defeat without fear of it ruining his reputation and won’t escalate to brinksmanship.
While that’s plausible, the counterargument can be made that Trump doesn’t want to bear responsibility for what would be the greatest American geopolitical defeat ever and won’t let the $183 billion that the US invested into this conflict go to waste without at least securing control over Western Ukraine. In that event, Russia might still ultimately be coerced into compromising on its maximum goals but after having needlessly burned bridges with China and India, which could leave it isolated in the post-conflict future.
Returning to the lede, the likelihood of Trump implementing a comprehensive pressure campaign against Russia if Putin rejects a ceasefire in Ukraine might get him to compromise on his original demands for this, though only if Ukraine first withdraws from Kursk and Donbass. It’s in the US’ interests not to perpetuate this conflict since MAGA thought leader Steve Bannon warned that Trump risks his own Vietnam if that happens while Trump is eager to “Pivot (back) to Asia” pronto in order to contain China.
Trump would therefore do well to coerce Zelensky into withdrawing from those two regions instead of “escalating to de-escalate” against Russia if Putin doesn’t agree to simply freeze the LOC. As Kellogg told the New York Post, “Very frankly, both sides in any negotiation have to give; that’s just the way it is in negotiations…Is it gonna be acceptable to everybody? No. But you try to run this balance.” That’s precisely the approach that Trump should follow otherwise he risks derailing his foreign policy agenda.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Trump is preparing for negotiations with Putin over Ukraine as well as with Xi over trade and likely also Taiwan, so he’d appear weak in their eyes if he let a middling leader like Petro publicly defy and even insult him without consequence.
Colombian President Gustavo Petro thought that he’d rebalance lopsided relations with his returning US counterpart by abruptly rejecting two previously agreed military flights for repatriating his country’s illegal immigrants but was ultimately taught an unforgettable lesson. Trump reacted with fury by threatening 25% tariffs that would double in a week’s time and sanctioning high-level officials on national security pretexts among other punitive measures, which quickly prompted Petro to capitulate.
White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt then confirmed her country’s victory in its brief dispute with Colombia, shortly after which Petro rage-tweeted a convoluted rant about imperialism and racism as a parting shot against Trump that was widely met with mockery online, especially from Americans. This short-lived scandal was significant since Trump proved how serious he is about leveraging tariffs and sanctions to coerce Ibero-American countries into accepting the return of their repatriated citizens.
He won the 2016 election in part because of his pledge to build a southern border wall for stopping illegal immigration, but after an estimated 8 million illegals flooded into the country during Biden’s term, he then promised to expel as many as possible if voters returned him to office like they ultimately did. It’ll be difficult to return all of them, however, which is why his administration wants to coerce them into voluntarily leaving on their own by creating extremely onerous conditions for those who remain.
To that end, repatriating some of them to their homelands on military flights – including in handcuffs like what just happened to some illegal immigrants from Brazil – is meant to intimidate them into returning back home on their own terms, ergo the importance of ensuring that these flights aren’t rejected. In parallel with this, the Trump Administration is exploring an agreement to deport asylum seekers to El Salvador, which is now globally known for its zero-tolerance of gang members.
On the topic, US-sanctioned Venezuela halted repatriation flights last February after briefly allowing their resumption in October 2023, so suspected Venezuelan gang members might be sent straight from the US to Salvadoran prisons if a deal is reached. Combined with an unprecedented ramping up of ICE raids across the country, those who remain in the US illegally will always have to look over their shoulder and fear either being deported back to their homelands or sent to El Salvador depending on who they are.
The Trump Administration rightly considers illegal immigration to be a national security threat, which explains Trump’s harsh reaction to Petro rejecting those two previously agreed military flights. If he didn’t make an example out of him, then most Ibero-American countries would predictably defy the US on this issue as well, thus ruining his ambitious repatriation plans. Trump therefore had to remind Colombia and every other country in the hemisphere that they’re the US’ junior partner.
Failure to submit to its reasonable demands that they receive their repatriated citizens who illegally immigrated to the US will entail crushing tariff and sanctions consequences that’ll risk harming their economies and greatly inconveniencing their political elite. Furthermore, disrespecting the US and Trump personally like Petro did is absolutely unacceptable in what Trump described as the nascent “Golden Age of America”, and those that do so will be made to pay the price, including reputationally.
The so-called “rules-based order” was never what the Biden Administration mispresented it as being with regard to the claim of every country supposedly being equal and having to follow the same rules. It was always about maintaining the US’ declining unipolar hegemony in the emerging Multipolar World Order by reinforcing the post-Old Cold War international hierarchy atop which it sits. A carrot-and-stick approach pairs with explicit double standards to coax countries into falling in line with varying success.
Those that are dependent on the US market and/or military equipment like most Ibero-American countries are tend to bend to its will while those like Russia that are more autarkic and strategically autonomous tend to resist. The Obama and Biden Administrations tried to disguise this reality with lofty rhetoric and by sometimes turning a blind eye to transgressions from its partners like those Ibero-American countries that hitherto refused to accept their repatriated citizens, but Trump is more direct.
He has no compunction about openly reminding them of their junior status vis-à-vis the US since he’d rather that his country be feared than loved if he has to choose between them per Machiavelli. Additionally, Trump is preparing for negotiations with Putin over Ukraine as well as with Xi over trade and likely also Taiwan, so he’d appear weak in their eyes if he let middling leader like Petro publicly defy and even insult him without consequence. These imperatives made him escalate with Colombia.
The example that Trump just made out of Petro will therefore reverberate across the world. What he calls the “Golden Age of America” can more accurately be called the era of US hyper-realism in foreign affairs whereby it explicitly declares its interests and then aggressively pursues them without any care for global opinion. Thus, it might be better for Russia and China to compromise with the US instead of challenging it if they won’t replicate this policy, or if they lack the same power or will to use it.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Trump’s known for his capriciousness, however, so it might be that he either didn’t mean to hint at anything at all in his latest remarks about Russia or he might unexpectedly change his mind about the compromises that he considers to be acceptable for each party during his upcoming call with Putin.
Trump said a few words about Russia shortly after his reinauguration while signing Executive Orders in the Oval Office. They’re important to interpret since they might hint at his peace plan, which he’s yet to officially reveal, but reports have circulated claiming that he’ll “escalate to de-escalate” through more sanctions against Russia and armed aid to Ukraine if Putin rejects whatever deal he offers. He’ll likewise allegedly cut Ukraine off if Zelensky rejects the same deal. Here’s what he said on Monday afternoon:
“Zelenskyy told me he wants to make a deal, I don’t know if Putin does … He might not. I think he should make a deal. I think he’s destroying Russia by not making a deal. I think, Russia is kinda in big trouble. You take a look at their economy, you take a look at their inflation in Russia. I got along with [Putin] great, I would hope he wants to make a deal.
He’s grinding it out. Most people thought it would last about one week and now you’re into three years. It is not making him look good. We have numbers that almost a million Russian soldiers have been killed. About 700,000 Ukrainian soldiers are killed. Russia’s bigger, they have more soldiers to lose but that’s no way to run a country.”
Starting from the beginning, his claim that Zelensky “wants to make a deal” coupled with his uncertainty about Putin’s willingness might be meant to portray the latter as an obstacle to peace, thus possibly setting the stage for the previously mentioned punitive measures. As for his opinion that Putin is “destroying Russia”, that’s hyperbole but frames his counterpart as the weaker of the two, especially when contrasted with Trump’s declaration earlier that day about the start of an American Golden Age.
He then elaborated by pointing to Russia’s inflation rate, which is implied to be the result of the West’s unprecedented sanctions and correspondingly hinting at the possibility of some relief in exchange for Putin agreeing to compromise instead of continuing to pursue his maximum goals. Building upon that, citing Ukraine’s grossly inflated estimate of Russian losses might belie ignorance of the facts if he truly believes their numbers, but it could also reaffirm his expectation that Putin must compromise.
To explain, Trump seems to believe that Western sanctions’ effect on the Russian economy and the battlefield losses that Russia has suffered (both of which are exaggerated in the context that he referred to them) justify proposing compromises from Putin, not giving into his demands. For this reason, it’s likely that the earlier reports about him planning to propose something less than what his counterpart signalled would be acceptable are true, after which he’ll “escalate to de-escalate” if it’s rejected.
Observers can only speculate about the substance of his envisaged proposal, but it might look something like what was suggested at the end of this analysis here, particularly with regards to the proverbial carrots that Trump might offer Putin with regard to Ukraine’s neutrality and phased sanctions relief. As for the compromises that might be requested of Russia, these could include freezing the Line of Contact while being asked to accept only the partial demilitarization of Ukraine and practically no denazification.
Trump’s known for his capriciousness, however, so it might be that he either didn’t mean to hint at anything at all in his latest remarks about Russia or he might unexpectedly change his mind about the compromises that he considers to be acceptable for each party during his upcoming call with Putin. Nobody can therefore say with certainty what he had in mind, let alone what he’ll ultimately do, but this analysis is premised on the assumption that he might have even subconsciously let part of his plan slip.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
They can accordingly either try to stop this through scandalous legal moves that risk a national crisis, which could even ruin Poland’s relations with the US, or they can let everything unfold however it will.
Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski echoed French President Emmanuel Macron’s concerns that Elon Musk’s social media campaigns in support of the AfD opposition in Germany and against incumbent British Prime Minister Keir Starmer amount to meddling. He also called for Poland to pass new laws “so that it is the Polish people who choose our president, not foreigners”, which is ironic considering his friendship with George Soros’ son and heir Alex, whose father has meddled in Europe for decades.
Trump is close friends with outgoing Polish President Andrzej Duda, who’s a fellow conservative-nationalist that’s stayed in touch with him over the years, so it follows that he’d prefer for his party’s candidate Karol Nawrocki to succeed him as opposed to the liberal-globalist Rafal Trzaskowski. To that end, it’s predictable that Musk might try to stop the ruling liberals from capturing the presidency during May’s election, which could take the form of replicating his existing campaigns but with a Polish touch.
This might lead to him passionately advocating for the Law & Justice (PiS) opposition in parallel with haranguing against Tusk, Sikorski, and Trzaskowski. PiS’ role as one of the most pro-American parties in European history could be emphasized as could the ruling “Civic Platform’s” (PO) “wokeness” with regard to LGBT. Likewise, Musk might ignore PiS’ visas-for-bribes scandal that brought a quarter-million Africans and Asians to Europe the same as he might ignore PO’s robust border security policy.
The precedent created by Romania annulling the first round of its presidential election last month on the pretext that foreign social media support for the frontrunner discredited the results, which was later revealed to have actually been a botched campaign by his own opponents, could be applied to Poland too. The difference between Romania and Poland, however, is that the first’s constitutional coup had the Biden Administration’s backing while Trump definitely won’t back that same scenario in the second.
About that possibility, it was reported last month that Tusk’s government “will propose that, for next year’s Polish presidential election in May, the certification of the result should be handled by the labour law chamber of the Supreme Court and not, as ordained by existing electoral law, the supervisory chamber of the same court.” The larger context behind this proposal concerns Tusk and the EU’s long-running claims that PiS politicized the Supreme Court during its near-decade in power.
The aforementioned report elaborated that “The Polish Government, along with the European Commission and the European Court of Justice, have argued that the supervisory chamber was improperly constituted as its members were appointed by PiS ally President Andrzej Duda on recommendation of the National Judicial Council (KRS).” It’s beyond the scope of the present analysis to dive deeper into the details of this dispute but it’s enough for casual observers to simply be aware of it.
The significance is that Tusk’s government might unilaterally implement this proposal, subsequently annul the results of the first round if Nawrocki wins, reject any ruling against this by the Supreme Court or the allegedly “PiS-dominated Constitutional Tribunal”, and rely instead on the European Commission and the European Court of Justice to legitimize their constitutional coup. Any pushback from the Trump Administration could thus provoke a very serious political crisis with both Poland but also the EU.
If Trump decides to cross the Rubicon in this respect, then he could either threaten punishing tariffs against the EU as a whole, hint at targeted sanctions against Poland’s ruling liberal-globalists, and/or flirt with drastically curtailing the US’ military presence in Poland and possibly freezing major arms deals. The last-mentioned option is the most radical since it risks ruining the anti-Russian basis upon which the Polish-US Strategic Partnership is built but could still be employed to provoke nationalist protests.
Therein lies the other trick up Trump’s sleeve since he could task Musk with pulling a page from Soros’ playbook by using X to incite large-scale protests for maximally pressuring the ruling liberal-globalists at what would by then be another pivotal moment in Poland’s history. Moreover, the footage of any violent crackdown against these peaceful protesters could then virally circulate on X to incite even more protests, which could be paired with sanctions against those officials who are responsible for this.
Tusk would therefore do well to read the writing on the wall and let May’s vote play out however it will, accepting that it’s impossible to completely eliminate foreign influence in contemporary elections due to social media and not daring to exploit that as the pretext for annulling the vote if Nawrocki wins. It’s better to maintain the status quo of a conservative-nationalist in the presidency and liberal-globalists running parliament than to risk a national crisis that could also ruin relations with the US.
The only reason why Tusk wants Trzaskowski to capture the presidency is so that PiS no longer opposes PO’s plans to radically change Polish society. The worst that would thus happen if Nawrocki wins is that Tusk isn’t able to fully implement his legislative agenda, thus perpetuating the political stalemate of the past year till the next parliamentary elections in 2027, unless they’re called earlier. Trump will still be in office by then, however, so Musk might also “meddle” in that vote too with a wink and a nod from him.
In any case, as was just written, social media enables foreign figures and governments to influence elections in other countries. There’s no way to completely eliminate this factor either since the proliferation of VPNs neutralizes potential bans, ergo the importance of prioritizing “Pre-Bunking, Media Literacy, & Democratic Security” instead as argued in the preceding hyperlinked analysis from 2022. These are much more effective means since they aim to inoculate citizens from foreign influences.
Wrapping everything up, Sikorski’s comments about Musk’s social media campaigns in Germany and the UK suggest that Poland’s ruling liberal-globalists are panicking since they fear that he’ll soon turn his attention to their country in order to stop them from capturing the presidency during May’s election. They can accordingly either try to stop this through scandalous legal moves that risk a national crisis, which could even ruin Poland’s relations with the US, or they can let everything unfold however it will.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
The main point that’s being conveyed through these updated terms is that Russia will not allow Ukraine to be used as NATO’s proxy for inflicting the bloc’s hoped-for strategic defeat upon it.
The entering into force of Russia’s updated nuke doctrine, the purpose of which was analysed here in late September, made headlines across the world because it coincided with a major escalation of the NATO-Russianproxy war in Ukraine. The US allowed Ukraine to use its ATACMS inside of Russia’s pre-2014 territory despite Moscow warning how dangerous that would be. This moment of truth was analysed here for those who’d like to learn more about how it’ll influence the contours of this conflict.
The circumstances in which Russia might resort to using nukes can be better understood after Sputnik published an unofficial translation of this doctrine here. The document stipulates that their purpose is to deter a wide range of threats and that they’ll only be used as a last resort. Such threats include everything from nearby large-scale military drills by Russia’s foes to the blocking of critical transport links in a likely nod to Kaliningrad among well-known ones like overwhelming conventional attacks, et al.
Moreover, Russia will regard such threats by countries with the backing of others as joint acts of aggression, thus placing these proxies’ patrons in its crosshairs if they cross its most sensitive red lines. The main point that’s being conveyed through these updated terms is that Russia will not allow Ukraine to be used as NATO’s proxy for inflicting the bloc’s hoped-for strategic defeat upon it. The timing of its publication suggests that the spree of provocations since February 2022 reshaped Russia’s thinking.
Targets such as the Kremlin, early warning systems, strategic airfields, nuclear power plants, and critical transport links like the Crimean Bridge were previously thought to be off limits in any proxy conflict. Instead, every single one of those was bombed by Ukraine with NATO’s backing, yet Russia time and again declined to dramatically respond out of concern that tensions could then spiral into World War III. Each example, however, could theoretically qualify for a nuclear retaliatory strike under the new terms.
To be sure, Putin is unlikely to abandon his prior caution by suddenly nuking Ukraine in response to another NATO-backed drone strike against one of Russia’s nuclear power plants for example when he won’t even authorize the destruction of a single major bridge over the Dnieper, but he might have even greater provocations in mind. It could be that he concluded that his prior restraint was interpreted as weakness instead of appreciated and that something much more dangerous is now being planned.
If that’s the case, then it would make sense why he’d want to convey the wide range of threats that his country’s nuclear doctrine is supposed to deter, thus legitimizing Russia’s reciprocal escalation in the lead-up to them materializing and counteracting perceptions that it might just be (another) “bluff”. In pursuit of this potential goal, it would make sense to publish the document instead of keeping it classified so that the public can be aware of the stakes involved, ergo Sputnik’s unofficial translation.
With this in mind, Russia’s updated nuke doctrine is meant to influence Western policymakers and the public alike, the first in terms of hopefully deterring them from whatever greater provocations they could be planning while the second might pressure them from below to complement this effort. The takeaway is that Russia is very concerned about future escalations and wants the world to know that it will indeed resort to nukes as a last resort in self-defence if its most sensitive red lines are crossed.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Russia is worried that the influence of hawkish forces inside the US’ “deep state” might be growing and could ultimately lead to a large-scale conventional strike against it, including by proxy through Ukraine, which Russia hopes to deter by reminding them that this would result in World War III.
The hullabaloo over Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine is misplaced since all that Putin did was explicitly confirm what was already self-evident to all serious observers. Nobody should have ever thought that Russia wouldn’t consider a nuclear response to any overwhelming non-nuclear strike against it or its mutual defence ally Belarus, nor that it would overlook those who partook in such a provocation by proxy. Here’s exactly what Putin told the Security Council during their latest meeting on Wednesday:
“I would like to draw your attention specifically to the following. The updated version of the document is supposed to regard an aggression against Russia from any non-nuclear state but involving or supported by any nuclear state as their joint attack against the Russian Federation. It also states clearly the conditions for Russia’s transition to the use of nuclear weapons.
We will consider such a possibility once we receive reliable information about a massive launch of air and space attack weapons and their crossing our state border. I mean strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, UAVs, hypersonic and other aircraft.
We reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against Russia and Belarus as a member of the Union State. All these issues have been agreed upon with the Belarusian side and the President of Belarus. Including the case when the enemy, using conventional weapons, creates a critical threat to our sovereignty.”
And here are some background briefings to review before analysing what this all means:
The above will now be summarized for the reader’s convenience.
Russia has no reason to use nuclear weapons first in Ukraine since it can accomplish all its goals in this improvised “war of attrition” through conventional means. Crossing that threshold risks losing the support of its close Chinese and Indian trade partners, which is what Ukraine wants. Russia also won’t launch a nuclear first strike against NATO unlike what some have speculated. Putin has remained calm through every one of the West’s escalations and continues doing his utmost to avoid World War III.
No matter how negatively some in the West might view his restraint, such as misperceiving it as weakness, their main decisionmakers still know better than to cross Russia’s ultimate red lines of launching a direct attack against it and/or Belarus or a large-scale one against them via their Ukrainian proxy. The first scenario is totally out of the question, while the second one has been openly discussed among some Westerners amidst the debate over letting Ukraine use their long-range weapons.
A few NATO-backed but Ukrainian-fronted long-range attacks would certainly be an escalation, but they wouldn’t cross Russia’s abovementioned ultimate red lines. The problem though is that some Westerners have convinced themselves that Russia is indeed so weak that it wouldn’t consider a nuclear response in the scenario of large-scale strikes against it. It’s this hawkish faction of the Western elite that his message is directed towards since he fears that they might be rising in influence.
Their comparatively more pragmatic rivals who still call the shots always signal their escalatory intentions far in advance so that Russia could prepare itself and thus be less likely to “overreact” in some way that risks World War III. Likewise, Russia continues restraining itself from replicating the US’ “shock-and-awe” campaign in order to reduce the likelihood of the West “overreacting” by directly intervening in the conflict to salvage their geopolitical project and thus risking World War III.
It can only be speculated whether this interplay is due to each’s permanent military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies (“deep state”) behaving responsibly on their own considering the enormity of what’s at stake or if it’s the result of a “gentlemen’s agreement”. Whatever the truth may be, the aforesaid model accounts for the unexpected moves or lack thereof from each, which are the US correspondingly telegraphing its escalatory intentions and Russia never seriously escalating in kind.
Russia senses that the balance of influence between these factions within the US’ “deep state” might be shifting from the comparatively pragmatic one to their more hawkish rivals, however, which explains why Putin felt the need to explicitly confirm what was already self-evident about his country’s nuclear doctrine. One explanation is that the US’ ruling liberal–globalists want to provoke a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis ahead of Trump’s potential second inauguration in order to sabotage his promise to broker a peace deal.
Another, which isn’t mutually exclusive, is that even the comparatively pragmatic faction is beginning to think that Russia is weak and therefore unlikely to escalate if the US launches a large-scale strike against it and/or Belarus by proxy through Ukraine. In their mind, this might coerce Russia into making unilateral concessions in exchange for peace, which could take the form of it withdrawing from some of the Ukrainian-claimed territory that it fought so hard to obtain control over since February 2022.
Putin really doesn’t want to risk doing anything that could inadvertently lead to World War III, hence why he’s thus far refused to reciprocally escalate every time that the West does, not to mention whenever they and their Ukrainian proxy crossed Russia’s earlier red lines. Nevertheless, he also doesn’t want Russia to lose its sovereignty if the West blackmails to that end it by exploiting these concerns to coerce it into a never-ending series of unilateral concessions, ergo why he authorized the specialoperation.
He therefore realized that it’s time to explicitly confirm what was already self-evident about Russia’s nuclear doctrine in order to dissuade the American “deep state’s” hawks from launching a large-scale strike against his country and/or Belarus by proxy through Ukraine. Depending on how serious it could be, Russia might consider responding with nukes against Ukraine and/or even some NATO countries, including before the damage is known upon “receiving reliable information about a massive launch”.
Once again, nobody should have ever thought that Russia wouldn’t consider a nuclear response to such a scenario, nor that it would overlook those who partook in it. Just because this wasn’t earlier explicitly articulated in its doctrine doesn’t mean that Putin would be forced to rule it out. No leader would ever let their hands be tied like that. Everyone knows this, but US hawks still had to be reminded of it just in case they’ve become so delusional as to think they could do pull off such an attack with impunity.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Kiev wants to assert the short-lived “Ukrainian People’s Republic’s” claims to modern-day Russian territory that Zelensky tacitly revived through a decree in January that most observers missed.
Ukraine’s sneak attack against Russia’s Kursk Region is widely interpreted by analysts as a desperate attempt to divert its foes’ forces from the Donbass front, but there are also unstated political objectives that are being advanced by it too. Few were aware of it at the time, but Zelensky signed a relevant decree in late January where he strongly implied the revival of territorial claims to Russian border regions that were either occupied or claimed by the short-lived “Ukrainian People’s Republic” (UPR).
Some of these areas importantly fall within modern-day Bryansk, Kursk, Belgorod Regions, which are at the forefront of what might turn out to be a larger Ukrainian offensive if Kiev expands the scope of its attack to include Kursk’s two neighbouring regions like some speculate that it’s considering. As for the other areas, they’re far behind the Donbass front lines in modern-day Voronezh, Rostov, and Krasnodar Regions and are therefore impossible to threaten through any ground force unlike the aforesaid three.
The political method behind what’s being presented as Ukraine’s military madness (and not without reason considering how counterproductive this could ultimately prove to be) is therefore to assert its tacitly revived claims from earlier this year. This is aimed at boosting morale at home and countering Russia’s international messaging. The first is self-explanatory while the second is about reminding the world of the UPR’s brief existence and associated claims to modern-day Russian territory.
The gradual revival of Russia’s historical claims to some of the land within Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders throughout the course of this decade-long conflict has hitherto only been responded to by Kiev with defensive pleas to international law but it now seems to be taking a more offensive dimension. Zelensky’s January decree can be seen in hindsight as laying the unstated political basis for what the Washington Post reported in May 2023 were his plans from the start of that year for invading Russia.
These goals aren’t being explicitly declared because they could discredit Ukraine’s abovementioned pleas to international law in response to Russia’s evolving territorial claims, plus the failure to achieve them after they’re declared could discredit Zelensky at home even more than he already is. Nevertheless, his country’s propagandists and their allies abroad are already trying to give Russia “a dose of its own medicine” by trolling it with claims of “People’s Republics” in Belgorod and Kursk Regions.
For as “clever” of a move as Kiev might consider these interconnected political-military-propaganda offensives to be, they risk backfiring by reminding Poles that Ukraine might one day resort to similar means for asserting the UPR’s claims to modern-day parts of their country. This was warned about here in June, which analysed the Polish President’s veto of a bill recognizing Silesian as a regional language on the partial pretext that it could endanger national identity with implied implications for national unity.
The preceding analysis referenced Zelensky’s January decree, which can now be seen as the grounds for tacitly reviving the UPR’s claims ahead of this month’s sneak attack against Russia’s Kursk Region. This isn’t to hint that a similar such operation might soon be launched against Poland, but just to draw attention to the fact that militant irredentism is an emerging trend in Ukraine at this crucial point in the conflict, which might potentially inspire extremists to act unilaterally in the western direction.
As it becomes obvious that the implied revival of the UPR’s territorial claims to Russia (and possibly also Belarus depending on whether their border crisis escalates) won’t amount to anything, it’s possible that some ultra-nationalists might redirect their sights westward. This could become more likely if there’s a perception that Poland either “hasn’t done enough” to help Ukraine or has “abandoned” it if Russia achieves a military breakthrough (such as refusing to dispatch uniformedtroops to stop the advance).
All told, the political method behind Ukraine’s military madness in Russia’s border regions aligns with the “logic” of its leadership, which is becoming increasingly desperate due to continued losses in Donbass and therefore resorting to more ultra-nationalism than usual for boosting morale at home. Some members of society might interpret this as a signal to openly express their Polonophobia and even carry out attacks within the Polish lands that the UPR claimed as its own, which could worsen bilateral ties.
To be clear, this remains unlikely for now, but it also can’t be confidently ruled out either considering how fast and far the state’s latest ultra-nationalist messaging might travel through society. Ukrainians are already more ultra-nationalist than anytime since the Nazis’ invasion of the USSR, after which they then genocided Russians, Jews, and even Poles. With Zelensky blowing the dog whistle that the UPR’s territorial claims are now informally being revived, some might therefore soon return to targeting Poles.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Kiev’s Implied Territorial Claims To Russia’s Border Regions Are Totally Bogus By Andrew Korybko It’s actually Russians that have always lived in modern-day Ukraine’s border regions, not Ukrainians…
These lessons could reshape how policymakers perceive the special operation and therefore improve the way in which it’s being waged.
Ukraine’s sneak attack against Russia’s Kursk Region appears to have successfully penetrated the border according to RT’s update on Wednesday, which followed the Defence Ministry’s claim that the fighting was only taking place on the Ukrainian side of the border. Even though it appears destined to fail and be seen in hindsight as this generation’s “Battle of the Bulge” like many social commentators have described it as, it still taught Russia five very important lessons that it would do well to consider implementing:
———-
* It Might Finally Be Time To Take Out All The Bridges Across The Dnieper
Russia has hitherto been reluctant to take out bridges across the Dnieper, but it might finally be time to do so in order to prevent Western arms and equipment from reaching its pre-2014 borders in possible preparation of more sneak attacks. Continuing to prioritize political objectives over military ones, such as remaining averse to inconveniencing civilians through the proposed means in order to avoid losing more hearts and minds, has arguably proven to have more drawbacks than benefits.
* Better ISR & Less Groupthink Can Reduce Russia’s Blind Spots
NATO has proven that it has impressive tactical capabilities after successfully disguising its proxy’s sneak attack, but Russia is the bloc’s peer and thus shouldn’t have been fooled. Better intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) could have prevented this, as could the optimization of feedback loops from the front. Per the latter, higher-ups might not have taken reports of a military build-up seriously since they could have deemed it “irrational”, but they should have listened if that was the case.
* Preemptive Resettlement & More Physical Border Defences Would Have Helped A Lot
In hindsight, it might have been wise to preemptively resettle folks who were living in proximity to the border and turn these areas into a security zone with many more physical defences. Two reasons why this wasn’t done might have been fear of it being spun by its foes as setting up a “buffer zone” inside of Russia and not wanting to inconvenience the locals. The first should never influence policymakers while the second could be mitigated by proper planning and funding (with possible “oligarch” contributions).
* Border Militias Might Not Be A Bad Idea If They’re Supervised By The State
The now-rebranded Wagner’s late founder Prigozhin had previously proposed creating a border militia in Belgorod Region, but he ultimately turned out to be the West’s “useful idiot” as explained in the preceding hyperlinked analysis so that might have been a very bad idea at the time had he succeeded. Nevertheless, properly supervised border militias might in fact be a good idea, such as if there were FSB agents embedded within them to ensure these non-state actors’ continued loyalty to the state.
* “Active Defence” Is Better Than “Passive Defence”
Even in the absence of proper ISR, Ukraine would have still struggled to assemble the forces needed for its sneak attack and then storm across the border had Russia been engaged in a policy of “active defence” (regular low-level attacks) instead of “passive defence” (sitting back and waiting for an attack). Going forward, Russia should consider the merits of implementing “active defence” all along the front, which would keep Ukraine on edge and possibly force it to voluntarily create its own “buffer zones”.
———-
The five lessons enumerated above could reshape how policymakers perceive the special operation and therefore improve the way in which it’s being waged, particularly with regards to addressing some of the constructive critiques thereof that were shared in this analysis here from November 2022. Retaining the same mindset risks more sneak attacks. It’s only through the pragmatic evolution of policymakers’ viewpoints in response to the past 2.5 years’ events that success can best be achieved.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Creative economic diplomacy was the key to getting their increasingly stalled talks back on track.
Russian Special Presidential Envoy Kirill Dmitriev, who’s also the CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, paid a visit to DC last week to continue negotiations with the US over bilateral ties and Ukraine. His trip was successful, with Dmitriev claiming afterwards that “we made three steps forward on a large number of issues” and praising Trump’s team for their sincere interest in understanding Russia’s position. This came several days after Trump signalled his growing impatience for a deal as was analysed here.
Dmitriev has been described by RT as Russia’s “chief economic envoy in recent Russian-US talks”, which takes on an even greater significance given the aforementioned context and Trump’s preference for transactional diplomacy. He’s also very American-friendly, having been educated at both Stanford and Harvard, so he’s someone who US officials can get along with and feel comfortable speaking to. These factors combine to elevate the importance of creative economic diplomacy in the Russian-US talks.
While progress had reportedly been made on repairing bilateral ties prior to Dmitriev’s trip, the Ukrainian aspect of their negotiations had arguably reached an impasse over Putin’s refusal to make major compromises on issues that he considers integral to Russia’s national security. This explains Trump’s self-admitted anger with Putin, but Dmitriev’s proposals for privileged US investments in Russia’s resource sector and equally privileged access to its enormous market helped alleviate that.
He was the right man talking about the right things at the right time, which accounts for Trump proclaiming after Dmitriev’s talks with top officials that “I think that President Putin is ready to make a deal”, thus reversing what he himself implied less than a week prior about losing patience with Putin. His volte-face thus suggests that he was pleased with whatever trade, investment, and resource proposals Dmitriev offered the US. It also contrasts with the US’ difficulty in clinching a resource deal with Ukraine.
How all of this relates to breaking the previously mentioned impasse on Ukraine is that the US might now be more flexible with its envisaged end game upon learning that Russia plans to reward it with privileged trade, investment, and resource deals for coercing Ukraine into compromises that align with Russia’s national security interests that Putin insists must be part of any final deal. These carrots that Dmitriev dangled could therefore be enticing enough that Trump revises his peace plan to cater to Putin.
To be clear, Putin isn’t trying to “buy off” Trump, but to lay a solid economic basis upon which the nascentRussian–US “NewDétente” could become a strategic partnership after the Ukrainian Conflict ends. Resource cooperation, especially on extracting fossil fuels from the Arctic and rare earth minerals from Donbass, is assessed by Russian policymakers as the speediest means to this end when coupled with privileged US access to their country’s enormous market. It also appeals to Trump and his team too.
While it’s premature to declare that the peace process has now been placed on the trajectory of an inevitable deal, the odds of one being agreed to are much greater than before Dmitriev’s trip, but Trump’s capriciousness might see him suddenly sour on Russia yet again. Nevertheless, Dmitriev’s timely intervention saw him employ creative economic diplomacy to get their increasingly stalled talks back on track, so now it’s up to Trump to close the deal by coercing Ukraine into Russia’s requested concessions.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
This moment of truth could even arrive earlier than expected and thus force Putin to compromise or escalate before he’s fully made up his mind either way.
Trump said in an interview with NBC News that “If Russia and I are unable to make a deal on stopping the bloodshed in Ukraine, and if I think it was Russia’s fault — which it might not be — but if I think it was Russia’s fault, I am going to put secondary tariffs on oil, on all oil coming out of Russia. That would be that if you buy oil from Russia, you can’t do business in the United States. There will be a 25% tariff on all oil, a 25- to 50-point tariff on all oil.”
NBC News interpreted this as alluding to what he earlier threatened on social media regarding the imposition of secondary sanctions on those that purchase oil from Venezuela. He wrote that “any Country that purchases Oil and/or Gas from Venezuela will be forced to pay a Tariff of 25% to the United States on any Trade they do with our Country.” As it relates to Russia, this would spike tariffs on China and India, the first of which is already in a trade war with the US while the second wants to avoid one.
This is precisely the former US Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg insinuated in an interview with the New York Post in early February that was analysed here at the time. The takeaway was that such threats might suffice for getting them to nudge Russia into a deal over Ukraine despite whatever apprehensions Putin might have. The consequences of not doing so could be their compliance with the US’ secondary sanctions and all that could entail for the Russian economy if it’s deprived of this revenue.
India is more susceptible to this form of American pressure while China might resist for the reasons explained here, in which case Russia could become disproportionately dependent on China, thus leading to the fait accompli of de facto junior partnership status that Putin has tried his utmost to avoid. Accordingly, it might only be India that tries nudging Russia into a deal over Ukraine while China might not do what Trump expects, instead openly defying his secondary sanctions if they’re then imposed.
This analysis here briefly touches upon the five reasons why Russia might accept or reject a ceasefire in Ukraine, with it becoming increasingly likely that Trump might soon ramp up the pressure on Putin to decide, especially after he also just said that there’s a “psychological deadline” for this. In his words, which followed right after his interview with NBC News, “It’s a psychological deadline. If I think they’re tapping us along, I will not be happy about it.”
The day before, Trump spent a sizeable amount of the day golfing with Finnish President Alexander Stubb, who shared his impression of his counterpart’s approach to Russia with the media. As he phrased it, “When you spend seven hours with someone, you at least get an intuition of the direction in which we’re going…The half-ceasefire has been broken by Russia, and I think America, and my sense is also the President of the United States, is running out of patience with Russia.”
This assessment aligns with what Trump told NBC News the next day and his later quip about a “psychological deadline” for concluding talks with Putin. The American leader’s preference for wielding sanctions as a foreign policy tool might therefore come into play against Russia exactly as was foreseen in early February after Kellogg’s cited interview. This moment of truth could even arrive earlier than expected and thus force Putin to compromise or escalate before he’s fully made up his mind either way.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Simply put, Ukraine not only “psyched-out” Russia, but it masterfully manipulated its perceptions after realizing long ago (or being told by the Anglo-American Axis) how strongly it’s affected by groupthink.
So much has happened since spring 2023’s Pentagon leaks that few even remember that they happened, but they’re more relevant than ever amidst Ukraine’s ongoing invasion of Russia’s Kursk Region since they proved that Zelensky had been plotting this since January 2023. The Washington Post reported on this aspect of those leaks in May 2023, writing that the US was already aware by then that Zelensky thought that this move would “give Kyiv leverage in talks with Moscow.”
This wasn’t lost on the Russians either since RT promptly published an article about it, which was analysed here at the time, thus raising questions about why there weren’t better border defences in place just in case. These reports circulated right before Ukraine’s ultimately failed counteroffensive, so it’s possible that the border was fortified as a precaution ahead of that happening, but then Russia grew complacent with its on-the-ground gains in Donbass over the past year and let its guard down.
About that, this analysis here from last week pointed out that Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk Region should incentivize Russia to finally eliminate groupthink. It’s difficult to believe that there were no reports whatsoever about a build-up along the border ahead of time, thus meaning that higher-ups might have dismissed whatever they were speculatively told by their underlings as “irrational”. Therein lies the problem since Ukraine always ends up surprising Russia but relevant lessons have yet to be learned.
Whether it’s long-range drone strikes against its strategic airfields, early warning systems, and even the Kremlin or naval drone attacks against its Black Sea fleet, all of which are aided by the Anglo-American Axis, Russia should have expected by now that every one of its soft spots is a likely target. Nevertheless, it’s regularly caught with its pants down, though folks also shouldn’t forget that it still intercepts a lot of drones and foils many impending plots too.
With that being said, more could have been done to protect the border from the invasion that Zelensky had been plotting for a year and a half. Prior to the latest events, he employed terrorist proxies for cross-borderraids into Belgorod Region, which might have deceived Russia into thinking that Ukraine abandoned its plans for a conventional invasion. That could explain why the only forces that it deployed along the border were counter-sabotage units who were unprepared to fend off a real invasion.
Such a decision still represents a lapse in judgement, however, when recalling that Ukrainian military-intelligence chief Budanov drew attention to Kursk Region in mid-May shortly after the start of Russia’s push into his country’s Kharkov Region. He said at the time that “they are holding a small group of forces in the border area, in the town of Sudzha. From our side, it is the Sumy direction, but the situation has not yet allowed them to take active action and start, let’s say, implementing their plan.”
As it turns out, Russia never reinforced its “small group of forces in the border area”, thus explaining why Ukraine was able to breach the border and is now fighting for control for Sudzha. Russia might have dismissed the forces that Ukraine assembled in preparation of this as an overreaction to Budanov’s aforementioned fear of a push into Sumy Region. If anything, some Russian policymakers might have even been pleased to see them, thinking that it’s better for them to be deployed there than to Donbass.
Simply put, Ukraine not only “psyched-out” Russia, but it masterfully manipulated its perceptions after realizing long ago (or being told by the Anglo-American Axis) how strongly it’s affected by groupthink. Time and again, a little creative thinking on Russia’s part would have made all the difference in thwarting Ukraine’s myriad plots, yet outdated mindsets continue to prevail in spite of all that’s happened. That needs to change, and urgently, in order for the specialoperation to succeed in its goals.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
These lessons could reshape how policymakers perceive the special operation and therefore improve the way in which it’s being waged.
Ukraine’s sneak attack against Russia’s Kursk Region appears to have successfully penetrated the border according to RT’s update on Wednesday, which followed the Defence Ministry’s claim that the fighting was only taking place on the Ukrainian side of the border. Even though it appears destined to fail and be seen in hindsight as this generation’s “Battle of the Bulge” like many social commentators have described it as, it still taught Russia five very important lessons that it would do well to consider implementing:
———-
* It Might Finally Be Time To Take Out All The Bridges Across The Dnieper
Russia has hitherto been reluctant to take out bridges across the Dnieper, but it might finally be time to do so in order to prevent Western arms and equipment from reaching its pre-2014 borders in possible preparation of more sneak attacks. Continuing to prioritize political objectives over military ones, such as remaining averse to inconveniencing civilians through the proposed means in order to avoid losing more hearts and minds, has arguably proven to have more drawbacks than benefits.
* Better ISR & Less Groupthink Can Reduce Russia’s Blind Spots
NATO has proven that it has impressive tactical capabilities after successfully disguising its proxy’s sneak attack, but Russia is the bloc’s peer and thus shouldn’t have been fooled. Better intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) could have prevented this, as could the optimization of feedback loops from the front. Per the latter, higher-ups might not have taken reports of a military build-up seriously since they could have deemed it “irrational”, but they should have listened if that was the case.
* Preemptive Resettlement & More Physical Border Defences Would Have Helped A Lot
In hindsight, it might have been wise to preemptively resettle folks who were living in proximity to the border and turn these areas into a security zone with many more physical defences. Two reasons why this wasn’t done might have been fear of it being spun by its foes as setting up a “buffer zone” inside of Russia and not wanting to inconvenience the locals. The first should never influence policymakers while the second could be mitigated by proper planning and funding (with possible “oligarch” contributions).
* Border Militias Might Not Be A Bad Idea If They’re Supervised By The State
The now-rebranded Wagner’s late founder Prigozhin had previously proposed creating a border militia in Belgorod Region, but he ultimately turned out to be the West’s “useful idiot” as explained in the preceding hyperlinked analysis so that might have been a very bad idea at the time had he succeeded. Nevertheless, properly supervised border militias might in fact be a good idea, such as if there were FSB agents embedded within them to ensure these non-state actors’ continued loyalty to the state.
* “Active Defence” Is Better Than “Passive Defence”
Even in the absence of proper ISR, Ukraine would have still struggled to assemble the forces needed for its sneak attack and then storm across the border had Russia been engaged in a policy of “active defence” (regular low-level attacks) instead of “passive defence” (sitting back and waiting for an attack). Going forward, Russia should consider the merits of implementing “active defence” all along the front, which would keep Ukraine on edge and possibly force it to voluntarily create its own “buffer zones”.
———-
The five lessons enumerated above could reshape how policymakers perceive the special operation and therefore improve the way in which it’s being waged, particularly with regards to addressing some of the constructive critiques thereof that were shared in this analysis here from November 2022. Retaining the same mindset risks more sneak attacks. It’s only through the pragmatic evolution of policymakers’ viewpoints in response to the past 2.5 years’ events that success can best be achieved.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
He said that nobody in Europe knows what Trump’s plan actually is, they’re unable to assemble the approximately 100,000 troops that a prolonged peacekeeping mission in Ukraine would require, and Poland still remains reluctant to participate in any such mission even if it’s heavily pressured to do so.
Chief of Poland’s National Security Bureau Dariusz Lukowski gave an interview to Radio ZET on Monday about his country’s position towards the Ukrainian Conflict. According to him, it shouldn’t send peacekeepers to Ukraine, but this still can’t be ruled out in the future despite Prime Minister Donald Tusk onceagain explicitly saying that it won’t do so. That’s because there’d be a lot of pressure on Poland to get involved if others dispatch their peacekeepers there first, but he’s still unsure whether it’ll happen.
He assessed that Europe as a whole doesn’t have the 100,000 troops ready that would be required for patrolling the over 1,000-kilometer-long frontline for the decade that he expects such a mission to last at minimum. Even if Poland doesn’t participate on the ground, however, he said that it could still “secure the airspace over Ukraine. A form of air policing. Aircraft based in Poland could patrol the airspace of Ukraine.” Such scenarios would naturally depend on the outcome of the Russian-US talks though.
About that, Lukowski said that new US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth didn’t brief his hosts about the details of Trump’s envisaged peace plan during last week’s visit nor request them to participate in any peacekeeping mission. He added that “We tried to ask the American side such a question (about their negotiating strategy), because we are interested in what types of instruments they would like to use to convince Putin to adopt such and such a solution and not others, but no specifics were given.”
Another point that this top security official made was that outgoing President Andrzej Duda “tried to convey in a very clear way how Poland perceives Russian issues, that Russia cannot be trusted”, but he didn’t say whether he thought that Hegseth will listen to what the Polish leader had to say. Lukowski continued by claiming that Russia could attack Poland at any moment but said that he doesn’t believe that the US would betray Poland even if that happens by abandoning it to face Russia all on its own.
Even so, he warned that Poland still needs three years “to have the capabilities to effectively resist or deter a potential adversary from attacking our country”, likely in a nod to the “East Shield” part of the “European Defence Line” that his country is building along its borders with Kaliningrad and Belarus. In any case, Lukowski said that his country’s plan is to survive for 2-3 weeks until support can arrive from its allies, which interestingly suggests a much longer delay in NATO aid than most observers expect.
Perhaps the top takeaway from his interview though was his admission that Poland failed in its plans to produce its own ammo. In his words, “It’s bad. In many areas we don’t have independence. This is a classic situation that we observe in Ukraine and a lesson that needs to be learned. If we do not have our own potential, guaranteed supplies, others will decide on the pace and manner of conducting war.” He then said that he doesn’t understand why this problem persists and warned about its consequences.
Lukowski’s interview confirmed Poland’s hesitation to directly involve itself in the Ukrainian Conflict exactly as Deputy Prime Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski signalled last November when warning that Zelensky wants to provoke a war between them and Russia. It’s also out of the loop when it comes to the ongoing Russian-US peace talks despite Hegseth describing Poland as America’s “model ally” during last week’s visit. Poland therefore isn’t expected to make any dramatic or rash moves for the time being.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
The path ahead will be very difficult due to the sensitive issues that Russia and the US must resolve.
12 February 2025 will go down in history as the day when the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine officially began to end. Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth started everything off by declaring that: Ukraine won’t join NATO; the US doesn’t believe that Ukraine can restore its pre-2014 borders; the US won’t deploy troops to the conflict zone; the US wants the Europeans to assume some peacekeeping responsibilities there instead; but the US won’t extend Article 5 guarantees to EU forces there.
This was followed by Trump and Putin talking for the first time since the former returned to office. They agreed to begin peace talks without delay, which was followed by Trump calling Zelensky to brief him about this and likely coerce the concessions from him that he presumably promised Putin. Trump also suggested that he’ll soon meet Putin in Saudi Arabia and that each of them might then visit each other’s countries as part of the peace process. Here are some background briefings about the larger context:
The first analysis about creative energy diplomacy contains a dozen proposed compromises for each side that could help move their talks along. In fact, the one about the US not extending Article 5 guarantees to EU forces in Ukraine is now policy per Hegseth, so it’s possible that some others might follow. Additionally, Trump just remarked about how unpopular Zelensky has become, which suggests that he’s planning the “phased leadership transition” via new elections that was also proposed in that piece.
It remains to be seen which of these other proposals might soon become US policy, with the same being said for the ones that Russia might implement, such as agreeing to limited military restrictions on its side of the DMZ that’ll likely be created by the end of this process for example. What follows are the five main issues that’ll shape the Russian-US peace talks on Ukraine between their leaders, diplomats, and whichever of their experts might be invited to participate in this via complementary Track II talks:
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* Territorial Parameters
The most immediate issue that must be resolved is where the new Russian-Ukrainian border will fall. Hegseth’s claim about Ukraine’s inability to restore its pre-2014 border hints that Trump could coerce Zelensky into withdrawing from at least all of Donbass, which is at the centre of the territorial dimension of their conflict, though it’s possible that his forces might fall back as far as Zaporozhye city. Letting Russia control that city and the parts of its new regions west of the Dnieper is unlikely at this time.
That’s because Trump might not want to take the flak that would follow giving Russia a city of over 700,000 whose residents didn’t vote in September 2022’s referendum. The same goes for the parts of Russia’s new regions west of the river. Instead, he might propose a UN-supervised referendum sometime after the fighting freezes to resolve this aspect of their territorial dispute, all while allowing Russia to continue to officially lay claim to those areas. That might be pragmatic enough for Putin to agree.
* DMZ Terms & Peacekeeper Roles
The next issue to address after the above are the terms of the DMZ along their interim border and the role of the peacekeepers who’d then likely deploy there to monitor it. Hegseth’s declaration that the US will not extend Article 5 guarantees to EU forces there could deter them from playing a major role, which Russia would have to authorize via a UNSC Resolution in any case per Permanent Representative Vasily Nebenzia otherwise they’ll be legitimate targets. Non-Western ones are thus much more agreeable.
As it turns out, the vast majority of UN peacekeepers are from non-Western countries, so they could prospectively deploy there under a UNSC mandate per Nebenzia’s suggestion and possibly even result in the total exclusion of any Western peacekeepers if it’s agreed that none will contribute to this mission. Their terms would have to be acceptable to both Russia and the US in order for this resolution to pass, so it’s unclear exactly what they’ll be able to do or not do, but that directly segues into the next issue.
* Demilitarization & Denazification
Two of Russia’s main goals in the specialoperation are to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, which it initially sought to do by militarily coercing Ukraine into this per the terms established in spring 2022’s draft peace treaty, though that didn’t succeed due to the UK and Poland. It’s unrealistic to imagine that Trump will agree to let Russia deploy its armed forces throughout the entirety of Ukraine to implement this so it can only be accomplished through similar diplomatic means involving Kiev’s acquiescence.
Therein lies the possible role that UN peacekeepers can play in monitoring and enforcing whatever is ultimately agreed upon for demilitarizing and denazifying Ukraine. This could take the form of inspecting suspected illegal arms sites and all of Ukraine’s cross-border traffic (including at its ports) while having the right to mandate changes to its media reporting and school curricula as need be. This is the only way to ensure that Ukraine remains demilitarized and denazified after the conflict ends.
* Sanctions Relief
Russia has repeatedly demanded the lifting of all Western sanctions, but the argument can be made that “deal-master” Trump wouldn’t ever agree to do this all at once, instead preferring to draft a plan for phased sanctions relief as a reward for Russia’s compliance with a ceasefire, armistice, or peace treaty. This could take the form of what was proposed in the creative energy diplomacy analysis whereby some Russian exports to the EU could resume during the first phase as a trust-building measure.
While Russia would prefer that they all be immediately lifted, its policymakers might conclude that it’s better to accept a phased plan if that’s all that Trump is comfortable offering instead of nothing at all. He’d do well though to engage in the goodwill gesture of lifting sanctions on Russia’s oil exports by sea too since that could convince those policymakers that he’s serious about relieving pressure on Russia. This would in turn make it easier for Putin to sell the compromise of phased sanctions relief at home.
* New Security Architecture
Russia envisaged creating a new European security architecture through mutual agreements with the US and NATO in December 2021 per the security guarantee requests that it shared with them at the time. These were in hindsight meant to diplomatically resolve their security dilemma, whose roots are in NATO’s continued eastward expansion after the Old Cold War and especially its clandestine expansion into Ukraine, in lieu of the special operation that Putin was secretly planning at the time if that failed.
So much has changed since then that separate comprehensive talks on this must start right after whatever agreement they reach on Ukraine. The new issues include NATO’s eastern military buildup, Finland and Sweden’s new memberships, Russia’s hypersonic Oreshniks, their deployment to Belarus, Russia’s deployment of nukes there too, the future of the New START that expires next year, and the new space arms race, et al. Agreeing on a new security architecture will therefore stabilize the world.
———-
As can be seen, the path ahead will be very difficult due to the sensitive issues that Russia and the US must resolve, but their leaders have shown that they have the will to negotiate in good faith. Neither side is likely to achieve their maximum objectives, but diplomacy is the art of the possible, so each will do their utmost to achieve as much as they can in this regard given the circumstances. The best-case scenario is a fair and lasting peace that truly resolves the root causes at the core of this conflict.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Trump 2.0 must become aware of the threat that the UK poses to its plans and respond accordingly to defend the US’ interests.
Russia’s Foreign Spy Service (SVR) accused the UK of trying to sabotage the nascentRussian–US “New Détente” for self-interested geopolitical reasons. According to their sources, the success of their talks could break the Brits’ regional containment of Russia, which is why they’re employing a dual-track policy for preventing this. The first part involves information warfare fearmongering about Trump’s ties with Russia while the second seeks to escalate the Ukrainian Conflict through a conventional intervention.
SVR’s report lacks any bombshells since everything that they revealed was already self-evident to astute observers, but it’s still important that they lent credence to what others before them had already picked up on and the timing with which they did so. “France, Germany, & Poland Are Competing For Leadership Of Post-Conflict Europe” while the UK plans to divide-and-rule the continent like usual, to which end it’s expected to rely more on Poland and/or Ukraine with whom it’s been colluding since February 2022.
Few either saw it at the time or still remember, but the UK forged an informal trilateral alliance with Poland and Ukraine exactly one week before the special operation began, which was leveraged shortly after to convince Zelensky to abandon spring 2022’s peace talks with Russia as was explained here. In the three years since, Poland and the US have taken harder stances towards Ukraine, the first initially for domestic political reasons and the second due to Trump’s eagerness to “Pivot (back) to Asia” pronto.
The aforesaid developments have left the UK as Ukraine’s top supporter, the position of which it expects to maintain for as long as possible since that former Soviet Republic is the lynchpin in London’s regional anti-Russian containment strategy, but events might ultimately force it to abandon this project. Until that happens, however, the UK is doing its utmost within all realistic limits to complicate and even possibly sabotage the nascent Russian-US “New Détente” and associated deal over Ukraine.
Should it fail, which is seemingly inevitable, then the fallback plan could be to refocus on Poland as the core of a new regional containment coalition that’ll be smaller in scope but nonetheless still formidable. Poland has the largest economy of the EU’s eastern members, now boasts NATO’s third-largest army, and aspires to restore its lost “sphere of influence” at the expense of Russia’s security interests. These factors could converge to make Poland the UK’s preferred top partner in post-conflict Europe.
The only problem to these plans is that the US is poised to make Poland its own top partner on the continent so the UK might have to compete with its American ally or accept junior partner status vis-à-vis Washington in any trilateral that might form between them. At the same time, however, Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski is a diehard Anglophile who even had British citizenship till he gave it up in 2006 to join the government so he might operate as the UK’s “agent of influence” to advance its agenda.
From the UK’s perspective, the best-case scenario is that: the nascent Russian-US “New Détente” fails for whatever reason; the US then feels compelled to resume large-scale military support to Ukraine in response so as to teach Russia a lesson as Trump might see it; but the UK successfully manipulates Western public opinion to supplant the US as the “leader of the free world” due to its consistently anti-Russian position that never once wavered no matter how difficult things became for Ukraine in the past.
On the flipside, the worst-case scenario from the UK’s perspective is that: the nascent Russian-US “New Détente” succeeds; a pragmatic compromise follows in Ukraine which turns it into an informal joint protectorate between Russia and the US; the US then turns Poland into its top partner in post-conflict Europe; and the US, not the UK, guides Poland as it restores part of its lost “sphere of influence” and then uses this geopolitical network to divide-and-rule Europe by keeping Germany and Russia apart.
It’s precisely this sequence of events that’s presently unfolding and which might consequently provoke the UK into doing something very dramatic to sabotage this process out of desperation. Russia clearly has an interest in preventing that, ergo why SVR chose this moment to lend credence to what others before them had already picked up on about the UK’s interests in this context. Trump 2.0 must become aware of the threat that the UK poses to its plans and respond accordingly to defend the US’ interests.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
EUROPE and the UK could deploy a fleet of 120 fighter jets to fend off Russian missiles and protect Ukraine’s airspace against Vladimir Putin. The defence plan, known as Operation Sky Shield,…
The path ahead will be very difficult due to the sensitive issues that Russia and the US must resolve.
12 February 2025 will go down in history as the day when the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine officially began to end. Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth started everything off by declaring that: Ukraine won’t join NATO; the US doesn’t believe that Ukraine can restore its pre-2014 borders; the US won’t deploy troops to the conflict zone; the US wants the Europeans to assume some peacekeeping responsibilities there instead; but the US won’t extend Article 5 guarantees to EU forces there.
This was followed by Trump and Putin talking for the first time since the former returned to office. They agreed to begin peace talks without delay, which was followed by Trump calling Zelensky to brief him about this and likely coerce the concessions from him that he presumably promised Putin. Trump also suggested that he’ll soon meet Putin in Saudi Arabia and that each of them might then visit each other’s countries as part of the peace process. Here are some background briefings about the larger context:
The first analysis about creative energy diplomacy contains a dozen proposed compromises for each side that could help move their talks along. In fact, the one about the US not extending Article 5 guarantees to EU forces in Ukraine is now policy per Hegseth, so it’s possible that some others might follow. Additionally, Trump just remarked about how unpopular Zelensky has become, which suggests that he’s planning the “phased leadership transition” via new elections that was also proposed in that piece.
It remains to be seen which of these other proposals might soon become US policy, with the same being said for the ones that Russia might implement, such as agreeing to limited military restrictions on its side of the DMZ that’ll likely be created by the end of this process for example. What follows are the five main issues that’ll shape the Russian-US peace talks on Ukraine between their leaders, diplomats, and whichever of their experts might be invited to participate in this via complementary Track II talks:
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* Territorial Parameters
The most immediate issue that must be resolved is where the new Russian-Ukrainian border will fall. Hegseth’s claim about Ukraine’s inability to restore its pre-2014 border hints that Trump could coerce Zelensky into withdrawing from at least all of Donbass, which is at the centre of the territorial dimension of their conflict, though it’s possible that his forces might fall back as far as Zaporozhye city. Letting Russia control that city and the parts of its new regions west of the Dnieper is unlikely at this time.
That’s because Trump might not want to take the flak that would follow giving Russia a city of over 700,000 whose residents didn’t vote in September 2022’s referendum. The same goes for the parts of Russia’s new regions west of the river. Instead, he might propose a UN-supervised referendum sometime after the fighting freezes to resolve this aspect of their territorial dispute, all while allowing Russia to continue to officially lay claim to those areas. That might be pragmatic enough for Putin to agree.
* DMZ Terms & Peacekeeper Roles
The next issue to address after the above are the terms of the DMZ along their interim border and the role of the peacekeepers who’d then likely deploy there to monitor it. Hegseth’s declaration that the US will not extend Article 5 guarantees to EU forces there could deter them from playing a major role, which Russia would have to authorize via a UNSC Resolution in any case per Permanent Representative Vasily Nebenzia otherwise they’ll be legitimate targets. Non-Western ones are thus much more agreeable.
As it turns out, the vast majority of UN peacekeepers are from non-Western countries, so they could prospectively deploy there under a UNSC mandate per Nebenzia’s suggestion and possibly even result in the total exclusion of any Western peacekeepers if it’s agreed that none will contribute to this mission. Their terms would have to be acceptable to both Russia and the US in order for this resolution to pass, so it’s unclear exactly what they’ll be able to do or not do, but that directly segues into the next issue.
* Demilitarization & Denazification
Two of Russia’s main goals in the specialoperation are to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, which it initially sought to do by militarily coercing Ukraine into this per the terms established in spring 2022’s draft peace treaty, though that didn’t succeed due to the UK and Poland. It’s unrealistic to imagine that Trump will agree to let Russia deploy its armed forces throughout the entirety of Ukraine to implement this so it can only be accomplished through similar diplomatic means involving Kiev’s acquiescence.
Therein lies the possible role that UN peacekeepers can play in monitoring and enforcing whatever is ultimately agreed upon for demilitarizing and denazifying Ukraine. This could take the form of inspecting suspected illegal arms sites and all of Ukraine’s cross-border traffic (including at its ports) while having the right to mandate changes to its media reporting and school curricula as need be. This is the only way to ensure that Ukraine remains demilitarized and denazified after the conflict ends.
* Sanctions Relief
Russia has repeatedly demanded the lifting of all Western sanctions, but the argument can be made that “deal-master” Trump wouldn’t ever agree to do this all at once, instead preferring to draft a plan for phased sanctions relief as a reward for Russia’s compliance with a ceasefire, armistice, or peace treaty. This could take the form of what was proposed in the creative energy diplomacy analysis whereby some Russian exports to the EU could resume during the first phase as a trust-building measure.
While Russia would prefer that they all be immediately lifted, its policymakers might conclude that it’s better to accept a phased plan if that’s all that Trump is comfortable offering instead of nothing at all. He’d do well though to engage in the goodwill gesture of lifting sanctions on Russia’s oil exports by sea too since that could convince those policymakers that he’s serious about relieving pressure on Russia. This would in turn make it easier for Putin to sell the compromise of phased sanctions relief at home.
* New Security Architecture
Russia envisaged creating a new European security architecture through mutual agreements with the US and NATO in December 2021 per the security guarantee requests that it shared with them at the time. These were in hindsight meant to diplomatically resolve their security dilemma, whose roots are in NATO’s continued eastward expansion after the Old Cold War and especially its clandestine expansion into Ukraine, in lieu of the special operation that Putin was secretly planning at the time if that failed.
So much has changed since then that separate comprehensive talks on this must start right after whatever agreement they reach on Ukraine. The new issues include NATO’s eastern military buildup, Finland and Sweden’s new memberships, Russia’s hypersonic Oreshniks, their deployment to Belarus, Russia’s deployment of nukes there too, the future of the New START that expires next year, and the new space arms race, et al. Agreeing on a new security architecture will therefore stabilize the world.
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As can be seen, the path ahead will be very difficult due to the sensitive issues that Russia and the US must resolve, but their leaders have shown that they have the will to negotiate in good faith. Neither side is likely to achieve their maximum objectives, but diplomacy is the art of the possible, so each will do their utmost to achieve as much as they can in this regard given the circumstances. The best-case scenario is a fair and lasting peace that truly resolves the root causes at the core of this conflict.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Trump has everything to gain by picking up where everyone left off over two and a half years ago.
The Wall Street Journal’s report that Trump wants to create a Western-patrolled DMZ along the Line of Contact (LOC) for freezing the Ukrainian Conflict, which was analysed here and here, dangerously runs the risk of escalating tensions with Russia to the point of a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis. It would therefore be much better for him to revive the draft Russian-Ukrainian peace treaty from spring 2022 instead. Other than averting World War III, which is an obvious motivation, here are five others:
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1. Fulfil His Democratic Mandate To Bring Peace To Europe
Trump won the popular vote and therefore has a democratic mandate to fulfil his campaign pledge to bring peace to Europe. Doing so would be a strong start to his second term and reassure his supporters that he won’t backtrack on his commitments like last time. Additionally, other countries will see that he’s serious about doing what he promised, thus leading to them taking him more seriously and making them less likely to haggle with him. He might also set himself up to win the Nobel Peace Prize too.
2. Create Less Space For The Deep State To Manipulate Him
Another one of Trump’s promises is to purge the country’s permanent military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies (“deep state”) of warmongering neoconservatives. If he backtracks on the most important of his foreign policy promises, then they’ll have more space to manipulate him. After all, it was his decision to bomb Syria early on into his first term that set the stage for every other foreign policy disappointment. Failure to hold his ground on Ukraine would be a very bad omen.
3. Compel The EU To Take More Responsibility For Its Defence
Trump’s reported plan for NATO aims to compel the EU to take more responsibility for its defence so as to rebalance the burden that the US carries in this regard and then facilitate the latter’s “Pivot (back) to Asia” to more muscularly contain China. This won’t be achieved with nice words or even threats, but only through shocking the system by forcing them to step up after he ends the conflict in this way, which is their worst fear and would thus leave them with no choice but to do what demands afterwards.
4. Help “Un-Unite” Russia & China As Realistically As Possible
He promised on the eve of the election to “un-unite” Russia and China, and while it’s impossible to turn them against each other, the most realistic outcome that he can hope for is to reduce Russia’s potentially disproportionate dependence on China by gradually restoring the European vector of its balancing act. Phased sanctions relief as a reward for compliance with a ceasefire/armistice could do a lot to avert the aforesaid scenario in a non-threatening way that would also be tacitly acceptable for Russia too.
5. Replenish Stockpiles To Better Prepare For Contingencies
And finally, swiftly ending the Ukrainian Conflict by reviving spring 2022’s draft peace treaty as the basis for this would enable the US to fully focus its military-industrial complex on replenishing its depleted stockpiles in order to better prepare for contingencies, such as those that might soon develop in Asia. This would be difficult to do if Trump keeps arming Ukraine after either being manipulated into turning this into another forever war or as an additional security guarantee to go with his reported DMZ plan.
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As can be seen from the five points above, Trump has everything to gain by picking up where everyone left off over two and a half years ago to sustainably end the Ukrainian Conflict on the terms that Kiev and Moscow tentatively agreed to shortly after it began, albeit with minor modifications. The current territorial realities, whether with regard to the LOC or the entire administrative borders of the four Ukrainian regions that joined Russia, would have to be recognized. If he does so, then a deal is certain.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Trump’s reported plan for a Western/NATO peacekeeping mission in Ukraine places Russia in the dilemma of either pre-empting this with another large-scale nationwide offensive, targeting those forces after they enter at the risk of sparking World War III, or tacitly accepting this endgame.
The Wall Street Journal’s report that Trump’s peace plan for Ukraine envisages the creation of an 800-mile demilitarized zone that would be patrolled by Europeans adds a lot of urgency to Russia’s nearly 1000-day-long struggle to achieve its maximum goals in this conflict. The potential entrance of conventional Western/NATO forces into Ukraine as peacekeepers places Russia in the dilemma of accepting yet another “red line” being crossed or risking World War III by targeting them.
To refresh everyone’s memory since it’s been so long since the special operation started, Russia officially aims to: 1) demilitarize Ukraine; 2) denazify it; and 3) restore its constitutional neutrality, among other supplementary and informal goals. September 2022’s referenda then added the official goal of removing Ukrainian forces from the entirety of the four regions that Russia now claims as its own, including the areas of Kherson and Zaporozhye on the other side of the Dnieper, which will be challenge.
At the same time, Putin has repeatedly refused to reciprocally escalate in response to egregious Ukrainian provocations like its bombing of the Kremlin, early warning systems, strategic airfields, oil refineries, and residential buildings, et al, all due to him not wanting the conflict to spiral out of control. For as responsible of an approach as this is, the drawback is that it created the perception that he might accept the crossing of even more “red lines”, including conventional Western/NATO forces in Ukraine.
Putin’s aversion to escalation might therefore be exploited by Trump, who was reportedly handed a plan in June advising him to give Ukraine whatever it wants if Russia refuses whatever peace deal he proposes, ergo the high likelihood of a conventional Western/NATO intervention to decisively freeze the conflict. Trump’s track record of “escalating to de-escalate” with North Korea and Iran suggests that he’d also go through with this plan against Russia, hence why it should take this scenario seriously.
Provided that Putin lacks the political will to risk an unprecedented escalation by targeting those conventional Western/NATO forces, and his behaviour thus far in response to other provocations suggests that this is indeed the case, then he’ll have to race against the clock to achieve his maximum goals. It’ll still take some time for the US to get key stakeholders like Poland on board, where 69% of the public is against dispatching troops to Ukraine in any capacity, so this likely won’t happen by mid-January.
In any case, Russia no longer has a hypothetically indefinite amount of time like before to: 1) demilitarize Ukraine; 2) denazify it; 3) restore its constitutional neutrality; and 4) remove Ukrainian forces from the entirety of the four regions that Russia now claims as its own, including those areas across the Dnieper. Even though the military-strategic dynamics of the conflict favour it, and capturing Pokrovsk could lead to huge gains in Donetsk, it’ll be very difficult to achieve all these goals by the time an intervention occurs.
To explain in the order that they were mentioned, Ukraine was initially supposed to be demilitarized upon the swift success of the special operation in its early phase, but the UK and Poland (whose role most observers aren’t aware of) convinced Zelensky to rubbish spring 2022’s draft peace treaty. That document would have greatly slashed its military capabilities, but it’s no longer realistic to imagine that he’d agree to this, especially after being given tens of billions of dollars’ worth of NATO arms.
NATO is also unlikely to agree to ask for them back due to the perception (regardless of its veracity) that Ukraine must be able to “deter” Russia from supposedly recommencing the conflict after it finally ends. The Taliban’s swift capture of Afghanistan after Biden’s bungled withdrawal from there was viciously lambasted by Trump, who’d go down in history as an even bigger loser if he agreed to “demilitarize” Ukraine and was then played for a fool by Putin if Russia steamrolls through it sometime later.
The only viable way in which Russia could implement Ukraine’s demilitarization in today’s context is to control as much of its territory as possible in order to ensure that no threatening weapons are deployed there. The problem though is that Russia is unlikely to obtain military control over all of Ukraine, or even just significant parts of its territory east of the Dnieper in proximity to the internationally recognized border across which Kiev’s shells still regularly fly, by the time of a Western/NATO intervention.
One of the reasons why the special operation’s opening phase didn’t result in ending the conflict on Russia’s terms is because the West informed Zelensky about how overextended its military logistics had become and thus encouraged him to exploit that to push it back like he ultimately did. Given how cautious of a leader Putin is, he’s unlikely to act out of character once more by ordering a repeat of this same risky strategy even if the frontlines collapse and Russia is able to roll into other regions.
Another unforeseen challenge that Russia experienced during the special operation’s opening phase was actually holding the broad swaths territory that it nominally controlled. Ukraine’s hidden Javelin and Stinger stockpiles inflicted enough losses behind Russia’s lines to engender the large-scale pullback that coincided with the failure of spring 2022’s peace talks. There’s also the obvious difficulty of swiftly capturing large cities like Kharkov, Sumy, and Zaporozhye, which hasn’t yet happened.
Moving along to Russia’s second maximum goal of denazifying Ukraine after explaining how tough it’ll be to achieve the first one of militarizing it, this too can’t succeed without a political agreement that’s no longer realistic in today’s context after such a chance slipped away in spring 2022. What Russia has in mind is Ukraine promulgating legislation that aligns with these goals, such as banning the glorification of World War II-era fascists and rescinding restrictions on ethnic Russians’ rights.
Zelensky has no reason to go along with this anymore like he flirted with doing in early 2022 and Trump’s team doesn’t seem to care all that much about this issue anyhow. It’s therefore unclear how Russia can achieve this before a Western/NATO intervention except in the unlikely scenario of a Russian-friendly Colour Revolution and/or military coup, neither of which the US would accept, and both of which would probably thus prompt the aforesaid intervention out of desperation to salvage “Project Ukraine”.
The third maximum goal of restoring Ukraine’s constitutional neutrality is comparatively more likely but nevertheless moot at this point given that the raft of security guarantees that it already clinched with NATO states since the start of this year de facto amount to continued Article 5 support. Contrary to popular perceptions, this clause doesn’t obligate the dispatch of troops, but only for each country to do whatever it deems fit to help allies under attack. Their existing military aid to Ukraine aligns with this.
Coercing Ukraine to rescind 2019’s constitutional amendment making NATO membership a strategic objective would therefore be a superficial concession to Russia on the US’ part to make Trump’s peace plan a little less bitter for Putin to swallow. As with the previous two maximum goals, Zelensky has no reason to comply with Putin’s demands in this regard since the latter’s forces aren’t in a position to impose this upon him, thus meaning that it can only realistically be done if Trump orders him to.
As the reader probably already picked up on, the common theme is that Russia’s inability to militarily coerce Zelensky into complying with its maximum goals greatly reduces the possibility that they’ll be achieved, which also holds true for the final one of obtaining control over all its new regions’ land. It’s unimaginable that Zelensky will voluntarily cede Zaporozhye with its over 700,000 population, for example, or that Trump will accept the Western opprobrium that would follow coercing him to do so.
The same goes for letting Russia cross the Dnieper to obtain control over that region’s and Kherson’s areas on the other side, thus creating the opportunity for it to build up its forces there in the future for a lightning strike across Ukraine’s western plains in the event that the conflict ever rekindles after it ends. There’s no way that Trump would ever give Putin such an invaluable military-strategic gift so Russia’s supporters shouldn’t deceive themselves by getting their hopes up thinking that this will happen.
The only way in which Russia can achieve its maximum goals before the entrance of Western/NATO troops into Ukraine as peacekeepers is through military means, which would require another large-scale multi-pronged offensive of the sort that characterized the special operation’s early days. Even then, however, the high risk of once again overextending its military logistics, being ambushed by Stingers/Javelins, and thus risking reputational costs and even on-the-ground losses, will remain.
As such, there are really only three options left for Russia: 1) escalate now before Western/NATO troops enter Ukraine and either coerce Zelensky into agreeing to these demands or capture and hold enough land in order to demilitarize as much of the country as possible; 2) escalate after they enter at the risk of sparking a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis that could spiral into World War III; or 3) accept the fait accompli of freezing the conflict along the Line of Contact and begin preparing the public accordingly.
It’s unclear which option Putin will choose since he hasn’t yet signalled a preference for any of them. Nevertheless, it’s timely to quote 19th-century Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov, who famously said that “Russia is not sulking; she is composing herself.” Russia knows that the clock is ticking for achieving its maximum goals before Trump likely orders Western/NATO peacekeepers to enter Ukraine. The Kremlin is quiet for now precisely because policymakers have yet to decide what to do.
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Readers might be interested in reviewing the following analyses for more insight into Russia’s dilemma:
Miroshnik and Zakharova said different things last week about these peacekeepers’ real purpose and their degree of coordination with Kiev in the unlikely scenario of them being deployed to Ukraine.
Astute observers might have been confused after two seemingly contradictory claims by Russian diplomats last week about the scenario of European peacekeepers in Ukraine. Ambassador-at-Large for tracking Kiev’s crimes Rodion Miroshnik alleged that “This could, in fact, be viewed as a blatant occupation of Ukraine by Europe…(the goal would be) to take control over [Ukraine’s] political regime militarily while retaining external governance of this land regardless of how negotiations may end.”
This was followed a day after by Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova revealing that “These forces will not be stationed at the line of combat engagement, nor replace the Ukrainian armed forces. Their purpose is protecting strategic points in coordination with the Ukrainians, for example, Odessa and Lvov, which is being openly mentioned both in Paris and London.” There’s accordingly confusion about these peacekeepers’ real purpose and their degree of coordination with Kiev.
A blend of both diplomats’ scenarios is the most likely if European troops formally enter Ukraine, though remembering how Russia said that it would target foreign forces there while the US said that it won’t extend Article 5 guarantees to NATO troops in Ukraine, this might not happen. If it still does and no escalation follows, then that would be because Russia either authorized a partially European-comprised peacekeeping mission at the UNSC or has Machiavellian calculations in letting it happen without this.
In any case, Kiev could quickly lose control of the “allied” military-strategic dynamics due to the overall much weaker and more vulnerable position that it would be in by the time that European troops might formally enter Ukraine, which could see some of them acting unilaterally in pursuit of their own goals. For instance, while European peacekeepers might coordinate protecting strategic points like Odessa and Lvov with Ukraine to free up the latter’s forces for the front, they might simply never leave afterwards.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) are unlikely to ever be tasked with using force to stop so-called “rogue” European peacekeepers so Kiev would probably just roll over and let them do what they want. There’s also the possibility that different Ukrainian factions in the presidential palace, SBU, and AFU, et al. eventually end up siding with different European countries’ peacekeepers as part of a power game. This could further weaken Ukraine from within and politically “Balkanize” it to Russia’s benefit.
Therefore, what might begin as close European-Ukrainian peacekeeping coordination could end in an occupation if some of these countries defy Kiev and side with competing factions, but local unrest could be mitigated by meeting people’s basic needs and not bothering far-right militants. The only exception could be in the unlikely event that Warsaw reverses its stance and deploys troops since Ukrainians might consider them to be hostile foreign occupiers for historical reasons who must thus be forcefully resisted.
Altogether, while the scenario of a European peacekeeping mission in Ukraine remains far-fetched for now, it can’t be ruled out entirely. Russia might authorize a partially European-comprised peacekeeping mission at the UNSC or let it happen without this if Putin thinks that it’ll cause more trouble for Ukraine. The risk though is that Europe and Ukraine decide to jointly threaten Russia instead of compete with one another for power and resources, and given Putin’s cautious nature, he’s unlikely to take this chance.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Russian propaganda claims that Poland intends to seize part of Ukraine. Deploying Polish troops in Ukraine would provide an argument for such narratives, something Warsaw does not want to give Moscow. — Ukrinform.
What ties these five trends together is Trump’s historic return to the presidency, his successful purge of the “deep state” that enabled him to pursue his long-sought “New Détente” with Russia, and Putin’s receptiveness to his American counterpart’s grand strategic plan of a comprehensive partnership.
I’m a Moscow-based American political analyst with a PhD. in Political Science from MGIMO, and this is my third yearly review of the New Cold War after I published by first and second on each anniversary of the special operation here and here. I’ve been analysing this subject every day since 24 February 2022, beginning at now-defunct OneWorld till mid-2022 and continuing at my Substack to the present. Here’s what I learned from doing this daily for my third year straight:
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* Trump’s Election Changed The Course Of History
Trump’s historic election victory was a game-changer in the New Cold War since everything would have been altogether different had Kamala won instead. Unlike her and Biden, he envisages responsibly managing the US’ geopolitical rivalry with Russia by brokering peace in Ukraine as the first step, after which he plans to initiate similarly motivated talks with Iran and China to that same end. Diplomacy and deal-making now take precedence over risking World War III through reckless provocations.
* The Consequences Of Ceding Sovereignty
The EU and Ukraine are learning the consequences of ceding their sovereignty to the US after Trump began treating them as the vassals that they are. The first now fears that America will abandon it as part of Trump’s “Pivot (back) to Asia” for more muscularly containing China while the second has no say in the nascent Russian-US talks over its ongoing conflict. Each ceded their sovereignty to the US with the false expectation that their allied liberal-globalists in the “deep state” would stop Trump’s return.
* Strategic Patience vs. Strategic Escalation
World War III might have already broken out long ago had Putin not exercised strategic patience by declining time and again to meaningfully respond to Ukraine’s many US-backed provocations. He only began to practice a policy of strategic escalation in late November last year to deter the outgoing Biden Administration from provoking the aforesaid after it dangerously allowed Ukraine to use the US’ long-range missiles against targets in Russia’s pre-2014 borders. This pragmatic approach deserves credit.
* From Populist-Nationalism To Civilization-States
Russia and Trump’s America both regard the emergence of civilization-states as the next phase of the global systemic transition. The first’s Eurasian Union and the second’s “Fortress America” policy, which consists of incorporating Canada and Greenland, fulfil this role. They also support populist-nationalist movements across the world that share their civilization-state vision of the future and might accordingly join forces in helping them come to power in order to accelerate this process as explained here and here.
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What ties these five trends together is Trump’s historic return to the presidency, his successful purge of the “deep state” that enabled him to pursue his long-sought “New Détente” with Russia, and Putin’s receptiveness to his American counterpart’s grand strategic plan of a comprehensive partnership. The successful conclusion of their nascent talks and the clinching of the aforementioned partnership will revolutionize International Relations while their failure could abruptly revive the risk of World War III.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Kiev is desperate to relieve pressure along the Donbass front where Russia has continued gradually gaining ground this year and might soon be on the brink of a breakthrough.
Russia is fighting to fend off Ukraine’s sneak attack its Kursk Region, though conflicting reports have emerged about the location of these clashes. The Russian Defence Ministry claimed that all the fighting has taken place on the Ukrainian side of the border, while Rybar – which boasts nearly 1.2 million subscribers and functions as a think tank of sorts – said that it’s taking place inside of Russia’s borders. Whatever the truth may be, this latest development is still immensely important.
Simply put, it might be Ukraine’s last hurrah since it represents a massive gamble to open up a new front inside of Russia’s pre-2014 borders with the intent of having its foes redeploy some of their troops to Kursk from Donbass, where they’ve continued gradually gaining ground this year. Russia had hitherto braced for yet another attack against neighbouring Belgorod Region, ergo the difficult but necessary decision to impose a strict security regime there late last month, so it was taken by surprise.
Prior to that, there was serious concern that Ukraine might be preparing to launch an offensive into Belarus, which could have expanded the conflict and possibly served as a pretext for Polish involvement. Taken together in light of what just happened in Kursk Region, Ukraine’s moves in those two directions might have been meant in hindsight to “psyche-out” Russia, thus facilitating its latest attack. Unlike prior cross–border raids, this one also involves uniformed Ukrainian troops, not terrorist proxies.
Nobody took Ukraine seriously when it announced that it plans to launch another counteroffensive by sometime later this year, though what’s presently unfolding might be what its policymakers had in mind. That said, the scale isn’t anywhere near what last year’s failed counteroffensive was, and it’s not truly a counteroffensive since Russia wasn’t attacking Ukraine from Kursk. Nevertheless, it’s still the largest cross-border attack so far, and it was clearly planned for some time instead of being an impromptu raid.
These observations don’t imply that it’ll succeed, however, since the military-strategic dynamics have been trending in Russia’s favour for the entire year. After all, Ukraine is diverting limited troops and equipment from the Donbass front to the Kursk one, and this could easily backfire by creating an opening that Russia could exploit. Furthermore, they’re unlikely to hold whatever they might have captured in Kursk, thus precluding the possibility that they can “trade it back” during peace talks.
Even so, the very fact that what’s turned into a two-day-long battle at the time of this analysis’ publication could even happened in the first place shows that Ukraine still has some tricks up its sleeve, namely its continued ability to evade Russia’s surveillance, intelligence, and reconnaissance. Russia didn’t detect any notable buildup near Kursk’s border ahead of time, only Belarus’ and Belgorod’s, otherwise it would have launched preemptive strikes and imposed a security regime along the border.
That’s not to knock Russia but to draw attention to NATO’s impressive tactical capabilities in being able to successfully disguise its proxy’s sneak attack. This contributed to the growing number of civilian casualties that Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zakharova condemned as proof of Kiev’s terrorism. It might get a lot worse than even that before it gets better too if Ukraine is able to achieve a breakthrough in Kursk Region that leads to it threatening the eponymous nearby nuclear power plant.
The odds of that happening are low though according to Major General Apty Alaudinov, who’s the deputy chief of the Russian Armed Forces’ military and political department and commander of the Akhmat special forces unit according to TASS. Another point to make though is that Rybar’s earlier hyperlinked report claimed that Ukraine seized control of a gas pipeline transit station, which if true, could end up seeing that facility destroyed and thus cut off Russian gas to its Central European clients.
Kiev has an interest in punishing Hungary and Slovakia for their anti-war positions, hence why it recently sanctioned a Russian oil company that had an EU waiver to continue supplying those two, so it might accordingly want to inflict maximum damage against them by destroying the aforesaid gas facility. To be clear, Rybar’s report hasn’t been confirmed and might be untrue, but its importance and Alaudinov’s remarks about the nearby nuclear power plant rest in highlighting the huge stakes involved in Kursk.
For these reasons, it can be concluded that this was in the works for a while and is therefore likely to be Ukraine’s last hurrah, which it’s only attempting now out of desperation to receive some relief along the Donbass front where Russia continues to gain ground and might be on the brink of a breakthrough. Russia will likely soon regain its lost territory, if any has really been captured by Ukraine that is, and then make Kiev pay for this dastardly sneak attack.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
The immense political pressure being placed upon the ruling party by the West is punishment for its pragmatic domestic and foreign policies.
The Georgian capital of Tbilisi has been beset by increasingly violent unrest as the foreign-backed opposition desperately seeks to overturn the outcome of fall’s parliamentary elections. They were won by the ruling Georgian Dream party, which is comprised of conservative-nationalists who won’t sacrifice their country’s objective national interests by sanctioning Russia or allowing Western “NGOs” to meddle in their affairs. It then froze EU accession talks till 2028 after the EU refused to recognize the results.
No self-respecting government like Georgia’s would continue trying to join an organization that denies the democratic mandate that it just received. The intention is to wait until the EU undergoes domestic political transformation, ideally by 2028, through the expected rise of more conservative-nationalist forces in the future who’d then recognize the aforesaid results. If they’re not recognized by that time, then this policy might be extended unless a regime change happens beforehand.
The situation is worsening as a result of the renascent Colour Revolution and the French-born president refusing to leave office after her term expires later this month, both provocations of which are aided by the EU threatening sanctions and the US suspending its strategic partnership with Georgia. The immense political pressure being placed upon the ruling party is punishment for its pragmatic domestic and foreign policies. Here are six background briefings to bring unaware readers up to speed:
To summarize, Georgian Dream refused to open a “second front” against Russia in summer 2023 to assist Ukraine’s doomed counteroffensive, which was unforgiveable from the West’s perspective. Georgia’s geostrategic importance also spiked after the West “poached” Armenia from Russia’s “sphere of influence” since it then became indispensable for furthering their plans there. Georgian Dream is too patriotic to become their puppet, however, and that’s why they now consider it to be their enemy.
Western intelligence’s success in organizing the defection of several Georgian ambassadors is aimed at creating a “government-in-waiting” to replace Georgian Dream if the Colour Revolution topples them, while convincing its French-born president to illegally remain in office is meant to turn her into a martyr. Potentially forthcoming sanctions could worsen the socio-economic situation there, thus making more people desperate enough to accept foreign funding to take part in the ongoing regime change campaign.
Although the Prime Minister said that “The Maidan scenario cannot be realized in Georgia”, that’s precisely the scenario that the West is orchestrating. As the security services intervene to restore order, decontextualized footage of their “Democratic Security” operations in defence of their country’s national form of democracy will likely circulate to discredit the state and radicalize the rioters. Everything will therefore likely get a lot worse before it gets better, and Georgia might even slip into a full-fledged crisis.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Russia and the EU will manage the latest phase of their US-instigated divorce without much difficulty, but the US might offer to bring them back together by authorizing its vassals’ import of Russian pipeline gas in exchange for some concessions from the Kremlin in the energy sector and Ukraine.
Pundits are discussing Ukraine’s decision to cut off Russian gas to Europe after Kiev refused to extend its five-year agreement with Moscow that expired on the first of the year, with the vast majority laying blame on the other side and hyping up the negative consequences for their opponent’s interests. The reality is that this development is much more political than anything else since the EU and Russia already weathered much more serious disruptions throughout 2022.
The Yamal pipeline through Poland was shut down a few months after the specialoperation began for sanctions-related reasons while Nord Stream 1 was gradually phased out of operation due to maintenance needs worsened by Canada’s delay on returning repaired gas turbines to Russia. That pipeline and the inactive Nord Stream 2 were then blown up in a terrorist attack in September of that year, though one still remains undamaged but has yet to re-enter into operation for political reasons.
The combined effect resulted in the share of Russia’s pipeline gas in EU imports plunging “from over 40% in 2021 to about 8% in 2023” according to the European Council. Nevertheless, the EU “narrowly avoided” a recession that year in CNN’s words, though it could enter into one later this year if Germany’s economic struggles deepen. Even so, it won’t be directly affected by Ukraine’s latest decision since this route only concerns 5% of EU imports, with the main clients being Slovakia, Hungary, and Moldova.
The first two are led by conservative-nationalists who are fiercely opposed to NATO’s proxy war on Russia through Ukraine while the third is ruled by a pro-Western figure who wants to reconquer her country’s separatist region of Transnistria in which several thousand Russian peacekeepers are still based. This observation lends credence to the earlier claim that Ukraine’s decision is much more political than anything else since it punishes Slovakia, Hungary, and Transnistria without harming other countries.
The last-mentioned is being hit particularly hard since it had to halt heating and hot water to households, which could lead to political unrest that might be manipulated from abroad to provoke a Colour Revolution. This could either result in regime change or weaken that polity enough from within that it becomes much easier for Moldova (with possible Romanian assistance) and/or Ukraine to invade. Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service warned about that scenario last month, which was analysed here.
Slovakia and Hungary won’t be harmed anywhere as much as Transnistria since each can import costlier LNG – whether from Russia, the US (which has poached a lot of its rival’s former EU market share), Algeria, and/or Qatar – from Lithuania/Poland or Croatia. Poland can connect Slovakia to Lithuania’s Klaipeda LNG terminal while Croatia’s Krk LNG terminal can supply Slovakia and Hungary. Hungary is also already getting some pipeline gas from TurkStream, which is Russia’s last pipeline to Europe.
All three are therefore being punished for political reasons, but it’s only Transnistria that risks an all-out crisis as a result, which could lead to an outcome that deals political damage to Russia if the government there is overthrown through an upcoming Colour Revolution or that polity is captured by its neighbours. In the event that another conventional conflict erupts, the aggressors might eschew targeting Russian troops in order to avoid provoking an escalation, but Russia can always still authorize them to intervene.
Observers can only speculate what Russia would do since there are arguments in favour of it withdrawing its peacekeepers if they aren’t attacked and Transnistria falls but there’s also a logic in sacrificing them as part of a plan to “escalate to de-escalate” the special operation on better terms. There’s also the possibility that Transnistria doesn’t slip into a Colour Revolution and isn’t invaded either. A potentially larger crisis would be averted so this is the best scenario for everyone’s objective interests.
Regardless of whatever may or may not happen in Transnistria, Ukraine’s decision to cut off Russian gas to Europe leads to the possibility that this route could be reopened once the conflict ends, thus representing a card that could be played to entice concessions from the Kremlin during negotiations. The same holds true for the Yamal pipeline and the last undamaged part of Nord Stream. Europe could use low-cost Russian gas to more confidently avoid a recession while Russia would appreciate the revenue.
To be sure, Russia stillprofits from LNG exports to the EU, which have filled the supply gap caused by the EU sanctioning its pipeline gas and Russia’s LNG competitors being unable to scale their exports to the point of fully replacing Russia’s exports that the EU still imports out of necessity. That said, Russia and the EU would mutually benefit a lot more if they returned as much as possible to their pre-2022 arrangement, though of course keeping in mind the contemporary political limitations to that.
America would have to approve this since it successfully reasserted its previously declining hegemony over the EU since the start of the special operation, however, but creative energy diplomacy of the sort elaborated on last month here could help lead to a breakthrough. The gist is that it’s the US that has an interest in making concessions to this end, not Russia, since the US doesn’t want Russia further fuelling China’s superpower rise like it could do out of spite if it isn’t offered a good deal in Ukraine.
At the same time, it’s unrealistic to imagine that the US will cede its influence over the EU, ergo why it might propose a compromise whereby Russia isn’t allowed to (re)obtain control over the European portions of Nord Stream, Yamal, and the trans-Ukrainian Brotherhood and Soyuz pipelines. The first could be purchased by an American investor as was analysed here in November while Poland might retain its post-2022 control over the second and the third would remain under Ukrainian control.
If the US really wants to incentivize Russia into agreeing to this proposal, which advances US interests by increasing the chances that Russia won’t build more pipelines to China out of the need to replace its lost revenue from the EU, then it can partially compensate Russia by releasing some of its seized assets. Even though those assets are legally Russia’s and were stolen from it, the Kremlin might agree to this swap if a large enough amount is offered in order to help manage its latest fiscal and monetary challenges.
In exchange for the US returning some of Russia’s seized assets and authorizing the EU’s resumption of some Russia gas pipeline imports, Russia might have to informally commit to not building any new pipelines to China while scaling back some of its demilitarization and denazification demands of Ukraine. American, Indian, and Japanese investment in Russia’s sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 megaproject could also replace frozen Chinese investment if waivers are granted for that purpose as a further incentive.
So long as Russia’s core security goals are achieved, which are restoring Ukraine’s constitutional neutrality and keeping uniformed Western forces out of the country, then it might be willing to compromise on demilitarizing all of Ukraine by settling for demilitarizing everything east of the Dnieper. This scenario was described more in detail at the end of this analysis here, which could include the vaguely defined denazification of that historically Russian region too instead of the entire country.
If Trump offers to terminate the US’ bilateral security agreement with Ukraine as part of a package deal that includes the abovementioned terms, then Russia might very well accept it since this would provide a mutually “face-saving” means for ending their proxy war while creating a basis for rebuilding relations. It’s not a perfect compromise, and some of each side’s supporters might argue that it’s more beneficial for their opponent, but their leaders might think differently and that’s all that ultimately matters.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Putin warned last week that letting Ukraine use Western long-range weapons to strike deep inside of Russia “will mean that NATO countries, the United States, and European countries are parties to the war in Ukraine. This will mean their direct involvement in the conflict, and it will clearly change the very essence, the very nature of the conflict dramatically. This will mean that NATO countries – the United States and European countries – are at war with Russia.”
NEW – Putin on the potential use of Western long-range weapons against Russia: “This would mean that NATO countries, the United States, and European nations are at war with Russia.”pic.twitter.com/3wwJ16LHCE
He preceded his words by reminding everyone that “the Ukrainian army is not capable of using cutting-edge high-precision long-range systems supplied by the West. They cannot do that. These weapons are impossible to employ without intelligence data from satellites which Ukraine does not have. This can only be done using the European Union’s satellites, or US satellites – in general, NATO satellites…(and) only NATO military personnel can assign flight missions to these missile systems.”
Foreign Minister Lavrov briefed foreign ambassadors about this on the same day, repeating the same points as his boss but also adding that “Our experts are confident that without such (Western) specialist involvement, it would be impossible (for Ukraine) to use these complex systems. These tasks can only be performed by professionals who have worked with these systems for a long time and know how to operate them. It would be impossible to train someone to use them in just a few weeks.”
Even though Kremlin spokesman Peskov assessed that “we have no doubt that this statement has reached its recipients”, Biden still signalled that he and Starmer might very well approve this proposal regardless. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov was then quoted by TASS as saying that “We know that the corresponding decisions were made some time ago, and signals of this kind have been transmitted to Kiev.” In other words, everything that’s played out thus far is political choreography.
Although the risk of World War III breaking out by miscalculation continues to grow as a result of these irresponsible Western escalations, it’s unlikely that Putin will radically respond by authorizing his forces to hit targets inside of NATO, let alone launch a nuclear first strike. If he was indeed planning to do so, then there wouldn’t be the need for this political choreography, he’d just do it, plus this latest escalation won’t result in reshaping the military-strategic dynamics of this proxy war in NATO and Ukraine’s favour.
Accordingly, there’s no reason for Putin to react as radically as some are worried that he will, with the most that he might do is finally authorize a US-inspired “shock-and-awe” bombing campaign or at least maybe hit a few bridges across the Dnieper. Even that might not happen though and he could instead just announce another round of partialmobilization of experienced reservists like he did two years ago. Another possibility could be curtailing or cutting off critical mineral and energy exports to the West.
With these much more realistic options in mind, Putin’s political choreography can be seen as an attempt to pressure Kiev into complying with his ceasefire precondition from this summer by withdrawing from all the territory that Moscow claims as its own. If that fails and he doesn’t ramp up bombing, then the secondary motive might be to prepare his people for another round of mobilization. By describing NATO as being in a state of war with Russia, he might also be hinting that he’ll curtail resource exports to it.
As for the West’s political choreography, it appears to be yet another example of “boiling the frog” by gradually crossing every one of Russia’s so-called “red lines”. This helps manage Western public opinion given the unprecedented nature of this proxy war and give Russia the time to prepare for the next escalation so that it’s not caught totally off guard and thus considers “overreacting” like some hawks have wanted. Observers should remember that the West is only just now doing this 2.5 years down the line.
Seeing as how their specialists would be handling pretty much everything connected to these long-range missiles, the fact that this hasn’t happened earlier speaks to their decisionmakers’ desire to control the escalation ladder with Russia, at least in terms of how they see it. Going through with it at this point is pure vindictiveness to inflict as much damage on Russia, including to its civilians, for foiling their strategic defeat of it. Once again, it won’t be game-changer, it just gives Kiev the chance to kill more Russians.
Reflecting on everything, this experience should teach observers that political choreography is only for the sake of perception management since backchannels exist for rival parties to discreetly convey real threats to one another, some of which might then be reaffirmed in public for soft power purposes. Rarely is everything as clear-cut as it seems, with it almost always being the case that much more is going on behind the scenes than meets the eye.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Putin has proven to have the patience of a saint by refusing to escalate in response to the slew of provocations that have been carried out against his country since the special operation began.
Russia’s foreign spy agency SVR revealed that “the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ operation in the Kursk region was prepared with the participation of the special services of the USA, Great Britain and Poland. The units involved in it underwent combat coordination in training centres in Great Britain and Germany. Military advisers from NATO countries provide assistance in managing the UAF units that have invaded Russian territory and in the use of Western types of weapons and military equipment by Ukrainians.”
They ended their statement to popular newspaper Izvestia by adding that “The alliance countries also provide the Ukrainian military with satellite intelligence data on the deployment of Russian troops in the area of the operation.” This coincided with the Russian Foreign Ministry summoning the US charges d’affaires to protest American journalists’ illegal crossing of their border for propaganda purposes in support of this invasion as well as the military role therein played by at least one American PMC.
Commander of the Akhmat Special Forces from Russia’s Chechen Republic Apty Alaudinov accused the invaders of carrying out a spree of war crimes as part of Zelensky’s stated goals of carving out a “buffer zone” and bolstering Ukraine’s “exchange fund” for future prisoner swaps. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko had earlier warned in an interview with leading Russian media that Ukraine might actually want Russia to use nuclear weapons, the possible rationale of which was explained here.
What all of these details show is that what’s happening in Kursk is a real NATO-backed Ukrainian invasion of universally recognized Russian territory, not some “5D chess master plan” by Russia to encircle the Ukrainians in a “cauldron” like some in the Alt-Media Community (AMC) have speculated. The US can play dumb about this all it wants, but Russia is convinced that it orchestrated this unprecedented provocation, thus raising questions about how it’ll respond.
A lot of AMC folks on social media demand something radical like Russia striking targets in NATO and/or having Wagner carry out cross-border incursions against its frontline members from Belarus, but neither are likely to materialize. Regardless of whatever one’s personal opinion might be about his approach, Putin has proven to have the patience of a saint by refusing to escalate in response to the slew of provocations that have been carried out against his country since the specialoperation began.
The most that it’s done is carry out strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in an attempt to impede its military operations as well as recently carve out a tiny buffer zone in Kharkov Region, but it won’t bomb bridges across the Dnieper nor political targets like the Rada. Time and again, Russia consistently refuses to escalate, only doing the bare minimum of what its most zealous supporters in the AMC demand when it finally decides to do something out of the ordinary.
The reason for this (some would say too) cautious approach is Putin’s fear of inadvertently triggering World War III, which he’s afraid might become inevitable if Russia radically responds to its foes’ provocations due to the fast-moving sequence of events that it could lead to. To be clear, Russia has the right to respond in such a way, but it’s voluntarily eschewing that right for the aforementioned reasons that it considers to be for the “greater global good”.
Accordingly, it’s highly unlikely that Putin will finally throw his characteristic caution to the wind by deliberately risking World War III (or at least that’s how he’d see everything as being) by opting for a radical response to his government’s conclusion that the US is involved in Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk. The only plausible scenarios in which he’d change his calculations would be if there was a nuclear provocation, a high-level assassination, or a terrorist attack even worse than the recent Crocus one.
Recalling what was written earlier about how Lukashenko warned that Ukraine might actually want Russia to use nukes, none of these scenarios and whatever other ones might cross Putin’s non-negotiable red lines (which the previously enumerated provocations didn’t do) can be ruled out. They’d also likely be used in the far-fetched event of a Russian military collapse along its western border, or Belarus’ collapse along its own with NATO or Ukraine, and subsequent large-scale invasion.
From Russia’s perspective, Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk remains manageable despite the US’ involvement in this unprecedented provocation, thus meaning that Putin probably won’t resort to the radical response that many in the AMC have been fantasizing about. If he finally decided to let loose, however, then he might only ramp up the intensity of the special operation in Ukraine instead of attacking NATO and thus risking the outbreak of World War III that he’s worked so hard to avoid thus far.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
This wasn’t officially a secret, but it also wasn’t exactly public knowledge either.
Russia’s Special Presidential Representative for SCO Affairs Bakhtiyor Khakimov revealed last week that “It’s no secret, but we, for example, and I mean the Russian side, are facing serious difficulties in transferring our share contribution to the general budget of the SCO, because the bank is located in China, and, according to the basic documents, the share contribution is made only in US dollars.” China’s voluntary compliance with US sanctions therefore prevents Russia from paying its SCO dues.
Unlike what Khakimov claimed, while this wasn’t officially a secret, it wasn’t exactly public knowledge either. Many among the Mainstream Media and the Alt-Media Community alike are under the false impression that China proudly rebuffs all of the US’ sanctions demands due to Beijing’s sharp rhetoric about them. This is in spite of RT informing the world about Russia and China’s US-provoked payment problems in early September. They wrote about it here, which was then analysed here.
Those who might have shrugged off that report as hyperbole or imagined that it was a “5D chess master plan” to “psyche out the US” like some on social media speculated now know that it was accurate after what Khakimov just revealed. China is so afraid of the US’ secondary sanctions threats that it won’t even let Russia pay its dollar-denominated SCO dues despite both being among its founding members. This reality is the exact opposite of what the general Western and non-Western public thought.
Few among them knew that the organization’s dues were denominated in dollars, which was probably agreed to at the turn of the century during its founding for reasons of financial convenience but wasn’t ever modified even after the West’s unprecedented sanctions against Russia since 2022. It’s frankly surprising that no changes were made after that nor any workarounds devised, so much so that Khakimov felt that he had to complain about this publicly, considering the SCO’s security-centric focus.
After all, the unconventional security threats that its members tackle also concern financial ones as well, but the priority has hitherto been on stopping terrorist and other criminal financing. Devising workarounds to other countries’ secondary sanctions threats, which essentially amount to political coercion through economic-financial means, hasn’t ever been something that they really considered. Nevertheless, sanctions are still objectively a threat to security, which is now beyond obvious.
China’s complex economic-financial interdependence with the US, which the latter has the political will to weaponize due to its belief that the former will either comply with its demands or that it wouldn’t go on the financial offensive (e.g. seriously trying to damage the dollar) after being punished for refusing, is responsible for this. No value judgement is being suggested since all sovereign states like China always put their national interests first and it would be ridiculous for it to risk them just for Russia’s sake.
That said, Khakimov’s revelation is still embarrassing for Beijing due to how powerfully it contradicts the non-Western public’s expectations of its policy towards this issue from an unassailable authoritative source. What he disclosed can’t be dismissed as so-called “fake news” but as a statement of indisputable fact, though hopefully the progress that was made on accelerating financial multipolarity processes during last week’s BRICS Summit in Kazan can lead to a speedy resolution of this ignominious issue.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
РФ сталкивается с затруднениями при переводе долевого взноса в бюджет Шанхайской организации сотрудничества, заявил специальный представитель президента России... РИА Новости, 22.10.2024
China’s complex economic-financial interdependence with the West places certain restraints on its sovereignty.
RT published a feature analysis on Friday asking, “Has the US finally succeeded in choking off Russia’s biggest trade lifeline?”, which readers are encouraged to read in full to learn more Russia and China’s US-provoked payment problems. In a nutshell, Chinese banks of all sizes have suddenly started complying with the US’ sanctions out of fear of secondary sanctions, which RT’s financial expert Henry Johnston reminded everyone has also been reported by the domestic Russian media whose articles he cites.
All of this is shocking for the average BRICS enthusiast who’s been influenced by wishful thinking articles since the start of the specialoperation into imagining that this group is an anti-Western bloc. They’ve also heard countless times that “the dollar is dead” or is “about to die any day now,” that Russia and China are “allies” who are jointly resisting the West in all respects, and that a new world order has already emerged to replace the previously American-led unipolar one. None of that is true though.
The dollar remains the world’s reserve currency despite the reputational damage caused by the US’ anti-Russian sanctions, Russia and China are mired in US-provoked payment problems, and multipolarity has yet to fully emerge since the legacy of America’s unipolar system is responsible for the aforesaid. China’s complex economic-financial interdependence with the West places certain restraints on its sovereignty in this respect and was even addressed by Lavrov in an interview with RBC last week:
“Of course, everyone is now looking for those new opportunities. But the People’s Republic of China, with the size of its economy, with the volume of its trade relations with the United States and the West as a whole, is, of course, much more dependent on the West than the Russian economy was.
And I have no doubt that China will reduce this dependence and will gradually move toward those forms of communication with its partners that will not be associated with such a dictate.
But, given the Chinese mentality, the Chinese style, they do this slowly. They do not want any sudden movements. This topic is being discussed with our Chinese colleagues. They have a fairly well-developed banking system, and it is very deeply tied to global financial markets.”
To Lavrov’s credit, he addressed the elephant in the room instead of delusionally denying the problem like top Alt-Media influencers tend to do for ideological reasons, which shows BRICS enthusiasts that there’s no need to try to cover up “politically inconvenient” facts like some gatekeepers aggressively do. The second lesson that they can learn is to emulate Johnston’s calm way of discussing sensitive disputes among strategic partners instead of exaggerating them like so-called “doomers” are infamous for doing.
Third, the reality of BRICS is finally more apparent in light of these problems: it’s a network of countries that voluntarily coordinate their policies to accelerate financial multipolarity, but whose members are limited by structural constraints and their ties with the West in terms of how far and fast they go. If it was a bloc like the average enthusiast imagines, especially an anti-Western one, then there’s no way that Chinese banks of all sizes would ever comply with the US’ anti-Russian sanctions.
The fourth lesson is that India proved more resilient to Western pressure than China. Many BRICS enthusiasts are suspicious of India’s close (but newly troubled) ties with the US, and a top Alt-Media influencer even described it as the West’s “Trojan Horse”. Sberbank’s Deputy CEO confirmed earlier this week though that “There are no restrictions on its operations” in India after it handled 70% of Russia’s $65 billion trade with that country last year, which was analysed here. Folks should reflect on this point.
And finally, BRICS enthusiasts should incorporate what they learned from the enumerated four lessons to recalibrate their worldview so that it more accurately reflects reality. There’s no shame in being wrong about anything and it’s understandable why so many people have such high hopes about BRICS, but it’s better to be aware of the facts and temper expectations than to be unaware of them and inevitably become deeply disappointed once reality hits. Here are 12 supplementary pieces clarifying BRICS:
Despite the group’s challenges as proven by Russia and China’s US-provoked payment problems and no matter the limitations inherent in its activity, BRICS is still gradually reforming the financial world order in a fairer direction for the Global Majority. As Johnston concluded in his feature article, “The fading hegemon still has a few trump cards it can play with some effect – and it is playing them now. But every time it does, it brings closer the day in which those cards will be rendered obsolete.”
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
If the Hindu Business Line’s source is correct, then the next summit will reaffirm its members’ voluntary right to de-dollarize their trade with each other (thus not obligating them to be drawn into the yuan’s orbit) and possibly make progress on a B…
This could lead to immense pressure upon Russia’s Global South partners to distance themselves from it and might also result in American retaliation against Russian forces inside of Ukrainian-claimed territory, both of which could reshape the conflict’s dynamics in Kiev’s favour and stave off its defeat.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko warned on Sunday in an interview with leading Russian media that “Such escalation on the part of Ukraine (byinvadingKursk) is an attempt to push Russia to asymmetric actions. Well, let’s say to use nuclear weapons. I know for sure that Ukraine would be very happy if Russia or we used tactical nuclear weapons there. They will applaud it. Then, probably, we would hardly have allies left. In general, there would be no even sympathetic countries left.”
That sounds absurd on the surface, but it actually makes a lot of sense if one thinks more deeply about it. The use of nuclear weapons is taboo because of the physical and environmental damage that they cause. There are also credible fears that they’d lead to one’s nuclear-armed adversaries retaliating in a tit-for-tat fashion, thus rapidly climbing the escalation ladder to the brink of World War III. Nevertheless, several states still retain nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes in line with their respective doctrines.
As regards Russia’s, they can be employed in the event of a large-scale conventional attack that threatens the existence of the state, among other conditions. That hasn’t yet happened in the Kursk context, but the hypothetical scenario of that region or another being completely captured by Ukraine might be deemed by some decisionmakers as meeting the criterion depending on how rapidly the front lines collapse. To be clear, there’s no credible indication that anything of the sort will unfold.
Nevertheless, Ukraine might capitalize upon its attack there by striking the nearby nuclear power plant. A top Russian military journalist had earlier warned that “[Ukraine] plan[s] to strike the storage sites of spent nuclear fuel of a nuclear power plant” in either Kursk or Zaporozhye. This then prompted the Russian Defence Ministry to officially declare that “tough military and military-technical countermeasures will be taken immediately” in that event.
Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that such strikes against those targets “could result in a large-scale technogenic catastrophe in Europe”, not to mention in the Russian heartland if the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant melts down in the aftermath. These combined conventional (invasion) and unconventional (de facto dirty bomb) attacks could push Russian decisionmakers closer to seriously considering the use of tactical nuclear weapons in response as a last resort out of self-defence.
Whether dropped inside of Russia’s own borders or Ukraine’s, they’d send a political shockwave across the world due to breaking the previously mentioned taboo, which could indeed lead to there being “no even sympathetic countries left” in support of Russia barring a few like North Korea. China and India would be under immense pressure to distance themselves from Russia, not just by the West, but also for appearance’s sake since they wouldn’t want to legitimize the use of nuclear weapons by their rivals.
Reports have also swirled that the US might conventionally retaliate against Russian forces inside of Ukrainian-claimed territory if nuclear weapons are used there, thus placing their proxy war on a direct path to World War III if that happens. Ukraine is still losing to Russia despite its sneak attack in Kursk so its leadership might have calculated, however “irrationally” it seems to objective observers, to provoke Russia into raising the stakes to that level.
It’s this escalation sequence that Lukashenko likely had in mind when warning that Ukraine wants Russia to use nuclear weapons, which could hypothetically occur if it completely captures a Russian region and/or is responsible for a nuclear catastrophe through its attacks against Russian nuclear power plants. The first probably won’t happen since their offensive appears to have been halted, while the second is entirely in Ukraine’s hands, so it’s incumbent on the West to do its utmost to stop them from doing this.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
There’s no reason to doubt what he said since he’s Russia’s top diplomat so all that can be done is to try to make sense of this unexpected news.
Foreign Minister Lavrov revealed on Monday that Russia was on the brink of reviving the grain deal this spring as a result of Turkish mediation until Ukraine suddenly dropped out of the talks. This disclosure is surprising since that same deal was much-maligned by Russia’s supporters at home and abroad after Russia refused to extend it last summer. Here are Lavrov’s exact words on the matter as reported by TASS:
“This spring Turkey attempted to renew the agreement on the protection of food supplies in a modified format. We were ready. At the last minute, the Ukrainians said: ‘Let’s write a clause – add to the obligations not to touch merchant ships the need to respect the safety of nuclear power plants.’ It seems out of place, but we also said: ‘Let’s do it.’
[Turkish President Recep Tayyip] Erdogan really convinced us that this would be a step forward, he was completely sincere and tried to be helpful. We agreed, but then the Ukrainians, who proposed it themselves, said they were not happy with it. Apparently, at that time they already had plans to bomb nuclear power plants.
There’s no reason to doubt what he said since he’s Russia’s top diplomat so all that can be done is to try to make sense of this unexpected news. The grain deal’s main criticism was that it was superficial after only around 3% of Ukrainian grain went to the Global South according to Putin himself. He also added that the West never implemented its part of the deal by removing obstacles to Russia’s own agricultural exports.
Russia’s worsening relations with Ukraine and the West since then suggest that neither of them had any intention of making good on their promises if the deal was revived. Moreover, while the nuclear power plant element might have sounded like a promising addition to the practically symbolic grain pact, there wouldn’t have been any guarantee that it too wouldn’t have been violated. Ukraine might have even used that to get Russia’s guard down ahead of a major preplanned drone attack against such facilities.
If that was the case, then it’s a blessing in disguise that this hybrid grain-nuclear deal fell through, but these observations still don’t answer the question of why Russia was even considering it. One possible explanation is that Putin sincerely thought that it could have advanced his diplomatic goal of laying the basis for resuming peace talks modelled off of their draft peace treaty from 2022. The reason why this can’t be ruled out is due to him bringing that up once again on Monday at a separate event.
He conditioned this upon the expulsion of Kiev’s forces from Kursk, but he also added that “The current authorities are clearly not ready for this, they have little chance of being re-elected. That is why they are not interested in ending the fighting, that is why they tried to carry out this provocation in Kursk Region, and before when they tried to carry out the same operation in Belgorod Region.” He might therefore have been hoping that the West would force Ukraine to do this after more so-called ‘goodwill gestures’.
Time and again, he seems to continue placing faith in the West becoming fatigued with this conflict the longer that it drags on for and the more that Russia continues gradually gaining ground in Donbass, which it’s continued to do since the start of the year and has recently picked up the pace. Putin still won’t radically respond to the spree of provocations against Russia over the past two and a half years out of fear that he’d inadvertently spark the Third World War that he’s thus far worked so hard to avoid.
Agreeing to another grain deal, a hybrid grain-nuclear one, or a reportedly Qatari-mediated partial ceasefire might thus be seen as a costless means to the end of politically resolving this conflict. So long as he remembers what he admitted regarding his naivete about the West and doesn’t let his guard down after more ‘goodwill gestures’, then perhaps this plan will succeed. Russia’s supporters should therefore brace themselves for this just in case so that they’re not disappointed if any such deals are agreed to.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
These lessons could reshape how policymakers perceive the special operation and therefore improve the way in which it’s being waged.
Ukraine’s sneak attack against Russia’s Kursk Region appears to have successfully penetrated the border according to RT’s update on Wednesday, which followed the Defence Ministry’s claim that the fighting was only taking place on the Ukrainian side of the border. Even though it appears destined to fail and be seen in hindsight as this generation’s “Battle of the Bulge” like many social commentators have described it as, it still taught Russia five very important lessons that it would do well to consider implementing:
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* It Might Finally Be Time To Take Out All The Bridges Across The Dnieper
Russia has hitherto been reluctant to take out bridges across the Dnieper, but it might finally be time to do so in order to prevent Western arms and equipment from reaching its pre-2014 borders in possible preparation of more sneak attacks. Continuing to prioritize political objectives over military ones, such as remaining averse to inconveniencing civilians through the proposed means in order to avoid losing more hearts and minds, has arguably proven to have more drawbacks than benefits.
* Better ISR & Less Groupthink Can Reduce Russia’s Blind Spots
NATO has proven that it has impressive tactical capabilities after successfully disguising its proxy’s sneak attack, but Russia is the bloc’s peer and thus shouldn’t have been fooled. Better intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) could have prevented this, as could the optimization of feedback loops from the front. Per the latter, higher-ups might not have taken reports of a military build-up seriously since they could have deemed it “irrational”, but they should have listened if that was the case.
* Preemptive Resettlement & More Physical Border Defences Would Have Helped A Lot
In hindsight, it might have been wise to preemptively resettle folks who were living in proximity to the border and turn these areas into a security zone with many more physical defences. Two reasons why this wasn’t done might have been fear of it being spun by its foes as setting up a “buffer zone” inside of Russia and not wanting to inconvenience the locals. The first should never influence policymakers while the second could be mitigated by proper planning and funding (with possible “oligarch” contributions).
* Border Militias Might Not Be A Bad Idea If They’re Supervised By The State
The now-rebranded Wagner’s late founder Prigozhin had previously proposed creating a border militia in Belgorod Region, but he ultimately turned out to be the West’s “useful idiot” as explained in the preceding hyperlinked analysis so that might have been a very bad idea at the time had he succeeded. Nevertheless, properly supervised border militias might in fact be a good idea, such as if there were FSB agents embedded within them to ensure these non-state actors’ continued loyalty to the state.
* “Active Defence” Is Better Than “Passive Defence”
Even in the absence of proper ISR, Ukraine would have still struggled to assemble the forces needed for its sneak attack and then storm across the border had Russia been engaged in a policy of “active defence” (regular low-level attacks) instead of “passive defence” (sitting back and waiting for an attack). Going forward, Russia should consider the merits of implementing “active defence” all along the front, which would keep Ukraine on edge and possibly force it to voluntarily create its own “buffer zones”.
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The five lessons enumerated above could reshape how policymakers perceive the special operation and therefore improve the way in which it’s being waged, particularly with regards to addressing some of the constructive critiques thereof that were shared in this analysis here from November 2022. Retaining the same mindset risks more sneak attacks. It’s only through the pragmatic evolution of policymakers’ viewpoints in response to the past 2.5 years’ events that success can best be achieved.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Russia could have advanced its long-term diplomatic interests without curtailing its campaign in Donbass if they succeeded, while Ukraine could have kept Russia’s guard down during this process for facilitating its unprecedentedly risky gamble in Kursk aimed at staving off seemingly inevitable defeat.
The Washington Post (WaPo) reported on Saturday that Qatar was secretly mediating a partial Russian-Ukrainian ceasefire before Kiev’ssneakattackagainst Kursk, which would have seen both sides agree not to target each other’s energy infrastructure. The Kremlin hadn’t commented by the time of that article’s publication nor this present one so it’s unclear how truthful it is. In any case, it’s worthwhile taking a look at what WaPo’s sources said, which might help discern whether or not this is believable.
The first tidbit is that “Some involved in the negotiations hoped they could lead to a more comprehensive agreement to end the war, according to the officials”. This was followed by the claim that “Russia ‘didn’t call off the talks (after Kursk), they said give us time,’ the diplomat said.” The Ukrainian “presidential office” then alleged that talks in Doha were indeed scheduled but were postponed until 22 August “due to the situation in the Middle East” and will now “take place in a video conference format”.
WaPo went on to cite “senior officials in Kyiv” who “had mixed expectations about whether the negotiations could succeed, with some putting the odds at 20 percent and others anticipating even worse prospects” even before Kursk. They still explored the reportedly Qatari-mediated partial ceasefire with Russia though because “’We have one chance to get through this winter, and that’s if the Russians won’t launch any new attacks on the grid,’ a Ukrainian official who was briefed on the talks said.”
“’Everything has to be weighed — our potential and the possible damage to our economy versus how much more damage could we cause them and their economy,’ the Ukrainian official briefed on the planned Qatar summit said. ‘But energy is definitely critical for us. We sometimes forget about the economy here, but we’re facing free fall if there’s no light and heat in the winter.’” According to them, the partial ceasefire would be modeled off of the now-defunct grain deal, but Kursk changed all of that.
It’s at this point that two interconnected questions come to mind: 1) why would Russia consider agreeing not to target the energy infrastructure upon which Ukraine’s entire war effort depends, thus preventing its foes’ complete collapse and possibly perpetuating the conflict into another year?; and 2) why would Ukraine launch its sneak attack knowing that it ended any chance, at least for the time being, that Russia might give them such a reprieve that could then allow them to keep fighting into next year?
As regards the first question, if there’s any truth to WaPo’s report (the veracity of which will be assessed later), then Russia might have thought that this could soften its image ahead of the possible resumption of peace talks and create the conditions for Ukraine to comply with more of its terms. Trump’s potential return to power and his promise to swiftly end the conflict could have hung heavy over policymakers’ heads and influenced them to consider abiding by this moratorium until after the elections at least.
If such negotiations were indeed being mediated by Qatar, then that could also explain why Russia left its border with Ukraine largely undefended and might have even shrugged off reports of a buildup there since policymakers could have considered it “irrational” for Kiev to carry out any such sneak attack. RT’s Sergey Poletaev also speculated that a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ was in place between Russia and the US over the defence of the former’s border from the latter’s Ukrainian proxy this entire time.
Taken together and assuming for the sake of this thought exercise that WaPo’s report is accurate, then it might have been that Russia was lured by the aforesaid speculative ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ with the US and the then-ongoing Qatari-mediated partial ceasefire talks with Ukraine into keeping its guard down. The purpose all along could have been for them to get Russia to leave large swathes of its border undefended in order to facilitate a Ukrainian sneak attack as part of an unprecedentedly risky gamble.
This hypothesis segues into answering the second question about why Ukraine would throw away any chance, at least for now, of Russia giving them a reprieve from attacks against their energy infrastructure that could then allow them to keep fighting into next year if they make it through the upcoming winter. Kiev and its US patron might have concluded that the pace of Russia’s on-the-ground gains in Donbass will inevitably lead to their defeat unless something drastic is done to change the conflict’s dynamics.
Freezing attacks on one another’s energy infrastructure wouldn’t halt Russia’s advance, not to mention if Moscow pulls out of the deal after the elections. Despite the odds of success being low, one possible way to prevent Russia’s seemingly inevitable victory would be to seize, hold, and then swap some of its pre-2014 land in exchange for Russia withdrawing from some Ukrainian-claimed land. This plan’s obvious flaw is that Russia might achieve a breakthrough in Donbass that leads to Ukraine’s collapse before then.
It can’t be ruled out though that NATOmightconventionallyintervene in Ukraine if that happens in order to force a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis aimed at saving its proxy from full-blown defeat. This could take the form of creating a NATO-Russian DMZ inside the disputed territories, but it’s unclear whether members have the political will to risk World War III over this. Ukraine knows that its sneak attack against Kursk leaves Donbass vulnerable so it might be hoping that this will happen if need be.
If that’s their leadership’s thought process, then the endgame might be to seize and hold some of Russia’s pre-2014 land through the winter, possibly aided by a conventional NATO intervention in its defensive support if Russia breaks through in Donbass, in order to swap it back next year. This plan assumes that Ukraine could survive until then even if its electricity sector is destroyed, which is dubious but could still happen if the abovementioned sequence of events leads to a NATO-Russian DMZ.
It also takes for granted that World War III wouldn’t break out if NATO conventionally intervenes in Ukraine to force the creation of that DMZ and then the threat thereof would remain manageable even if Russian-Ukrainian hostilities continue raging in Kursk. Another related assumption is that Russia would either allow NATO to also set up a DMZ on its pre-2014 border with Ukraine or NATO would willingly leave that frontier open and thus risk Russia launching offensives against those Ukrainian border regions.
The preceding calculations are “irrational”, but they might have still influenced the Ukrainian leadership’s thought process when deciding to launch their sneak attack against Kursk in spite of knowing that it would end any chance of a Qatari-mediated partial ceasefire with Russia, at least for now. From Russia’s perspective, such a deal wouldn’t have adversely affected the pace of its on-the-ground gains in Donbass, might have given it diplomatic leverage in new peace talks, and could always be abandoned.
It therefore appears that there might be some truth to WaPo’s report about Qatar secretly mediating a partial Russian-Ukrainian ceasefire before Kursk since both sides would have gained from those talks. Russia could have advanced its long-term diplomatic interests without curtailing its campaign in Donbass if they succeeded, while Ukraine could have kept Russia’s guard down during this process for facilitating its unprecedentedly risky gamble in Kursk aimed at staving off seemingly inevitable defeat.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Properly framing everything is of the highest importance in order to gradually erode the Western elite’s propaganda in a similar spirit as the emerging Multipolar World Order has already gradually eroded the former’s unipolar hegemony, which will thus further accelerate the global systemic transition. It is indeed the case that the New Cold War is the result of the US-led West’s Golden Billion trying to stop the jointly BRICS- and SCO-led Global South from developing their alternative socio-economic and political models.
The Emerging Multipolar World Order
International Relations are in the midst of a global systemic transitionfrom unipolarity to multipolarity, the latter of which manifests itself through the emergence of different economic, military, political, technological, and other centres of influence across the world, not to mention the diversity of socio-cultural systems that predate all of this. Nevertheless, it’s taboo in the West to discuss these trends despite policymakers acknowledging them in documents like the US’ annual intelligence assessment.
The True State Of Affairs In The West
The elite have ideological reasons to suppress these facts from the public, namely the need to maintain the discredited narrative that their models are superior to all others, universal, and must therefore be imposed upon everyone else “for their own good” in a modern-day “civilizing mission”. Drawing attention to this bloc’s gradual decline relative to those abovementioned emerging centres of influence contradicts this notion since it proves that other effective models do indeed exist besides their own.
Awareness of this objectively existing and easily verifiable fact could lead to a crisis in confidence throughout the West since the unsavoury aspects of its own models are only tolerated by the population because they’ve been brainwashed into believing that they’re nevertheless superior to all others. Those among them who become aware of this reality are either co-opted by the system upon becoming economic/political elites themselves or are discredited as “conspiracy theorists” and “foreign agents”.
To be sure, these same models do indeed undergo some changes in order to remain somewhat competitive vis a vis their rivals abroad, but they by and large never reduce the systemic inequality that’s built into them by design for the elite’s own interests. This results in continual friction between the people and the elite, which is mostly managed through a combination of gaslighting operations, media distractions, occasional handouts, and typical divide-and-rule plots, et al.
The True State Of Affairs In The Global South
The aforesaid observation represents the true state of affairs in the West, which non-Western societies are keenly aware of precisely because this dystopian model is aggressively being imposed upon them from abroad, hence why they’re in a better position to accurately describe its various aspects. Their countries are exploited for labour, markets, and resources in order to indefinitely sustain the Western elite’s self-interested system, which thus imbues it with both domestic and international inequalities.
Since the living conditions are generally worse in non-Western countries than Western ones due to the former being exploited by the latter’s elite, it was inevitable that those societies across the Global South would be the ones leading the worldwide resistance to this system. That system, it should be said, is the Western-centric model of globalization that eventually came to also incorporate a radical social dimension related to its elite’s hyper-liberal ideology.
Their “civilizing mission” therefore has socio-economic motivations, the first connected to changing foreign societies’ traditional way of life for ideological reasons and the second driven by the desire to indefinitely exploit them. In order to prevent the targeted people from pushing back against these violations of their human rights, “Western Democracy” is imposed onto them since its cyclical leadership changes are easily manipulated through the informationwarfare that the elite have perfected.
The political dimension of Western-centric globalization is proselytized on the false premise that it supposedly safeguards people’s human rights even though the reality is that it institutionalizes their systematic violation thereof as was just explained. Colour Revolutions and Unconventional Warfare (which when applied together can be described as HybridWar) are the means for forcing targeted states into adopting this socio-economic and political trifecta for sustaining the Western elite’s dominance.
Dividing-And-Ruling Western & Non-Western Societies
Those societies that have been forced into subjugation or are still resisting that scenario in the face of such pressure like Ethiopia is have understandably come to hate their oppressors. Their justified outrage, however, is maliciously misportrayed by the Western Mainstream Media (MSM) and its “fellow travellers” in academia, the expert community, “NGOs”, pop culture, and the like as so-called “anti-Americanism” or some other form of unabashed bigotry that should always be universally condemned.
It’s through this manipulation of their own people’s perceptions that the Western elite’s systemically unequal models are upheld in the minds of those who they directly rule over and are also the only ones capable of changing everything from within. The Western masses, who admittedly enjoy some degree of indirect benefit from the same system that oppresses them (the latter of which is obviously less than it oppresses Global South societies), are falsely made to think that the non-Western masses hate them.
This crude divide-and-rule tactic that’s implemented through the MSM’s malicious misportrayal of the Global South’s grassroots anti-imperialist movements serves to reinforce the Western elite’s false narrative that the non-Western masses are bigoted, jealous, and victims of propaganda. Their targeted audience among the Western masses is then manipulated into thinking that their society is indeed more civilized, their models more effective, and their own people truly freer.
From there, it’s not too difficult for the Western elite to mislead the masses under the influence of their information warfare operations into supporting “civilizing missions” abroad and tolerating the imperfections of their system that many have come to realize exist despite the many gaslighting campaigns falsely claiming that they’re perfect. These interconnected outcomes advance the elite’s neo-imperialism abroad while sustaining their self-interested system at home.
The Western Elites’ Achilles’ Heel
The Achilles’ heel of this “solution” is that it’s all based on the Western elite manipulating their own people’s perceptions about the Global South. Should these lies be shattered, then the Western masses would realize the reasons why the vast majority of humanity detests the same models that the former have been brainwashed into believing are superior. The resultant lack of support for their elite’s foreign policy and renewed agitation for reform at home would destabilize this unequal system from within.
This explains why the Western elite censor alternative media that contradict their narratives, incessantly wage information warfare against their own people, and continue to misportray the Global South. It should be remembered that one of the most crucial claims underpinning this perception manipulation operation is that the non-Western masses are “bigoted barbarians” despite the truth being that they’re civilized anti-imperialists, which the Western masses must urgently come to realize.
Therein lies the grand strategic importance of properly framing the New Cold War between the Western elite and the non-Western masses who are striving for a Multipolar World Order wherein International Relations are more democratic, equal, and just than they presently are. This noble goal would also be embraced by the Western masses if they were made aware of the truth since they too stand to gain from this seeing as how they’re also oppressed by this same elite that the Global South is against.
Properly Framing The New Cold War
The first step in awakening the Western masses is to counteract their elite’s false narrative that their non-Western peers are “bigoted barbarians”, ergo the need to describe the object of the latter’s justified hatred as accurately as possible. It’s for this reason why it’s best to call them the US-led West’s Golden Billion since this most accurately encapsulates the essence of their being as well as precisely what it is that the non-Western masses are against.
To explain, the Golden Billion refers to the richest billion on the planet who live within Western civilization, which itself is presently led by the US’ elite. The non-Western masses aren’t against their Western counterparts, but against the system of Western-centric globalization created by their elite that’s resulted in the strikingly unequal outcome whereby a minority of people live much better than the majority who their elite ruthlessly exploit in order to indefinitely uphold this neo-imperial system.
By thus framing the New Cold War as being between the US-led West’s Golden Billion and the Global South, the latter of which is led by BRICS and the SCO since those two are building alternative economic-financial systems for reforming Western-centric globalization, everything becomes much clearer. This global competition isn’t between “democracies and dictatorships” like the Western elite falsely claim, but about the Western elite’s efforts to snuff out rival systems and thus retain their hegemony.
The Western Masses’ Expected Reaction To Reality
Upon becoming aware of this, those among the Western masses who believe in the morals, ethics, values, and principles that they’ve been told that their side represents (even though it really doesn’t do so) will sympathize with their non-Western peers and revitalize their own anti-imperialist movements. This prediction is predicated on the presumption that the majority of people in that civilization are genuinely decent folks who wouldn’t support their elite exploiting others if they learned the truth.
This is especially the case due to the racist optics of their majority-White civilization oppressing the world’s majority non-White civilizations, which would be regarded as unacceptable among those Western masses who become aware of this due to newfound anti-racist sentiment at home. The reality of contemporary affairs is that the Western elite are doing the exact same thing to the Global South that they accuse the latter’s Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and other representatives of attempting against them.
It’s not any of those or others who are aggressively trying to impose their country’s models onto Americans in order to ruthlessly exploit them, but the Western elite that are doing this to them and everyone else in all respects. The socio-economic and political models associated with Western-centric globalization contradict the very same morals, ethics, values, and principles that the Western elite manipulate within their own civilization to imbue their people with a false sense of superiority.
The Importance Of Correcting Manipulated Perceptions
This perception manipulation operation persists because the Western masses are deprived of accurate information about the rest of the world, instead relying on their MSM and its “fellow travellers” to misleadingly filter and subsequently spin everything they’re told about the non-West. Despite their own policymakers tacitly acknowledging the existence of alternative socio-economic and political models in documents like their annual intelligence assessments, their people aren’t allowed to discuss them.
The only discourse that’s “politically correct” is that which smears the Global South as bigoted, jealous, and victims of propaganda in order to falsely justify the Western elite’s “civilizing mission” since anything else is verboten, especially if it draws attention to grassroots anti-imperialist movements. The absolute last thing that the Western elite want is for their people to become aware of the reality behind the New Cold War since the resultant reaction among the masses will discredit and destabilize their side.
It’s for this reason why properly framing everything is of the highest importance in order to gradually erode the Western elite’s propaganda in a similar spirit as the emerging Multipolar World Order has already gradually eroded the former’s unipolar hegemony, which will thus accelerate events. It is indeed the case that the New Cold War is the result of the US-led West’s Golden Billion trying to stop the jointly BRICS- and SCO-led Global South from developing their alternative socio-economic and political models.
The Golden Billion vs. The Global South
Describing the antagonist as the US-led West’s Golden Billion draws that the attention of that civilization’s masses to several “politically incorrect” facts. First, the system that they benefit from (despite also being oppressed by it) is responsible for global inequality. Second, this system originates in their own Western civilization. And finally, the US – which has been captured by an ideologically radical and self-interested elite – controls this bloc of countries.
The Western masses aren’t allowed to be made aware of this sequence of facts or discuss it. Realizing that they’re part of the Golden Billion that generally enjoys better living standards than the majority of the world due to their system’s inherent inequality vis a vis the Global South would wrack them with guilt. Furthermore, learning that this worldwide evil originates in their civilization discredits its false pretence of superiority. And finally, being dominated by the US contradicts their claims of freedom.
There are also benefits connected to raising awareness of the jointly BRICS- and SCO-led Global South concepts as well. First, this reinforces the reality that the protagonists represent the majority of the global population, which lives comparatively poorer than the West due to the Golden Billion’s exploitative and neo-imperial models. Second, two alternative organizations have emerged for reforming International Relations. And finally, Westerners might be inspired to learn more about them.
All of this further erodes the Western elite’s propaganda that upholds their neo-imperial system at home and thus prevents its destabilization from within the core of their global system. Awareness of the New Cold War being between the US-led West’s Golden Billion and the jointly BRICS- and SCO-led Global South could therefore lead to the Western masses experiencing a crisis of confidence in their side since everything they’ve been brainwashed into believing is exposed as a lie through this accurate framing.
The Real Reason Why The Western Elite Hate President Putin
The worst fear that the Western elite have is that the masses under the influence of their information warfare operations will learn about President Putin’s GlobalRevolutionaryManifesto, the summary of which can be read in the preceding hyperlinks and the related speeches read here, here, and here. Upon doing so, the Western masses will learn that the Global South of which Russia is a part is striving for true democracy in International Relations against their own elite’s desire to protect their dictatorial system.
That’s the dark truth of the New Cold War, namely that the Western masses have been brainwashed by their elite into thinking that the system that the latter aggressively imposes upon the rest of the world is democratic in all respects even though it’s actually dictatorial. Its social aspects destroy traditional cultures, the economic ones enslave their targeted people, and the political aspects falsely make these same slaves think that they’re free.
By contrast, the alternative models that are being developed by the jointly BRICS- and SCO-led Global South respect traditional cultures, economically liberate their people, and enable them to freely manage their affairs however their society deems fit. Moreover, the vast majority of humanity resides in the Global South, which thus means that their side in the New Cold War is therefore democratic by default since it represents much more of the world’s population than the Golden Billion does.
Pushing Back Against Western Propaganda
It’s anti-democratic to the core for a minority of humanity to aggressively impose its socio-economic and political models onto others against their will, yet that’s exactly what’s been going on since the end of the Old Cold War once the unipolar moment arrived. The global systemic transition that International Relations are presently in the midst of is aimed at reforming that state of affairs so that everything becomes more democratic, equal, and just for the majority of humanity than it currently is.
All of this is obvious to everyone apart from the majority of those in the Golden Billion and their “fellow travellers” (agents of influence) embedded within the Global South, among whom it remains largely unknown and is still taboo to publicly discuss even for those who are aware of it. That’s why it’s so important for folks to popularize the proper framing of the New Cold War as being between the US-led West’s Golden Billion and the jointly BRICS- and SCO-led Global South.
Doing so will overwhelm the Golden Billion’s censors by ensuring that the Western masses become aware of these concepts that’ll inevitably revolutionize their understanding of everything. The Western elite can then only unconvincingly claim that those same concepts, especially the Golden Billion itself, are just so-called “conspiracy theories”. The recent Western trend of rising scepticism in general and against the elite in particular will reinforce the masses’ convictions that this explanation is false, though.
Forbidden Knowledge Could Be A Game Changer
Sensing that they’ve been made aware of “forbidden knowledge”, they’ll enthusiastically learn more about those concepts connected to the proper framing of the New Cold War popularized by activists, thus setting into motion a sequence of events that’ll discredit and destabilize the Golden Billion. Revitalizing anti-imperialist revolutionary movements within the West itself would pose the greatest threat to that civilization’s ideologically radical, self-interested, and ultimately despotic elite.
That outcome could be a game changer in the New Cold War by potentially ending this worldwide struggle before it uncontrollably escalates into a major conflict by miscalculation. All that needs to happen is for the Western elite to finally respect the Global South’s UN-enshrined sovereign right to manage their affairs however they deem fit. For as simple of a solution as that is, the Golden Billion continues to oppose it since that outcome would doom the neo-imperial system from which they profit.
Concluding Thoughts
Absent an anti-imperialist revolution in the West that topples those elite who’ve brought humanity to the brink of Armageddon, the New Cold War will continue being fought through proxy wars like the UkrainianConflict and forthcoming similar such ones like those that are expected to erupt all across Africa. Even in that scenario, however, it’s still optimal that the Western masses realize the reality of this worldwide struggle so they’re at least aware of what their elite are doing abroad in their name.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Andrew Korybko is an American Moscow-based political analyst specialising in the relationship between the US strategy in Afro-Eurasia, China’s One Belt One Road global vision of New Silk Road…
Russia is worried that the influence of hawkish forces inside the US’ “deep state” might be growing and could ultimately lead to a large-scale conventional strike against it, including by proxy through Ukraine, which Russia hopes to deter by reminding them that this would result in World War III.
The hullabaloo over Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine is misplaced since all that Putin did was explicitly confirm what was already self-evident to all serious observers. Nobody should have ever thought that Russia wouldn’t consider a nuclear response to any overwhelming non-nuclear strike against it or its mutual defence ally Belarus, nor that it would overlook those who partook in such a provocation by proxy. Here’s exactly what Putin told the Security Council during their latest meeting on Wednesday:
“I would like to draw your attention specifically to the following. The updated version of the document is supposed to regard an aggression against Russia from any non-nuclear state but involving or supported by any nuclear state as their joint attack against the Russian Federation. It also states clearly the conditions for Russia’s transition to the use of nuclear weapons.
We will consider such a possibility once we receive reliable information about a massive launch of air and space attack weapons and their crossing our state border. I mean strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, UAVs, hypersonic and other aircraft.
We reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against Russia and Belarus as a member of the Union State. All these issues have been agreed upon with the Belarusian side and the President of Belarus. Including the case when the enemy, using conventional weapons, creates a critical threat to our sovereignty.”
And here are some background briefings to review before analysing what this all means:
The above will now be summarized for the reader’s convenience.
Russia has no reason to use nuclear weapons first in Ukraine since it can accomplish all its goals in this improvised “war of attrition” through conventional means. Crossing that threshold risks losing the support of its close Chinese and Indian trade partners, which is what Ukraine wants. Russia also won’t launch a nuclear first strike against NATO unlike what some have speculated. Putin has remained calm through every one of the West’s escalations and continues doing his utmost to avoid World War III.
No matter how negatively some in the West might view his restraint, such as misperceiving it as weakness, their main decisionmakers still know better than to cross Russia’s ultimate red lines of launching a direct attack against it and/or Belarus or a large-scale one against them via their Ukrainian proxy. The first scenario is totally out of the question, while the second one has been openly discussed among some Westerners amidst the debate over letting Ukraine use their long-range weapons.
A few NATO-backed but Ukrainian-fronted long-range attacks would certainly be an escalation, but they wouldn’t cross Russia’s abovementioned ultimate red lines. The problem though is that some Westerners have convinced themselves that Russia is indeed so weak that it wouldn’t consider a nuclear response in the scenario of large-scale strikes against it. It’s this hawkish faction of the Western elite that his message is directed towards since he fears that they might be rising in influence.
Their comparatively more pragmatic rivals who still call the shots always signal their escalatory intentions far in advance so that Russia could prepare itself and thus be less likely to “overreact” in some way that risks World War III. Likewise, Russia continues restraining itself from replicating the US’ “shock-and-awe” campaign in order to reduce the likelihood of the West “overreacting” by directly intervening in the conflict to salvage their geopolitical project and thus risking World War III.
It can only be speculated whether this interplay is due to each’s permanent military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies (“deep state”) behaving responsibly on their own considering the enormity of what’s at stake or if it’s the result of a “gentlemen’s agreement”. Whatever the truth may be, the aforesaid model accounts for the unexpected moves or lack thereof from each, which are the US correspondingly telegraphing its escalatory intentions and Russia never seriously escalating in kind.
Russia senses that the balance of influence between these factions within the US’ “deep state” might be shifting from the comparatively pragmatic one to their more hawkish rivals, however, which explains why Putin felt the need to explicitly confirm what was already self-evident about his country’s nuclear doctrine. One explanation is that the US’ ruling liberal–globalists want to provoke a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis ahead of Trump’s potential second inauguration in order to sabotage his promise to broker a peace deal.
Another, which isn’t mutually exclusive, is that even the comparatively pragmatic faction is beginning to think that Russia is weak and therefore unlikely to escalate if the US launches a large-scale strike against it and/or Belarus by proxy through Ukraine. In their mind, this might coerce Russia into making unilateral concessions in exchange for peace, which could take the form of it withdrawing from some of the Ukrainian-claimed territory that it fought so hard to obtain control over since February 2022.
Putin really doesn’t want to risk doing anything that could inadvertently lead to World War III, hence why he’s thus far refused to reciprocally escalate every time that the West does, not to mention whenever they and their Ukrainian proxy crossed Russia’s earlier red lines. Nevertheless, he also doesn’t want Russia to lose its sovereignty if the West blackmails to that end it by exploiting these concerns to coerce it into a never-ending series of unilateral concessions, ergo why he authorized the specialoperation.
He therefore realized that it’s time to explicitly confirm what was already self-evident about Russia’s nuclear doctrine in order to dissuade the American “deep state’s” hawks from launching a large-scale strike against his country and/or Belarus by proxy through Ukraine. Depending on how serious it could be, Russia might consider responding with nukes against Ukraine and/or even some NATO countries, including before the damage is known upon “receiving reliable information about a massive launch”.
Once again, nobody should have ever thought that Russia wouldn’t consider a nuclear response to such a scenario, nor that it would overlook those who partook in it. Just because this wasn’t earlier explicitly articulated in its doctrine doesn’t mean that Putin would be forced to rule it out. No leader would ever let their hands be tied like that. Everyone knows this, but US hawks still had to be reminded of it just in case they’ve become so delusional as to think they could do pull off such an attack with impunity.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
His proposal is well-intentioned but ill-advised for the reasons that’ll be explained.
The respected Russian intellectual Sergey Karaganov, who serves as the honorary chairman of Russia’s influential Council on Foreign and Defence Policy and is also an academic supervisor at the Higher School of Economics’ School of International Economics and Foreign Affairs, is once again talking about nukes. He made global headlines last year after he proposed a nuclear first strike against Europe, which was responded to here, and just gave an interview to Kommersant about updating Russia’s nuclear doctrine.
Although the preceding hyperlinked response supported this proposal at the time, upon further reflection, it’s clear that it won’t deter the West for the reasons that’ll now be explained. The current doctrine enumerates four scenarios in which nukes can be used, which include threats to the existence of the state and large-scale conventional aggression. Karaganov believes that they should be used “in the event of any encroachment on our territory and our citizens” in a nod to Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk.
While he’s sure to have his share of supporters among the hawks at home and Russia’s most passionate supporters abroad, they’re all overlooking a few “inconvenient facts”. First, any encroachment of Russian territory can be framed as threatening the existence of the state if the Commander-in-Chief truly wants to use nukes in response, but the current one won’t resort to radical measures as explained here. Basically, Putin has worked hard to avoid World War III by miscalculation, and he won’t get careless now.
The second point is that the aforementioned calculations are already in force for a reason regardless of however anyone feels about this since dropping nukes in response to what the government officially considers to be an act of terrorism in Kursk is grossly disproportionate. Not only that, but it would suggest that Russia can’t conventionally respond to territorial incursions due to presumed weakness, which isn’t the case seeing as how it just launched a counteroffensive to expel Ukraine from that region.
Third, even if the doctrine was changed according to Karaganov’s vision, it’s unlikely to specify the targets and scale of Russia’s nuclear response since the exact circumstances can’t be known in advance. If decisionmakers were legally compelled by a revised doctrine to use nukes no matter what, then they might opt to drop them on their own territory or just across the border in order to avoid escalating. This observation segues into the fourth point about why their hands shouldn’t be tied in the first place.
Mandating a nuclear response to any cross-border encroachment whatsoever can lead to Russia’s adversaries manipulating it into using such weapons exactly as Lukashenko warned last month that Ukraine sought to do through its invasion of Kursk. It was explained here that “China and India would be under immense pressure to distance themselves from Russia, not just by the West, but also for appearance’s sake since they wouldn’t want to legitimize the use of nuclear weapons by their rivals.”
And finally, Russia can already employ discreet channels to convey its intent to use nuclear weapons in circumstances other than its publicly stated ones (or per a novel interpretation thereof as was touched upon in the first point), so updating its nuclear doctrine is pretty much only a soft power exercise. All that it would do is send a strong message of intent, albeit one which ties decisionmakers’ hands in arguably counterproductive ways and which could be easily manipulated as explained.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Российские официальные лица говорят, что работа по обновлению ядерной доктрины страны («Основ государственной политики РФ в сфере ядерного сдерживания») находится на продвинутой стадии.
The American elite acknowledge that average people are worried about World War III.
Biden said over the weekend that “The United States stands ready to engage in talks with Russia, China, and North Korea without preconditions to reduce the nuclear threat”, but this is an insincere statement that’s only being spewed in response to Trump’s recent rhetoric on this subject resonating with voters. The Republican candidate claimed during a podcast that he was on the brink of a denuclearization deal with Russia and China, a month prior to which he warned that Kamala could spark World War III.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov rubbished Trump’s claim of a possible deal by retorting that “this does not correspond to reality. We are well aware that the Trump administration’s attempts to bring Chinese representatives to the same negotiating table with us were unsuccessful.” Nevertheless, average Americans will likely never hear what that he had to say, hence why they might believe Trump. It’s with this in mind and amidst his rising poll numbers that Biden took a stab at this issue.
The outgoing leader’s handlers also assumed that average Americans are ignorant of this subject and won’t ever hear the Russian side of the story otherwise they wouldn’t have put him up to saying what he just did about the US’ readiness to engage in talks with Russia to reduce the nuclear threat. That’s because Putin suspended participation in the New START in February 2023 and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov confirmed that it won’t resume such talks with the US till after the UkrainianConflict ends.
Those who follow this already know that, but average Americans don’t, hence why some might fall for Biden’s implied suggestion that Kamala would continue this peaceful policy if she wins. World War III has never been discussed by them as much as it is now after Russia’s recently revised nuclear doctrine, which the Mainstream Media greatly fearmongered about, and unprecedented Israeli-Iranian tensions. Many people are therefore very scared and thus receptive to talk about avoiding World War III.
Both Trump and Biden are lying as was explained, but the first comes off as more believable given the false perception that he was close to Putin and might accordingly have stood a chance at pulling this off, while the second doesn’t have much credibility given his well-known dementia. In any case, since most Americans don’t know that they’re being misled, they might only have the impression that Biden is desperately pulling a page from Trump’s playbook in order to help Kamala.
The takeaway is that the American elite acknowledge that average people are worried about World War III, which is why Trump has made a big deal about how he’ll allegedly prevent this if he returns to office, and then Biden was advised to make it seem like he’s already trying to do so. In reality, the greatest risk of this scenario comes from hawkish forces in the country’s permanent military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies (“deep state”), who’ve proven their ability to work behind presidents’ backs.
It’s they, much more so than whoever the president may be at any given time, who hold the future of the world in their palms and could end it if they miscalculate in their proxy war on Russia. This doesn’t mean that the risk will remain forever, since presidents can partially counteract these hawkish “deep state” forces, but just that it’s still acute and somewhat beyond their power to stop. Trump might do a better job at this than Kamala, but he’s also erratic, so he might inadvertently worsen such threats.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Only Russian officials know for sure why their country hasn’t ever tried to do this, but the lack of an authoritative explanation this long into the conflict was bound to make many supporters restless.
It’s frustrating for some that Russia hasn’t ever attempted to destroy even one of Ukraine’s twenty bridges over the Dnieper over the past 2,5 years since the specialoperation began except reportedly when retreating from Kherson and only after Kiev damaged the bridge first. Troops and equipment, including from NATO, continue crossing the river unimpeded. Some have posited outlandish theories for why Russia isn’t interested in stopping this, but the following five reasons are arguably the most cogent:
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1. Russia Doesn’t Want The Global South To Think Poorly Of It
Russia is extremely sensitive to international opinion no matter how much its representatives act like they don’t care. It therefore prioritizes humanitarian and perceived soft power concerns over military ones by refusing to destroy these bridges in order for the Global South not to draw an unflattering comparison between Russian and US bombings. Further inconveniencing Ukrainian civilians, such as by disrupting cross-river supplies and impeding evacuations westward, could harm its image abroad.
2. Post-Conflict Political & Economic Considerations Still Predominate
On the topic of soft power, Russia still seems to think that reconciliation between the Russian and Ukrainian people is realistic, but this would be much more difficult to achieve than it already is if some Ukrainians were cut off from their families on the other side of the river for the duration of the conflict. There also appears to be a sincere belief in the possibility of the aforesaid reconciliation restoring close pre-conflict trade ties with Ukraine and even the EU, thus requiring intact bridges to fully capitalize on.
3. Ukrainian Air Defence Might Be Too Concentrated Along The Dnieper
Ukrainian air defences have improved since the early stages of the special operation but are still far less effective than Kiev claims, though their possible concentration along the Dnieper or at least parts of it in defence of some bridges might have deterred Russia from destroying them as the conflict dragged on. If that’s the case, which can only be speculated, then Russia might have concluded that it’s not worth firing so many missiles on saturation strikes against defended bridges which might not even end up destroyed.
4. Russian Missile Production Might Lag Far Behind Its Shell Production
Building upon the aforesaid hypothetical, even though Sky News reported in May that Russia is producing 3x as many shells as the West at ¼ of the cost, its missile production might lag far behind and could be why it doesn’t want to expend what’s needed to destroy at least one possibly defended bridge. Even that might strain its finite reserves, let alone saturating twenty bridges with the intent of destroying them all since taking out just one wouldn’t make much of a difference, so it might have given up on this.
5. The US Might Have Threatened To Intervene If Russia Destroys Those Bridges
Lastly, Russia still thinks that it can keep all of Ukraine out of NATO and Putin remains worried about sparking World War III by miscalculation, so any US threats to conventionally intervene if Russia destroyed those bridges might have deterred it. From the US’ perspective, destroying them early on might have led to a decisive Russian victory, which the West could have then wanted to thwart by salvaging the western half of its geopolitical project at the risk of the hot war that Putin wants to avoid.
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Only Russian officials know for sure why their country hasn’t tried to destroy these bridges, but the lack of an authoritative explanation this long into the conflict was bound to make many supporters restless. If some of the military-strategic reasons are responsible, then they might not want to publicly acknowledge this, thus suggesting that it’ll never happen. If reputational and/or political considerations are to blame, however, then a change in perceptions could prompt a change in policy if the will exists.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
People should be mature enough to accept that no country is perfect, not even their favorite one like Russia, and that setbacks are an unavoidable part of every military conflict.
Nobody foresaw in February 2022 that Russia’s special operation would descend into a protracted “war of attrition” that just passed two and a half years last month. This occurred because all sides underestimated each other and there were some shortcomings in hindsight with the campaign’s initial stages, which readers can correspondingly learn more about here and here. Nevertheless, many members of the Alt-Media Community (AMC) remain convinced that this was actually the plan all along.
In their minds, everything is proceeding according to some “5D chess master plan” wherein all setbacks and challenges are just an attempt by Russia to “psyche out” its opponents, but average folks are supposedly unable to understand the intricacies of such complex strategy. As QAnon’s followers say, “trust the plan”, but the plan has actually changed since everything began. It’s now known from the spring 2022 draft peace treaty that Russia sought a swift end to hostilities and not a protracted conflict.
Decisionmakers truly believed that their lightning-fast advance through large swathes of Ukraine had successfully coerced Zelensky into agreeing to Russia’s security guarantee requests related to the restoration of its constitutional neutrality and scaling back its armed forces to a practically symbolic level. Russian troops were in Kiev, Chernigov, Kharkov, and Sumy Regions, and they also had a presence across the Dnieper in Kherson Region and parts of Nikolaev Region too, though logistics were stretched thin.
It was because the Anglo-American Axis understood how fragile their foe’s logistics were that Boris Johnson went to Kiev to convince Zelensky to keep up the fight with the expectation that the Ukrainians could then capitalize on this weakness to push Russia back towards the border. This plan worked and Russia was expelled from all the abovementioned areas after its logistics were severed. The only reason why they were overextended to begin with was to provoke Ukrainian decisionmakers into panicking.
It was admittedly a gamble, and one that was supposed to manipulate them into agreeing to Russia’s terms for peace, particularly their country’s demilitarization. Likewise, perpetuating the conflict was also a gamble as well since the Anglo-American Axis thought that the combination of unprecedented sanctions and Ukraine’s expected counteroffensive would succeed in forcing Russia to fully withdraw. Neither expected that their respective gambles would fail and a “war of attrition” would follow.
Evidence in support of this explanation is plenty. To begin with, Russia wouldn’t have overextended its logistics if the plan all along was to bait Ukrainian forces into firing range as part of some prolonged demilitarization strategy. Ukraine could have been comfortably but very slowly demilitarized without even crossing the border at the beginning, with Russia only advancing after its enemy was worn down. As is known, that’s not how everything unfolded, and anyone claiming otherwise is being dishonest.
Supplementarily, Russia’s large-scale withdrawal from Kiev, Chernigov, and Sumy Regions as a “goodwill gesture” made it appear weak and disorganized to most observers other than those with a psychological need to believe in “5D chess master plan” conspiracy theories for whatever their reason may be. Even worse, this “goodwill gesture” was then followed by its forces being pushed out of the parts of Nikolaev Region that they advanced into as well as Kharkov Region and the western part of Kherson Region.
Top Alt-Media influencers at the time claimed that these moves were all part of some cunning plan to envelop the advancing Ukrainians in a series of cauldrons, after which Russia would steamroll through Eastern Ukraine up to the Dnieper and then decisively end the conflict. That also never came to pass. In fact, the aforesaid developments were all due to Ukraine capitalizing upon Russia’s overextended logistics from the initial stage of the conflict, which led to physical and especially reputational losses.
Another point is that the West didn’t ramp up its military-industrial production in the years preceding Russia’s special operation even though the scenarios of an intensified Donbass Conflict or even a Russian military intervention in all of Ukraine were openly being discussed by their media and think tanks. The West either thought that Russia could be deterred, that the odds of it winning were so high that it wasn’t worth planning for a protracted war, or that unprecedented sanctions would quickly lead to its defeat.
In any case, they were clearly caught just as much off guard by the “war of attrition” that followed the initial phase of the special operation as Russia was, with neither being ready for this. Russia could have more easily taken out all of Ukraine’s bridges across the Dnieper early on if was really planning for a protracted conflict, but it didn’t for the reasons explained here. It’s now too late since those bridges are better defended and Russia doesn’t have as many extra missiles to spare to saturate all of them.
Drone warfare also evolved so rapidly that each side took larger losses than expected as they learned the hard way how best to adapt to this revolution in military affairs. This whole time, Russia continued to advance in Donbass, which confirms that its forces kept coming to Ukraine’s instead of letting Ukraine’s come to it like many in AMC now claim. It’s enough to recall the Battles of Artyomovsk/Bakhmut and Avdeeva to see that the plan has been and still continues to be to move forward at literally all costs.
The pace of Russia’s advances has quickened as a result of it winning the “race of logistics”/“war of attrition” with NATO as explained in the two preceding hyperlinked analyses, thus setting the stage for the impending Battle of Pokrovsk that could be a game-changer on the Donbass front as argued here. Observers should remember that some of the territory through which Russia is advancing is just open fields that place its troops at greater risk, but capturing and holding that land is still considered worth it.
The same calculation was seen when Russia pushed into Kharkov Region from the north last spring after previously withdrawing in 2022. Although it didn’t advance that far, the official objective was to carve out a buffer zone for protecting Belgorod Region from cross-border terrorist raids and shelling. Those who insist that the “war of attrition” was Russia’s plan all along, with the corollary that Russia is sitting back and letting Ukrainian forces come to it instead of coming to them, can’t cogently account for this.
What appears to have happened among many in the AMC over the past two and a half years is that they found themselves forced into a narrative dilemma by a combination of events and trolling pressure. The indisputable setbacks that accompanied the first nine months of the special operation from its beginning in February 2022 to Russia’s withdrawal from the western half of Kherson Region across the Dnieper that November deeply disappointed them. This was made all the worse by trolls mocking them and Russia.
Calmly acknowledging these setbacks and trying to account for them in order to better understand what happened wasn’t done by many since community gatekeepers smeared that as “dooming” and lending credence to anti-Russian propaganda. An alternative reality was therefore created where everything unfortunate was chalked up to some grand “5D chess master plan” conspiracy theory that average people supposedly can’t understand but are still obliged to never question for reasons of dogma.
One conspiracy theory led to another till an ecosystem of lies was created for explaining everything that happened over the past two and a half years, with the most recent conspiracy theories building upon the older ones and everything thus being dependent on believing the manufactured narrative in its entirety. Questioning one claim leads to questioning those that followed and so on till the alternative reality that was created is dismantled in full, which gatekeepers fear would lead to mass demoralization.
People should be mature enough to accept that no country is perfect, not even their favourite one like Russia, and that setbacks are an unavoidable part of every military conflict. The “5D chess master plan” conspiracy theory is intellectually insulting and debunked by the factual evolution of this conflict. To be clear, Russia is winning since the military-strategic dynamics continue trending in its favour, but it improvised a lot to get to this point. It’s about time that the AMC honestly relates how this happened.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Beyond it are just a few lightly defended towns and then vast expanses of grassland that could become the scene of manoeuvre warfare until Russia reaches the next heavily defended localities further afield.
Ukrainian officials have urged locals in and around the town of Pokrovsk to evacuate within the next two weeks as Russian forces rapidly approach this pivotal military logistics hub. The head of neighbouring Mirnograd’s military administration bluntly said “Don’t wait. It will not get better, it will only get worse. Leave”, and then admitted that “The enemy is advancing faster than expected.” The Associated Press cited local commanders who blamed Russia’s swift gains on their side’s poorly trained conscripts.
One of them claimed that “Some people don’t want to shoot. They see the enemy in the firing position in trenches but don’t open fire. … That is why our men are dying…They don’t receive even the lowest standard of training required for our (combat) actions.” An unnamed soldier also lamented that “The main problem is the survival instinct of newcomers. Before, people could stand until the last moment to hold the position. Now, even when there is light shelling of firing positions, they are retreating.”
The poor quality of Ukraine’s recruits casts doubt on whether the whopping 120,000 troops that Belarusian President Lukashenko claimed had been deployed along his border could make much of a difference if some of them are sent to Donbass out of desperation to halt Russia’s advance. They’d more than likely participate in “meat waves” like those before them did in Artyomovsk/Bakhmut and Avdeevka, and just like their predecessors, they’re also destined to sacrifice themselves in vain.
Russia’s capture of Pokrovsk, however long it might take, could reshape the conflict’s dynamics due to this town’s strategic significance for Ukraine’s military logistics. Beyond it are just a few lightly defended towns and then vast expanses of grassland that could become the scene of manoeuvre warfare. Ukraine’s US-backed invasion of Kursk reminded observers that maneuverer warfare isn’t dead like some had earlier claimed, and it might soon make a major comeback in the fields past Pokrovsk.
Ukraine’s successes in Kharkov, Kherson, and most recently Kursk over the past two and a half years were the result of missteps on Russia’s part, not examples of Ukrainian “military genius” like its supporters in the media misportrayed them as. It either exploited overstretched and undermanned supply chains in the first two cases or took advantage of a poorly defended border in the second. None of these three precedents suggests that Ukraine is capable of beating Russia head-to-head at manoeuvre warfare.
It’s therefore possible that Russia could quickly capture broad swaths of Donbass once manoeuvre warfare begins to be fought along that front upon its capture of Pokrovsk, which could then improve its position for assaulting the heavily defended Kramatorsk-Slavyansk agglomeration in northern Donbass. In that event, Russia might also take advantage of its post-Pokrovsk manoeuvre warfare successes (assuming that they’re achieved as expected) to branch out in other directions.
Capturing Pokrovsk would enable Russia to move north into southern Kharkov, west into eastern Dnipro (neither of which it has any territorial claims to), and southwest into Zaporozhye (all of which it claims). Opening up a third front in Kharkov to complement the northern and eastern ones from Belgorod and Lugansk could be seen as revenge for Kursk as could opening one in Dnipro. The Kharkov vector could also help cut off supply lines to Kramatorsk-Slavyansk and thus facilitate the full capture of Donbass.
Moving into south-eastern Dnipro could be a shortcut for launching operations in northern Zaporozhye so it also can’t be discounted due to the possibility that this could lead to a siege of the latter’s namesake administrative centre. Observers can only speculate which vector(s) Russia would move into after Pokrovsk and when that might be, but the point is that manoeuvre warfare might play a large role in its forthcoming operations after that tow is captured.
Ukraine’s poorly trained conscripts and its lightly defended towns beyond Pokrovsk increase the odds of a partial Russian military breakthrough up to the next heavily defended localities further afield, and this could result in serious changes to the way in which Ukraine fights this conflict. It could either stay the course by doubling down on Kursk (and potentially opening new fronts in Belarus and/or Russia’s other border regions) at the expense of Donbass or decisively shift back to the latter at the former’s expense.
Either way, it’ll be forced into a dilemma, especially if Russia opens up new fronts in Kharkov and/or Dnipro in parallel with putting maximum pressure upon Donbass’ Kramatorsk-Slovyansk. Ukraine thus stands to lose more ground, or it could explore whether Russia would be willing to swap whatever Kiev controls in Kursk for whatever Moscow controls in Kharkov (and possibly also Dnipro by then). The possibility also exists that Ukraine could become hellbent on crossing Russia’s non-negotiable red lines.
About that, this could take the form of a nuclear provocation (such as that which could be caused by a crippling attack against its nuclear power plants or spent nuclear fuel storage sites there), a high-level assassination, or a terrorist attack even worse than the recent Crocus one. The purpose would be to provoke Russia into using nuclear weapons just like Lukashenko warned last week that Kiev wants to do, which could then serve as the tripwire for a conventional NATO intervention in Ukraine’s support.
All told, Russia’s capture of Pokrovsk might still take a while since Kiev could decide to turn this town into the next Artyomovsk, but the conflict’s dynamics will likely be reshaped once that happens if Russia can employ manoeuvre warfare against the lightly defended towns in the fields beyond. Any subsequent breakthrough would force Ukraine into the dilemma of prioritizing some fronts and the expense of others, but it might try to cut the Gordian knot through a series of swaps or escalations instead.
It’s anyone’s guess what it would do in that scenario, but those are the three most likely options: sacrifice one front to save another; swap land with Russia; or try crossing Russia’s non-negotiable red lines as part of a dangerous gamble to “escalate to de-escalate” up to the brink of provoking World War III. In any case, all eyes will be on Pokrovsk as Russia inches towards this pivotal military logistics hub and inevitably begins battling for control of it, so everyone will eventually see what Kiev ultimately does.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Comparing And Contrasting Russia’s Pullbacks From Kharkov And Kherson Regions By Andrew Korybko It’s of the highest importance during this time to apply President Putin’s advice against indul…
The last thing that Trump wants is for the US to be drawn back into another war with Russia after “Pivoting (back) to Asia”, let alone a direct one instead of the proxy war that they’ve recently resolved to end, but the chances of this happening would spike if Poland obtained its own nukes.
Polish Prime Minister Tusk recently declared that “We must be aware that Poland must reach for the most modern capabilities also related to nuclear weapons and modern unconventional weapons.” This followed French President Macron proposal to extend his country’s nuclear umbrella over its continental allies. The unmistakable innuendo is that Poland’s historic French ally might help Poland develop its own such weapons in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Poland’s ruling liberal-globalist coalition earlier criticized the outgoing conservative president’s request to host US nukes on the basis that their country would be unable to independently use them, yet now the leader of this same coalition wants to go even further by developing nukes. Tusk indirectly addressed their reversal on the nuclear issue by mentioning how much has recently changed in an allusion to Trump suspending military and intelligence aid to Ukraine, which prompted panic among the EU elite.
Tusk’s talk about Poland obtaining nukes is likely a misguided negotiation tactic with the US, however, for the reasons that’ll now be explained. For starters, it was proposed in response to newfound speculation that the US might no longer abide by NATO’s Article 5, which doesn’t make sense in Poland’s case since it already hosts 10,000 troops who the US would certainly protect if need be. These forces should therefore already function as psychological reassurance to Poles that Article 5 still applies to them.
Nevertheless, so much of the population exhibits symptoms of political Russophobia for reasons beyond the scope of this analysis to explain that they might not feel fully comfortable unless the US deploys even more troops to Poland, which segues into the second point. The outgoing conservative president recently suggested that the US could redeploy some of its troops from Germany to Poland, and this might be precisely what the Prime Minister hopes to achieve by talking about developing nukes.
“Poland Is Once Again Poised To Become The US’ Top Partner In Europe” if it plays its cards right as explained in the preceding hyperlinked analysis so there objectively isn’t any reason to flirt with developing nukes as a negotiation tactic for making this even more likely than it already is. That said, Tusk and his team might truly believe that Trump is a Russian agent like he previously accused him of being, ergo why there’s a possibility that they might genuinely expect him to sell Poland out to Russia.
If that’s really the case, then they might have convinced themselves that threatening to develop nukes if the US doesn’t deploy more troops to Poland is the only way to get Trump to consider complying with their request, but this is probably a bluff since they don’t have the means to go through with it. This moves everything along to the third point since Tusk’s plan would be extraordinarily costly, require expertise and equipment that Poland lacks, and be practically impossible to pull off in secret.
France also has no reason to risk the global opprobrium that would accompany its support of Poland’s proposed nuclear weapons program either since it doesn’t need the cash nor does it have any reason to cede its role as the EU’s only nuclear-armed member along with the prestige that this entails. The most that it might do is base some of its nukes in Poland, but that would be no different than hosting American ones, which Tusk’s coalition earlier criticized. It also wouldn’t move the needle on US troops.
Putting everything together, Poland’s talk about obtaining nukes is indeed likely nothing but a negotiating tactic with the US, albeit a completely misguided one since it risks getting on the US’ bad side more so than encouraging it to comply with Poland’s request to base more troops on its soil. Trump doesn’t want any serious unpredictability in Europe after the US’ “Pivot (back) to Asia”, which necessitates redeploying some of its troops there, especially if this raises the risk of war with Russia.
He wants to end their proxy war in Ukraine, have the Europeans to decide among themselves how best to ensure their own security amid the US’ consequent military downscaling, and then focus on more muscularly containing China. If Poland were to obtain nukes, however, then it might feel emboldened to cross Russia’s red lines in Ukraine just like the US did before it in provoking the specialoperation. The worst-case scenario is that Poland also saber-rattles along its border with Kaliningrad and/or Belarus.
The last thing that Trump wants is for the US to be drawn back into another war with Russia, let alone a direct one instead of the proxy war that they’ve recently resolved to end, but the chances of this happening would spike if Poland obtained its own nukes. That could abruptly ruin his planned “Pivot (back) to Asia” and is therefore why he might actually be upset at Tusk for talking about this. He probably knows that it’s a bluff, or was at least informed of this by experts, but that might not make a difference.
Tusk’s nuclear plans pose a challenge to Trump’s geopolitical plans, plus they imply that Trump can’t be trusted to abide by Article 5, perhaps due to him supposedly really being a Russian agent. That makes them offensive and infuriating, which could lead to Trump either delaying what might have already been his hitherto unannounced decision to redeploy some US troops from Germany to Poland or sending them to another regional country like Hungary instead, all to teach Tusk a lesson.
Of course, he might also go through with what Poland wants without any problems since this aligns with the US’ own interests, but it could then be sold as preventing Poland from obtaining nukes at the cost of creating unprecedented unpredictability in Russian-European relations after the Ukrainian Conflict ends. That improvised narrative could reinforce Trump’s desired international perception as a peacemaker and would thus turn an otherwise scandalous affair in US-Polish relations into a huge soft power opportunity.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Transatlantic ties, Russian-US relations, and the nature of American hegemony are all transforming before everyone’s eyes as Trump makes bold moves to force Zelensky to the peace table with Putin.
An unnamed senior Defence Department told the media on Monday evening that Trump decided to freeze all military aid to Ukraine until its leaders demonstrate a good-faith commitment to peace. This comes just several days after Zelensky picked his fight with Trump and Vance at the White House. The Wall Street Journal earlier predicted that Ukraine could only continue fighting at its current level till this summer in such a scenario. Here are five takeaways from this monumental development:
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1. Trump Is Serious About Brokering Peace
Zelensky made it clear during his disastrous visit to the White House last Friday that he’s dead-set on fighting till the last Ukrainian unless his country either gets NATO membership or Western troops. Neither of those demands is acceptable to Trump since they’d risk World War III, but so too could that risk continue rising if the conflict doesn’t soon end. Trump therefore realized that the only way to force Zelensky to the peace table with Putin is to freeze all military aid until he moderates his extreme stance.
2. He & Putin Likely Have A Secret Agreement
Trump said last week that “A ceasefire could take place immediately”, which was arguably an inadvertent admission of a secret agreement with Putin. No lasting peace can be reached until after the next Ukrainian presidential elections, but they can’t be held during martial law, ergo the need for a ceasefire. Although Putin earlier conditioned this on Ukraine withdrawing from the disputed regions, he might support a ceasefire to justify the US’ curtailed aid to Ukraine and legitimize Russian-US economicdeals.
3. But It’s Not Yet A Comprehensive One
If the aforesaid speculation is accurate, then it doesn’t mean that those two have a comprehensive agreement. Serious issues such as the final Russian-Ukrainian border and the question of peacekeepers have yet to be agreed to and might not be resolved till after the next Ukrainian presidential and parliamentary elections. It’s therefore premature to predict that the Line of Contact will become the final border and that Western peacekeepers will be deployed there, especially since Russia opposes both.
4. Poland Might Have A Pivotal Role To Play
About 90% of Western military aid to Ukraine transits through Poland so Trump might ask it to stop the Europeans from using its territory to arm Ukraine during a ceasefire in exchange for post-conflict perks. He doesn’t want the Brits, French, or Germans emboldening Ukraine to violate the ceasefire or provoke Russia into doing so and can incentivize Poland to prevent this by promising to keep American troops there, possibly redeploy some from Germany to Poland, and turn Poland into its top partner in Europe.
5. The “New Détente” Is Trump’s Top Priority
Every major move that’s taken place since Trump’s call with Putin in mid-February has been predicated on advancing his grand strategic goal of a Russian–US “New Détente”, the gist of which is to revolutionize International Relations through a game-changing comprehensive partnership between them. Readers can learn more about its details from the three preceding hyperlinked analyses, but it’s the pursuit of this goal that ultimately drove Trump to make the fateful decision to freeze all military aid to Ukraine.
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Transatlantic ties, Russian-US relations, and the nature of American hegemony are all transforming before everyone’s eyes as Trump makes bold moves to force Zelensky to the peace table with Putin. His latest one was literally one of the worst-case scenarios from Ukraine’s and Europe’s perspective but there’s little that they can do in response other than capitulate to his demands. The US holds all the cards like Trump reminded Zelensky last Friday and those who think otherwise risk paying the price.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Poland might participate in these exercises in order to send a strong anti-Russian signal, but the extent to which it might pivot towards France and away from the US will depend in large part on the outcome of its upcoming presidential election.
Everyone in Europe is wondering what form French President Macron’s potential plans to extend his country’s nuclear umbrella over the rest of the continent could take, especially considering the risks that they could entail after Moscow’s very negative reaction. Putin suggested that Macron was following in Napoleon’s footsteps, while Foreign Minister Lavrov was much more direct in describing Macron’s words as a threat and even outright comparing him to Hitler. Macron’s move could therefore escalate tensions.
The Economist published an article about the options at his disposal, the most realistic of which is to station nuclear-capable Rafales in Central & Eastern Europe (CEE) and include some of those countries in its quarterly nuclear air force drills codenamed “Poker”. According to one of their sources, “In recent days, other allies (than Italy, which participated once in 2022,) have offered to take part.” The most obvious candidate is Poland, whose prime minister declared earlier this month that he wants nukes.
Its outgoing president once again appealed to the US in his latest interview with the Financial Times last week to host some of its nuclear weapons but was promptly shut down by Vice President Vance, who said that he’d be “shocked” if Trump agreed because it could lead to a “nuclear conflict”. Seeing as how France has been Poland’s ally since the Napoleonic era, notwithstanding how it hung Poland out to dry against the Nazis, Poland might now therefore prioritize The Economist’s proposed French option.
That would be a volte-face if there ever was one since Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Szejna from the ruling liberal-globalist coalition, which opposes the outgoing (and very imperfect) conservative president, responded to last May’s US nuke request with solid points that also hold true for French ones. In his words, “Poland will not become a nuclear power (since it wouldn’t obtain operational control over these weapons), and Russian missiles will be aimed at these facilities (where they’re based).”
Poland might therefore hold off on hosting French nuclear-armed Rafales, which would in any case be a major decision likely requiring a lot of negotiations and planning instead of a swift move by both, in favour of participating in its quarterly “Poker” drills instead. In that event, these would become prestige-building exercises showcasing the renewed strength of their historical alliance, which would also likely aim to co-manage CEE between them as forecasted in one of the scenarios recently shared here.
The prestige element is important since there’s no credible “Russian threat” to Poland or France to justify including Poland in France’s “Poker” drills, let alone possibly basing nuclear-armed Rafales there, but dramatic stunts such as the one described above could rally some Europeans. In particular, these are the bloc’s liberal-globalist elite who’ve come to believe their own propaganda about Russia and some of the CEE people with pathological fears of it, both of whom would fall under joint Franco-Polish influence.
Poland might fall further under French influence too with time, in which case its opposition to the French-led proposal for a “European Army” – which was recently endorsed by Zelensky but was subsequently rebuffed by Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski – might gradually erode. That would largely depend on the outcome of May’s presidential election in Poland, however, since the liberal-globalist candidate might go along with this while the conservative and populist ones would remain against it.
If the ruling coalition captures the presidency, then greater French influence over Poland in the event of Poland being invited to participate in France’s quarterly “Poker” drills and possibly one day hosting its nuclear-armed Rafales could first see Poland inviting more foreign military forces onto its territory. This would align with Tusk’s proposal last week for the EU and NATO to jointly secure Poland’s eastern border. In line with their preferences, he and his president would likely prefer EU forces over NATO/US ones.
The conservative and populist opposition (which aren’t one and the same) prefer the opposite, NATO/US forces over EU ones, so more foreign forces might ultimately be based in Poland regardless. Nevertheless, the point is that any “European Army” might establish a major military presence in Poland if the liberal-globalist candidate becomes president, after which Poland might pivot towards what might by then be a possibly French-led instead of German-led EU at the expense of its alliance with America.
About that, Tusk and Sikorski made irresponsible past statements about Trump such as smearing him as a “Russian agent”, and Secretary of State Rubio just put Sikorski in his place for lending false credence to rumours about Musk cutting Ukraine off from Starlink, so bilateral ties aren’t too good right now. They’ll therefore likely become even worse if the liberal-globalists assume full control over the government upon winning the presidency and then make tangible moves to pivot Poland away from the US.
A new European security architecture is forming as the Ukrainian Conflict approaches its inevitable end, and among the most significant variables shaping its final configuration is the relationship between France and Poland, with the outcome of the latter’s next presidential election influencing these ties. Poland could hypothetically participate in France’s “Poker” drills under a conservative or populist president while still remaining closer to the US, but this balance is unlikely under a liberal-globalist one.
Poland’s closer alignment with either the EU (via France) or the US might therefore be the most important factor in determining what this security architecture looks like due to the country’s immense economic and military weight on Russia’s western frontier. While the expansion of French influence over Poland might be a given if it begins participating in the “Poker” drills, which makes sense from its perspective, the next presidential election will likely decide whether this turns into a full-blown pivot.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
What ties these five trends together is Trump’s historic return to the presidency, his successful purge of the “deep state” that enabled him to pursue his long-sought “New Détente” with Russia, and Putin’s receptiveness to his American counterpart’s grand strategic plan of a comprehensive partnership.
I’m a Moscow-based American political analyst with a PhD. in Political Science from MGIMO, and this is my third yearly review of the New Cold War after I published by first and second on each anniversary of the special operation here and here. I’ve been analysing this subject every day since 24 February 2022, beginning at now-defunct OneWorld till mid-2022 and continuing at my Substack to the present. Here’s what I learned from doing this daily for my third year straight:
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* Trump’s Election Changed The Course Of History
Trump’s historic election victory was a game-changer in the New Cold War since everything would have been altogether different had Kamala won instead. Unlike her and Biden, he envisages responsibly managing the US’ geopolitical rivalry with Russia by brokering peace in Ukraine as the first step, after which he plans to initiate similarly motivated talks with Iran and China to that same end. Diplomacy and deal-making now take precedence over risking World War III through reckless provocations.
* The Consequences Of Ceding Sovereignty
The EU and Ukraine are learning the consequences of ceding their sovereignty to the US after Trump began treating them as the vassals that they are. The first now fears that America will abandon it as part of Trump’s “Pivot (back) to Asia” for more muscularly containing China while the second has no say in the nascent Russian-US talks over its ongoing conflict. Each ceded their sovereignty to the US with the false expectation that their allied liberal-globalists in the “deep state” would stop Trump’s return.
* Strategic Patience vs. Strategic Escalation
World War III might have already broken out long ago had Putin not exercised strategic patience by declining time and again to meaningfully respond to Ukraine’s many US-backed provocations. He only began to practice a policy of strategic escalation in late November last year to deter the outgoing Biden Administration from provoking the aforesaid after it dangerously allowed Ukraine to use the US’ long-range missiles against targets in Russia’s pre-2014 borders. This pragmatic approach deserves credit.
* From Populist-Nationalism To Civilization-States
Russia and Trump’s America both regard the emergence of civilization-states as the next phase of the global systemic transition. The first’s Eurasian Union and the second’s “Fortress America” policy, which consists of incorporating Canada and Greenland, fulfil this role. They also support populist-nationalist movements across the world that share their civilization-state vision of the future and might accordingly join forces in helping them come to power in order to accelerate this process as explained here and here.
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What ties these five trends together is Trump’s historic return to the presidency, his successful purge of the “deep state” that enabled him to pursue his long-sought “New Détente” with Russia, and Putin’s receptiveness to his American counterpart’s grand strategic plan of a comprehensive partnership. The successful conclusion of their nascent talks and the clinching of the aforementioned partnership will revolutionize International Relations while their failure could abruptly revive the risk of World War III.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
While there might indeed be some Russian hardliners who think that peace talks should just be a ruse for buying time to make more military gains, such attitudes don’t reflect the Kremlin’s, yet WaPo tried to misportray that mysterious think tank’s report as something worth taking seriously.
The Washington Post (WaPo) published an article this week about how “Document prepared for Kremlin outlines hard-line negotiating stance”, which purports to be based off of an unnamed FSB-linked think tank’s report from early February that was published before the Riyadh talks. Since the alleged report itself wasn’t included in their article, nor even was the name of the think tank that supposedly produced it, it’s impossible to determine its veracity. In any case, here’s what the author(s) suggested:
* Prioritize normalizing Russian-US relations;
* Propose US access to Donbass’ rare earth minerals;
* Agree not to station Oreshniks in Belarus if the US doesn’t station new systems in Europe;
* Stop arms supplies to states “unfriendly” to the US if the US stops arms supplies to Ukraine;
* Exacerbate the US’ tensions with both China and the EU;
* Rule out a resolution of the conflict until 2026 at the earliest;
* Completely dismantle the current Ukrainian government;
* Insist on official recognition of Russian control over the new regions;
* Carve out buffer zones in northeastern and southwestern Ukraine (Odessa is specifically mentioned);
* Oppose any, including non-Western, peacekeeping plans;
From the above, the modus operandi appears to be getting on the US’ good side through diplomacy and economic deals while simultaneously working to worsen the US’ relations with the two other Great Powers that are most interested in this conflict, China and the EU. It’s unclear how the second part could be achieved since information warfare has very real limits in this respect, but anyhow, these approaches are meant to facilitate political (government dismantlement) and security (buffer zone) goals in Ukraine.
About those goals, they’ll require sustained military pressure to have any chance of succeeding, ergo the proposal to rule out resolving the conflict until 2026 at the earliest. This takes for granted that Russia will continue to advance and that Trump won’t “escalate to de-escalate”, which could take the form of threatening to deploy US troops in its most dramatic manifestation, to coerce a compromise. The assumption is that Trump might pump Ukraine with weapons at the most but that this won’t stop Russia.
A related assumption is that the international community will officially recognize Russian control over the new regions and that all peacekeeping plans, including non-Western ones, will be thwarted. There’s little that Russia can realistically do to convince nearly 200 countries to align their policy with its own on this very sensitive issue while it would have to be willing to bomb foreign forces, including non-Western ones, to foil any peacekeeping plans. All of this therefore comes off as wishful thinking.
To be sure, the preceding proposals might hypothetically be implemented, but they’re premised on a combination of luck and assumptions. This doesn’t mean that they’re impossible, just that they’re unlikely without a clearly defined path, and none exists according to WaPo’s review of this mysterious think tank report. Having said that, assuming for the sake of argument that the document is real, some parts of it are pragmatic and could help advance the more ambitious parts if Russia plays its cards right.
For instance, normalizing relations with the US, clinching strategic resource deals with it, and agreeing to the missile and arms quid pro quos could forge the trust required to discuss the other goals. Trump might then be much more amenable to Russia’s proposal for completely dismantling the current Ukrainian government, which is a cesspool of corruption connected to his Democrat enemies, and discussing demilitarized buffer zones such as the “Trans-Dnieper” one that was proposed here.
In the event that both are achieved, then the need for peacekeepers could disappear since the new Ukrainian government wouldn’t be revanchist and the buffer zones could deter any future one from trying to reconquer their country’s lost territory, thus meeting the hardliners’ reported goals. For that to happen, however, Russia must negotiate with the US in good faith instead of exploiting diplomacy to buy time for military gains like that mysterious think tank strongly implied that it should do.
Therein lies the main reason why WaPo’s report about that unnamed institute’s proposals should be treated sceptically since it coincidentally conforms with Bloomberg’s report from earlier in the week alleging that Putin isn’t sincere about peace talks. These narratives discredit him and his diplomats while lending credence to Western warmongers’ plans to “escalate to de-escalate” right now in order to “force Russia to peace” instead of “wasting time” with “doomed-to-fail” peace talks.
While there might indeed be some Russian hardliners who think that peace talks should just be a ruse for buying time to make more military gains, such attitudes don’t reflect the Kremlin’s, yet WaPo tried to misportray that mysterious think tank’s report as something worth taking seriously. They might have also omitted some of its contents too since it’s suspicious that they didn’t link to or publish the document that they reported on, which would have preemptively dispelled questions about their reporting.
The public is therefore misled to believe such things as Russia not wanting to end this conflict until next year at the earliest, that it’s stirring trouble in the US’ ties with China and the EU, and that it might even oppose peacekeepers from friendly non-Western countries like China and India. It’s therefore easy to see why some might question WaPo’s reporting, but even if these and the other proposals really were put forth, it doesn’t mean that they’ll be applied or that they represent the government’s official policy.
To conclude, while the hardliners’ reportedly envisaged endgame in Ukraine represents the best-case scenario for Russia, the actual outcome will likely see some compromises being made on these goals since it’ll be very difficult to accomplish them all. Moreover, Putin and his closest advisors are considered to be so-called “moderates” so they’re already disinclined to support “hardline” policies, thus raising the odds of diplomacy leading to a negotiated settlement possibly by year’s end.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
President Putin Cautioned Russian Strategic Forecasters Against Indulging In Wishful Thinking By Andrew Korybko Strategic forecasters must always aspire to reflect reality as accurately as they can…
This proposal is the most realistic means for keeping the peace after an armistice.
Bloomberg cited unnamed “people with knowledge of Kremlin thinking” to report that Russia will only demand that Ukraine restore its constitutional neutrality, “drastically cut back military ties with the NATO alliance”, limit its army, and freeze the front lines, albeit with some territorial swaps. Also, “The Kremlin’s position is that while individual NATO members may continue to send arms to Ukraine under bilateral security agreements, any such weapons should not be used against Russia or to recapture territory.”
To be sure, Bloomberg might have either invented their sources or they’re uninformed of what the Kremlin thinks, but there’s also the possibility that they’re accurately reflecting what it plans to ask for during peace talks. Hopefully Russia’s demands of Ukraine are more than what Bloomberg just reported, however, because the aforesaid requests would be settling for much less than it might otherwise be able to achieve as suggested by some of the proposals made at the end of this analysis here.
For instance, any agreement to limit the Ukrainian Armed Forces is meaningless without a monitoring mission paired with credible enforcement mechanisms to enforce compliance. After all, even written guarantees that individual NATO members won’t arm Ukraine for the purpose of using these weapons against Russia or to recapture territory – not to mention purely verbal ones – could be broken. There’s also the question of how Russia would respond to future drone and missile strikes from Ukraine.
The most realistic way to address these concerns is through the participation of only non-Western countries in monitoring and peacekeeping roles, the latter of which could concern deployment along the entire Russian-Ukrainian border, including the Line of Contact (LOC). About the second-mentioned, the reported territorial swaps could see Russia give back its part of Kharkov Oblast in exchange for Ukraine giving back its part of Kursk Oblast, which each would formally retain their territorial claims to the other.
This would restore the status quo ante bellum along that part of their universally recognized frontier while serving as a legal workaround against their respective constitutional prohibitions on ceding territory, which in Russia’s case is absolute while Ukraine’s requires a national referendum. Accordingly, freezing the LOC through an armistice a la the Korean precedent wouldn’t violate either of their laws, thus retaining Ukraine’s claims to the entirety of its pre-2014 borders and Russia’s to its post-2022 ones.
As for effectively keeping the peace, Russia could be more confidently assured that Ukraine won’t unilaterally violate the armistice with Western encouragement if the proposed non-Western monitoring and peacekeeping contingent is allowed to inspect all trains and cars that cross the Dnieper eastward. Ukraine might undertake a long-term clandestine campaign to rebuild its heavy weaponry presence in proximity to the DMZ ahead of a possible sneak attack so this would be imperative for impeding that.
Likewise, since such equipment could also be smuggled across the river, these forces should also be given the means for patrolling it as well as the right to detain people, seize their contraband, and use lethal force if they come under attack. Kiev should have a special regime since it’s difficult to enforce such checks given the capital’s location on both sides of the river, but one possibility is fencing off its north-eastern, eastern, and south-eastern reaches beyond the city’s limits and conducting checks there.
The ideal scenario should be to demilitarize everything east of the Dnieper and north of the LOC that remains under Kiev’s formal control, the so-called “Trans-Dnieper” region for lack of a better description, while having its DMZ manned by Russia’s closest non-Western partners. The first part of this suggestion would prevent Ukraine from unilaterally violating the armistice while the second would do the same with regards to Russia since it would be loath to attack Indian and other such friendly peacekeepers.
This proposal takes for granted that NATO will continue expanding its influence in Western Ukraine along that side of the Dnieper, but the river will serve as a major obstacle to on-the-ground offensive action by either party, all while they presumably concentrate air defence systems up and down its banks. It’s unrealistic to expect Russia to plant boots its boots on the NATO-Ukrainian border, monitor everything that crosses, and then hold these positions indefinitely as explained here so this is the next best solution.
In the event that Russia or Ukraine detects illegal military activity by the other in the Trans-Dnieper region such as prohibited arms and special forces, then they should already have a protocol agreed upon as part of their armistice for peacefully addressing this prior to resorting to kinetic action if that fails. This could include a formal complaint with evidence, tasking the non-Western monitoring and peacekeeping mission with investigating, and in the worst-case scenario, drone or missile strikes against those targets.
On-the-ground military activity by either party would be strictly prohibited since that would violate the terms of the armistice and instantly risk another conflict, ergo the purpose of the non-Western monitoring and peacekeeping mission along the DMZ, the Dnieper, and around Eastern Kiev for deterring this. There could also be previously agreed and very severe economic, financial, and other consequences from Western and non-Western countries that would immediately enter into effect if that happens.
Basically, the Trans-Dnieper region would function as a no-man’s land or buffer zone, and the locals who feel uncomfortable living there could either relocate elsewhere in Ukraine such as west of the Dnieper or take advantage of Russia’s simplified procedure from summer 2022 for moving eastward instead. As can be seen, the proposal for a demilitarized Trans-Dnieper region that would be monitored and maintained by non-Western peacekeepers would greatly keep the pace, hence why Russia must demand it.
Any armistice or peace treaty that doesn’t include this outcome risks being unilaterally violated by Ukraine with Western encouragement after some time. Its terms, especially those involving severe multidimensional consequences against whichever party sends ground forces into this zone (though importantly not for carrying out surgical strikes), should also reassure the West that Russia won’t violate this deal either. That’s why the US would do well to seriously consider this proposal if Russia brings it up.
Should Russia settle for less by only demanding what Bloomberg reported, then it would be tacitly requesting nothing more than a temporary lull in hostilities to prepare for the next inevitable phase of the conflict. Officially speaking, Russia remains determined to reach a lasting peace that preferably meets as many of its maximum goals as is realistically possible given the new circumstances in which it now finds itself after over 1,000 days of conflict, so it should be receptive to the Trans-Dnieper proposal.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
The interplay between them, Russia, and the US will determine the continent’s future security architecture.
French President Macron’s declaration on Wednesday that he’s flirting with extending his country’s nuclear umbrella over other continental allies shows that he’s throwing down the gauntlet to Germany and Poland for leadership of post-conflict Europe. Outgoing German Chancellor Scholz published an hegemonic manifesto in December 2022 that later took the form of what can be described as “Fortress Europe”, which refers to the German-led attempt to lead Europe’s containment of Russia.
This concept requires Poland subordinating itself to Germany, which unfolded over the first half of last year but then slowed as the ruling liberal-globalist coalition started taking a more populist-nationalist approach towards Ukraine ahead of May’s presidential election. Even if this started off insincerely, it’s since assumed a life of its own and created a new dynamic in the latest circumstances brought about by Trump’s return whereby “Poland Is Once Again Poised To Become The US’ Top Partner In Europe”.
Poland’s economy is the largest of the EU’s eastern members, it now boasts NATO’s third-largest army, and it’s consistently sought to be the US’ most reliable ally, the last point of which works most in its favour amidst the transatlantic rift. If these trends remain on track, Poland could prevent France or Germany from leading post-conflict Europe by carving out a US-backed sphere of influence in Central Europe, but it would have a shot at leadership in its own right if conservatives or populists come to power.
The sequence of events that would have to unfold begins with either of them winning the presidency, and this either pushing the liberal-globalists more in their direction ahead of fall 2027’s parliamentary elections or early elections being held on whatever pretext and then won by conservatives or populists. Poland’s former conservative government was very imperfect, but their country served as a bastion of EuroRealists (usually described by the Mainstream Media as Euroskeptics) during those eight years.
Should it reassume that role upon the return of conservative rule in parliament, perhaps in a coalition with populists, then this would perfectly align with Trump’s vision and could result in Poland either leading similar domestic political processes across the continent or at least in its own region. Even if only the second-mentioned scenario materializes, it would most effectively prevent liberal-globalist France or Germany from leading Europe as a whole by bifurcating it into ideologically competing halves.
France’s nuclear weapons are the ace up its sleeve though that it might play for keeping some conservative/populist-inclined societies under liberal-globalist sway by extending its umbrella over those countries which fear that Russia will invade but that they’ll then be abandoned by the US. That might help reshape some of their voters’ views if they come to feel dependent on France and thus decide to show fealty to it by keeping their ideologically aligned governments in power instead of change them.
This doesn’t mean that France will succeed, but what was explained above accounts for Macron’s unprecedented proposal in the context of his country’s Great Power ambitions at this historic moment. A lot in this regard will likely depend on the outcome of Romania’s domestic political crisis, which readers can learn more about here, since the liberal-globalist coup against the populist-nationalist frontrunner in May’s election redux could further entrench French influence in this geostrategic frontline state.
Few are aware, but France already has hundreds of troops there, where it leads a NATO battlegroup. It also signed a defence pact with neighbouring Moldova in March 2024, which could hypothetically include the deployment of troops to there too. France’s military presence in South-eastern Europe places it in a prime position for conventionally intervening in Ukraine if it so chooses, whether before or after the end of hostilities, and suggests that Macron will focus on this region for expanding French influence.
Should progress be made, then three other scenarios would be possible. The first is that Poland and France compete in Central Europe, with the first eventually extending its sway over the Baltics while the second does the same over South-eastern Europe (within which Moldova is included in this context due to its close ties with Romania), thus trifurcating Europe between them and Germany. In this scenario, Germany would also have some influence over each Central Europe region, but it wouldn’t predominate.
The second scenario is that Poland and France, which have been historical partners since the early 1800s, cooperate in Central Europe by informally dividing the Baltics and Southeastern Europe between them in order to asymmetrically bifurcate Europe into imperfectly German and Polish-Franco halves. The Polish part would either remain under partial US influence if Poland continues aligning with the US even under liberal-globalist rule or the liberal-globalists might pivot towards France and away from the US.
The final scenario is that all three employ their Weimar Triangle format to coordinate tripartite rule over Europe, but this is dependent on the liberal-globalists capturing the Polish presidency in May and then aligning with Berlin/Brussels over Washington. It’s therefore the least likely, especially since the liberal-globalists might pivot towards France instead of Germany/EU as a compromise between their ideological, electoral, and geopolitical interests ahead of fall 2027’s parliamentary elections.
Regardless of what ends up transpiring, the “military Schengen” that was pioneered between Germany, Poland, and the Netherlands last year and to which France expressed an intent to join will likely continue incorporating more EU members in order facilitate these three aspiring leaders’ interests. Germany needs this for its “Fortress Europe” plans, Poland needs its allies to swiftly come to its aid in a hypothetical war with Russia, while France needs this to entrench its influence in South-eastern Europe.
What’s ultimately being determined through the interplay of France, Germany, and Poland’s competing leadership plans for post-conflict Europe is the continent’s future security architecture, which will also be influenced to varying degrees by Russia and the US, be it jointly through their “NewDétente” and/or independently. There are too many uncertainties at present to confidently predict what this emerging order will look like, but the dynamics described in this analysis account for the most likely scenarios.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
What ties these five trends together is Trump’s historic return to the presidency, his successful purge of the “deep state” that enabled him to pursue his long-sought “New Détente” with Russia, and Putin’s receptiveness to his American counterpart’s grand strategic plan of a comprehensive partnership.
I’m a Moscow-based American political analyst with a PhD. in Political Science from MGIMO, and this is my third yearly review of the New Cold War after I published by first and second on each anniversary of the special operation here and here. I’ve been analysing this subject every day since 24 February 2022, beginning at now-defunct OneWorld till mid-2022 and continuing at my Substack to the present. Here’s what I learned from doing this daily for my third year straight:
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* Trump’s Election Changed The Course Of History
Trump’s historic election victory was a game-changer in the New Cold War since everything would have been altogether different had Kamala won instead. Unlike her and Biden, he envisages responsibly managing the US’ geopolitical rivalry with Russia by brokering peace in Ukraine as the first step, after which he plans to initiate similarly motivated talks with Iran and China to that same end. Diplomacy and deal-making now take precedence over risking World War III through reckless provocations.
* The Consequences Of Ceding Sovereignty
The EU and Ukraine are learning the consequences of ceding their sovereignty to the US after Trump began treating them as the vassals that they are. The first now fears that America will abandon it as part of Trump’s “Pivot (back) to Asia” for more muscularly containing China while the second has no say in the nascent Russian-US talks over its ongoing conflict. Each ceded their sovereignty to the US with the false expectation that their allied liberal-globalists in the “deep state” would stop Trump’s return.
* Strategic Patience vs. Strategic Escalation
World War III might have already broken out long ago had Putin not exercised strategic patience by declining time and again to meaningfully respond to Ukraine’s many US-backed provocations. He only began to practice a policy of strategic escalation in late November last year to deter the outgoing Biden Administration from provoking the aforesaid after it dangerously allowed Ukraine to use the US’ long-range missiles against targets in Russia’s pre-2014 borders. This pragmatic approach deserves credit.
* From Populist-Nationalism To Civilization-States
Russia and Trump’s America both regard the emergence of civilization-states as the next phase of the global systemic transition. The first’s Eurasian Union and the second’s “Fortress America” policy, which consists of incorporating Canada and Greenland, fulfil this role. They also support populist-nationalist movements across the world that share their civilization-state vision of the future and might accordingly join forces in helping them come to power in order to accelerate this process as explained here and here.
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What ties these five trends together is Trump’s historic return to the presidency, his successful purge of the “deep state” that enabled him to pursue his long-sought “New Détente” with Russia, and Putin’s receptiveness to his American counterpart’s grand strategic plan of a comprehensive partnership. The successful conclusion of their nascent talks and the clinching of the aforementioned partnership will revolutionize International Relations while their failure could abruptly revive the risk of World War III.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Poland’s direct participation in the conflict, even if only in a peacekeeping capacity, is integral to either perpetuating hostilities or rekindling them in the event that a ceasefire is agreed to.
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk reaffirmed his position from late last year that his country won’t dispatch peacekeepers to Ukraine, which followed new Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth declaring that the US won’t extend Article 5 guarantees to any NATO members that send troops there. Tusk’s Defence Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz then drew attention to how Polish soldiers in Ukraine could escalate tensions with Russia, an obvious observation of course but one that Poland had hitherto never shared.
Poland’s newfound pragmatism is attributable to political calculations ahead of May’s presidential election. The ruling liberal-globalists want to replace the outgoing (and very imperfect) conservative president with one of their own in order to remove this obstacle to their plans for transforming Polish society. They’re therefore compelled to respond to worsening public opinion on Ukraine by precluding the dispatch of peacekeepers lest their candidate lose May’s election if they warmonger.
Poles’ views towards Ukraine have changed so much that Politico just published a detailed article about this here, where they cite the latest opinion polling from a reputable Polish research centre showing that “only one in four Poles has a positive opinion of Ukrainians, while nearly a third hold a negative view.” In connection with that, a similarly reputable institution’s polling from last summer showed that only 14% support their troops deploying to Ukraine, which might be even less now after all that’s happened.
In brief, the revival of the VolhyniaGenocidedispute combined with Ukrainian ingratitude to Poland after Kosiniak-Kamysz revealed that his country had maxed out its pro bono military aid to toxify mutual perceptions, with this being much more pronounced in Polish society than in the Ukrainian one. This shift resulted in Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski scrapping his earlierproposal for Poland to shoot down Russian missiles over Western Ukraine on the pretext of protecting its nuclear power plants.
The ruling liberal-globalists’ stance towards Ukraine then shifted so dramatically that Deputy Prime Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski from the Left (“Lewica”) wing of their parliamentary coalition accused Zelensky in early November of wanting to drag Poland into a war with Russia. Kosiniak-Kamysz then reminded everyone earlier this week of conservative grey cardinal Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s spring 2022 proposal to dispatch troops to Ukraine, a position that he himself no longer holds, Kaczynski said.
Kaczynski’s candidate for president also came out against sending their country’s soldiers there, thus showing how Poland’s ruling duopoly of the liberal-globalists and (very imperfect) conservatives is now competing with one another over who’s more likely to stay out of that conflict. Each’s previously aggressive position has flipped at some point over the past three years as proven in the preceding two paragraphs, which is the result of most Poles now wanting peace in Ukraine even at Kiev’s expense.
This greatly imperils European warmongers’ plans since Poland’s direct participation in the conflict, even if only in a peacekeeping capacity, is integral to either perpetuating hostilities or rekindling them in the event that a ceasefire is agreed to. Poland is the indisputable leader of the Central & Eastern European region due to its much greater population, stronger economy, and larger military, not to mention the civilizational legacy that its erstwhile Commonwealth left in some of these countries to this day.
Its leadership’s decision to restrict their country’s participation in the conflict to a logistical role accordingly reshapes scenario forecasts. This means that only Western European countries might take part in any peacekeeping role, but their respective leaderships are just as sensitive to worsening public opinion on Ukraine as Poland’s, perhaps even more so given their propensity for early elections. It therefore can’t be taken for granted that any of them will go through with this unless Poland does too.
After all, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov just confirmed his country’s position that “the presence of armed forces from NATO countries, even under the EU flag or as part of national contingents, is completely unacceptable to us.” Recalling how Hegseth recently declared that the US won’t extend Article 5 guarantees to any NATO members that send troops there, and keeping in mind the significance of traditionally anti-Russian Poland sitting on the sidelines, Western Europe might reconsider its plans.
If that comes to pass and none of them risk provoking Trump’s wrath or a hot war with Russia by unilaterally dispatching troops to Ukraine, then that would be the result of Poland’s newfound pragmatism, which is largely due to worsening public opinion on Ukraine as was explained. There’s of course the chance that the liberal-globalists capture the presidency after May’s election and then capitulate to the European warmongers, but that would risk them losing 2027’s parliamentary elections.
In fact, there’s even the possibility that their ruling parliamentary coalition collapses as a result and early elections are called shortly after such a fateful decision might be made, which could lead to the (very imperfect) conservative half of the Polish duopoly replacing them. There’s also the possibility that Confederation’s populist-nationalists, whose presidential candidate reached an historic high of 16,8% in the latest poll, make a surprise showing to emerge as a powerful independent third force in parliament.
These credible political risks might convince the liberal-globalists to keep their pledge not to deploy any troops to Ukraine no matter the pressure upon them. That would worsen their ties with Western Europe while their ties with Russia show no signs of improvement, thus leading to Poland’s relative isolation from continental affairs. As was just explained here, that could lead to the US exploiting Poland’s position to divide-and-rule Europe after the Ukrainian Conflict ends, which observers should keep a close eye on.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Najnowszy sondaż prezydencki 2025 wskazuje, kto ma obecnie największe szanse na wygraną. Jak rozkładają się procenty kandydatów na prezydenta Polski? Kto jest w lepszej sytuacji? Inne dane wynikają z ostatniego sondażu dla Onetu, Polskiego Radia24, R…
He wants to deter the even greater provocations that the West might now be plotting, such as destabilizing and then invading Belarus, with the intent of coercing him into freezing the existing LOC and then possibly accepting the deployment of Western/NATO peacekeepers there.
Putin surprised the world on Thursday when he addressed the nation to inform them that Russia had tested a new hypersonic medium-range missile earlier that morning in an attack against a famous Soviet-era industrial complex in the Ukrainian city of Dnepropetrovsk. He explained that this was a response to the US and UK recently allowing Ukraine to use their long-range missiles inside of Russia. Their decision resulted in the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine “assuming elements of a global nature” in his words.
As was explained here with regards to the “moment of truth” that this latest phase of the conflict led to, he was faced with the choice of either escalating or continuing his policy of strategic patience, the first of which could foil attempts by Trump to reach a peace deal while the second could invite more aggression. Putin chose the former and did so in a creative way that few foresaw. The Oreshnik missile system whose existence he disclosed on Thursday has Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs).
It’s essentially the same sort of weapon that Russia could use in the event of a nuclear conflict with the West since the aforesaid feature coupled with its hypersonic speed means that it’s impossible to intercept. In other words, Putin rattled Russia’s nuclear sabre in the most convincing way possible short of testing a nuclear weapon, which his government previously confirmed that it wouldn’t do for the reasons that were explained here. He’s therefore finally climbing the escalation ladder.
Putin hitherto declined to escalate in response to the over 1,000 days’ worth of NATO-backed Ukrainian provocations that included bombing the Kremlin, early warning systems, strategic airfields, nuclear power plants, and the Crimean Bridge, among many other sensitive targets, so as to avoid World War III. He also prioritized political goals over military ones up until this point, but that’s all changing now since he realized that his strategic patience was interpreted as weakness and only invited more aggression.
Seeing as how Ukraine’s latest use of Western weapons inside of Russia’s pre-2014 territory isn’t unprecedented due to the HIMARS already having been used in Belgorod and Kursk Regions, the latter of which Ukraine invaded with NATO’s support over the summer, the question arises of why it took over three months for his views to change. It should also be noted that Russia didn’t significantly respond to Ukraine fielding the F-16s despite Lavrov previously warning that they could be nuclear-equipped.
Russia might have therefore received intelligence that the West is plotting an even greater provocation in the future. Belarusian media just aired a documentary exposing a Western plot to destabilize and invade their country, which readers can learn more about by reviewing the seven analyses that were listed in this one here. Correspondingly, it was assessed that “Russia’s Updated Nuke Doctrine Aims To Deter Unacceptable Provocations From NATO”, and the aforesaid would certainly constitute such.
Putin’s strategic patience would have finally reached its limits if he caught wind that anything of the sort was afoot, which would explain why he’d order the Oreshnik to be used against that Soviet-era industrial complex in Central Ukraine in order to send an unmistakable message to the West to reconsider its plans. Recalling how concerned he is about avoiding World War III, it also makes sense why his spokesman confirmed that Russia informed the US about this approximately half an hour ahead of time.
After all, launching an intermediate-range hypersonic missile westward without any advance notification could have prompted the US to panic by interpreting this as the start of a potential nuclear first strike by Russia, thus setting into motion the exact same scenario that he’s worked so hard to avoid. His motive was to deter the West from carrying out unacceptable provocations that cross Russia’s most sensitive redlines, which the West might be plotting out of desperation to “escalate to de-escalate” on its terms.
It was written here, here, and here that Trump might resort to that, but the latest ATACMS escalation – which can be regarded as a provocation due to these missiles having a much longer range than the HIMARS – suggests that the “Collective Biden” decided to do so first out of fear that whatever deal he might reach with Putin would compromise on too many of the US’ interests. Accordingly, Putin might now have decided to beat the US to the punch by “escalating to de-escalate” on Russia’s terms instead.
Thursday morning was the first time that a MIRV was used in combat, which is much more significant than the US “boiling the frog” by expanding the range of the missiles that Ukraine has already been able to use inside of Russia’s pre-2014 borders after once again signalling its escalatory plans long in advance, especially since few saw it coming and the US only had around a 30-minute notice. Putin also warned that Russia’s new doctrine allows it to use such weapons against those who arm Ukraine.
It’s unlikely that he’ll throw caution to the wind by launching Oreshniks against military targets in NATO countries at the risk of sparking World War III, but it can’t be ruled out that the next escalation that he’s considering in response to more aggression could be bombing Moldova instead. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zakharova said earlier in the week that the Western-backed government there is “turning the country at a rapid pace into a logistics hub used to supply the Ukrainian armed forces.”
It’s not a NATO member though so Russia could bomb it without crossing the West’s red lines while still signalling that he’s not the pushover that they convinced themselves that he was after misreading the reasons for his strategic patience if they still keep provoking him even after Thursday’s escalation. They want him to accept Western/NATO peacekeepers along the Line of Contact (LOC), Ukraine’s continued militarization, its future membership in NATO, and no change in its anti-Russian legislation.
By contrast, Putin wants to expel Ukraine from the four regions that voted to join Russia in September 2022, no Western/NATO peacekeepers along the LOC, Ukraine’s demilitarization, the restoration of its constitutional neutrality, and the rescinding of its anti-Russian legislation. Beating the West to the punch by “escalating to de-escalate”, or at least finally climbing the escalation ladder in response to their provocations, is therefore aimed at achieving as many of these maximum goals as he can.
If he sticks to his guns and doesn’t waver from his newfound approach, which is arguably long-overdue since some believe that he should have begun applying it after the failure of spring 2022’s peace talks, then he stands a much greater chance of achieving at least part of the most important ones. NATO can always conventionally intervene in Ukraine west of the Dnieper to salvage some of its geopolitical project so Russia should assume that it won’t be able to demilitarize or denazify that part of the country.
What it can do, however, is employ military and diplomatic means (both individually and in combination through its abovementioned newfound approach) to obtain control over all the territory that it claims as its own east of the Dnieper, possibly including Zaporozhye’s eponymous city of over 700,000 people. The new LOC could then be patrolled by purely non-Western forces deployed as part of a UN mandate while Ukraine might be coerced to demilitarize everything that remains under its control east of the Dnieper.
All heavy weapons would have to be withdrawn westward as part of a massive demilitarized zone (DMZ), while the possibility also exists that this “Trans-dnieper” region might also receive political autonomy or at least cultural autonomy to protect the rights of ethnic Russians and those who speak that language. This scenario was first tabled here in March and could take the form shown below, with the western part of the country in blue possibly hosting NATO troops as part of the arrangement that’ll then be described:
Ukraine could be deterred from breaking the ceasefire due to the DMZ placing it at a disadvantage, while Russia would be deterred by the “security guarantees” that Ukraine clinched with a bunch of NATO countries this year, which amount to de facto Article 5 support. While Russia could storm into the DMZ, NATO could also storm into Western Ukraine or possibly even cross the Dnieper, whether due to a swift intervention or having already deployed its troops west of the river per tacit agreement with Russia.
What was detailed in the three preceding paragraphs is the maximum that Russia can realistically achieve given the new military-strategic circumstances in which it finds itself over 1,000 days since the specialoperation began. Putin finally started climbing the escalation ladder in order to deter the even greater provocations that the West might now be plotting with the intent of coercing him into freezing the existing LOC and then possibly accepting the deployment of Western/NATO peacekeepers there.
Such a scenario would be completely unacceptable for him from the perspective of Russia’s national security interests and his own reputational ones after promising to check NATO’s expansion in Ukraine. Keeping that bloc west of the Dnieper while demilitarizing everything east of it and north of the administrative borders of the four former Ukrainian regions that joined Russia in September 2022, tentatively known as the “Trans-dnieper” region, would be a tolerable compromise though.
Trump might deem this to be pragmatic enough of a deal for him to go along with since it could still be spun by all relevant parties to the conflict as a victory (e.g. Russia gained land and created a DMZ deep inside Ukraine; Ukraine continued to exist as a state; and the US de facto incorporated Western Ukraine into NATO). It could even enter into force prior to that if either side “escalates to de-escalate” before his inauguration and this is the “mutually face-saving” compromise that they reach to avoid World War III.
Of course, it would be better if they agree to this without sparking a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis that risks spiralling out of control, hence why their diplomats should begin discussing it now or a third country’s ones like India’s should propose it behind the scenes to get the ball rolling. Putin’s newfound (and arguably long-overdue) approach signals that he won’t accept freezing the existing LOC, nor especially the deployment of NATO/Western peacekeepers there, and will escalate to avert that.
He might even go as far as using tactical nukes in Ukraine (and/or NATO’s logistics hub in Moldova) if he feels that he’s being cornered by the evolving circumstances in which the West might soon place him through its possibly forthcoming greater provocations (e.g. destabilizing and invading Belarus). The West must therefore start taking Putin seriously after he finally began climbing the escalation ladder otherwise the worst-case scenario of World War III might become unavoidable if they push him too far.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
When Russian President Vladimir Putin visits India at the end of this or the beginning of next year, his meetings will come against the backdrop of New
Its self-exclusion from the proposed “army of Europe” coupled with creeping informal concerns about Germany and Ukraine’s territorial intentions make Poland the perfect US partner for dividing-and-ruling Europe after NATO’s proxy war with Russia finally ends.
Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski came out against Zelensky’s proposal for an “army of Europe” by flatly declaring that “it will not happen” despite many of his peers wanting to prioritize such plans in light of the US’ impending disengagement from the continent that JD Vance hinted at in his historic speech. Casual observers assumed that this lifelong Europhile would have jumped at the opportunity, as would former President of the European Council-turned-Prime Minister Donald Tusk, but that didn’t happen.
Even though they’re more of an Anglophile and Germanophile respectively than they are Europhiles, and their corresponding foreign patrons support Zelensky’s proposal, Sikorski and Tusk’s half of Poland’s ruling duopoly must most immediately appeal to public opinion ahead of May’s presidential election. They need to replace outgoing President Andrzej Duda with their fellow “Civic Platform” (PO) member Rafal Trzaskowski instead of allowing his fellow “Law & Justice” (PiS) member Karol Nawrocki to do so.
Tusk’s PO-led liberal-globalist coalition came to power in fall 2023 but have been unable to implement their radical socio-cultural agenda at home due to the (very imperfect) conservative president’s veto rights. Replacing him with Trzaskowski would enable PO to fulfil their plans while his replacement by Nawrocki would lead to a continued impasse until fall 2027’s next parliamentary elections. On the foreign policy front, both PO and PiS are pro-American, albeit to different degrees.
PO can’t be described as anti-American by any stretch, but it’s traditionally been considered more pro-German than pro-American, while PiS has evolved into an openly anti-German party that’s rabidly pro-American. Accordingly, PO might hypothetically want to participate in an “army of Europe”, but they have to play it cool for now ahead of May’s presidential elections. At the same time, however, they’ve also evolved since fall 2023 and have begun to promote some policies in support of the national interest.
These have taken the form of fortifying PiS’ border wall with Belarus that was built to stop illegal immigrant invasions, which that neighbouring country’s leader at the very least turns a blind eye to as an asymmetrical response to Poland’s regime change campaign against him, and standing up to Ukraine. The latter has seen Poland revive the VolhyniaGenocidedispute in recent months and declare that it’ll only provide arms to Ukraine on credit instead of continuing to give them everything for free like before.
With these policies in mind, which might be sincere and not just a charade to win over some so-called “moderate nationalists” from PiS, PO might also be serious about its opposition to the “army of Europe”. In that case, it actually wouldn’t matter whether Trzaskowski or Nawrocki replaces Duda in several months’ time since Poland might still exclude itself from this regional process in pursuit of what its ruling duopoly would have apparently agreed to be the national interest.
To elaborate, Poland has consistently sought to carve out a “sphere of influence” for itself in Central & Eastern Europe, whether overlapping with parts of its former Commonwealth or expanding beyond those borders into new domains like the Balkans. These ambitions have taken the form of the 2009 “Eastern Partnership” that it co-founded with Sweden, the 2016 “Three Seas Initiative” that it co-founded with Croatia, and the 2020 “Lublin Triangle” that it co-founded with Lithuania and Ukraine.
Prior to PO’s pivot back to the gist of these plans late last year, the early months of its most recent rule essentially saw it subordinating Poland to Germany’s “Fortress Europe” concept, which refers to the Biden Administration’s plans to have the EU’s de facto leader take control of the continent as its proxy. Germany’s incomparable economic strength and ruling coalition’s liberal-globalist ideology paired with Olaf Scholz’s December 2022 hegemonic manifesto to make this a very attractive scenario for the US.
Everything changed since then after Trump’s unprecedented political comeback over the past year, which is revolutionizing the US’ foreign policy and led to Vance’s historic speech last week where he hinted at his country’s impending disengagement from Europe. Vance’s speech also importantly coincided with new Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth’s praise of Poland as “the model ally on the continent”, however, thus suggesting that the US will once again favour Poland over Germany.
That wouldn’t be surprising since it’s the same policy that Trump applied during his first term, but it would be greatly helped along if PiS remained in the presidency and Poland didn’t descend into the sort of liberal-globalist dystopia that Vance just railed against should Trzaskowski win. Even if he does, however, PO might exercise self-restraint and control some of its most extreme liberal-globalist impulses so as to not get on Trump’s bad side and risk being made an example out of like others already have.
The strengthening of Polish-US military ties throughout the US’ impending disengagement from Europe as it “Pivots (back) to Asia” to more muscularly contain China would advance both of their interests. From the American side, Poland can once again be wielded as a wedge for keeping German-Russia ties in check if they improve after the Ukrainian Conflict ends and the AfD plays a role in the next ruling coalition to help bring that about, which segues directly into what Poland stands to gain from this.
Simply put, its ruling duopoly’s dreams of restoring their country’s lost geopolitical glory could once again be entertained if the US returns to openly favouring Poland as its top European ally, which can lead to American backing for the Polish-led “Three Seas Initiative” and “Lublin Triangle” in pursuit of this. Poland would become the natural magnet for regionally disaffected states like the Baltics, Romania, and even Ukraine if the NATO-Russian proxy war ends in a compromise as expected so this is very plausible.
Depending on the outcome of the US’ reportedly planned rapprochement with Belarus, Poland might be encouraged to step up and repair relations with Russia’s top ally too, all in an attempt to lure Lukashenko away from Moscow and back towards his pre-summer 2020 “balancing act” to keep Putin on edge. None of this would be possible if Poland ceded even more of its sovereignty to the German-led EU by joining the “army of Europe” that Zelensky just proposed and thus weakened its military alliance with the US.
Some Poles also fear that the AfD’s possible role in Germany’s next ruling coalition could lead to the revival of at least informal claims to what Warsaw calls the “Recovered Territories” that were obtained after World War II. These were Polish for centuries before becoming German but it’s beyond the scope of this analysis to detail. Likewise, there’s also a risk that post-conflict Ukraine redirects some of its hyper-nationalism away from Russia to Poland, whose south-eastern regions are claimed by some radicals.
Consequently, the US’ impending disengagement from Europe could embolden a partially AfD-ruled Germany and an irredeemably hyper-nationalist Ukraine to one day advance their claims to Poland (perhapsevenjointly), which could only possibly be deterred by Poland’s close military ties with the US. Of relevance, Ukraine claims to already have almost 1 million troops while Poland and Germany are actively competing to build the EU’s largest army, with Poland already having the third-largest in NATO.
The preceding two paragraphs weren’t written to imply a prediction about Germany and/or Ukraine invading Poland, but simply to describe how Poland’s ruling duopoly might perceive the fast-moving processes in Europe right now and what they think they could possibly lead to. This interpretation would account for why the pro-German half of this duopoly that’s currently in power broke with Berlin over this issue and shows how easily the US can exploit this perception to continue dividing-and-ruling Europe.
Neither half of Poland’s ruling duopoly is expected to replace their fearmongering about a Russian invasion with fearmongering about a German and/or Ukrainian one, but they’re evidently concerned about the last two scenarios as proven by PO’s new approach towards the EU and the US. Refusing to cede more military sovereignty to the German-led EU while strengthening military ties with the US shows that even the most Europhilic half of this duopoly is hedging against the aforesaid threats.
Looking forward, PO will either expose the abovementioned approach as an electioneering charade after May’s presidential vote or it’ll continue along this trajectory by having Poland once again serve as the US’ top ally on the continent, following which its ruling duopoly would seek to derive some benefits. These could take the form of the US helping Poland restore its lost geopolitical glory in contemporary conditions via the “Three Seas Initiative” while deterring perceived German and/or Ukrainian threats.
The US’ impending disengagement from Europe would remain incomplete in that case since its continental focus would shift to Poland and its envisaged “sphere of influence”. The total amount of troops there would be less than what it now has in Europe, but it would still suffice for supervising them all after the Ukrainian Conflict ends. Everything depends on PO, however, and they might ultimately prefer keeping Poland subordinated to Germany instead of once again trying to rise as a regional power.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Poland Hinted That Germany Is To Blame For Its Dispute With Ukraine By Andrew Korybko The Biden Administration can either turn a blind eye to its German liberal-globalist allies’ dual power plays o…
The Russian leader was the first to talk about a European-wide populist-nationalist revolution and to foresee the emergence of civilization-states as the next phase of the global systemic transition.
Vice President Vance excoriated the Europeans in his keynote speech at last week’s Munich Security Conference, which can be read in full here. He accused the ruling liberal-globalist elite of becoming the greatest threat to their own civilization after straying from its traditional values and massively importing migrants. Vance made it clear that Trump 2.0 won’t support them against their own people, especially the populist-nationalists who they’re actively cancelling, censoring, and persecuting.
He very strongly implied that the US wants these same like-minded movements to rise to power across Europe, which would amount to a continent-wide revolution of the sort that Putin was the first to predict back in June 2022 while speaking at that year’s St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. His speech can be read in full here, but what follows is the pertinent excerpt that’s since been vindicated by none other than the new American Vice President nearly three years after being mocked by Western leaders:
“A direct result of the European politicians’ actions and events this year will be the further growth of inequality in these countries, which will, in turn, split their societies still more, and the point at issue is not only the well-being but also the value orientation of various groups in these societies. Indeed, these differences are being suppressed and swept under the rug.
Frankly, the democratic procedures and elections in Europe and the forces that come to power look like a front, because almost identical political parties come and go, while deep down things remain the same. The real interests of people and national businesses are being pushed further and further to the periphery.
Such a disconnect from reality and the demands of society will inevitably lead to a surge in populism and extremist and radical movements, major socioeconomic changes, degradation and a change of elites in the short term. As you can see, traditional parties lose all the time. New entities are coming to the surface, but they have little chance for survival if they are not much different from the existing ones.”
The populist-nationalists that have since risen all across Europe wouldn’t have anywhere near the support that they do had it not been for the ruling liberal-globalist elite’s counterproductive compliance with the US’ anti-Russian sanctions. The massive import of civilizationally dissimilar immigrants, many of whom refuse to assimilate and integrate into European society, played a major role as well but it was the economic consequences of these sanctions that led to their surge in popularity over the past three years.
The public at large threw their weight behind populist-nationalists as a result of these socio-cultural (migrant-related) and especially economic (sanctions-related) changes, the latter of which have accelerated since 2022 unlike the former that peaked in 2015 and has since mostly stabilized. Forecasting the further worsening of these economic trends amidst the then-newly imposed sanctions and prognosticating their political consequences, Putin soon thereafter elaborated on his prediction.
He did this at the ceremony welcoming four former Ukrainian regions to Russia on 30 September 2022. His full speech can be read here and was analysed here at the time, which focused on the last two-thirds of his speech about the global struggle for democracy against the Western elite, both across the world and within the West itself. There’s too much to cite so readers are encouraged to at least read through the analysis if they don’t have the time to read through the full speech, but here are a few highlights:
“People cannot be fed with printed dollars and euros…That is why politicians in Europe have to convince their fellow citizens to eat less, take a shower less often and dress warmer at home. And those who start asking fair questions like ‘Why is that, in fact?’ are immediately declared enemies, extremists and radicals. They point back at Russia and say: that is the source of all your troubles. More lies.
…
Let me repeat that the dictatorship of the Western elites targets all societies, including the citizens of Western countries themselves. This is a challenge to all. This complete renunciation of what it means to be human, the overthrow of faith and traditional values, and the suppression of freedom are coming to resemble a ‘religion in reverse’ – pure Satanism.
…
As I have already said, we have many like-minded people in Europe and the United States, and we feel and see their support. An essentially emancipatory, anti-colonial movement against unipolar hegemony is taking shape in the most diverse countries and societies. Its power will only grow with time. It is this force that will determine our future geopolitical reality.”
Putin was talking about the exact same populist-nationalists who are now on the verge of electorally coming to power all across Europe and whose movements were just endorsed by Vance at Munich. The confluence of interests between Russia and Trump’s America as regards these political forces was also just touched upon in this analysis here, which mentions how these three – Russia, Trump’s America, and Europe’s populist-nationalists – embrace Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin’s civilization-state model.
Vance showed his adherence to these views by talking about the US and Europe’s “shared civilization”, which aligns with the essence of Dugin’s teachings about how International Relations are evolving in the direction of civilization-states like the West and the Russian World, et al. Trump 2.0, whose return to power can be described as the “Second American Revolution”, and Europe’s populist-nationalists can be considered the vanguards of the West’s civilizational revival that Trump calls the “American Golden Age”.
Putin embraced Dugin’s civilization-state model long ago, with his most famous expression thereof being the article that he wrote in July 2021 “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, which explicitly talks about these kindred people’s “civilizational ties”. He’s since made repeated references to the uniqueness of Russian Civilization, thus being ahead of his Western counterparts, who are only just now starting to speak in the same way.
Considering all of this, it was veritably the case that Vance just vindicated Putin’s prediction about political change in Europe, which could lead to a “new world order” if successful. The West’s coalescence into a civilization-state can accelerate a return to t“spheres of influence” modelled off of the “19th-Century Great Power Chessboard” paradigm wherein Great Power-led civilization-states like Russia and the US-led West cut deals with one another over smaller countries instead of using them against each other.
While this approach is admittedly controversial, it’s the embodiment of realpolitik in contemporary global affairs, pragmatically eschewing ideological imperatives in favour of interests-driven agreements. Should the US-led West begin applying it, or rather return to this model of diplomacy that it previously practiced for centuries, then it would tremendously restore stability to International Relations. It’s premature to predict if this will happen, let alone when, just that it’s now a credible scenario to monitor.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
TEHRAN (Tasnim) – A Russian-based political analyst described the recent US attack on an airbase in Syria as an “illegal act of war”, noting that President Donald Trump is following Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s footsteps in attacking t…
These lessons could reshape how policymakers perceive the special operation and therefore improve the way in which it’s being waged.
Ukraine’s sneak attack against Russia’s Kursk Region appears to have successfully penetrated the border according to RT’s update on Wednesday, which followed the Defence Ministry’s claim that the fighting was only taking place on the Ukrainian side of the border. Even though it appears destined to fail and be seen in hindsight as this generation’s “Battle of the Bulge” like many social commentators have described it as, it still taught Russia five very important lessons that it would do well to consider implementing:
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* It Might Finally Be Time To Take Out All The Bridges Across The Dnieper
Russia has hitherto been reluctant to take out bridges across the Dnieper, but it might finally be time to do so in order to prevent Western arms and equipment from reaching its pre-2014 borders in possible preparation of more sneak attacks. Continuing to prioritize political objectives over military ones, such as remaining averse to inconveniencing civilians through the proposed means in order to avoid losing more hearts and minds, has arguably proven to have more drawbacks than benefits.
* Better ISR & Less Groupthink Can Reduce Russia’s Blind Spots
NATO has proven that it has impressive tactical capabilities after successfully disguising its proxy’s sneak attack, but Russia is the bloc’s peer and thus shouldn’t have been fooled. Better intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) could have prevented this, as could the optimization of feedback loops from the front. Per the latter, higher-ups might not have taken reports of a military build-up seriously since they could have deemed it “irrational”, but they should have listened if that was the case.
* Preemptive Resettlement & More Physical Border Defences Would Have Helped A Lot
In hindsight, it might have been wise to preemptively resettle folks who were living in proximity to the border and turn these areas into a security zone with many more physical defences. Two reasons why this wasn’t done might have been fear of it being spun by its foes as setting up a “buffer zone” inside of Russia and not wanting to inconvenience the locals. The first should never influence policymakers while the second could be mitigated by proper planning and funding (with possible “oligarch” contributions).
* Border Militias Might Not Be A Bad Idea If They’re Supervised By The State
The now-rebranded Wagner’s late founder Prigozhin had previously proposed creating a border militia in Belgorod Region, but he ultimately turned out to be the West’s “useful idiot” as explained in the preceding hyperlinked analysis so that might have been a very bad idea at the time had he succeeded. Nevertheless, properly supervised border militias might in fact be a good idea, such as if there were FSB agents embedded within them to ensure these non-state actors’ continued loyalty to the state.
* “Active Defence” Is Better Than “Passive Defence”
Even in the absence of proper ISR, Ukraine would have still struggled to assemble the forces needed for its sneak attack and then storm across the border had Russia been engaged in a policy of “active defence” (regular low-level attacks) instead of “passive defence” (sitting back and waiting for an attack). Going forward, Russia should consider the merits of implementing “active defence” all along the front, which would keep Ukraine on edge and possibly force it to voluntarily create its own “buffer zones”.
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The five lessons enumerated above could reshape how policymakers perceive the special operation and therefore improve the way in which it’s being waged, particularly with regards to addressing some of the constructive critiques thereof that were shared in this analysis here from November 2022. Retaining the same mindset risks more sneak attacks. It’s only through the pragmatic evolution of policymakers’ viewpoints in response to the past 2.5 years’ events that success can best be achieved.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
They’d only advance the political goal of speeding up the resumption of peace talks on more of Russia’s terms at major economic, financial, and reputational costs, not to mention risking World War III by miscalculation, since conventional means suffice for responding to all existing military threats.
There’s been a lot of talk once again about Russia using nuclear weapons in Ukraine after Putin declared that a de facto state of war would be in place between his country and NATO if the West let Ukraine use their long-range weapons to hit targets deep inside of Russia. Medvedev also ominously wrote that the formal grounds for using nukes have already been met per Russian doctrine, contrary to what Karaganov earlier claimed when calling for doctrinal reforms, and suggested that Kiev might soon be obliterated.
The question therefore arises of what would really be achieved by Russia using nuclear weapons in Ukraine at this point. Tactical ones are meant for stopping large-scale and mostly mechanized assaults, but neither side resorts to these anymore much due to how easily drones can stop them, which are paired with minefields and barriers to create formidable obstacles to such advances. Instead, units remain mostly dispersed and don’t gather together anymore, which reduces the utility of tactical nukes.
Nevertheless, Ukraine still has bases, logistics facilities, and staging areas where a comparatively larger number of troops and equipment are stationed, and these could prospectively be targeted through those means. That said, they could also be targeted through conventional ones too without crossing the Rubicon of becoming the second country in the world to use these weapons during wartime. This only rarely happens though as proven by Ukrainian troops and equipment continuing to reach the front.
About that, Russia hasn’t even attempted to take out a single bridge across the Dnieper thus far, so it wouldn’t make sense to resort to tactical nukes to that end when conventional means could suffice if properly utilized in concentration and sequence should the political will ever arise to do so. It hasn’t yet and might not ever due to perceived humanitarian/soft power and nebulous post-conflict political goals continuing to take precedence over immediate military ones.
Nuking those bridges could also risk contaminating all the downstream regions and therefore poisoning them indefinitely, which would pose a very serious risk to the health of Russian residents in Zaporozhye, Kherson, and Crimea, likely resulting in forced evacuations from all three territories. It’s difficult to imagine that any Russian decisionmaker, let alone one as rational as Putin, would believe that these hefty costs are worth it when conventional means could suffice as explained above.
Another possibility is nuking Kiev like Medvedev, who has a poor track record of accuracy for predicting Russian policy despite his prestigious position as the Deputy Chair of the Security Council as explained here, hinted could be in the cards. Destroying a large city mostly inhabited by civilians despite the plethora of military and strategic targets there would expose Russia’s prior condemnation of the US’ nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as hypocritical and lead to universal vilification.
Although Medvedev insists that the already existing formal grounds for using nukes in Ukraine “make sense to the international community” in presumed reference to the Global South, China and India aren’t expected to remain silent, to say nothing of approve. It was explained here that “[they’d] be under immense pressure to distance themselves from Russia, not just by the West, but also for appearance’s sake since they wouldn’t want to legitimize the use of nuclear weapons by their rivals.”
There’s also no way that they could uphold their reputations across the world if they didn’t come out strongly against Russia’s speculative replication of Hiroshima/Nagasaki in Kiev, which could kill hundreds of thousands of people in an instant. Hypothetically speaking, Russia might wager that the complex economic-financial interdependence between its own economy and those two’s (especially regarding the energy trade) could deter them from sanctioning it, but the EU precedent suggests otherwise.
Nuking Kiev would therefore amount to sending a strong political message at immense economic, financial, and reputational costs with little of military significance to gain from this dramatic decision. In fact, any use of nukes whether tactical or strategic and regardless of the target could lead to China and India feeling pressured into meaningfully distancing themselves from Russia for the aforementioned reason. Russia should accordingly make sure that these costs are worthwhile if it decides to use them.
One of the scenarios in which the cost-benefit calculation might favor this could be the extreme one of dropping dozens of nukes from north to south to the west of the Dnieper in order to create a “green (radioactive) curtain” for stopping any large-scale NATO invasion force that might rush up to the river. At present, however, no credible indications exist to suggest that anything of the sort is being assembled despite continued concerns that this could be employed in the event of a major Russian breakthrough.
The cascading consequences could inadvertently lead to the Third World War that Putin has worked so hard to avoid till now. It would therefore be done as a last resort out of desperation and only if Russia wanted to stop this advance instead of let it to reach the river to facilitate Ukraine’s partition afterwards (unless Russia thought they’d cross it). In fact, using even one nuke at this point would be seen as an act of desperation since it would suggest that Russia can’t conventionally respond to battlefield threats.
This might suffice for deterrence and speeding up the resumption of peace talks on more of Russia’s terms since NATO might think that it’s truly desperate enough to use nukes at scale due to its perceived weakness (whether objectively existing or not), but at tremendous cost to its other interests. Provided that Russia’s conventional capabilities really are as formidable as thought, and there’s no serious reason to doubt that, then it arguably isn’t worth Russia using nukes unless the variables drastically change.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Here is how the thinking goes about Russia’s response to possible missile strikes ‘deeper inside Russian territory’ among Western commanders and their war-happy political establishment.
Beyond it are just a few lightly defended towns and then vast expanses of grassland that could become the scene of manoeuvre warfare until Russia reaches the next heavily defended localities further afield.
Ukrainian officials have urged locals in and around the town of Pokrovsk to evacuate within the next two weeks as Russian forces rapidly approach this pivotal military logistics hub. The head of neighbouring Mirnograd’s military administration bluntly said “Don’t wait. It will not get better, it will only get worse. Leave”, and then admitted that “The enemy is advancing faster than expected.” The Associated Press cited local commanders who blamed Russia’s swift gains on their side’s poorly trained conscripts.
One of them claimed that “Some people don’t want to shoot. They see the enemy in the firing position in trenches but don’t open fire. … That is why our men are dying…They don’t receive even the lowest standard of training required for our (combat) actions.” An unnamed soldier also lamented that “The main problem is the survival instinct of newcomers. Before, people could stand until the last moment to hold the position. Now, even when there is light shelling of firing positions, they are retreating.”
The poor quality of Ukraine’s recruits casts doubt on whether the whopping 120,000 troops that Belarusian President Lukashenko claimed had been deployed along his border could make much of a difference if some of them are sent to Donbass out of desperation to halt Russia’s advance. They’d more than likely participate in “meat waves” like those before them did in Artyomovsk/Bakhmut and Avdeevka, and just like their predecessors, they’re also destined to sacrifice themselves in vain.
Russia’s capture of Pokrovsk, however long it might take, could reshape the conflict’s dynamics due to this town’s strategic significance for Ukraine’s military logistics. Beyond it are just a few lightly defended towns and then vast expanses of grassland that could become the scene of manoeuvre warfare. Ukraine’s US-backed invasion of Kursk reminded observers that maneuverer warfare isn’t dead like some had earlier claimed, and it might soon make a major comeback in the fields past Pokrovsk.
Ukraine’s successes in Kharkov, Kherson, and most recently Kursk over the past two and a half years were the result of missteps on Russia’s part, not examples of Ukrainian “military genius” like its supporters in the media misportrayed them as. It either exploited overstretched and undermanned supply chains in the first two cases or took advantage of a poorly defended border in the second. None of these three precedents suggests that Ukraine is capable of beating Russia head-to-head at manoeuvre warfare.
It’s therefore possible that Russia could quickly capture broad swaths of Donbass once manoeuvre warfare begins to be fought along that front upon its capture of Pokrovsk, which could then improve its position for assaulting the heavily defended Kramatorsk-Slavyansk agglomeration in northern Donbass. In that event, Russia might also take advantage of its post-Pokrovsk manoeuvre warfare successes (assuming that they’re achieved as expected) to branch out in other directions.
Capturing Pokrovsk would enable Russia to move north into southern Kharkov, west into eastern Dnipro (neither of which it has any territorial claims to), and southwest into Zaporozhye (all of which it claims). Opening up a third front in Kharkov to complement the northern and eastern ones from Belgorod and Lugansk could be seen as revenge for Kursk as could opening one in Dnipro. The Kharkov vector could also help cut off supply lines to Kramatorsk-Slavyansk and thus facilitate the full capture of Donbass.
Moving into south-eastern Dnipro could be a shortcut for launching operations in northern Zaporozhye so it also can’t be discounted due to the possibility that this could lead to a siege of the latter’s namesake administrative centre. Observers can only speculate which vector(s) Russia would move into after Pokrovsk and when that might be, but the point is that manoeuvre warfare might play a large role in its forthcoming operations after that tow is captured.
Ukraine’s poorly trained conscripts and its lightly defended towns beyond Pokrovsk increase the odds of a partial Russian military breakthrough up to the next heavily defended localities further afield, and this could result in serious changes to the way in which Ukraine fights this conflict. It could either stay the course by doubling down on Kursk (and potentially opening new fronts in Belarus and/or Russia’s other border regions) at the expense of Donbass or decisively shift back to the latter at the former’s expense.
Either way, it’ll be forced into a dilemma, especially if Russia opens up new fronts in Kharkov and/or Dnipro in parallel with putting maximum pressure upon Donbass’ Kramatorsk-Slovyansk. Ukraine thus stands to lose more ground, or it could explore whether Russia would be willing to swap whatever Kiev controls in Kursk for whatever Moscow controls in Kharkov (and possibly also Dnipro by then). The possibility also exists that Ukraine could become hellbent on crossing Russia’s non-negotiable red lines.
About that, this could take the form of a nuclear provocation (such as that which could be caused by a crippling attack against its nuclear power plants or spent nuclear fuel storage sites there), a high-level assassination, or a terrorist attack even worse than the recent Crocus one. The purpose would be to provoke Russia into using nuclear weapons just like Lukashenko warned last week that Kiev wants to do, which could then serve as the tripwire for a conventional NATO intervention in Ukraine’s support.
All told, Russia’s capture of Pokrovsk might still take a while since Kiev could decide to turn this town into the next Artyomovsk, but the conflict’s dynamics will likely be reshaped once that happens if Russia can employ manoeuvre warfare against the lightly defended towns in the fields beyond. Any subsequent breakthrough would force Ukraine into the dilemma of prioritizing some fronts and the expense of others, but it might try to cut the Gordian knot through a series of swaps or escalations instead.
It’s anyone’s guess what it would do in that scenario, but those are the three most likely options: sacrifice one front to save another; swap land with Russia; or try crossing Russia’s non-negotiable red lines as part of a dangerous gamble to “escalate to de-escalate” up to the brink of provoking World War III. In any case, all eyes will be on Pokrovsk as Russia inches towards this pivotal military logistics hub and inevitably begins battling for control of it, so everyone will eventually see what Kiev ultimately does.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
Comparing And Contrasting Russia’s Pullbacks From Kharkov And Kherson Regions By Andrew Korybko It’s of the highest importance during this time to apply President Putin’s advice against indul…
remnant
in reply to remnant • • •I can't even use @4352378d because they want a first time buyer to post a bond in sats (but I can't because my sats are locked up by @4657dfe8) 😩
Surely I'm being fully regarded here and there is an easier way? How do you start out in lightning and be privacy preserving? #asknostr
remnant
in reply to remnant • • •